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PREFACE
Th is book is the revised version of the PhD thesis which I defended at 
Utrecht University on June 18, 2010. Th e research on which the thesis 
was based was carried out as part of the project ‘Markets, power and 
institutional development: Th e rise, organisation and institutional 
development of markets in Holland, 11th–16th centuries’, funded by 
the Netherlands Organisation of Scientifi c Research (NWO).
Without the help and support of many people this book would not 
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administration with a study of history, Oscar Gelderblom hired me as 
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doing historical research. Oscar also stimulated me to apply for a posi-
tion as PhD student. My two supervisors, Bas van Bavel and Jan Luiten 
van Zanden, not only had the courage to employ me, with my unusual 
background, but over the years they have also provided many valuable 
critical comments and challenging suggestions that helped me sharpen 
my thoughts. I am grateful for their support, encouragement, and 
trust.
With Jaco Zuijderduijn and Erika Kuijpers I have had many helpful 
discussions about commodity markets and factor markets in Holland. 
In the initial phase of my research I profi ted from the suggestions 
and comments of the organisers and participants of the Posthumus 
PhD training programme. Ronald van der Spiegel kept me informed 
of all references to markets that he came upon in the accounts of the 
counts of Holland and also allowed me to use his transcription of the 
Inquisitie of 1369. Christiaan van Bochove shared his knowledge of 
measuring market integration with me. Christopher Dyer allowed me 
to use the library of the Centre for English Local History at Leicester 
University and readily answered my questions about medieval mar-
kets in England. Jeroen Benders, Bruce Campbell and Anne DeWindt 
each commented on draft  versions of one or more chapters of the 
book. Many others also contributed in a variety of ways. I hope they 
will forgive me for not mentioning all of them separately; I thank 
them all.
Doing research and writing a dissertation can sometimes by a lonely 
job, but for me it was not. My colleagues at the Social and Economic 
History group at Utrecht University provided the stimulating and 
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sociable environment that made writing this book not only an intel-
lectually rewarding, but also a truly enjoyable experience. Finally, 
I want to thank Renk, who, besides everything else, many years ago 
stimulated me to enrol as a history student. I am not sure he would 
have done this if he had realised how much of my time was going to be 
spent on writing this book; but I am grateful all the same.
Jessica Dijkman
Utrecht, April 2011
1 Generale privilegien Kennemer-landt, 176–177. Th e currency unit (lb. Holl.) is the 
Holland pound, in common use as a unit of accounting in medieval Holland.
2 Van Dam, Vissen in veenmeren, 204–205.
3 ‘Register van Hollandt en Westvrieslandt’, 79.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In 1466 Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, gave permission to install 
scales for weighing cheese and butter to the villages Sloten and Osdorp, 
then situated about fi ve kilometres west of Amsterdam but nowadays 
incorporated in the city’s western suburbs. Th e villagers had requested 
permission to install the scales because this would save them the trou-
ble and the costs of having to take their dairy products to Haarlem or 
Amsterdam. A reliable weighing facility nearby obviously facilitated 
the wholesale trade in locally produced cheese and butter. Th e charter 
specifi es that the villagers were expected to fi nance the new scales 
themselves, employ weights that were in common usage, and hence-
forth pay a rent of 2 lb. Holl. per year.1
No reference is made to the local lord. Certainly, the lord of Sloten 
and Osdorp pocketed the revenues from the scales for many years, 
until they were reclaimed by government offi  cials in 1495,2 but he 
clearly had no role in setting up the scales. Nor is anything heard of 
protests from Amsterdam or Haarlem against the new weighing facil-
ity, even though we know that at a later stage, in the 16th century, 
towns objected to rural scales and tried to concentrate the dairy trade 
within their walls. If a protest was raised in 1466, it was unsuccessful: 
the scales of Sloten and Osdorp were still in operation at the end of the 
16th century.3
Th e weighing facility of Sloten and Osdorp was one of a considera-
ble number of similar rural scales that emerged in the Holland coun-
tryside from the middle of the 14th century onwards. When the fi rst of 
these scales were installed, Holland—the western part of the present-
day Netherlands—was still an independent county, governed by a 
count who, although formally a vassal of the German emperor, ruled 
as sovereign in all but name. Rural weighing facilities continued to 
be established aft er Holland was incorporated in the Burgundian 
2 chapter one
Figure 1 Holland around 1400
Map: G-O graphics, Wijk bij Duurstede
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empire in 1433. Th e network of rural scales had an important role 
in the dairy trade that developed in the late Middle Ages: it allowed 
small-scale rural producers to market their products at little expense 
and provided them with access not just to the consumers in Holland’s 
urban centres but also to interregional trade networks, stretching to 
the southern Low Countries and the German Rhineland.4
Th e case of the Sloten and Osdorp scales touches upon the elements 
that form the central theme of this book: the institutions that shaped 
Holland’s medieval commodity markets, the social and political rela-
tions, the confl icts of interest in which these institutions were grounded, 
and the eff ects of this institutional framework on market performance. 
Th ese issues are related to a wider debate: the discussion about the 
commercialisation of medieval society.
1.1 Holland: a commercialising economy
From the late 10th century a process of commercialisation took place 
in many parts of Europe. Pace and timing varied and the process was 
not always unidirectional, but on the whole the market as mechanism 
for the allocation of goods, labour, land and capital gained ground. For 
England, with its wealth of early source material, the progress of com-
mercialisation can be traced in more detail than for any other part of 
northwestern Europe. Between the late 11th and the late 13th century, 
English urbanisation levels increased. In the countryside customary 
rents in labour and kind were converted to money rents, and wage 
labour became more important. Regional specialisation grew, infra-
structure was greatly improved, and interregional trade expanded. Th e 
number of markets and fairs proliferated, and the volume of coinage in 
circulation soared.5
4 A more detailed analysis of the rise of rural dairy scales is presented in section 4.3.
5 Th e classic study on high-medieval commercialisation is Lopez, Commercial 
Revolu tion. Th e body of recent literature on the commercialisation of medieval 
England is large and growing. A survey and synthesis of the main elements can be 
found in Britnell and Campbell, Commercialising Economy. As the introduction to this 
volume explains, opinions diff er on the rate of change, largely because interpretations 
of the 1086 situation as described in the Domesday Book diff er greatly. For recent 
quantitative estimates of urbanisation, monetisation, and export trade in the late 
13th century, see Campbell, ‘Benchmarking Medieval Economic Development’. For a 
recent appraisal of commercial activity and population numbers, see Langdon and 
Masschaele, ‘Commercial Activity’.
4 chapter one
Compared to England, and in fact also to its neighbours on the con-
tinent (Flanders and the German Rhineland), Holland made a late 
start. Until the 10th or 11th century, Holland had been little more than 
a wasteland swamp on the periphery of European civilisation. Th e only 
parts that were inhabited were the sandy dune-lands along the coast, 
the river banks along the rivers, and a few pockets of maritime clay 
sediments in the north and in the southwest. From the 11th century 
onwards, Holland’s large central peat district was gradually reclaimed 
and settled, and marshes were turned into farmland.6 Using a system of 
river toll posts, the counts of Holland had started to tax the interna-
tional transit trade on the Rhine and Meuse rivers at an early stage, but 
Holland itself was not much involved in this trade: exchange beyond 
the local level was very limited. Only by the end of the 12th century did 
the fi rst signs of urbanisation become manifest. Dordrecht, situated 
favourably at a confl uence of waterways and in the heart of the comital 
toll system, was well on its way to becoming a small centre for the 
international east-west river trade in wine, grain, wood, and salt, and 
some of the pre-existing settlements in the coastal region had begun to 
develop as regional market centres.7 Nevertheless, as late as the middle 
of the 13th century, the Franciscan monk Bartholomaeus Anglicus, 
author of the encyclopaedia De proprietatibus rerum, in his description 
of the countries of Europe pictured Holland primarily as a land of lush 
meadows, with many cattle, grain fi elds, and forests rich in game. Th is 
was in marked contrast with the section Anglicus wrote on neighbour-
ing Flanders, praised mainly for its trade, industry, and famous towns 
and ports.8
In view of such a late start, the speed of economic change in the late 
Middle Ages is striking. In the second half of the 13th century, and 
particularly aft er 1270, the young towns of Holland began to grow. 
A large metropolis did not develop: instead, a sprinkle of small and 
very small towns emerged. All the same, the urban-to-rural ratio rose 
rapidly. While around 1200 the urban population of Holland cannot 
6 Th e classic study on the reclamations is Van der Linden, Cope. A recent synthesis 
in English that includes the results of later research is provided by Van de Ven, Man-
Made Lowlands, 52–82.
7 Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Van waterland tot stedenland’, 118–121. For the river toll sys-
tem, see Verkerk, ‘Tollen en waterwegen’; for Dordrecht, Van Herwaarden et al., 
Geschiedenis van Dordrecht, 19–20.
8 Bartholomaeus Anglicus, De rerum proprietatibus, 654, 680; Seymour et al., 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus, 10, 35, 158. Cf. De Boer, ‘Op weg naar volwassenheid’, 28–30.
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have numbered more than a few thousand, by 1300 this fi gure was 
already around 30,000 (14% of the population), and just before the 
middle of the 14th century it had risen to about 55,000 (23%).9
Urban industries developed. Th e Haarlem Accijnsbrief of 1274, for 
instance, a charter listing the excises the urban authorities were allowed 
to levy, mentions the production and sale of a wide variety of industrial 
products: beer, textiles, shoes, saddles, and even ships.10 Products of 
urban industry were probably sold mainly in or near the town where 
they had been produced, but not exclusively so: the discovery of 
two late 13th-century Leiden cloth seals in excavations in Amsterdam 
makes it clear that trade between the Holland towns was also begin-
ning to develop.11 So was international trade, although this was mainly 
conducted by foreign merchants. Around the middle of the 13th cen-
tury, the existing east-west trade route along the Rhine and Meuse had 
been complemented with a north-south axis, creating a system shaped 
like an inverted ‘T’; a navigable route making use of Holland’s network 
of inland waterways now connected the delta of the Rhine and Meuse 
to the Zuiderzee. Th is route provided Flemish and German merchants 
with a safe alternative to the treacherous North Sea route. A series of 
toll reductions and safeguards shows that Hansa merchants visited the 
delta in the second half of the 13th century.12 By the end of that cen-
tury, trade contacts with England probably also intensifi ed. By then, 
Holland shipmasters—and occasionally Holland merchants—had 
begun to play an active role: along with their more numerous Zeeland 
counterparts, they turn up in the correspondence between King 
Edward I of England and Count Floris V of Holland, dealing with trade 
confl icts between their subjects.13
From the late 13th century onwards Dordrecht received a number 
of privileges from the counts of Holland that gave the town the right 
to act as an exclusive depot for the transit river trade. Dordrecht 
 9 De Boer, ‘Op weg naar volwassenheid’, 33; Van Bavel and Van Zanden, ‘Jump-
Start’, 505. Th e fi gure includes urban settlements of all sizes.
10 Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Van waterland tot stedenland’, 123–134; Koch et al., Oorkonden-
boek van Holland en Zeeland tot 1299 (hereaft er OHZ) III, no. 1681 (Accijnsbrief).
11 Baart, ‘Materiële stadscultuur’, 99–100. Th e author also mentions fi nds of 
imported luxury articles such as silk and sub-tropical fruits in 13th-century Dordrecht 
and Amsterdam.
12 Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Town and Country in Holland’, 61; De Boer, ‘Florerend’, 
132–133.
13 OHZ II, nos. 505, 506; De Boer, ‘Florerend’, 139–144; Kerling, Commercial 
Relations, 176–177.
6 chapter one
14 For the history of the Dordrecht staple right see Van Herwaarden et al., 
Geschiedenis van Dordrecht, 79–88. Th e relocations of the Hansa kontor to Dordrecht 
are discussed by Niermeyer, ‘Dordrecht als handelsstad’ IV, 213–214 and VI, 146–147. 
Niermeyer also gives the fi gures for the wine transports (‘Dordrecht als handelsstad’ II, 
24–25).
15 Kaptein, ‘Poort van Holland’, 117–124.
moreover off ered merchants facilities such as quays and cranes, stor-
age, and brokerage. On two occasions, in 1358 and in 1386, the Bruges 
Hansa kontor was even temporarily relocated to Dordrecht, although 
in both cases the original situation was restored once the Hansa mer-
chants had resolved their confl icts with the Bruges authorities. Th e few 
surviving late 14th-century accounts of the Dordrecht toll show that at 
that point in time on average 3,300 voeder (a unit of approximately 
1,000 litres) of wine arrived in the city annually. About half was sold in 
Dordrecht; the remainder was transported directly to the southern 
Low Countries or England.14
In the north of Holland, Amsterdam gradually developed as Hol-
land’s second main port. Amsterdam was a convenient place for the 
transfer of bulk goods from overseas—in particular beer from north-
ern Germany—to smaller vessels, for inland navigation to towns in the 
centre and south of Holland and to the southern Low Countries. Th e 
accounts of the comital beer toll in Amsterdam for the period between 
late October 1352 and early May 1354 show that in these eighteen 
months about 33,000 casks of beer were imported, in addition to other 
commodities such as grain, fl ax and herring. Amsterdam shipmasters 
probably played a role in inland navigation. In the middle of the 14th 
century they also ventured out eastward across the Zuiderzee, carrying 
dairy products to the towns in the IJssel region; in the decades that fol-
lowed, Amsterdam merchants established their own trade contacts in 
the Baltic region.15
Although Dordrecht and Amsterdam held vital positions in the net-
work of waterways, other towns also participated in interregional trade 
activities. Among them were the small Zuiderzee ports Edam, 
Monnickendam, Hoorn and Enkhuizen in the north, river towns like 
Brielle, Schiedam, Schoonhoven, and Gorinchem in the south, and 
also Leiden, Delft , Haarlem and Alkmaar, situated on the sandy strip 
along the North Sea coast but connected to the main waterways 
through small rivers and canals. As we will see in Chapter 4, even some 
villages had their direct links to interregional trade. Only at the very 
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16 Lesger, ‘Intraregional trade’, 189–192.
17 Niermeyer, Bronnen Beneden-Maasgebied, nos. 315 (tariff  list of the toll at Alphen, 
1339) and 441 (tariff  list of the river tolls at Niemandsvriend, Ammers, Dordrecht, 
Strienemonde, Geervliet and Geertruidenberg, 1355–1358).
18 E.g. the studies presented in the volume edited by Seibt and Eberhard, Europa 
1400.
19 De Boer, Graaf en grafi ek, 32–35, 63–133; Blockmans, ‘Social and Economic 
Eff ects’, 850–856, 861–862.
end of the 15th century a clearly defi ned urban hierarchy emerged; 
interregional trade was increasingly reserved to a few larger ports, 
Amsterdam fi rst and foremost among them.16
Unfortunately only very few medieval river toll accounts have been 
preserved. Moreover, the counts frequently granted toll exemptions or 
reductions to merchants from certain towns. Th erefore it is not possi-
ble to make a systematic quantitative reconstruction of trade fl ows 
based on toll data. However, two tariff  lists from the middle of the 14th 
century give a good impression of the variety of goods transported 
over Holland’s waterways at that point in time. In addition to the prod-
ucts that have already been mentioned, the tariff  lists refer to a wide 
range of foodstuff s, such as fruits and vegetables, dairy products, 
grease, oil, and herring, and to raw materials and industrial products 
such as wool, fl ax, dye-stuff s, various metals, hops, woollen and linen 
cloth, household utensils, and furniture. Th ey also include livestock, 
fuel, construction materials and millstones.17
In the second half of the 14th century, Holland’s economic develop-
ment seems to have accelerated, notably at a time when many other 
countries were experiencing problems. It is true that the much-quoted 
late medieval crisis was very oft en not a period of general decay: in 
many countries decline in some sectors or regions went hand in hand 
with partial recovery or even growth in others.18 Nevertheless, demo-
graphic developments indicate that in the latter half of the 14th cen-
tury Holland did exceptionally well. Th e Holland narrative sources are 
strangely silent about the Black Death, which has given rise to the 
assumption—widely supported until a few decades ago—that the 
region was not much aff ected. Detailed research, however, has shown 
that although the exact impact of the fi rst onset of the Plague is 
unknown, Holland was not completely spared. Moreover, there is no 
doubt the recurrent epidemics of the following decades took a heavy 
toll.19 Yet by the year 1400—very early in comparison with England, for 
instance—the total population of Holland had almost returned to its 
8 chapter one
20 Van Bavel and Van Zanden, ‘Jump-Start’, 505.
21 Unger, History of Brewing, 50–57; Kaptein, Hollandse textielnijverheid, 45–50.
22 Unger, Dutch Shipbuilding, 25–34; cf. Niemeijer, Van accijnsbrief tot Zuidam, 
17–18 (shipbuilding in Haarlem); Boelmans Kranenburg, ‘Visserijbedrijf Zijdenaars’, 
325–330; Boelmans Kranenburg, ‘Visserij Noordnederlanders’, 290–291.
23 De Boer, Graaf en grafi ek, 273–314 (nominal fi gures).
24 Ibid., 211–245, 334–336.
25 Boekel, Zuivelexport, 10–12, 24–31.
26 Van Zanden, Rise and Decline, 30–34; Van Bavel, ‘Early Proto-Industrialization’, 
1126–1145.
pre-Plague level. Th e urban ratio had actually increased: a full third of 
the population was now living in towns.20
Th ese dynamics suggest a solid economic foundation, and there is 
indeed abundant evidence of strong economic growth aft er 1350. 
Brewing and textile production had older roots, but both became major 
urban industries in the second half of the 14th century.21 Shipbuilding 
followed a similar path from the early 15th century onwards; so did 
herring fi shing and processing.22 To a certain extent the expansion was 
accompanied by a concentration of industrial activities in the larger 
towns. Th e revenues from the sale of hops and gruit (a mixture of herbs 
used in brewing) and the duties on weighing and measuring in Gouda 
and Schoonhoven provide a good illustration: in Gouda weighing rev-
enues increased from an average of 24.8 lb. Holl. annually in the late 
1350s to 83 lb. Holl. annually in the late 1390s, whereas for its much 
smaller neighbour Schoonhoven the corresponding fi gures were 12.4 
lb. Holl and 15.5 lb. Holl.23
At fi rst sight the countryside seems to have fared worse than the 
towns. Since the reclamations, the peat lands had been drained to allow 
for grain cultivation, but ultimately this made matters worse: the soil 
subsided, causing serious problems with water management. In the 
end, bread grain cultivation had to be abandoned. Dick de Boer, who 
was the fi rst to study the impact of these ecological changes in detail, 
focused mainly on the negative consequences: the economic base of 
rural society was eroded and people migrated to the towns.24 However, 
the rural economy proved to be more fl exible than this suggests. Arable 
farming was largely replaced by the more market-oriented cattle and 
dairy farming.25 In addition, a wide range of non-agrarian or semi-
agrarian market-oriented activities developed, such as peat digging, 
brick making, shipping, fi shing, spinning and weaving, and the con-
struction and maintenance of dikes and canals.26
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Th e products of the developing urban industries and market-ori-
ented agriculture were sold at urban markets in Holland; increasingly 
they were also exported to the neighbouring regions. Dairy exports to 
Germany, for instance, expanded rapidly in the late 14th and early 15th 
centuries. Beer from Gouda, Delft , and Haarlem was exported to the 
east and north of the present-day Netherlands, eastern England, 
Flanders, and Brabant. Cloth from Leiden and Amsterdam found its 
way to the fairs in the southern Low Countries and in the IJssel towns; 
from there it was exported to northern Germany and the Baltic states.27
Not only were Holland merchants and shipmasters engaged in these 
export trades, but by this time they were also actively involved in 
importing wine, grains, wood and other products that Holland did not 
produce in suffi  cient quantities. In almost all of Holland’s towns urban 
government was dominated by a mercantile elite. In late 14th- and 
15th-century Leiden, for instance, many members of the local political 
elite were engaged in the interregional trade in a variety of products, 
but especially cloth, peat and wine.28
Compared to the late 14th-century boom, the 15th century shows a 
more diff erentiated pattern of economic development. Comital and 
seignorial revenues from the river tolls had risen markedly in the sec-
ond half of the 14th century, but demonstrate an erratic and, on the 
whole, stagnant pattern in the fi rst decades of the 15th century. A war 
in the river area, a prolonged succession confl ict, and enmities with 
the German towns were at least partly to blame.29 Neither did the 
incorporation of Holland into the expanding Burgundian empire her-
ald only economic bliss. Toll revenues did rise again from about 1440 
onwards, but by that time the textile industry had been facing a seri-
ous  crisis for several years. It recovered only gradually aft er 1450.30 
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Notwithstanding these setbacks, the overall impression is one of rela-
tive prosperity—especially in comparison to neighbouring regions— 
and increasing commercialisation. One of the most remarkable 
elements is the continued progress of urbanisation until about 1480, 
when a severe recession set in. Despite this late 15th-century crisis, in 
the early 16th century a staggering 45% of the Holland population 
lived in towns.31 Th at the Holland economy by this time had developed 
some extraordinary characteristics is also demonstrated by the occu-
pational structure in the countryside: agriculture covered only 41% of 
rural labour input, a strikingly small share for a pre-modern society.32
Holland’s geographical situation undoubtedly contributed to the 
region’s remarkable economic development in the late Middle Ages. 
Between the 11th and 13th centuries improvements in shipbuilding 
tech niques resulted in the development of the cog, a combination of 
a cargo ship and a warship well suited to shipping conditions in north-
western Europe.33 Th e growth of North Sea shipping meant that 
Hol land’s coastal location became an advantage. Th e delta of the Rhine 
and Meuse off ered easy access to sea, and Holland’s many inland 
waterways moreover facilitated internal transport. However, in princi-
ple other lowland regions bordering the North Sea enjoyed similar 
advantages. Although some of these regions, for instance Flanders 
and eastern England, showed strong economic growth at an early 
stage, aft er the middle of the 14th century population numbers and 
urbanisation stagnated or even declined. Th is suggests that geographi-
cal factors alone do not suffi  ce to explain the favourable development 
of Holland’s late medieval economy; other aspects must have contrib-
uted as well.
Th e fi rst to advance an hypothesis on this issue was H.P.H. Jansen, 
who in his 1976 inaugural lecture mainly focused on events in the lat-
ter half of the 14th century, when—as he believed—Holland experi-
enced a sudden and drastic transformation from an agrarian and rural 
society into an urban, industrial, and commercial one. Jansen  suggested 
that in these years Holland had enjoyed a competitive advantage over 
its neighbours because of its low wage levels. Th at in turn was the result 
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of the fact that there was no more virgin peat land available to absorb 
the labour surplus and, as Jansen thought, also a consequence of the 
relatively mild eff ects of the Plague.34
Curiosity as to what exactly had happened aft er the middle of the 
14th century increased when De Boer’s research made it clear that 
Jansen’s era of transformation had also been a period of deteriorating 
ecological conditions. Whereas De Boer stressed mainly the negative 
eff ects of the subsidence of the peat soil, Wim Blockmans argued that 
the necessity of large grain imports had forced Holland to specialise in 
products like dairy, herring, textiles, and beer— which were in demand 
in the markets of neighbouring regions—and in the building of ships 
needed to transport these commodities. Holland profi ted from its 
relatively late start: techniques that had developed elsewhere—such 
as brewing hop beer—could easily be adopted and perfected.35 Jan 
Luiten van Zanden drew attention to another eff ect of ecological 
change: the consequences for the rural labour market. He interpreted 
the growth of non-agrarian, market-oriented activities supplementary 
to farm work as a reaction to the diminishing prospects for subsistence 
farming, and he saw this as a process of proto-industrialisation that 
contributed materially to the rapid commercialisation of the Holland 
countryside.36
Th e emphasis on the second half of the 14th century is understand-
able, because economic growth in these years makes Holland stand 
out from its neighbours. However, as we have just seen, trade and 
industry had begun their rapid expansion almost a century earlier. 
In his contribution to the Geschiedenis van Holland (History of 
Holland), Peter Hoppenbrouwers claims that by 1350 Holland had 
probably already made up for much of its earlier backwardness.37 Th is 
suggests that the late 14th-century boom had roots in the preceding 
period. Th e idea is supported by an analysis of the development of corn 
tithes, which shows that although arable yields did fall in the 1370s, 
they recovered aft erwards. Only aft er 1400 did a really dramatic decline 
set in. Th is implies that arable farming was still possible at the end 
of the 14th century. Consequently, ecological problems alone cannot 
explain the economic transformation that took place from the middle 
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of the 14th century onwards, although these problems most likely did 
reinforce it.38
Th is moves the search for an explanation for Holland’s rapid rise to 
an earlier period: to the 11th to 13th centuries, when the reclamation 
of the extensive central peat district took place. Th e idea that the recla-
mations must have had a profound impact on the structure of society 
is based not only on the magnitude of the undertaking, but also on the 
way it was organised. Each reclamation project began with an agree-
ment between a group of colonists and the count of Holland, or one of 
the noblemen who had purchased tracts of wilderness from the count 
for the purpose of selling it on. Th is agreement defi ned the rights and 
duties of both parties. Th e colonists each received a holding, large 
enough to maintain a family. In addition to personal freedom, they 
acquired full property rights to their land: they could use it and dis-
pose of it as they saw fi t. At the same time, the new settler community 
was incorporated into the fabric of the emerging state: the settlers 
accepted the count’s supreme authority, paid taxes, and performed 
military services if called upon.39 On the local level the count was rep-
resented either by the sheriff , an appointed functionary with lower 
jurisdictional authority, or—as in Sloten and Osdorp—by a village lord 
who was granted lower jurisdiction plus some additional rights. Only 
very few lords also held higher jurisdictional authority.40
Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude have suggested that in the 
absence of both obligations to a manorial lord and restrictions imposed 
by collective farming practices, a society developed characterised by 
‘freedom, individualism and market orientation’. In their view this is 
part of the explanation for the rise of the Dutch Republic (with Holland 
as its leading province) to an economic world power in the early mod-
ern period.41 Th e argument seems intuitively correct, but the exact 
nature of the link between the ‘absence of a truly feudal past’ and 
marked economic performance at this much later stage is implied 
rather than explained.
In one respect Bas van Bavel and Jan Luiten van Zanden have 
been able to establish a tangible connection between the period of the 
reclamations and Holland’s rapid economic growth in the late 
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Middle Ages. Th ey describe Holland before 1350 as a frontier society: 
whereas new land was abundant, labour was scarce and—in contrast 
to Jansen’s assumptions—wages were relatively high. Combined with 
the near absence of urban control over the countryside and the fact 
that craft  guilds had no formal political power (and were therefore 
unable to dictate production conditions), scarcity of labour induced 
the development of labour-saving techniques. It was these tech-
niques that gave Holland’s industries a decisive competitive edge once, 
aft er the middle of the 14th century, wages began to rise in the sur-
rounding countries.42
Th ere is another possible link, one that has not yet been fully explored. 
Th is concerns an element of vital importance to the process of com-
mercialisation that Holland experienced: the organisation of com-
modity markets. As the example of the Sloten and Osdorp scales 
suggests, markets are more than neutral and spontaneous meeting 
places of supply and demand: they are shaped by rules, customs, and 
practices—factors that determine the risks, possibilities, and costs of 
exchange, and thus determine market performance. Th ese institutional 
arrangements in turn do not appear out of the blue: they refl ect the 
interests and the infl uence of groups of people in society. Following 
this line of reasoning, the social and political relations characterising 
Holland’s frontier society must have shaped market structures in such 
a way as to support and stimulate exchange.
For Holland’s medieval markets, recent research has brought to light 
some remarkable characteristics that do indeed appear to have been 
related to the structure of society.43 Markets for free wage labour based 
on short-term contracts, able to supply large numbers of labourers, 
emerged at an early stage. Labour legislation never acquired a general 
character; it was restricted to proletarian workers in the towns and 
was less repressive than in, for instance, England. Th e diff erence is at 
least partly explained by the fact that in Holland bound labour was 
almost non-existent because of the absence of the manorial system. 
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Land markets, not just in the towns but also in the countryside, oper-
ated smoothly thanks to a reliable and transparent registration of land 
transfers by public courts. Since early forms of funded debt were always 
based on real estate as collateral, these courts also acquired a central 
role in capital markets, developing and supporting a variety of instru-
ments that facilitated credit transactions. Public courts could acquire 
and maintain this central position because competition from seigno-
rial or ecclesiastical jurisdictions was weak, and a homogeneous sys-
tem of local courts, urban and rural, developed at an early stage.44
Despite the explanatory value of institutional models, they have 
hardly ever been used in analysing medieval commodity markets in 
Holland. Th e literature on Holland’s medieval trade is mainly based, 
oft en implicitly, on the assumption that markets emerged as a result 
of patterns of supply and demand, propelled mainly by exogenous 
factors—for instance, demographic or technological developments.45 
It does not explain why markets were organised the way they were, nor 
does it pay much attention to the eff ects of market structure on market 
performance. Th ere are exceptions. Some of the older works do discuss 
the organisation of markets, usually markets in a certain town or in a 
certain sector of the economy, in great detail. Much of this work con-
centrates on legal aspects or is of a descriptive nature. However, the 
sections on the economy in J. Huizinga’s series of articles on the rise of 
the town of Haarlem, the book by W.S. Unger on the food provisioning 
of the towns of Holland, and the articles by J.F. Niermeyer on late 14th-
century Dordrecht as a trading centre stand out because of the atten-
tion they pay to the interaction between social and political relations 
and the organisation of exchange.46 Th is is also true for the much more 
recent work by Leo Noordegraaf on confl icts in internal trade, by Remi 
van Schaïk on urban food provisioning in the northern Netherlands, 
and by Bart Ibelings on markets in various Holland towns.47 Be that 
as it may, none of these authors takes the framework of commodity 
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market institutions as the point of departure for a coherent view on the 
relation between social and political structure, market organisation, 
and market performance.
Th at is what this book intends to do. Its aim is to discover whether 
favourable commodity market institutions rooted in Holland’s specifi c 
social and political structure contributed to the remarkable economic 
development Holland experienced in the late Middle Ages. Th e book 
therefore discusses the framework of commodity market institutions, 
the factors that gave rise to this framework, and the framework’s eff ect 
on market performance.
Th ree essential elements in the approach this book takes follow 
directly from this research question. Th e fi rst relates to the concept of 
the market. Markets are seen as sets of institutions: rules, customs, and 
practices that structure the exchange of goods. Th e offi  cial weekly mar-
kets and fairs in medieval towns and villages are part of this institu-
tional framework, but they are by no means the only part. A great deal 
of trade by-passed these formal institutions, taking place at informal 
but still public or semi-public trade venues—for instance, at conveni-
ent places along the road, at inns, or even in private (as, for example, in 
the shape of long-term trade relationships between two individuals).48 
In fact, there is no clear dividing line: public and private markets are 
concepts designating the opposite ends of a continuum. Th erefore the 
rules, customs and practices shaping the less public side of the market 
are also part of this research.
Th e second element concerns the time period under investigation. 
In order to discover whether market institutions were indeed  infl uenced 
by the characteristics of society formed by Holland’s history of recla-
mation and settlement, the development of these institutions has to be 
traced back in time as far as possible. Th is is why the book mainly 
focuses on the 13th, 14th and the fi rst half of the 15th century. In this 
way it includes both the ‘formative’ period of Holland as a frontier 
society and the ‘jump-start’ of the second half of the 14th century and 
early 15th century. In many places, a description of developments in 
the late 15th and 16th century has been included in order to outline 
the evolution and the long-term eff ects of institutions emerging at an 
earlier stage; however, the book does not pretend to cover these later 
150 years in detail.
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Th e third element is the comparative approach: Holland will be 
compared with Flanders (or with the southern Low Countries in a 
wider sense, depending on the availability of information) and with 
England (when possible to eastern England in particular, as the most 
commercialised region). By limiting the comparison to three regions 
bordering the North Sea, some explanatory variables for diff erences in 
the process of commercialisation can be excluded beforehand: the 
three regions enjoyed similar climatological conditions and they all 
had good access to the same sea trade routes. Th is makes it easier to 
focus on the impact of the social and political structure of the three 
societies on commodity market institutions. In this respect the three 
regions display signifi cant diff erences. In England the early rise of a 
strong central power, combined with the persistence of manorialism 
and the integration of feudal lordship in the organisation of the state, 
gave rise to market institutions characterised—more so than in 
Holland—by seignorial and royal control. Indeed a more striking 
example demonstrating the role of medieval lords and kings in the 
organisation of markets would probably be diffi  cult to fi nd. In Flanders 
powerful cities dominated trade; as a result, urban trade monopo-
lies and mechanisms of compulsion and exclusion were much more 
prominent than in Holland. Admittedly, from a European perspective 
Flanders was not a unique case: in Tuscany, for example, urban domi-
nation was probably even more pronounced.49 However, a comparison 
between Holland and Tuscany would make it much more diffi  cult to 
unravel institutional and geographical causes of diverging market 
performance.
Aspects of this comparative approach will be discussed in more 
detail in the last section of this introductory chapter. We will now turn 
to some methodological issues related to the concept of institutions, 
focusing fi rst on their eff ects and second on their origins.
1.2 An institutional approach
In the words of Douglass North, institutions are ‘the humanly 
devised  constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence 
they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social 
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or economic’.50 North’s defi nition leaves room for multiple interpreta-
tions about the nature of institutions and their eff ect on economic per-
formance. Some scholars focus mainly, or even exclusively, on formal 
institutions: the offi  cial laws and enforcement procedures that together 
form the legal regime under which exchange takes place. Others adopt 
a broader approach and also include informal elements, even the val-
ues and beliefs that are seen as the most fundamental motivators of 
human activity.51 Th is book pays attention to more than just formal 
rules and laws: it also aims to study the contribution of informal cus-
toms, traditions, codes of conduct, and organisational arrangements to 
structuring commodity trade. Values and beliefs, however, are not 
studied here as institutions in their own right. Although private con-
victions play an important role in every society, their contribution to 
economic behaviour can best be observed by looking at the tangible 
rules, customs, and practices—both formal and informal—to which 
they help give rise.52
Institutional economics share with classical economic theory the 
conviction that market incentives are the driving force for economic 
growth. People, in the words of Adam Smith, will always want ‘to truck, 
barter and exchange one thing for another’,53 and it is fortunate 
that they do, for in this way markets stimulate specialisation and inno-
vation. In the institutional view, however, people may be willing to 
engage in trade, but whether they are able to do so is ultimately decided 
by the level of transaction costs. Ineffi  cient market institutions imply 
high transaction costs and will therefore keep people from engaging 
in exchange. Effi  cient institutions, on the other hand, lower transac-
tion costs, thus promoting exchange and all the advantages that come 
with it.54
Th e concept of transaction costs requires closer attention since it 
is vital in explaining exactly how institutions aff ect market effi  ciency. 
In this book two broad categories of transaction costs are distin-
guished. Th e fi rst category comprises all costs that need to be incurred 
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to match supply and demand. Th ey include both search and informa-
tion costs (i.e. the costs of fi nding appropriate buyers or sellers and 
acquiring adequate information on market opportunities and market 
conditions) and bargaining and decision costs (the costs of negotiation 
and closing a deal). Th e second category is related to the issue of secu-
rity. It covers not only the costs of policing and contract enforcement, 
but also those of rent-seeking (through disproportionate taxation of 
trade or requisitioning of marketable commodities) by the authorities, 
or alternatively of the attempts to keep such predatory regimes at bay.55 
Transport costs are not included in the concept of transaction costs as 
it is used here. Although it is clear that transport costs can also infl u-
ence market performance, their origins are very diff erent. Whereas 
transaction costs originate in social and political relations, transport 
costs are mainly infl uenced by geographical and technological factors. 
Th is book focuses on transaction costs because they are directly rele-
vant to the main research question.
As we shall see, the framework of commodity markets as it evolved 
in late medieval Holland did indeed reduce transaction costs of both 
categories, although it should also be noted that the eff ect was not uni-
form, nor was it always unidirectional.
Not only the eff ects of institutions, but also their origins have been and 
still are the subject of discussion. Th e idea that institutions develop 
more or less spontaneously because they provide an effi  cient response 
to economic needs is a popular one, but it is also problematic. It sug-
gests that effi  cient institutions—‘effi  cient’ being defi ned as  contributing, 
in a given set of circumstances, optimally to the welfare of society—
will automatically prevail over less effi  cient alternatives. Unfortunately, 
things do not always work that way. Many societies end up with 
obviously ineffi  cient institutions, simply because powerful groups 
or individuals create and sustain institutional arrangements that 
support their particular interests, if necessary at the expense of aggre-
gate welfare. A more credible way to account for the development of 
institutions is the ‘social confl ict view’ adopted in this book: in this 
view institutions are seen as the eff ect of a confrontation of various 
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social groups. Th is implies that the institutions that develop are not 
 automatically the most effi  cient ones for society at large; they merely 
suit best the interests of those that have the power to create and sustain 
them.56
Furthermore, institutions in turn tend to reinforce the position 
of power-holders. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James 
Robinson explain why this happens by distinguishing between eco-
nomic institutions (which include property rights, but also the struc-
ture of markets) and political institutions (Figure 2). Th ey stress that 
economic institutions determine not only economic performance as a 
whole, but also the distribution of resources. Economic institutions in 
turn are determined by political power, which is based on political 
institutions, but also—and here the circle closes—on the distribu-
tion of resources. A second, equally circular mechanism specifi es the 
nature of political power and its interaction with political institutions: 
groups with de facto political power consolidate their position by 
shaping political institutions that give them de jure political power as 
well. Together the two mechanisms explain the path dependency that 
appears to be a feature of many societies: institutions usually change 
only slowly and incrementally. Th e mechanisms also explain how insti-
tutions can ‘petrify’: even if their original function no longer exists, 
they can still be maintained by groups that benefi t from them and have 
both the de facto and the de jure political power required to sustain 
them.57
Figure 2 Causes and eff ects of institutions (endogenous system)
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Th e related notion that effi  cient institutions arise more easily when 
rent-seeking lords or elites are kept in check by the presence of coun-
tervailing powers enjoys wide support. What this means in a concrete 
historical situation is another matter. S.R. Epstein, in his research on 
the development of commodity markets in Italy in the late Middle 
Ages, underlined the impact of the rise of a strong central state, which, 
by removing constraints and impediments to trade raised by feudal 
lords, towns or rural elites (such as toll barriers or protectionist urban 
regulations), increased market range and market size and in this way 
helped reduce transaction costs.58 But obviously a strong central state 
can also act as a rent-seeking institution itself—for instance, by impos-
ing high taxes on trade.59 In other words, the conditions that encourage 
favourable economic institutions to develop include more than just the 
strength of the state.
A useful approach to this issue is provided by Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson. Th ey argue that benefi cial economic institutions are 
more likely to arise when political institutions provide eff ective con-
straints on power-holders, when they give power to a broad group of 
people that have investment opportunities and will therefore benefi t 
from secure property rights for all, and when opportunities for rent-
seeking by power-holders are few.60 With regard to commodity market 
institutions, this book will provide support for this argument It shows 
that in Holland these conditions were largely fulfi lled. Urban elites 
were unable to dominate trade and concentrate it within the town 
walls by non-economic means, as their counterparts in Flanders could 
do. Furthermore, urban authorities in Holland did have the power to 
counteract attempts at rent-seeking by the count of Holland more 
eff ectively than the towns of England could withstand the English 
king; likewise the powers of seignorial lords to exploit rural trade were 
much more limited than in England.
Despite its explanatory power, the institutional model presented by 
Acemoglu and his co-authors also has its weaknesses. For one, it 
focuses on endogenous forces and leaves very little room for the infl u-
ence of exogenous factors. A second objection is closely connected to 
the fi rst: the model explains institutional continuity much better than 
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it explains institutional change. Admittedly, Acemoglu does add that 
external events, especially sudden shocks like wars, may change the 
balance of powers in society and thus lead to an adjustment, or even a 
drastic turn-about, of the institutional framework.61 However, the case 
of commodity markets in Holland presented here suggests that institu-
tional change as a result of exogenous forces was not restricted to such 
rare occasions. It is quite easy to fi nd examples of institutional innova-
tion that clearly responded to external impulses, for instance the rise of 
specialised cattle fairs in the late 14th and early 15th century that will 
be discussed in Chapter 2. In addition, some of the practices that 
served to facilitate trade were probably copied from examples else-
where. Some institutions migrate easily; and because of its late rise, 
Holland was in a good position to adopt successful models developed 
in neighbouring regions. Th e replacement of the duel by truth-fi nding 
methods of proof in debt confl icts, to be investigated in Chapter 7, is a 
good example of institutional migration.62 In cases like this, institu-
tional change seems to have been the joint eff ect of endogenous and 
exogenous factors, although it can still be maintained that endogenous 
factors, by channelling the direction and setting the pace, were deci-
sive. Figure 3 gives a graphic representation.















More fundamental is a second fl aw in the institutional model. Th e 
development of commodity markets in medieval Holland provides 
clear indications that economic performance was not exclusively 
determined by institutions, whatever their origins. Exogenous forces 
also had a direct impact (also depicted in Figure 3). We will see that, 
even though the foundation for favourable commodity market institu-
tions in Holland was laid before 1350, an acceleration of growth took 
place only in the second half of the 14th century, when economic cir-
cumstances changed. Th e contribution of non-institutional factors 
should not be seen as an alternative to the eff ect of institutions, but in 
interaction with it. In other words, an effi  cient institutional framework 
is a necessary precondition, but in itself it does not suffi  ce to generate 
economic growth. Effi  ciently organised markets may sometimes actu-
ally create new economic opportunities. However, they more oft en do 
something less spectacular: they determine whether people are able to 
turn opportunities that arise from other factors—most commonly 
changes in supply and demand, in turn infl uenced by demographic, 
geographic, or technological change—into productivity-raising activi-
ties, or whether they are prevented from doing so.
1.3 Research questions
Whereas medieval markets for labour, land or capital can only very 
rarely be pinpointed to a specifi c time and place, commodity exchange 
frequently can be so located. Part of the exchange of goods—and prob-
ably a considerable part—took place at recognisable (although not 
necessarily formally authorised) trade venues: at the quays of a port 
town, for instance, at a weekly market or fair, or perhaps at an informal 
gathering close to a village church. All these places were part of the 
institutional framework for commodity exchange, and a vital part at 
that. Trade venues, and the rules and customs that determined their 
functioning, take centre stage in Part I of this book.
Concentration of trade in time and space aff ected transaction costs 
in more than one way. Firstly it contributed to a reduction in search 
and information costs: it was relatively easy to fi nd interested buyers 
and sellers and obtain reliable information on prices at a busy market 
place. Where advantages of scale allowed for the provision of  specialised 
services such as brokerage and auctioning, bargaining and decision 
costs were also lowered. Formal markets could also contribute to a 
reduction in costs related to security: the authorities oft en provided 
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rules and enforcement mechanisms to guarantee orderly proceedings 
and fair dealing at the market place. Th ere was a reverse side, however: 
concentration of trade, especially when accompanied by restrictive 
policies or coercion, also provided opportunities for rent-seeking 
through taxation, the compulsory use of local services, or pre-emptive 
rights for local merchants.
Th e development of a network of trade venues was of course partly 
determined by the demographic, geographic, and economic factors 
that fi gure prominently in many studies devoted to the analysis of mar-
ket networks.63 However, the impact of social and political relations 
should not be ignored. It is from this perspective that Part I begins 
with discussions of two categories of trade venues: fairs and rural trade 
venues (formal or informal). Clearly these two categories do not cover 
the entire range of physical markets in medieval Holland. Nonetheless, 
both fairs and rural trade venues, as we shall see shortly, did have an 
important role in the progress of commercialisation. Moreover, the 
development of these two categories of trade venues demonstrates the 
impact of social and political relations very well. Th us, an in-depth 
discussion of these two categories, more than an exhaustive enumera-
tion of each and every type of trade venue that existed, contributes to 
the goal of this book: to demonstrate whether and how the specifi c 
characteristics of the Holland society—in turn related to the county’s 
history of settlement and reclamation—aff ected the organisation 
and thus ultimately the effi  ciency of medieval commodity markets. 
In order to avoid too narrow a focus, the development and functioning 
of fairs and rural trade venues is placed against a wider background: 
frequent attention is paid to both parallels and relations with other 
types of trade venues.
Chapter 2 analyses the role and development of fairs in late medie-
val Holland. Because of their periodic character and the legal regime 
they enjoyed—during the fair regular restrictions on foreign traders 
were usually lift ed and immunity was off ered for previously contracted 
debts—fairs provide a good example of the advantages attached to 
concentrating trade in time and space. Certainly, medieval Holland 
was not renowned for its fairs: it never hosted gatherings of foreign 
merchants comparable to those of the Champagne region, or to the 
24 chapter one
64 Feenstra, ‘Les foires’, 221–222, 227–228.
65 E.g. Lopez, Commercial Revolution, 87–90; North and Th omas, Rise of the Western 
World, 54–56; Britnell, Commercialisation, 90; Gelderblom, ‘Decline’. Cf. Epstein, 
‘Regional Fairs’, 470, and Munro, ‘New Institutional Economics’, 412–413, who retrace 
the idea to the work of Max Weber.
66 One of the fi rst to draw attention to the ‘rash of annual and biennial commercial 
gatherings’ in the late Middle Ages was Verlinden, ‘Markets and Fairs’, 151–153.
67 Epstein, ‘Regional Fairs’, 462–464, 467–472.
international fairs of Flanders or England. Nevertheless, Holland did 
have a substantial number of smaller fairs, many of them serving 
mainly the local market but some with an additional role in regional 
or interregional trade. Th is fact has been noted before: in an article 
on fairs in the northern Low Countries written more than fi ft y years 
ago, Robert Feenstra recorded that between the 14th and 16th centu-
ries  several towns in Holland received licenses for fairs. However, 
Feenstra dismissed these fairs as unimportant: they were never more 
than local or regional aff airs to begin with and became redundant, 
moreover, when in the 16th century sea borne trade increased and 
Holland changed into ‘one big permanent market’.64 Th is view is in 
keeping with the idea expressed in much of the older literature that the 
fairs of the Middle Ages were representatives of an early, immature 
stage in the development of trade, to be superseded by more sophisti-
cated permanent urban trading networks with the progression of eco-
nomic development.65
Yet a proliferation of lesser fairs was a very characteristic aspect of 
economic life in late medieval western and central Europe.66 Epstein 
has linked the rise of these fairs to the rising standards of living aft er 
the demographic catastrophes in the fi rst half of the 14th century. 
A higher demand for products like dairy, meat, and textiles promoted 
regional specialisation and the rise of interregional trade. According to 
Epstein, the rise of lesser fairs in the late Middle Ages demonstrates an 
adequate response to increasingly complex and variable patterns of 
production and trade. Fairs, as temporary facilities, could easily be 
established in convenient places in response to changes in supply and 
demand. But fairs did not simply spring up overnight in response to 
commercial needs: politics and power were also important. Epstein 
focuses on the role of the central state. He claims new fairs emerged 
only when and where an increasingly powerful state helped to over-
come the opposition of towns to the rise of trade facilities outside 
their walls.67 Whether this is what happened in Holland is doubtful: 
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Feenstra’s—admittedly preliminary—results suggest that Holland’s 
fairs were largely established in the existing towns, not in villages. 
More detailed information is needed to bring to light whether and how 
social and political relations in Holland aff ected the rise of fairs. 
Chapter 2 therefore presents a detailed chronological reconstruction 
of the pace and timing of the development of fairs in Holland between 
the early 13th and the late 15th century. It then proceeds to investigate 
the contribution to this development by economic changes on the one 
hand, and by political and social relations on the other.
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the development of rural trade venues in 
relation to the commercialisation of the Holland countryside. Th at a 
process of commercialisation of the countryside occurred in the 
Middle Ages is perhaps not self-evident. In the view of Russian econo-
mist Chayanov, peasants based their decisions mainly on tradition and 
subjective habits instead of an objective analysis of economic opportu-
nities. Th ey were primarily subsistence-oriented and did not produce 
more than their own household could consume.68 Chayanov’s ideas 
have, explicitly or implicitly, found their way into the views of many 
historians. Yet his assumptions are not supported by new research, 
clearly demonstrating the involvement of many peasants with the 
market. Even when peasants consumed part of their own produce, sur-
pluses were usually marketed, and ordinary villagers were routinely 
involved in the exchange of all kinds of commodities. Where market 
institutions were effi  cient and transaction costs were low, peasants pro-
duced for the market as soon as they found there was a demand for 
their products. But where markets were diffi  cult to enter or unsafe, 
creating high barriers to trade, peasants chose, quite rationally, for 
subsistence as the less costly or risky alternative.69
In this light the availability of rural trade venues and the rules and 
practices that determined conditions for exchange at these venues 
counted: they were an important part of the institutional framework 
that set the stage for rural commercialisation. In turn, the development 
and functioning of rural trade venues were strongly infl uenced by the 
structure of rural society, which in Holland had some rather unusual 
characteristics. Manorial lords, who in England competed for market 
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rights and thus initiated the development of a dense network of rural 
markets and fairs, were largely absent in Holland. While in Flanders 
much of the rural economy was geared to the industrial and mercantile 
needs of powerful cities, towns in Holland were small and only gradu-
ally gained political power.
Th e eff ects are not immediately obvious. Recent studies on the medi-
eval English economy have done much to moderate the idea that lords 
did nothing but exploit their tenants. It turns out that peasants were 
quite capable of innovation and market participation, despite the limi-
tations of the manorial system, and that many lords were well aware of 
the need to stimulate such economic activities.70 In this line of reason-
ing the dense network of village fairs and markets, controlled by the 
lords who owned these trade venues, is fi rst and foremost a positive 
contribution to a reduction of transaction costs for peasants, rural 
craft smen, and traders, thus permitting a higher level of exchange and 
specialisation.71 Nevertheless, this should not blind us to the fact that a 
tight control over trade also facilitated seignorial exactions. Likewise, 
in pre-Plague Europe, urban coercion (in the form of regional trade 
monopolies) sometimes showed positive returns: it gave urban elites 
an incentive to invest in infrastructure and urban institutions, and it 
provided both peasants and urban craft smen with stable markets. 
However, the poor economic performance of ‘urban coercive’ regions 
like Flanders and Italy at the end of the Middle Ages suggests that by 
then the damage from rent-seeking outweighed the original benefi ts.72
Chapter 3 explores the implications of the almost complete absence 
of seignorial control and urban coercion for the rise of an institutional 
framework favourable to rural commercialisation in 13th- and early 
14th-century Holland. Chapter 4 examines how a tradition of informal 
trade and absence of coercion established before 1350 contributed to 
the rise of a highly market-oriented rural economy in the second half 
of the 14th and the early 15th century. It does so by discussing in detail 
the development and organisation of two types of newly emerging 
rural trade venues: fi sh markets along the North Sea coast and rural 
weigh houses for dairy in the north of Holland.
Chapter 5, the fi nal chapter of the fi rst part of the book, discusses 
another trade venue, the development of which was also shaped—and 
 introduction 27
73 A concise summary of the history of the Dordrecht staple right is given by Van 
Herwaarden et al., Geschiedenis van Dordrecht, 79–88.
forcefully so—by politics and power: the Dordrecht staple. As we saw, 
Dordrecht’s staple privileges gave the town the right to act as an exclu-
sive depot for the transit river trade in wine, grain, wood, and salt. Th e 
Dordrecht authorities took great pains to enforce these privileges in 
the entire river delta.73 Th us, whereas fairs and rural trade venues show 
how concentration of trade could facilitate and stimulate commerciali-
sation, the Dordrecht staple highlights the reverse side of the coin: the 
opportunities for rent-seeking off ered by concentration.
Dordrecht’s staple right presents us with a double paradox. Firstly, 
the fact that Dordrecht managed to acquire and maintain a very sub-
stantial set of monopoly privileges seems at odds with the assumption 
that Holland’s history of occupation and settlement had given rise to a 
society that knew but few non-economic constraints on trade. Secondly, 
although throughout the Middle Ages the Dordrecht staple gave rise to 
numerous complaints, in the second half of the 14th century—when 
the staple privilege reached its widest legal defi nition and Dordrecht 
fl ourished—Holland as a whole experienced a phase of strong eco-
nomic growth. Chapter 5 examines this double paradox by investigat-
ing the confl icts between Dordrecht and two smaller neighbouring 
towns, Brielle and Schoonhoven.
Not all institutions that structured commodity exchange in medieval 
Holland can be related to a specifi c type of trade venue. Many rules, 
customs and practices were common to a variety of trade venues, 
or cannot be pinpointed in time and space. Th e second part of the 
book therefore abandons the distinction in categories of trade venues. 
It takes a complementary approach by focusing on rules, customs, and 
practices that shaped commodity trade largely independently of the 
location where the exchange took place. Although in practice institu-
tional arrangements frequently had more than one eff ect at the same 
time, for analytical purposes it is still useful to distinguish between 
institutions that primarily related to the matching of supply and 
demand, and institutions that had their greatest impact on security. 
Th is distinction is the guiding principle of the second part of the book, 
which presents these two parts of the institutional framework in two 
consecutive chapters.
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As in Part I, no attempt has been made to present an exhaustive 
discussion of all aspects of the two clusters of institutions. In Chapter 
6 in particular, the selection from a large group of rules and regulations 
directed at preserving the public character of the market and reducing 
information asymmetries has been narrowed down to just one aspect: 
the organisation of weighing and measuring. Th e choice of this par-
ticular aspect is not based on the argument that it was of greater impor-
tance to commercialisation than, for instance, quality control; the 
organisation of weighing and measuring was chosen because it dem-
onstrates with great clarity the impact of social and political relations 
on the development of the institutional framework, and thus this 
choice contributes most to the central question of this book. It is pre-
sented here as a case study that also refl ects developments in other 
aspects of market regulation.
To modern man, systems of weights and measures are fi xed and 
abstract entities, conventions that can be used to ascertain quantities of 
commodities regardless of their nature or of the circumstances. It has 
been the merit of Polish historian Witold Kula to demonstrate that 
this situation is a relatively recent one. Kula argues that pre-modern 
weights and measures were ‘representational’ rather than ‘conven-
tional’: weights and measures were closely linked to the nature of 
the commodity and the way it was produced. Measures for land, 
for example, were derived from the time needed to plough a plot or 
from the amount of seed required to sow it; consequently, they varied 
from place to place and could change over time. From a modern per-
spective we can fault this measuring system for its lack of standardisa-
tion but, as Kula notes, it made good sense in the context in which it 
was used.74
Th eir ‘representational’ nature implied that weights and measures, 
as was the case with all other institutions, were the product of social 
and political relations of the society in which they functioned. Powerful 
landowners, for instance, frequently managed to increase the size of 
the grain measure used for collecting dues-in-kind on their estates, 
whereas in the towns pressure from local retailers resulted in smaller 
measures.75 How the specifi c political and social structure of the 
Holland society aff ected the organisation of weighing and measuring, 
and what this meant for market effi  ciency, is the subject of Chapter 6.
74 Kula, Measures and Men, 3–8.
75 Ibid., esp. 29–31 (land measures) and 54–62 (measuring of grain in Poland).
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Chapter 7 discusses the same questions for a series of institutions 
that deal primarily with security: the mechanisms for the enforcement 
of contracts. Here we are not, as in Chapter 6, dealing with just one 
example representing a much wider range of regulations. When in com-
mercial exchange between strangers payment and delivery did not take 
place simultaneously, the enforceability of contracts was, in the words 
of Avner Greif, the ‘fundamental problem of exchange’: people were 
not prepared to enter into a commercial contract unless they were con-
fi dent the other party would fulfi l his obligations. One solution to this 
problem relied on a system of communal responsibility: if somebody 
reneged on a contract with a stranger, all members of the culprit’s com-
munity (his town of residence, for example, or the guild he belonged 
to) were held liable for the damage. Th e disciplining eff ect of the  system 
ultimately depended on intracommunity self-regulation: a defaulter 
knew that aft erwards his own community would seek compensation 
from him for the costs incurred through his actions. Th e alternative 
was a system of individual responsibility that allowed the injured party 
to bring legal action directly against the defaulter himself. Th is required 
the existence of an eff ective legal system imposed by an authority with 
enough power not only to issue rules but also enforce them.
In Greif ’s work these two arrangements are fi tted into a clear 
chronological framework. Greif argues that communal responsibility 
systems made impersonal exchange possible in a time when law 
enforce ment by the state was non-existent. Merchant guilds, for 
instance, provided monitoring, coordination and internal  enforcement 
mechanisms to correct defaulting—both between guild members and, 
through communal responsibility, with outsiders. In the 13th century, 
when larger political units were formed and strong rulers were able to 
guarantee security and enforce contracts, merchant guilds lost their 
function.76
Th e idea of a transition from communal to individual responsibility 
has been questioned. Lars Boerner and Albrecht Ritschl, for instance, 
underline the coexistence and the mutual reinforcement of collective 
and individual mechanisms throughout the Middle Ages.77 In a similar 
vein, research by Oscar Gelderblom and Regina Grafe on merchant 
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guilds in four major European towns between the middle of the 13th 
and the end of the 18th century demonstrates that throughout the 
period various types of merchant organisations existed, from individ-
ual agency to full-fl edged merchant guilds endowed with formal privi-
leges, disciplining powers, and powers of exclusion. Which model 
prevailed at a given place and time depended on more than one varia-
ble, and various economic and political circumstances played a role.78 
Seen from this perspective, the case of Holland is an interesting one. 
As we shall see, between the early 13th and the middle of the 15th cen-
tury, merchant guilds were of very little signifi cance, whereas urban 
authorities were actively engaged in contract enforcement almost from 
the moment they came into being. Apparently, the society of Holland 
provided fertile ground for a system of individual liability. Chapter 7 
aims to show which factors contributed to this situation and how it 
aff ected the effi  ciency of contract enforcement.
Effi  cient institutions can be defi ned as institutions that, by lowering 
transaction costs, stimulate exchange and thus contribute to aggregate 
welfare. But how to assess the effi  ciency of institutions in an actual 
historical situation? A single institution may have many eff ects, inten-
tional or unintentional: it may help reduce one type of transaction 
costs while raising another type, or open up possibilities for exchange 
to one group while closing them to others. For instance, restricting 
access to urban markets to guild members—a common kind of regula-
tion in many medieval towns—reduced options to engage in trade for 
everybody else. On the other hand, since guilds also controlled quality 
and were able to discipline their members, buyers had less trouble 
acquiring correct market information and would be protected, to a 
certain extent, against cheating. How to weigh these advantages against 
the disadvantages? Moreover, institutions interact: they cannot be eas-
ily disentangled from the framework of which they are part. Th is 
makes it diffi  cult to study the eff ects of a single institution. It also 
means that more oft en than not a combination of institutions contrib-
uted to a single eff ect.79
Here these issues have been tackled by combining diff erent 
approaches. Th e fi rst is the choice for the comparative approach 
78 Gelderblom and Grafe, ‘Rise, Persistence and Decline of Merchant Guilds’.
79 Ogilvie, ‘Whatever Is, Is Right?’, 668–675; cf. Gelderblom and Grafe, ‘Rise, 
Persistence and Decline of Merchant Guilds’, 3.
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mentioned earlier. Th e book does not pretend to exhaustively cover all 
rules, customs, and practices that shaped medieval commodity trade 
in Holland. Rather, it focuses on diff erences and similarities between 
Holland, England, and the southern Low Countries in the three main 
elements underlying institutional theory: social and political relations, 
institutions, and economic performance. Th e comparison makes the 
links between these elements stand out and in this way helps to answer 
the research question. For practical reasons, the analysis of the English 
and Flemish situation has been based on secondary literature, with 
very few references to the primary sources. Consequently, the scope 
and depth of the comparisons have been aff ected by the uneven avail-
ability of research results. On some issues the information required for 
a detailed comparison is simply not available for England, Flanders, or 
even both countries. In these cases comparisons have been curtailed. 
In Chapter 2, for instance, the number of fairs in Holland has been 
compared with the fi gures for England but not for Flanders, because a 
systematic inventory of medieval fairs for Flanders is lacking.
Th ere is another danger involved in the comparative approach: it 
may lead to overstressing the impact of endogenous factors. In order to 
minimise this risk, a conscious eff ort is made to also take into account 
the infl uence of exogenous factors on the development of the institu-
tional framework (mainly in Part I) and to identify and explain simi-
larities that existed regardless of social and political structures 
(particularly in Part II).
Secondly, an attempt is made to complement the qualitative, in-
depth analysis of aspects of the institutional framework with a quanti-
tative, but more general assessment of the total. Th is is the essence of 
Part III of the book. Whereas Parts I and II provide an analytical dis-
cussion of diff erent parts of the institutional framework—investigating 
the origins of the institutions and off ering a qualitative assessment of 
their consequences for transaction costs—Part III steps back from 
individual institutions. It tests, in a much more general way, the 
hypothesis that Holland’s favourable framework of market institutions 
gave rise to better economic performance. It does so by looking at two 
quantitative indicators: market integration and market orientation.
Chapter 8 studies the level of market integration. Th e underlying 
assumption is that favourable institutions, by reducing transaction 
costs, promote the rise of well-integrated markets. Based on the 
assumption that effi  cient market institutions and low transaction costs 
will encourage and facilitate participation in market transactions, 
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Chapter 9 makes an attempt to estimate the degree of commercialisa-
tion of late medieval society in Holland.
Market integration and market orientation have been selected 
because they can be seen as general indicators of market performance, 
and because for these two aspects at least some quantitative informa-
tion suitable for interregional comparison can be generated. For other 
aspects of market performance fi gures are simply not available. 
However, if as is indicated in Figure 3, market performance is infl u-
enced not just by the quality of the institutional framework but also by 
exogenous forces, the two indicators cannot be expected to provide 
absolute proof of a causal relation between the institutional framework 
on the one hand and market performance on the other. Th e quantita-
tive approach in Part III should be seen as complementary to the much 
more detailed but qualitative information presented earlier. Only by 
combining the two approaches can an assessment of the relation 
between institutions and market performance be attempted.
PART I
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: TRADE VENUES
1 Handt-vesten Alckmaer en Hoorn, 90; Fasel, Stadsarchief Alkmaar, summaries 80 




In 1447 the town of Hoorn, in West-Friesland, requested permission 
for a new fair in addition to its two existing fairs, to be held at a con-
venient time for the marketing of dairy products. Th e request was 
received favourably: Duke Philip the Good granted a license for a fair, 
to be held on St. Lawrence’s Day (August 10). But the local authorities 
in Alkmaar, about 20 kilometres west of Hoorn, protested. Th e new 
fair was scheduled only two weeks before the fair in their home town; 
moreover, in Hoorn no tolls were levied, whereas in Alkmaar the toll 
to be collected by the ducal offi  cials was set at 2.5%. Alkmaar’s protests 
proved successful: in 1449 the duke withdrew Hoorn’s license. Th e 
Hoorn authorities were not discouraged. Th ey continued to organise 
their dairy fair and even had the audacity to advertise it as far away as 
Flanders. Th e duke reacted by prohibiting his subjects from visiting 
the fair in Hoorn, but apparently to no avail. At the end of the 16th 
century, both the August fair and the pre-existing Pentecost fair had 
developed into important venues for the dairy trade.1
Although in contrast to England and Flanders large international fairs 
were unknown in Holland, the county did have many smaller fairs 
that served the local population or, as with the Hoorn dairy fair, played 
a role in regional or interregional trade. Of course fairs were never the 
only trade venues; in fact, trade in certain commodities—for instance 
wine, beer, or fresh foodstuff s—by-passed fairs almost entirely. In this 
sense, trade at fairs cannot be seen as representative of trade in general. 
However, an analysis of the eff ects of fairs on market performance and 
of the contribution of economic and political factors to the rise of fairs 
does help to answer the questions on which this book focuses.
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As discussed in the Introduction, views on the role of the lesser fairs 
of the late Middle Ages diff er: sometimes they are seen as pale refl ec-
tions of the institutions of an earlier age, sometimes as fl exible solu-
tions to new economic needs.2 Th e chapter therefore begins with an 
attempt at clarifi cation by positioning these two opposing views in a 
transaction costs perspective. Th e next step is a reconstruction of the 
pace and timing of the development of fairs in medieval Holland. Until 
now, such an overall view has been lacking. In his article on medieval 
fairs in the northern Low Countries, Robert Feenstra gives examples 
but does not present a full survey. Later research has either followed 
the same approach or has been restricted to an individual fair or a 
small cluster of fairs.3 Th is makes it diffi  cult to grasp the role fairs 
played in late medieval trade. A chronological reconstruction of the 
rise of fairs in Holland and a comparison with developments in 
England and Flanders can remedy this situation. Th e chapter then con-
tinues with an analysis of the role of these fairs in local trade and in the 
regional and interregional trade in some of the products of Holland’s 
agricultural specialisation as it took shape from the late 14th century: 
dairy, cattle, and horses. Th e fi nal section focuses on the factors that 
caused the emergence of fairs.
2.2 Fairs and transaction costs
If fairs represent a necessary, but sub-optimal phase in the develop-
ment of commerce, their early decline should be seen as a sign of 
advance: they made way for more effi  cient institutions. If, on the other 
hand, fairs demonstrate commercial and institutional vitality and fl ex-
ibility, it is the proliferation and continuation of fairs that signals pro-
gress rather than their demise. A transaction cost approach, based on 
the distinction between costs for providing security on the one hand 
and costs for matching supply and demand (in this case primarily 
search and information costs) on the other, can assist us here: it pro-
vides a theoretical foundation for the assessment of the contribution of 
fairs to market effi  ciency, which can in turn be used to interpret the 
role of fairs in medieval Holland.
2 For the historiographical background of these two views, see section 1.3.
3 Feenstra, ‘Les foires’, 220–221; Noordegraaf, ‘Internal Trade’; Noordegraaf, Atlas 
Nederlandse marktsteden; Ibelings, ‘Hollandse paardenmarkten’.
 fairs 37
4 Van Houtte, ‘Les foires’, 179–180.
5 Bautier, ‘Foires de Champagne’, 117–126.
6 Wedemeyer Moore, Fairs of Medieval England, 158–166, 285, 287; cf. Greif, 
‘Institutions and Impersonal Exchange’, 185, 189.
7 Van Houtte, ‘Les foires’, 179–180, 201–202.
On the issue of security, fairs traditionally had important advan-
tages over other trade venues. Fairgoers enjoyed the benefi ts of a 
special legal regime that both provided protection from arrest for pre-
viously contracted debts and ensured the quick administration of jus-
tice for transgressions committed at the fair.4 Th e ways in which this 
protection was eff ectuated diff ered. Th e elaborate system employed by 
the counts of the Champagne region in the late 13th century was 
unique. It was based on a series of agreements with neighbouring lords 
that forced these rulers, on pain of exclusion of their subjects from the 
Champagne fairs, to ensure safety on the roads and to grant the gardes 
de foire access to their territories in order to enforce contracts entered 
into at the fair.5 In England the Crown was supposed to respect and 
enforce the right of all merchants to travel freely in the realm since 
Magna Carta. In addition, special royal safeguards were frequently 
granted to individuals and groups of merchants visiting the fairs. 
Beyond this, the role of the Crown was limited; but the individual 
owners of the great international fairs employed guards to maintain 
law and order at the fair, and they installed special fair courts that, just 
as at the Champagne fairs, provided a quick and accessible means to 
resolve commercial confl icts. Th ese courts allowed for a system of con-
tract enforcement based on individual liability, even though commu-
nal elements such as boycotts were also used.6
Special fair courts did not exist in the southern Low Countries, where 
the competence of the local courts was temporarily extended over the 
fair and its visitors. However, the urban authorities fully respected 
the guarantees for a safe arrival, sojourn, and departure granted by the 
counts of Flanders and the dukes of Brabant to visitors to the fairs; in 
fact, the Brabant towns, and Antwerp in particular, actively exerted 
themselves to punish any infringement of these rights and to ensure 
full protection for fairgoers on the road.7 Although the mechanisms 
for providing security diff ered, the eff ects were similar: the costs of 
contracting and of the protection of property rights were kept in check.
Despite the unpretentious character of most of Holland’s fairs, guar-
antees for the safety of visitors appear to have been as common as at 
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 8 OHZ III, 1525.
 9 Van Berkum, Beschryving Schoonhoven, 63–68.
10 De Boer, Faber, and Jansen, Rekeningen grafelijkheid III, 15, 23, 26.
11 Blok, Leidsche rechtsbronnen, 154; cf. Feenstra, ‘Les foires’, 230 n. 3.
12 Kosters, ‘Rechtsmacht over vreemdelingen’, 280–281. Th e implications of burgess 
status with regard to arrest for debts is discussed in more detail in section 7.4.
13 Van Houtte, ‘Les foires’, 180.
the large fairs abroad. Th e grant of a fair to the young town of Schiedam 
in 1270, for instance, promised all visitors, merchants or otherwise, 
foreigners or denizens, known or unknown, a safe arrival, stay, and 
departure under the protection of the count of Holland, ‘according to 
the custom of the other fairs in our county’.8 Th e license for a dairy fair 
in Schoonhoven granted more than two and a half centuries later used 
almost the same words and then went on to specify that visitors to the 
fair did not have to fear ‘capture, encumberment, arrest or harassment 
to their person or to their merchandise because of any debts whatso-
ever, as long as these debts are not made at the aforesaid fair’.9
Th e fairs of Holland had no special law courts: just as in the south-
ern Low Countries, local courts were responsible for administering 
justice. We know that the fairs were policed. In the late 14th century 
the bailiff  of Heusden sent men over to Giessen every year to guard the 
fair in this village.10 Other than that, little is known about the practi-
calities of the safeguards. However, a case from mid-15th century 
Leiden shows that they were not mere standard formulas but had real 
meaning. A man named Th omas Cantels had been trying to recover a 
debt by seizing some property of the debtor—under normal circum-
stances a perfectly legal procedure if the debtor came from out of town. 
He found himself stopped by the local court on the grounds that dur-
ing the fair ‘nobody can be distrained or arrested’.11 Th is is not surpris-
ing. Th e fairs’ special legal regime mattered mainly to foreigners, as 
locals were protected from arbitrary arrest by their burgess status; 
but in medieval Holland, as in other parts of Europe, visitors from a 
neighbouring town or from the surrounding countryside were also 
considered ‘foreigners’.12 Th erefore it is perfectly understandable that 
protection from arrest mattered not only to visitors of large interna-
tional fairs, but also to those of small regional fairs.
Th ere are strong indications that by the end of the Middle Ages the 
comparative advantage of this special legal regime was disappearing. 
In his study of fairs in medieval Flanders and Brabant, J.A. van Houtte 
states that immunity from arrest was restricted to fairs exclusively.13 
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14 Niermeyer, Bronnen Beneden-Maasgebied, no. 177; freedom from arrest is con-
fi rmed in the renewal of Geertruidenberg’s license for a weekly cattle market in 1398 
(Niermeyer, Bronnen Beneden-Maasgebied, no. 713; De Jong, ‘Veemarkt Geertru i-
denberg’, 250–251). Possibly an even earlier reference comes from Schiedam, which in 
1270 received a license for a fair; in the document, the pre-existing weekly market is 
referred to with the term ‘similiter cum omni libertate’ (OHZ III, no. 1524).
15 Cerutti, Geschiedenis Breda, 110 (Breda, 1321); ‘Inventaris Oud Archief 
’s-Hertogenbosch’, summary of inv. no. 3876 (Den Bosch, 1328). Cf. the Brabant village 
of Lith, which was granted a free weekly market in 1359 by its ecclesiastical lord 
(BHIC, ‘Lokale geschiedenis’).
16 Niermeyer, Bronnen Beneden-Maasgebied, no. 320 (Heerjansdam, 1340); 
Chronologisch register vervolg Groot-Charterboek, 14 (Westenrijk, 1439); Breen, 
Rechtsbronnen Amsterdam, 76 (Amsterdam, 1469).
17 Gelderblom, ‘Decline’, 229.
18 Rollin Coucerque and Meerkamp van Embden, Rechtsbronnen Gouda, 303.
However, in late medieval Holland weekly markets increasingly off ered 
the same kind of protection. One of the fi rst documents to illustrate 
this dates from 1307: in this year the count of Holland forbade his sub-
jects to visit the new weekly market in Heusden, just across the south-
ern border, but he simultaneously promised them immunity from 
arrest at the Geertruidenberg market that they were supposed to visit 
instead.14 Th e episode indicates that competition between Holland and 
its neighbours may have infl uenced the decision; and indeed, contrary 
to Van Houtte’s statement, some Brabant towns just across the border 
(Breda and Den Bosch for instance) also had ‘free’ weekly markets.15 
In the 14th and early 15th centuries, free weekly markets were also 
established in some villages in the south of Holland. Th e fact that in 
1469 the market of Amsterdam is also referred to as ‘free’ suggests that 
by then immunity had also been introduced for at least some pre-exist-
ing markets in other parts of the county.16
Subsequently, the need for any kind of periodic reinforcement of 
protection from arrest seems to have diminished. Firstly, in contrast to 
Bruges and Antwerp, the rise of Amsterdam as an international trade 
centre was not based on a pre-existing cycle of fairs. It relied on the 
commitment of local and central authorities to the safety of Amsterdam’s 
foreign visitors throughout the year and on a system of confl ict resolu-
tion answering to commercial needs as it had developed in regular 
law.17 Secondly, for some of Holland’s local or regional fairs, traditional 
immunity was abandoned and replaced by regular urban law. In early 
16th-century Gouda the authorities issued a proclamation that during 
the next fair urban law would apply; they obligingly added a warning 
to beware of damages that might result.18 Th e immediate cause for this 
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19 Van Houtte, ‘Les foires’, 203–205.
20 Van Mieris, Groot charterboek II, 698 (for a reference to the Frisian visitors 
cf. 604).
21 A more detailed discussion of these systems, their eff ects, and their backgrounds 
follows in Chapter 7.
22 Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, 125–126.
23 Breen, Rechtsbronnen Amsterdam, 297, 298, 304–305, 306–307, 309, 311–312, 
317–317, 362, 382, 399, 402. On one occasion a similar safeguard was issued for the 
intervention was probably the unwanted side-eff ect of the immunity 
from arrest. Van Houtte uncovered several instances of abuse for the 
15th-century Brabant fairs: people took advantage of the immunity 
from arrest in order to escape the obligation to repay previously con-
tracted debts.19 In fact, the fi rst reference of this kind in Holland dates 
back to the middle of the 14th century. In 1345 the Alkmaar authori-
ties complained that the fairs were leaving their town ‘lawless’ (rech-
teloes) for weeks on end: they requested and obtained permission to 
apply regular urban law instead.20 Certainly, this was a year in which 
trade was slack, probably as a consequence of the war with the Frisians 
who normally visited Alkmaar. Th at might explain why in this case the 
disadvantages of immunity from arrest outweighed the advantages. Yet 
in both Alkmaar and Gouda it is unlikely that the traditional immu-
nity would have been set aside if effi  cient alternative systems of confl ict 
resolution were not available.21
Th e advance of these alternative systems should not be overrated. 
Events in the last decades of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th 
century make it clear that in times of crisis immunity from arrest could 
still be a valued attribute. In these years many towns and villages in 
Holland were experiencing serious fi nancial problems, caused by a 
combination of economic decline and unrelenting fi scal demands 
from the central government. Th ey had to borrow heavily to provide 
the necessary funding.22 In cases like this, concerning public debt, the 
idea of communal responsibility was still very much alive: travellers 
from indebted communities risked arrest for the debts of their town or 
village of origin. Th is probably explains the series of explicit safeguards 
for visitors to both fairs and weekly markets dating from the late 15th 
and early 16th century. Amsterdam is a good example: between 1494 
and 1512 the magistrate of Amsterdam repeatedly issued ordinances to 
assure the inhabitants from the surrounding towns and villages that 
visitors to the market and the fairs in Lent and September need not 
fear arrest for the debts of their community.23 Similar assurances were 
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weeks between October 18 and November 11—perhaps to accommodate the autumn 
cattle trade? (Ibid., 339).
24 Noord-Hollands Archief, Stadsbestuur van Haarlem (stadsarchief van Haarlem), 
inv. no. 666–669 (Haarlem; the 1512 safe-conduct is printed in Handvesten Haerlem, 
186–187); Korteweg, Rechtsbronnen Woudrichem, 334 art. 62 (Woudrichem); 
Handtvesten Enchuysen, 47–48 (Enkhuizen); ‘Octrooi van de wekelijkse marktdag’ 
(IJsselstein); Rollin Coucerque and Meerkamp van Embden, Rechtsbronnen Gouda, 
no. 178 (Gouda); Inventaris van het oud-archief der stad Edam, 7 (Edam).
25 Accessibility to outside traders is a common feature of fairs all over Europe. 
Cf. for Flanders, Van Houtte, ‘Les foires’, 200–201; for England, Wedemeyer Moore, 
Fairs of Medieval England, 93–94. Accessibility of urban markets in general will be 
discussed in section 3.2.
26 Hay, ‘Notes’; Hay, ‘Some Alternatives’; Bromley, Symanski, and Good, ‘Rationale 
of Periodic Marketing’.
given to visitors of the Lucasfair in Haarlem by the central authori-
ties, at the request of the Haarlem magistrate. Likewise, the installation 
(or confi rmation) of free weekly markets in such diverse towns as 
Woudrichem, Enkhuizen, Gouda, Edam, and IJsselstein around this 
time is probably not a coincidence.24 Still, these were extra-ordinary 
circumstances; moreover, the fact that the revival of immunity applied 
to weekly markets as well as to fairs supports the impression that at this 
stage the comparative advantage of fairs with regard to the costs of 
security was no longer of great signifi cance.
But fairs off ered other advantages besides protection from arrest: they 
also provided opportunities to reduce search and information costs. 
Because fairs were periodic events with a low frequency and also 
because—in contrast to permanent and weekly markets in many 
towns—access was usually open to outsiders,25 they were able to attract 
a concentration of supply and demand that other trade venues could 
not always equal. Intuitively we would expect the advantages fairs had 
over permanent trade in this respect to diminish when aggregate trade 
volumes expanded. However, research in present-day developing 
countries has shown that the relation with scale is not as direct as that. 
In some cases periodic markets can be very persistent even when total 
trade volume increases: they lower costs for petty traders serving 
small communities and for merchants buying up small surpluses, and 
they reduce the time investment small producers have to make to sell 
their products.26
Circumstances in medieval Europe were probably similar. Small 
towns and villages were numerous; periodic visits to several of these 
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27 Th is argument is made by James Masschaele (Peasants, Merchants, and Markets, 
53–54) to explain the profusion of rural markets in medieval England; cf. Mitchell, 
‘Changing Role of fairs’, 557–558, for an 18th-century view on the advantages of dairy 
fairs over private dairy trade in the Midlands.
28 Th e system of licensing and the diff erences between England and Holland will be 
discussed in more detail in section 2.5.
communities off ered retailers in non-daily items a chance to spread 
costs. For small producers, especially for peasants producing seasonal 
commodities and living some distance away from the centres of 
demand, fairs provided good opportunities for selling the produce of a 
season without taking up too much time and—because of the competi-
tion between buying merchants—at a better price than in private 
transactions. For the merchants who acted as buyers, fairs saved time 
and money in comparison with the alternative of buying at the farm-
house gate.27
In Holland, with its large number of landowning smallholders, these 
advantages may well have carried even more weight than elsewhere. 
To itinerant traders and smallholding peasants, fairs must have pro-
vided attractive opportunities to reduce search and information costs 
in the 13th and early 14th century. With the rise of market-oriented 
dairy and cattle farming in the late 14th and 15th century, the benefi ts 
of a dense network of fairs must have been even greater.
In short, even if in late medieval Holland fairs were no longer essen-
tial for trade from the perspective of security, their contribution to the 
reduction of search and information costs in local and regional trade 
was still vital. Th e analysis in the next section of the development of 
the number of fairs demonstrates the eff ects of the interaction of these 
two apparently opposite trends.
2.3 Fairs in Holland: a chronological reconstruction
Any attempt to reconstruct the development of fairs in Holland must 
take into account the availability, reliability, and validity of the sources. 
In contrast to England, where early governmental centralisation guar-
anteed both an eff ective royal control over market rights and a fairly 
systematic recording of them from about 1200 onwards, formal licenses 
for markets and fairs do not appear regularly in the Holland sources 
until the late 13th century.28 Only by screening a wide range of sources 
is it possible to gain insight into the development of fairs over time, 
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although even then there is no guarantee of completeness. A survey of 
fairs held in medieval Holland has been compiled by systematically 
checking the most important editions of comital and local charters, 
accounts, and by-laws for references (see Appendix A). Th e analysis of 
the development of fairs in the following sections focuses on the 13th, 
14th, and early 15th centuries, but in order to be able to position the 
results in a long-term perspective, the survey also covers the 12th cen-
tury and the latter half of the 15th century.
Table 1 shows three sets of data derived from this survey. Th e fi rst 
column shows the number of newly licensed fairs in each 50-year inter-
val. Th e second column shows the total number of fairs fi rst recorded 
in each 50-year interval. Th e fi gures include the newly licensed fairs 
referred to in the fi rst column but also all other fi rst recordings of 
apparently unlicensed fairs. Th e third column shows the number of 
towns and villages with fairs fi rst recorded in each 50-year interval; 
fi gures are lower than in the second column because many towns had 
more than one fair.
Figure 4 presents the geographical distribution of the towns and vil-
lages with fairs. Th e map shows, unsurprisingly, that fairs fi rst emerged 
in the oldest inhabited districts: the coastal strip and the river area. 
In the central peat district and in the north the share of places that 
Table 1 Number of medieval fairs in Holland
Number of newly 
licensed fairs
Number of new 
recordings of fairs 
(licensed or unlicensed)
Number of new 
recordings of towns 
and villages with 
one or more fairs 
(licensed or 
unlicensed)
before 1200 – 1 1
1201–1250 3 7 5
1251–1300 7 13 9
1301–1350 15 29 12
1351–1400 20* 27 11
1401–1450 6 11 6




Sources: see Appendix A
*: Including formal permission to Monnickendam, as a part of the charter of urban liberties, to 
uphold the three existing fairs.
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Figure 4 Towns and villages with fairs
Sources: see Appendix A
Map: G-O graphics, Wijk bij Duurstede
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were not recorded as having a fair until the late 14th or the 15th cen-
tury is larger.
Once established, not all fairs continued to function throughout the 
period under investigation; in some cases there is reason to believe 
they were never actually launched at all. Since it is not always possible 
to trace the fate of individual fairs with certainty, Figure 5 distinguishes 
four categories. Th e fi rst covers the fairs that have left  traces in the 
sources around or aft er the given date and therefore almost certainly 
still existed. Th e second category covers the fairs that functioned ear-
lier, but for which there is no evidence around or aft er the given date. 
It is possible that these fairs were still there, but it is by no means cer-
tain. A third category covers the fairs for which only an offi  cial license 
could be found, without any additional evidence that the fair ever 
materialised: it is improbable that the fairs in this category ever really 
functioned and, if they did, even less likely that they continued to do so 
for long. Th e fi nal category covers the fairs for which there are clear 
indications that they ceased to exist; in most cases these indications are 
remarks in the comital accounts stating a fair no longer rendered any 
toll revenues because it had decayed.
Although the table and the graph approach the issue from diff erent 
angles, they suggest the same thing: fairs began to emerge in the 13th 
century and multiplied in the 14th century, while aft er 1400 growth 
rates declined. However, results for all three phases require a critical 
evaluation.
Th e number of fairs in the 12th and 13th centuries may well have 
been underestimated as a result of the paucity of early sources: there is 
a very real possibility fairs have been overlooked because they did not 
Figure 5 Survival of fairs fi rst recorded before 1500
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29 Vis, ‘De “Historia”’, 124–125.
30 Th e fi rst reference to the two fairs in administrative sources dates from 1246, 
when they are mentioned as the dates for making a payment (OHZ II, 680). For the 
1204 reference to Voorschoten, see Gumbert-Hepp and Gumbert, Annalen van 
Egmond, 323–324.
31 OHZ II, no. 680 art. 59 (Delft ); OHZ III, nos. 1435 (Leiden), 1442 (Haarlem), 
1583 (Alkmaar); Niermeyer, Bronnen Beneden-Maasgebied, no. 39 (Vlaardingen); 
Henderikx, ‘Graaf en stad’, 50.
32 Henderikx, ‘Graaf en stad’, 50; Cordfunke, Alkmaar in prehistorie en middeleeu-
wen, 52, 55, 56; Gumbert-Hepp and Gumbert, Annalen van Egmond, 176; Oppermann, 
Fontes Egmundenses, 64, 69, 74, 75, 76, 83.
leave any traces in the documents. In addition, several fairs that are 
fi rst recorded in the 13th or early 14th century probably have older 
roots. It is not a coincidence that the only fair mentioned before the 
year 1200 was held near Egmond Abbey, on the festival of St. Adalbert, 
the abbey’s patron saint. We are informed about it because the author 
of the Miracula Nova Sancti Adalberti, writing in Egmond around 
1140, mentions it: he laments the preoccupation of some of the West-
Frisian visitors to the festival with business and socialising at the fair 
instead of with devotion.29 But the records of Egmond are unique in 
Holland: no other source is as detailed and dates back as far in time. 
Th is obscures the view on similar fairs in the rest of the county. Th e 
rural fairs of Valkenburg and Voorschoten for instance, both situated 
near Leiden, were well-established by the middle of the 13th century. 
As will be discussed later, around that time all kinds of payments were 
scheduled at these fairs. Th is suggests an early start, and indeed there 
is a chance reference to the Voorschoten fair dating from 1204 in the 
Egmond records supporting the suggestion—but that is all we have.30
Likewise we are left  in the dark about the origins of the fairs in Hol-
land’s oldest urban settlements. For Leiden, Haarlem, Delft , Alkmaar, 
and Vlaardingen, fairs are fi rst attested between 1246 and 1272, in all 
cases as existing institutions.31 All of these towns had probably begun 
to develop as regional market centres in the 12th century, even though 
documentary evidence is available only for Alkmaar. Th anks to its 
proximity to and links with Egmond Abbey, we are informed about 
the destruction of the forum of Alkmaar by the West-Frisians in 1132 
and also of the existence in the 12th century of a toll, a monetarius 
(mint master), and an Alkmaar grain measure.32 A market function 
of this kind suggests that the fair in Alkmaar may have pre-dated 
the third quarter of the 13th century, although it is impossible to say 
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33 In 1215 the abbot of Egmond granted, among other rights, half of the toll of the 
‘consecration of the church’ and one third of the toll in Alkmaar to Willem the son of 
the lord of Egmond. Th e Alkmaar toll may or may not refer to a fair; the other toll 
probably does relate to a fair; but since no location is mentioned, this might just as well 
be the fair in Egmond (OHZ I, no. 357).
34 OHZ IV, no. 2385 (Medemblik); Hamaker, Rekeningen grafelijkheid I, 7.
Th e item in the account records the revenues of the Muiden toll. Because the sum it 
renders is very high compared with the entry for the ‘Muiden market toll’ in 1342 (the 
next account available), C.L. Verkerk has suggested that the 1308 entry might refer to 
the revenues of a river toll instead of a market toll (Verkerk, ‘Tollen en waterwegen’, 
111). However, that is unlikely: in both accounts the Muiden toll revenues are directly 
followed by the Ouderamstel toll revenues, referred to as the ‘Ouderamstel market toll’ 
in 1342, which experienced a similar drop. Ouderamstel, as far as we know, has never 
been the location of a river toll.
35 Besteman, ‘Pre-Urban development of Medemblik’, 4, 9, 21–28. Verkerk, ‘Tollen 
en waterwegen’, 110–111; Van Vliet, ‘Utrecht, Muiden’, 19–21.
36 Burgers, Dijkhof, and Kruisheer, ‘Doordringing van het schrift ’, 203–207. 
According to the authors (197–201) some towns, Dordrecht foremost among them, 
began to systematically keep registers and accounts even before the count did, but 
until the late 14th century only a fraction of what the urban clerks produced has 
survived. For the fi rst comital accounts, see Hamaker, Rekeningen grafelijkheid I.
by how much.33 Th is is also true for the fairs in the other towns just 
mentioned. In fact it might be signifi cant that for Medemblik and 
Muiden, the two towns in Holland with a commercial role going back 
to an even more distant past, fairs are also recorded quite early: in 1289 
and 1308 respectively.34 In the Carolingian era, Medemblik was a trad-
ing centre on the Frisian trade route between Dorestad and the North 
Sea; the Frankish kings had a manor here and they probably also levied 
a toll on trade. In Muiden the bishop of Utrecht levied a toll from at 
least the late 10th century onward. At that time Utrecht was the most 
important commercial centre in the northern Low Countries; Muiden 
seems to have served as an outport. Th e relatively early emergence of 
fairs in these towns suggests that a market function on a regional scale 
may have been preserved, even though there is no evidence for conti-
nuity of the fairs themselves.35
With the passing of time the reliability of the sources improves. By 
the end of the 13th century, the chancery of the count of Holland had 
developed into a permanent institution with a staff  of professional 
scribes. Charters were produced and registered in increasing numbers. 
Th e fi rst comital accounts that have survived date from the early 14th 
century.36 But although we gradually reach fi rmer ground, in the 14th 
century fi rst attestations of apparently already existing fairs are still 
frequent. Th e high number of ‘new fairs’ both in the fi rst and in the 
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37 See Appendix A for the locations of these fairs and for references.
38 Register van Hollandt en Westvrieslandt, indices over 1580–1590, 1591–1599, 
1600–1609 and 1610–1627; under ‘beestemarkt’, ‘markt’ and ‘paardenmarkt’.
39 Britnell, Commercialisation, 160–161.
40 For the international fairs in general and the fair of St. Ives in particular, see 
Wedemeyer Moore, Fairs of Medieval England; for the proliferation of lesser fairs Brit-
nell, Commercialisation, 88–91; Letters, ‘Online Gazetteer of Markets and Fairs’. Th e 
exact number of fairs recorded before 1350 (2,342) was obtained by communication 
second half of the century is therefore at least partly the result of 
belated recordings of older institutions.
Over time the number of these belated recordings must have faded 
out. Th is sheds a somewhat diff erent light on what looks like a sharp 
drop in the number of new fairs around the year 1400: fi gures for the 
late 14th century are fl attered by late recordings of pre-existing fairs, 
whereas those for the 15th century are probably more realistic. 
However, the diff erence is such that it is most likely there was a real 
decline in growth rates; the number of fairs in operation may even 
have stabilised in the early 15th century. Th is should not be taken as a 
sign that the era of fairs was coming to an end. As Figure 5 illustrates, 
the majority of fairs established before 1400 continued to function 
aft er that date. Furthermore, judging by the number of licenses, new 
fairs continued to be founded even aft er 1500: in the fi rst half of the 
16th century licenses were granted for at least six more fairs.37 Moreover, 
the fact that the Estates of Holland established several new fairs in the 
late 16th and early 17th century, many of them cattle fairs, bears wit-
ness to a continued role for fairs even in the early modern era.38
Th e development of fairs in Holland stands out more clearly when it is 
compared with what happened elsewhere. In a European perspective, 
England is oft en regarded as a special case. Th e English network of 
fairs did not expand in the late Middle Ages; instead, it showed signs of 
contraction. Few new fairs emerged in the late 14th and in the 15th 
century, whereas at the same time several existing fairs decayed.39 
However, England did experience a phase of strong growth in the 13th 
and early 14th centuries. In these years a remarkable proliferation of 
fairs and markets took place. Th e phenomenon has been interpreted as 
both the refl ection of and a further stimulus to rapid commercialisa-
tion. Besides the large international fairs in Winchester, Westminster, 
St. Ives, Bury St. Edmunds, Northampton, Stamford, and Boston, the 
English sources mention more than 2,300 lesser fairs established before 
the middle of the 14th century.40 Yet a comparison with Holland 
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from the Centre for Metropolitan History. Cf. Epstein, who claims that ‘fairs were 
more numerous in England before the Black Death than anywhere else in Europe’ 
(Epstein, Freedom and Growth, 80).
41 Britnell, ‘Proliferation’, 219–220; Masschaele, ‘Multiplicity’, 257–258, 262; 
Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants and Markets, 170.
42 Th e fi gures for Holland are based on the 42 to 45 fairs in operation in the middle 
of the 14th century, a population of 235,000 (Van Bavel and Van Zanden, ‘Jump-Start’, 
505), and on an estimated area of about 4,600 square kilometres, calculated as follows: 
in 1833, when cadastral measuring began, the provinces of North-Holland and South-
Holland covered 5,511 square kilometres (CBS, Jaarcijfers, 1); about 940 square kilo-
metres were agrarian land in new polders added between 1540 and 1815 (De Vries and 
Van der Woude, First Modern Economy, 31). No attempt has been made to correct for 
land loss or reclamations between 1350 and 1540. Th e fi gures for the number of fairs 
per 100 square kilometres in England are based on the information of the Centre for 
Metropolitan History. Estimates of the English population just before the Black Death 
vary considerably. Th e fi gure used here is 4.0 to 4.5 million. Th e fi rst of these two fi g-
ures is the estimate of the population in the late 13th century given by Campbell; the 
second is the lowest of the estimates given by Hatcher for 1347 (Hatcher, Plague, 68; 
Campbell, ‘Benchmarking Medieval Economic Development’, 30).
suggests that pre-Plague England may not be as exceptional as has 
been assumed.
Firstly, thanks to the superior quality of English sources, coverage 
for the early period is better than in Holland: early fairs are less likely 
to have escaped notice. Secondly, many English fairs and markets, 
especially those established aft er the middle of the 13th century, were 
short-lived: they functioned for a while, then decayed and were 
replaced by new attempts of an equally evanescent nature. Few accu-
rate data are available for fairs, but for weekly markets some research 
has been done on 13th- and 14th-century survival rates. In Northamp-
tonshire, only 27 of the 43 markets recorded before 1330 were actually 
functioning in that year. For Huntingdonshire, the corresponding fi g-
ures (in the year 1348) are 9 to 11 out of 18 markets.41 If the two coun-
ties refl ect a wider pattern and if fairs did not do better or worse than 
markets, perhaps half to two-thirds of the fairs recorded before the 
middle of the 14th century were actually functioning at that time. Th at 
would amount to an average of 0.9 to 1.2 fairs per 100 square kilome-
tres or, expressed as a per capita fi gure, 2.6 to 3.9 fairs per 10,000 
inhabitants. Th e corresponding numbers in Holland are 0.9 to 1.0 fairs 
per 100 square kilometres (which equals the English fi gure), or 1.8 to 
1.9 fairs per 10,000 people—somewhat fewer than in England, but not 
inordinately so, especially when the diff erence in the quality of sources 
is taken into account.42
Admittedly there is a striking diff erence between Holland and 
England in another respect. Whereas in Holland fairs were largely 
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43 On the formation of the cycle of the fi ve fairs and the existence of other fairs in 
the 11th and 12th century, see Yamada, ‘Mouvement des foires’. Some examples of 
13th-century fairs are given by Van Houtte, ‘Les foires’, 188. Fairs in small towns and 
villages in late medieval Flanders are discussed by Stabel, Kleine stad, 256–258.
44 Benders, ‘Item instituimus’, 657.
45 Pauly, ‘Foires luxembourgeoises’, esp. 110, 116–117, 119.
46 Assuming that Guelders covered about 6,600 square kilometres (the area of the 
present province of Gelderland plus 33% for the Overkwartier), the total of 72 to 75 
fairs recorded before the middle of the 16th century comes down to 1.1 fair per 100 
square kilometres; the 82 fairs recorded in Luxembourg before the end of the 16th 
century result in a fi gure of 3.2 fairs per 100 square kilometres. In both cases, this 
includes fairs that may not have survived until the end of the period. Th e fi gures 
urban aff airs—of the 96 fairs recorded before 1500, about 85% were 
located in a town—a considerable number of English fairs took place 
in the countryside, in villages or at manors.
Information on fairs in Flanders, apart from the cycle of the fi ve major 
fairs in Lille, Ypres, Messines, Th ourout, and Bruges, is unfortunately 
scanty. A systematic inventory is not available; therefore a quantitative 
comparison with Holland is not possible. At the time the well-known 
cycle of the fi ve Flemish fairs emerged—in the second half of the 12th 
century—a number of other fairs already existed, but they were prob-
ably relegated to a second-rank position when the fi ve rose to promi-
nence. Th ere is scattered evidence that additional fairs were established 
in the 13th century. More importantly, there are clear indications that 
fairs emerged in many small Flemish towns between the 14th and the 
16th century, and with the rise of the rural textile industry also in an 
increasing number of villages.43
For other parts of the Low Countries, more quantitative  information 
is available. Research by Jeroen Benders, partly based on the accounts 
of the counts (later the dukes) of Guelders, has shown that in this 
region by the late 13th century twenty fairs were in operation, while 
the total number of fairs recorded before the middle of the 16th cen-
tury is 72 to 75. Th e dates of establishment of the new fairs, as far 
as they are available, indicate that the 15th and not, as in Holland, 
the 14th century was the period of strongest growth.44 Likewise, for 
Luxembourg (and Lorraine) Michel Pauly describes a steady increase 
in the number of fairs between the 12th and the 16th century.45 At the 
end of the Middle Ages, Luxembourg may have had more fairs per 100 
square kilometres than Holland. Guelders probably had less, but as 
both Luxembourg and Guelders were not nearly as densely populated 
as Holland, per capita fi gures must have been higher than in Holland 
in both cases.46
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A preliminary conclusion about the contribution of Holland’s fairs 
to the functioning of commodity markets in general can now be drawn. 
Th e foundations for a network of fairs was in place well before the mid-
dle of the 14th century, much as it was in England; moreover, and in 
contrast to England, growth continued strongly in the second half of 
the 14th century. As fairs at this stage both improved security and 
reduced search and information costs, the dense network that resulted 
must have given the effi  ciency of commodity markets a boost. In this 
light, the fact that aft er 1400 intensifi cation slowed down is not neces-
sarily a sign of stagnation. Th e development of alternative mechanisms 
for the protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts 
may have reduced the need for more fairs; and in many cases the den-
sity of the existing network may have suffi  ced to keep search and infor-
mation costs at acceptable levels. We shall return to this hypothesis 
later; but in order to do so, it is necessary to investigate in more detail 
fi rstly the role of economic and secondly the role of political factors in 
the development of fairs.
2.4 Economic function
One way to discover more about the contribution of economic factors 
to the rise of fairs in Holland is by investigating the trade conducted at 
these fairs. Information is scarce, but every now and then glimpses of 
what was occurring do show up in charters or accounts: information 
on the type of transactions, the products that changed hands, catch-
ment areas, and trade volumes. As a frame of reference, it is helpful to 
distinguish between two types of fairs frequently found in medieval 
Holland: predominantly retail and predominantly wholesale. Many 
fairs were characterised by a predominance of retailing by itinerant 
traders and local producers to consumers in a region of limited pro-
portions, usually a town and its immediate surroundings. A wide vari-
ety of products was sold at these fairs. Other fairs were dominated by 
wholesale transactions between agrarian producers in a region and 
merchants buying their products in order to market them elsewhere. 
Trade at these fairs was characterised by a certain degree of specialisa-
tion and oft en—though not always—by larger catchment areas.47
should therefore be compared to a similarly construed estimate for Holland, which 
arrives at 2.1 fairs per 100 square kilometres in 1500.
47 Th e fi rst type corresponds with the ‘lokalen Versorgungsjahrmarkt’ in the classi-
fi cation of fairs proposed by Rothmann (Rothmann, ‘Überall ist Jahrmarkt’, 104–105). 
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Th e second type mirrors Rothmann’s ‘Regionalen Gewerbejahrmarkt’ except for the 
fact that in Holland this type of fair focused on agrarian and not on industrial com-
modities. Rothmann distinguishes fi ve more categories, none of which are clearly rec-
ognisable in Holland, although as will be explained in section 2.5 the oldest markets 
probably originated as ‘Lokaler grundherrschaft lichen Sammeljahrmarkt’.
48 For the Gouda cloth fair at the end of the 15th century, see Ibelings, ‘Markt 
Middeleeuws Gouda’, 48–49; Winnink, ‘Markt in Gouda’. Th e fair was visited by many 
merchants from various towns in Holland; although it is not clear who the buyers 
were, it is likely they included other merchants or retailers besides local consumers. 
For the installation or confi rmation of a cloth fair and fi ve other fairs in Gorinchem 
in 1382, see Bruch, Middeleeuwsche rechtsbronnen Gorinchem I, no. 21; Stamkot, 
Geschiedenis van Gorinchem, 27.
49 De Jager, Middeleeuwsche keuren Brielle, 171–174.
It should be clear that the intention is not to categorise every single 
fair appearing in the sources. Firstly, fairs were rarely exclusively 
devoted to either retail or wholesale functions, and the emphasis some-
times shift ed over time; this can make classifi cation of individual fairs 
hazardous. Moreover, the two types are not exhaustive. Th e rare exam-
ples of cloth fairs, for instance—there were specialised cloth fairs 
in Gouda and in Gorinchem—do not quite fi t the categorisation.48 
Nonetheless, distinguishing between the two types that cover the 
majority of fairs in medieval Holland allows for a better understanding 
of the economic function of these fairs.
Local retailing
In Holland, as elsewhere, the fairs characterised by a predominance of 
local retailing were probably quite numerous. A well-documented 
example is the fair in the small town of Brielle. An urban by-law that 
was revised in 1445—and must therefore date from before this year—
regulates the location of the stalls of a variety of tradesmen. Th e list 
begins with cloth retailers, both from Brielle and elsewhere. Th ey are 
followed by traders of metal objects like locks and scissors, of shoes, 
cake, mercery, jewelry, leather belts and bags, wooden plates, lanterns, 
wooden furniture, and peltry. Certainly the fact that the fi rst fi ve of the 
nine days the fair lasted are referred to as entry days—as at the large 
international fairs abroad—suggests that the urban authorities at least 
hoped to attract trade on a grander scale. However, the enumeration 
of commodities as a whole makes it clear that retailing to locals 
dominated.49
Bits and pieces of information from other locations indicate that 
there were many fairs with a similar role. A clue is provided by the 
fact that in some towns, especially small towns in an early stage of 
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50 Muller, ‘Oude register graaf Florens’, 172 (Vlaardingen); Hamaker, Rekeningen 
grafelijkheid I, 184; II, 21, 126 (’s-Gravenzande); Hamaker, Rekeningen grafelijkheid I, 
268–269 (Monnickendam).
51 Van Gent and Janse, ‘Van ridders tot baronnen’, 42.
52 Hamaker, Rekeningen grafelijkheid I, 64–65.
53 RAL AG, inv no. 334–36 f 27v, 334–37 f 26.
54 Breen, Rechtsbronnen Amsterdam, 76, 533 ; Rollin Coucerque and Meerkamp van 
Embden, Rechtsbronnen Gouda, 301; but see also 363–365 for an enumeration of much 
less valuable articles such as knives, shoes, pots and second-hand clothing. Cf. Noorde-
graaf, Atlas Nederlandse marktsteden, 24: in the 17th century, many fairs specialised in 
luxury items and trinkets.
development, a convenient distribution of fairs over the year was 
scheduled. Vlaardingen, for instance, had a summer fair and a winter 
fair in the late 13th century. In the middle of the 14th century, 
’s-Gravenzande had fairs in March and October, and Monnickendam 
had a ‘fi rst fair’, a ‘middle fair’, and a ‘last fair’.50 Th is suggests a response 
to the need to regularly stock up with some of the necessities of life that 
weekly or daily markets did not provide.
For the 13th and 14th centuries, detailed information on what was 
sold at these fairs is scarce, but cloth was probably an important item. 
We are best informed about the fairs of Valkenburg and Voorschoten. 
Th e owners of these fairs, the lords of Wassenaer, levied impositions on 
the measuring of cloth.51 Moreover, one of the oldest comital accounts—
dating from 1317—has entries for two small purchases of cloth at the 
Valkenburg fair, to be made into items of clothing for the children of 
two noblemen who had been placed in the count’s care.52 If the early 
15th-century situation is any indication, the range of products con-
sumers could buy at these fairs probably also included foodstuff s. In 
1423 and 1424, for instance, the Catharinagasthuis (St. Catherine’s 
hospital) in Leiden sent a servant to the fair of nearby Valkenburg in 
order to purchase cheese.53
Th e Brielle example shows that local fairs were not put out of busi-
ness by the rise of better-equipped, permanent urban markets in the 
course of the Middle Ages, although they may well have concentrated 
more on certain specialised or even luxury consumer items. Late 15th- 
and early 16th-century references to the sale of jewelry at fairs in 
Amsterdam and Gouda confi rm this impression.54 Th e explanation is 
to be found in the fact that for the traders of these commodities fairs 
helped to lower search and information costs: they made it possible to 
spread costs and off er access to a concentration of potential customers 
at the same time.
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Wholesale of agricultural products
Most of the fairs dominated by wholesale trade in a limited range of 
agricultural products came into being aft er the middle of the 14th cen-
tury. A fi rst impression of the commodities these fairs specialised in 
can be gleaned from their occurrence over the year. Figure 6 shows in 
which months the fairs fi rst recorded between 1350 and 1500 took 
place.
Two peaks are clearly visible. Th e one in July has a double back-
ground. Firstly, it indicates the popularity of the dairy trade: July was a 
good time for selling the cheese produced during spring and early 
summer. Some of the July fairs served this purpose. Secondly, several 
other July fairs were horse fairs. Th e peak in October is related to the 
sale of fattened livestock ready for slaughter: many of these fairs were 
cattle fairs. Th e role of fairs in the trade of all three commodities (dairy, 
cattle, and horses) deserves more attention.
Th e timing of the rise of dairy trade at fairs suggests a link with 
the development of commercial dairy farming in the second half of 
the 14th century, stimulated by both ecological changes—the subsid-
ence of the peat soil reduced possibilities for arable farming—and the 
rising demand for dairy products among the urban middle classes, 
who in the aft ermath of the Black Death had seen their purchasing 
Figure 6 Periodicity of fairs fi rst recorded between 1350 and 1500
Source: see Appendix A.
Th e graph covers 44 fairs; for two fairs the dates are unknown. For the dating of the 
fairs that were linked to the movable Christian holidays two options are indicated, the 
fi rst corresponding with the earliest possible date for Easter (March 22) and the second 


















Early Easter date Late Easter date
 fairs 55
55 Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Agricultural Production’, 101; Van Bavel and Gelderblom, 
‘Land of Milk and Butter’, 56.
56 Weststrate, In het kielzog, 106–107.
57 Nirrnheim, Hamburgische Pfund- und Werkzollbuch, nos. 171, 174, 204, 269.
58 Smit, Opkomst, 71.
59 For a detailed calculation per town or village of origin, see Table 3; the translation 
into kilograms is based on the Alkmaar butter barrel of 158 kg and a schippond of 300 
pounds of 0.494 kg each (Verhoeff , Oude Nederlandse maten en gewichten, 3, 119, 123).
60 Sneller, Deventer, 56–63 (trade from Holland to Deventer) and 94 ff . (trade 
between Deventer and the German lands); Van Bavel and Gelderblom, ‘Land of Milk 
and Butter’, 57–58.
61 Van Mieris, Groot charterboek III, 691–693.
power grow.55 Soon, part of the dairy produced in Holland was 
exported to neighbouring regions. Th e late 14th-century accounts of 
the Guelders river tolls on the Rhine, Waal, and IJssel repeatedly men-
tion cheese from Holland, much of it probably on its way to markets in 
the German Rhineland.56 Around 1400, Holland butter and cheese 
were also transported in modest quantities to Hamburg.57 Transports 
of dairy products across the Zuiderzee date back to at least the middle 
of the 14th century.58 Less than a century later they had reached impres-
sive proportions. Th e register of the Kamper pondtol, a toll levied in 
Kampen at the mouth of the IJssel between 1439 and 1441, records 
over these two years a total of 6,700 barrels of butter and 6,800 schip-
pond of cheese, plus another 2,900 large and 97,000 small cheeses: the 
equivalent in total of 532,000 kilogram butter and at least 500,000 kilo-
gram cheese per year.59 Th e dairy products were shipped to the fairs of 
Deventer or one of the other IJssel towns, where they were sold mainly 
to German merchants. From the late 15th century onwards, the Brabant 
fairs had a similar role for dairy exports to the south.60
Several fairs in Holland, especially in the northern part of the county, 
were involved in the regional and interregional dairy trade at an earlier 
stage in the marketing process: they off ered peasants an effi  cient chan-
nel to sell their products under favourable conditions. In 1399 the 
villagers of Schermer, for instance, were granted exemption from the 
imposition on money changing when selling their dairy (and cattle) 
at the fairs of Alkmaar, Haarlem, Beverwijk, and Akersloot.61 Th at 
this was the fi rst step in a supra-local trade network is revealed by 
the accounts of the toll of Spaarndam, a toll post on the main water-
way connecting the north of Holland to the more urbanised regions 
in the south. In July 1391 the toll offi  cials registered the transport 
of 5,500 cheeses and 23 tons of butter, all purchased at the Akersloot 
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62 De Boer, Graaf en grafi ek, 365. Apart from the shipment from Akersloot, the 
direction of the transport is not mentioned in the register; in theory, dairy shipments 
from the south to the north may have been included.
63 Th e distinction between towns and villages is discussed in more detail in section 
3.1.
64 Th e role and development of these rural scales will be discussed in section 4.3.
65 Boschma-Aarnoudse, Tot verbeteringe, 124–125.
66 Usually the weigh house was leased out together with the exchange, but for a few 
years (1384/85, 1385/86, 1389/90 and 1393/94) separate data are available (NA AGH, 
1568 f 18v, 1569 f 19v, 1570 f 18v, 1571 f 10v). Weighing was usually obligatory for 
wholesale transactions, but not for retailing. Although other products were also 
weighed, in dairy-producing regions cheese must have dominated (Noordegraaf, 
‘Waag’, 21–22.)
67 Th e two towns got into a serious confl ict over the dairy fair established by impe-
rial license in Schoonhoven in the 1530s. For a description of the confl ict, see Ibelings, 
‘Confl ict over de zuivelmarkt’.
fair.62 Th is fair, situated in the middle of a dairy production region, is 
therefore a good example of a periodic market linking specialised pro-
duction areas to consumer demand elsewhere. It also seems to be the 
only rural fair with a role in the dairy trade: the other fairs mentioned 
in the charter to Schermer were all urban fairs—and so too was the 
mid 15th-century dairy fair in Hoorn discussed at the beginning of 
this chapter.63
Fairs were not the only option for peasants with dairy products to 
sell. In the northern part of Holland, village scales—where dairy could 
be weighed and sold to visiting merchants—provided an alternative.64 
Th e permanent or weekly urban markets of towns like Edam, 
Monnickendam, and Amsterdam were another possibility.65 In Hoorn 
too, the dairy trade must have been important long before the dairy 
fair was established: at more than 60 lb. Holl. per year at the end of the 
14th century, the revenues from the Hoorn weigh house suggest a 
lively trade.66
In the central and southern part of Holland, the role of fairs in the 
dairy trade was probably less pronounced than in the north; perma-
nent urban markets were more important. References to wholesale 
dairy trade at fairs in these regions are virtually absent before the 
1530s, when the installation of a new dairy fair in Schoonhoven gave 
rise to a serious confl ict with neighbouring Gouda, reminiscent of the 
confrontation between Hoorn and Alkmaar almost a century earlier.67 
Still, there is no doubt that commercial dairy production did take place 
in the central part of Holland well before the 16th century. Th e toll 
register of the Guelders river town of Tiel over the years 1394–1395, 
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68 Westermann, Rekeningen riviertollen Gelderland, 49–88. Th e register records the 
transport of 4,700 cheeses from Gorinchem, Delft  and Gouda upstream over the 
course of 15 months.
69 OHZ I, no. 334. Th e privilege is repeated in 1275, when a fourth fair is added 
(OHZ II, no. 1683).
70 Hamaker, Rekeningen grafelijkheid II, 167, 316–317, 420–424. It is not clear 
whether the people from ‘Oesterlant’ in the list came from northern Germany or from 
a village of this name on the West-Frisian island of Wieringen (cf. Lesger, Hoorn als 
stedelijk knooppunt, 24–25; Gijsbers, Kapitale ossen, 35).
for instance, records upstream cheese shipments from Gorinchem, 
Delft , and Gouda.68
In short, there is a link between the dairy export trade and fairs, but 
it is not a particularly direct one. Farmers visited fairs to sell their but-
ter and cheese, especially in the north of the county; however, they also 
made use of a variety of alternative trade venues.
Th e late 14th and 15th centuries also witnessed the rise of several spe-
cialised cattle fairs in Holland. Some of these were important nodes in 
the developing international cattle-trade network. On a modest scale, 
cattle trade had been taking place for a long time. Th e fi rst indication 
for Holland’s role in this trade is provided by the charter of urban liber-
ties of Geertruidenberg, dating from 1213. Geertruidenberg was situ-
ated on the overland route from Holland to Brabant, which must have 
made it a perfect location for the trade in cattle from the southern part 
of Holland to the markets of the booming towns in the southern Low 
Countries. Apparently this trade took place on a frequent basis. 
Although the charter granted in 1213 does mention three annual fairs, 
it also states that the weekly market (forum ebdomadale) was the com-
pulsory venue for cattle trade for Hollanders and foreigners alike.69
By the middle of the 14th century another concentration of cattle-
trade venues had developed in the northern part of the county. Hoorn 
in particular stands out. In the spring of 1344 and 1345, comital func-
tionaries purchased more than 200 cows and oxen in the north of 
Holland, partly for fattening and consumption by the count’s house-
hold and partly as provisions for a war against the Frisians. About one 
quarter was bought in Alkmaar, the rest in Hoorn. Most of the people 
who sold their cattle to the count’s purveyors were probably locals, or 
came from villages elsewhere in West-Friesland.70 However, there are 
indications that the cattle trade soon developed an interregional 
component.
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71 Blanchard, ‘Continental European Cattle Trades’, esp. 428–429, 431–433.
72 Van Mieris, Groot charterboek II, 604, 626. Th e second document in fact also 
mentions Danish merchants (and merchants from Flanders and Brabant), but in a 
tentative way: they may not have been frequent visitors (cf. Fasel, Alkmaar in het drijf-
zand, 55).
73 Gijsbers, Kapitale ossen, 34–35; Handtvesten Enchuysen, 81.
74 Handvesten Haerlem, 39.
75 Gijsbers, Kapitale ossen, 35. Gijsbers also mentions East-Frisians, but the only 
reference to their presence dates from 1351 when, formally at least, the Lucasfair did 
not yet exist (Van Mieris, Groot charterboek II, 806).
76 RAL AG, inv. no. 334–27 f 29v and 334–41 f 23.
Ian Blanchard places the rise of an expanding system of cattle 
production and cattle trade, in which Holland had a role as a special-
ised fattening zone, in the 15th century, when a growing number of 
lean oxen was transported every year from Denmark to the Low 
Countries, mainly via overland routes.71 But sea transports of cattle to 
the north of Holland started earlier than this, albeit on a more modest 
scale. Two Alkmaar toll tariff s, both dating from 1339, refer to visits of 
cattle merchants from eastern Friesland, just across the Zuiderzee, to 
the Alkmaar fair.72 Eventually it was not Alkmaar but Hoorn—as a 
conveniently situated port town—that developed into the main centre 
for the interregional cattle trade. It was mainly here that imported 
cattle were sold to farmers, to be grazed in Holland during the sum-
mer  months. Another toll tariff , dating from 1389 and stating the 
toll for Danes selling horses and cattle in Hoorn, suggests that by this 
time cattle imports by sea over longer distances were no longer 
exceptional.73
Th e Hoorn cattle market was a weekly market and not a fair, as is 
shown by the fact that all purchases by the count’s functionaries 
in 1344 and 1345 took place on Fridays. At the next step in the produc-
tion process, however, fairs had a more prominent role. In autumn the 
cattle, now properly fattened, were ready for slaughter and consump-
tion. Haarlem’s Lucasfair, offi  cially established in 1355, was an impor-
tant centre for this part of the cattle trade.74 Cattle were sold here by 
farmers from Kennemerland and West-Friesland and by burgesses in 
the area who had invested in the profi table business of ox fattening.75 
Some buyers came from towns in other parts of Holland: the 
Catharinagasthuis (St. Catherine’s hospital) in Leiden, for instance, 
twice purchased cattle in Haarlem around 1420.76 But the Haarlem fair 
may also have functioned as a link in a cattle trade from the grazing 
areas in Holland to the centres of consumption in the southern Low 
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77 Handvesten Haerlem, 186–187. For the dependency of Brabant cattle fairs on sup-
plies from Holland, cf. Van der Wee and Aerts, ‘Lier Livestock Market’, 240, 244; 
Blanchard, ‘Continental European Cattle Trades’, 428–429.
78 Gijsbers, Kapitale ossen, 37. Gijsbers stresses the role of 15th-century Amsterdam 
in the trade of fattened cattle in the autumn, but the sources she mentions may also be 
interpreted as referring to the trade in young animals in spring.
79 Gijsbers, Kapitale ossen, 222; Kistemaker, Wagenaar, and Van Assendelft , Amster-
dam marktstad, 37–39.
80 Scholtens, Uit het verleden van Midden-Kennemerland, 113; Noord-Hollands 
Archief, Archief Stads- en Gemeentebestuur Beverwijk inv. no. 40 (charter changing 
the dates of the leather fairs, 1547).
81 Pols, Westfriesche stadrechten II, 270 (Grootebroek). Th e license for the two fairs 
in Schoorl, fairs which according to the villagers had been destroyed during the ‘trou-
bles’ in the 1570s, was confi rmed by the Estates of Holland in 1609 and again in 1623 
(Register van Hollandt en Westvrieslandt, 1607–1609 page 810 and 1623–1626 page 
214; Regionaal Archief Alkmaar, Gemeentebestuur Alkmaar (oud archief, 1325–1815), 
inv. no. 2318). According to Goettsch, the original license had been granted in 1446; 
however, I have not been able to fi nd evidence in the primary sources to support this 
assumption (Goettsch, Schoorl, 42).
Countries. A safe-conduct granted to the visitors to the Lucasfair in 
1511 refers to merchants from ‘alrehande nacien’ (various nations).77
Amsterdam was also a lively cattle-trade centre, and probably from 
an early date.78 However, it seems transactions took place at the weekly 
market, as in Hoorn, or on a permanent basis. Although in the 17th 
century Amsterdam had both a spring and an autumn cattle fair, nei-
ther is mentioned in the Middle Ages.79 Cattle trade did take place at a 
number of smaller fairs in the county. In the north, the autumn fair of 
Beverwijk probably had a role similar to the Haarlem fair, although on 
a smaller scale (in the 14th century the counts of Blois occasionally 
bought fat oxen here). However, in the 16th century both Beverwijk 
fairs turned into specialised leather fairs.80 Likewise there are doubts 
about the success of the cattle trade at some rural fairs in this part of 
the county. Of the fair in Grootebroek, for instance, nothing is heard 
aft er the early 15th century; and although Schoorl certainly had two 
important cattle fairs by 1600, it is not clear if these fairs actually date 
back to the middle of the 15th century.81 Perhaps at that point the 
attractions of the markets of Hoorn and Amsterdam and the Haarlem 
fair left  little room for competitors.
In the south and centre of Holland a number of urban livestock fairs 
emerged that survived the Middle Ages. Among the six fairs granted to 
Gorinchem by the lord of Arkel in the 1380s was a cattle fair. Nearby 
Woudrichem had a fair for horses and cattle, and similar fairs were 
established around 1410 in Th e Hague, Woerden, and Schoonhoven. 
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82 Bruch, Middeleeuwsche rechtsbronnen Gorinchem, no. 21 (Gorinchem); Nier-
meyer, Bronnen Beneden-Maasgebied, no. 623 (Woudrichem); Plomp, Woerden, 56–57 
(Woerden); Van Berkum, Beschryving Schoonhoven, 56–57 (Schoonhoven); NA AGH, 
inv. no. 203 f 32 (Th e Hague; with thanks to Ronald van der Spiegel, who brought this 
document to my attention).
83 Smit, Rekeningen Hollandse tollen, 238, 239, 240, 275, 280, 301, 340, 345; Ibelings, 
‘Hollandse paardenmarkten’, 93, 106.
84 Kersbergen, ‘Rotterdamsche jaar- en weekmarkt’, 168 (Rotterdam); Soutendam, 
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Th e Schoonhoven fair was actually not new: it had been moved to this 
town from the nearby village of Stolwijk.82
Th is brings us to the last category of fairs: the growing group of spe-
cialised horse fairs. Th ese fairs will be discussed here only briefl y 
because they date mainly from aft er the period under investigation; 
nevertheless, their development provides a good illustration of the role 
fairs could fulfi l. Th e fi rst horse fairs emerged in the late 14th and early 
15th century, but in the course of the 15th century, and especially aft er 
1480, their numbers increased rapidly. Growth continued in the fi rst 
decades of the 16th century. Several existing fairs appear to have grown 
into horse fairs. Th is kind of transformation seems to have occurred 
most oft en at rural fairs. Th e fairs of Voorschoten and Valkenburg (and 
Vlaardingen) are described as horse fairs in the toll accounts of the 
river tolls at Geervliet and De Gleede in the 1520s and 1530s, as is the 
fair of Alblasserdam.83 A prominent role for the horse trade can also be 
observed at some urban fairs, for instance those of Rotterdam, Gouda, 
and Delft , although here it is clear that other merchandise was also 
sold.84
Furthermore, several new horse fairs made their appearance, almost 
all of them situated in towns. Privileges for horse fairs were granted to 
Schiedam in 1483 and to Haarlem in 1512.85 Gouda acquired a license 
for a second horse fair in 1502 and a third one was established in 
1505.86 Th e number of horses sold at these fairs was substantial. Bart 
Ibelings estimates sales for Gouda at 2,000 per year in the early 16th 
century; at the three fairs of Valkenburg, Voorschoten and Vlaardingen 
together, over 3,000 horses were sold around 1550.87
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Th ere are parallels in other countries. A signifi cant growth of 
the horse trade has also been demonstrated for 16th-century England. 
Th e economic background is not so diff erent from what had occurred 
in the continental cattle trade earlier. Regional specialisation and inter-
regional trade were stimulated by a growing demand for horses and an 
increased variety of uses horses were put to. Certain areas became 
noted for the breeding or rearing of a specifi c type of animal. Fairs 
facilitated the exchange between breeders and rearers of horses, and 
between rearers and users.88 Horse fairs in late 15th- and early 16th-
century Holland may have had a similar role. We know that around 
this time horse breeding developed in Holland’s river area, where 
large-scale farmers could muster the capital required for this trade.89 
We can only assume that despite the predominance of peasant small-
holding in other parts of Holland, horse-rearing and horse-breeding 
also found their way there. Th ere can be no doubt that, by the late 15th 
century, Holland was participating in the interregional horse trade. 
A Delft  toll tariff  of this period distinguished between buyers of horses 
from Holland and buyers from the southern Low Countries.90 Likewise, 
the late 16th-century toll registers of the horse fair of Vlaardingen 
show that half the horses changing hands were bought by merchants 
from Brabant and another 20% by merchants from Flanders.91
In summary, late medieval wholesale fairs in Holland functioned 
much as they did in other parts of Europe: by reducing search and 
information costs for small-scale farmers and for merchants buying 
their products, they facilitated regional and interregional trade in an 
age of growing specialisation. Th ere can be little doubt that wider eco-
nomic developments—in this case the rise of dairy and cattle farm-
ing—stimulated the development of fairs. Th is at least partly explains 
the large number of new fairs in the second half of the 14th century. 
On the other hand, the trade in dairy, cattle, and horses also made use 
of the dense network of fairs that had emerged prior to 1350, when 
agrarian specialisation was not so prominent. Th e fact that such a net-
work had come into being before the needs of regional specialisa-
tion called for it suggests that other factors also played a role in the rise 
of fairs.
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2.5 Power and politics
Th e oldest fairs
In much of late medieval Western Europe the right to install markets 
and fairs belonged to the regalia: it was a prerogative of the ruler, who 
could either exercise this right himself or enfeoff  it to a vassal. Th e idea 
that markets and fairs required formal, public authorisation predates 
the Middle Ages. Th e Roman empire had its ius nundinarum: permis-
sion to hold a fair or market and collect the revenues was usually 
granted by the emperor, the senate or the provincial governor.92 Th e 
principle was revived in the Carolingian empire in the second half of 
the 9th century. Carolingian rulers wanted more control over markets 
and fairs because of the links with royal responsibilities for food provi-
sioning, preservation of peace and order, and regulation of weights, 
measures, and currency; they also wanted a tighter grip on market rev-
enues. Aft er the disintegration of the Carolingian empire, the Ottonian 
rulers in the German lands continued to exercise control over markets 
and fairs; but in the fragmented west the Frankish kings were no longer 
able to do so. In some regions, the rulers of territorial principalities 
took over almost immediately: the dukes of Normandy are the most 
prominent example. Elsewhere, however, control over markets and 
fairs was fi rst usurped by local lords and only passed on to territorial 
rulers at a later stage.93
In late medieval Holland the right to install markets and fairs lay in 
principle with the count.94 Of the 57 licenses for fairs recorded before 
1500, 36 were granted by him.95 Licenses for fi ve late 13th-century fairs 
in IJsselstein and Vianen were granted by the bishop of Utrecht; at that 
time these two towns still belonged to Utrecht. Another ten fairs—six 
in Gorinchem and four in Woudrichem—were installed in the late 
14th century by the lords of the ‘free’ lordships of Arkel and Altena in 
their capacity as autonomous sovereigns; these lordships were not fully 
incorporated in the county of Holland until later. Enfeoff ment of the 
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right to install markets was uncommon before the 15th century. Most 
lords in Holland were ambachtsheren, local lords who had been granted 
lower jurisdictional authority. Many also enjoyed some other rights, 
such as fi shing rights or the right to operate a mill, but not the right to 
license markets and fairs: none of the 57 licenses for fairs was granted 
by an ambachtsheer. Th ere were, however, also lords who enjoyed a 
superior class of rights, the hoge heerlijkheidsrechten: these always 
included higher jurisdictional authority, but at least in some cases also 
the right to license markets. Six of the 57 licenses for fairs were granted 
by lords in this category: one in Heenvliet, two in Purmerend and two 
in Schagen, and one in Vianen (in addition to the fairs already estab-
lished there earlier by the bishop of Utrecht). With the exception of 
Vianen, all these fairs date from the second half of the 15th century. 
Th is is not a coincidence: hoge heerlijkheidsrechten were but sparingly 
granted until 1400.96
When the counts of Holland fi rst acquired the right to license mar-
kets and fairs is another matter. Th is seems to have happened relatively 
late. Admittedly, an 11th-century document, composed to support the 
claims of the bishop of Utrecht to sovereignty over Holland, mentions 
markets, mints, and tolls (marcatis, monetis, theloneis) as comital prop-
erties.97 Nonetheless, the fi rst proof that the count of Holland was actu-
ally able to eff ectuate his authority over markets and fairs is the charter 
of urban liberties granted to Geertruidenberg in 1213, by which he 
gave permission to hold three fairs in this young town; and only from 
about 1270 onward did the extension and consolidation of comital 
power progress to a stage that made licenses for fairs and markets a 
regular feature of public administration.
In England, royal control over fairs and markets was achieved at a 
much earlier moment in time, refl ecting the early rise of central power. 
Before the Norman Conquest, most markets were rather informal 
aff airs, oft en connected to gatherings of people around a church. In 
fact, it is doubtful if the Anglo-Saxon kings ever licensed markets: in 
this respect England diff ered from the Carolingian empire. But in the 
century aft er the Conquest, the Norman and Angevin kings success-
fully claimed the right to license new markets and fairs.98 Markets that 
64 chapter two
 99 Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants, and Markets, 59–60; Masschaele, ‘Multiplicity’, 
262.
100 Pauly, ‘Foires luxembourgeoises’, 112–113.
could credibly claim long usage were referred to as being held ‘by pre-
scription’ and left  undisturbed; but by 1200, even in the most remote 
corners of the realm, a royal license was considered to be a prerequisite 
for a new market or fair. As we saw, literally thousands of these licenses 
were issued between 1200 and 1350. Lords, lay or ecclesiastical, applied 
for market licenses because of their potential as a source of revenues, 
and market rights became an object of competition and confl icts 
between lords. Th is ‘scramble’ for market rights probably goes a long 
way in explaining the large number or English fairs recorded before 
1350. Enfeoff ment of the royal prerogative to license markets and fairs, 
as in 15th-century Holland, did not take place. Royal jurisdiction over 
markets and fairs culminated in the Quo Warranto campaigns of the 
late 13th and early 14th century, when organisers of unlicensed mar-
kets (and people infringing other royal rights) were called before the 
royal courts to substantiate their rights.99
In Holland a public system of licensing of markets was not in 
 operation until the late 13th century, but as we have seen, this did not 
mean that there were no fairs. Several of Holland’s oldest fairs devel-
oped without formal authorisation from the count. If a license was 
granted aft erwards, it was no more than a formal confi rmation of a 
pre-existing situation. Originally these fairs may have developed on 
the estates of abbeys or lay lords, as a comparison with Luxembourg 
can illustrate. According to Michel Pauly, the oldest fairs of Luxembourg 
formed near the centre of a manor, where tenants would come to pay 
their rents. If they paid in kind, the lord would be happy to sell some of 
the surpluses; if rents had to be paid in cash, the peasants would wel-
come opportunities to market their products. Since many large man-
ors belonged to abbeys or other ecclesiastical institutions, the centres 
of these manors were oft en also religious centres. In these cases, rent 
payments were usually scheduled on the day of the festival of the 
patron saint, and the gathering of people provided an extra stimulus 
for trade.100 In Holland, the fair at Egmond Abbey may well have been 
of this type.
To complicate matters, the count of Holland represented not only 
public power, but was also the ‘private’ owner of several manors. In his 
capacity as a landowner he may have established fairs on some of them. 
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Likely candidates are the oldest fairs in the heartland of the counts of 
Holland, the region around Leiden and the Meuse delta. Four fairs in 
this region—in Valkenburg, Voorschoten, Delft , and Vlaardingen—
date from before the middle of the 13th century. Oppermann believed 
that these fairs formed a cycle, as in the Champagne region and 
Flanders, and suggested they were mainly visited by Flemish mer-
chants. Th e idea was taken up by Fockema Andreae, who assumed the 
count of Holland established the Valkenburg fair at that particular site 
to make it fi t into the cycle.101 It is certainly possible that Flemish mer-
chants visited the fairs. Th e fi rst reports of their presence in Holland 
date back to the 12th century.102 And although the charter of urban 
liberties of Geertruidenberg does not mention a specifi c location when 
it states that merchants and their merchandise have free passage to the 
Holland fairs, the fairs of Valkenburg, Voorschoten, Vlaardingen and 
Delft  may well have been intended.103 Th e Holland fairs probably pro-
vided Flemish traders with opportunities to sell their merchandise to 
the local population with a minimum of expenditure on search and 
information costs. However, as Feenstra has pointed out, there are no 
indications whatsoever that the four fairs provided a platform for 
international trade comparable to the fairs in the Champagne region 
or in Flanders.104
Since Valkenburg, Vlaardingen and Delft  all evolved around comital 
manors, it is much more likely that at least these three fairs fi rst devel-
oped as manorial fairs. In fact the fi rst reference to the Valkenburg 
fair dates from 1246, just before the dissolution of the manor there.105 
Th e Voorschoten fair is a somewhat more complicated case. Th ere is 
no evidence that the count of Holland ever had a manor at Voorschoten, 
or, for that matter, that the Voorschoten fair ever belonged to him. It is 
possible that the Voorschoten fair developed without comital authori-
sation on the estate of the lords of Wassenaer; they held the fair at the 
end of the 13th century and had long been infl uential noblemen and 
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landowners in the region.106 Th e Voorschoten fair certainly does date 
back to a time when the comital licensing system did not yet exist: the 
fi rst reference dates from 1204.107
Holland’s oldest fairs, then, were rural fairs. However, with the emer-
gence of towns several of these oldest fairs seem to have lost their 
prominent position. In the towns, economies of scale permitted 
permanent trading and facilitated the development of facilities such 
as quays, cranes, a weigh house, carrying services, storage, brokerage 
and money changing. In Dordrecht all these facilities were already pre-
sent by the end of the 13th century; by the middle of the 14th century 
Holland’s smaller towns also off ered at least some of them. In Schiedam, 
for instance, a weigh house, brokers and money changers were all 
available before the middle of the 14th century.108 Although these facil-
ities were off ered on a permanent basis, fairs held in towns profi ted 
from them as well. As was mentioned earlier, towns moreover pro-
vided reliable legal mechanisms for contract enforcement.
Th e rise of urban markets and the possibilities for the reduction of 
transaction costs that they provided thus eroded the position of pre-
existing rural fairs. Nevertheless, two of these fairs continued to play 
an important role: the fairs of Voorschoten and Valkenburg. From at 
least the middle of the 13th century onwards, many types of payments 
were scheduled at these two fairs. Some were rent payments connected 
to land or other rights, while the 14th-century comital accounts also 
mention the payment of tithes and comital taxes (beden) from the 
regions of Rijnland and Delfl and.109 Th e fairs of Voorschoten and Valk-
enburg therefore had a commercial, but also a fi nancial and an admin-
istrative function. It may well have been this combination of functions 
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that explains why the two fairs continued to exist, even though—unlike 
Delft  and Vlaardingen—Voorschoten and Valkenburg did not grow 
into towns.
Rural fairs that did not assume the same versatile role were much 
less likely to survive. Th e fair of Ouderamstel is a good example. 
Th is fair is fi rst mentioned in the mid 14th-century accounts for 
Amstelland.110 Two references from the end of the 14th century make 
it clear that at this fair rent payments were scheduled, although there is 
nothing to indicate taxes or tithes were also paid there.111 In contrast to 
the Voorscho ten and Valkenburg fairs, the Ouderamstel fair fell into 
decay in the 15th century: the comital accounts mention the fair no 
longer rendered any tolls, despite eff orts to revive it.112 Th e fact that 
aft er the early 14th century the Ouderamstel fair was not supported by 
a fi nancial and administrative function, as the fairs of Valkenburg and 
Voorschoten were, may explain its demise.
Perhaps this is also what happened in Egmond. Th e mid 14th- 
century abbey accounts do not mention the Egmond fair as the date for 
the payments of rents by the abbey’s tenants. For the abbey’s posses-
sions in the central part of Holland, the Valkenburg fair is frequently 
referred to; but for its properties in the north, either no date is men-
tioned, or rents are due on October 1 or November 1.113 In fact, in the 
north of Holland a tradition of scheduling payments of rents and taxes 
at fairs seems to be lacking altogether: the comital accounts for 
Kennemerland, West-Friesland, and Waterland also do not refer to it. 
It is possible that this is related to the fact that in the 11th century 
the counts of Holland lost much of their control in the north. Th eir 
power base shift ed to the central and southern part of Holland; in the 
region north of the IJ, central authority was virtually absent until the 
counts reclaimed it in the 13th century.114 Th e fact that the Egmond 
fair is no longer referred to in the sources aft er the early 13th century 
confi rms the idea that in Holland’s oldest rural fairs had little chance of 
survival unless they were bolstered by a fi nancial and administrative 
function.
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Towns: negotiation and competition
It is easy to see why not just urban elites, but also craft smen, innkeep-
ers, petty traders, and local consumers would have wished for a fair in 
their town. Fairs, even if the tolls belonged to the count of Holland, as 
they did in many of the smaller towns, attracted people and business, 
off ered an extra outlet for the products of local industry, provided the 
townspeople with commodities that could not easily be obtained 
locally, and may well have been seen as an enhancement of urban sta-
tus.115 In the 13th, 14th and even 15th century, licenses were probably 
not that diffi  cult to obtain—but they did not come for free either. Th e 
principle of an exchange of privileges in return for fi nancial, political, 
or military support is a familiar one. Exactly how it aff ected the rise of 
fairs in medieval Holland is demonstrated by some of the licenses from 
the 14th century.
Between 1339 and 1342 the towns of Alkmaar, Rotterdam and 
Dordrecht received licenses for a total of fi ve fairs. Around this time 
Count Willem IV (1337–1345) was in constant need of money because 
of his luxurious lifestyle and military ambitions. One way to meet 
this need was to donate privileges liberally—in exchange for payment, 
of course.116 Dordrecht, for instance, paid a large sum for the exten-
sion of its staple rights for all shipping on the Meuse in 1344.117 Whether 
the grants of fairs to Alkmaar, Rotterdam and Dordrecht were moti-
vated by fi nancial considerations cannot be proven, but it is a good 
guess.
Another upsurge of fair privileges can be observed between 1355 
and 1357: a total of eight fairs was granted to Edam, Monnickendam 
and Enkhuizen (to all three towns as part of a grant of urban liberties), 
and to Haarlem.118 It is not clear which fairs were new—certainly not 
all of them, for the charter of Monnickendam explicitly gives permis-
sion to uphold the existing three fairs, and the revenues of these fairs 
are listed in the comital accounts for the years 1342 to 1345.119 
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Nevertheless, the accumulation of so many privileges in such a short 
time-span is remarkable. Th is time there are no signs of money trans-
fers; in fact, in at least one case (Enkhuizen), it was the count who bore 
the costs.120 Count Willem V had just won the succession confl ict that 
had torn Holland apart for several years. Th e grants of liberties to a 
number of towns can be seen as part of a strategy to consolidate his 
powers: the towns gained a certain degree of autonomy, but in return 
they were expected to confi rm their loyalty to the new ruler. No doubt 
some towns used the situation to reinforce any existing rights to hold a 
fair, or obtain new privileges to this end.
Not all fairs established in this way were equally successful: the fairs 
of Edam, for instance, never prospered, and those of Rotterdam were 
not a great success either.121 But others did well: the Lucasfair in 
Haarlem, for example, developed into a major cattle trade venue. It is 
obvious that at least some of these fairs did answer to an economic 
need, even if the immediate cause for the granting of the license was a 
political one.
In the fi rst years of the 15th century many towns received exemp-
tion from the market tolls of the fairs in Woudrichem, Giessen, 
Heusden, and sometimes also Gorinchem, in return for supporting 
Count Willem VI in the war against the lord of Arkel.122 However, no 
more peaks in the granting of licenses for fairs can be discerned com-
parable to those of the middle of the 14th century. As we saw, this was 
not because fairs were no longer needed: they still provided attractive 
opportunities to reduce search and information costs. Th e reasons are 
to be found in a combination of other factors. Firstly, it has already 
been suggested that—aft er the rapid growth of the number of fairs in 
the 14th century—a saturation point may have been reached, espe-
cially when in the 15th century economic growth was more hesitant. 
Still, it is questionable if that alone would have deterred individual 
towns from trying to better their position.
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Th e events around the Hoorn dairy fair illustrate what could happen 
if towns did make the attempt: they risked a confrontation with their 
neighbours. Certainly, there are also incidents that suggest an amicable 
solution. In 1462 the urban authorities of Enkhuizen, at the eastern-
most tip of West-Friesland, were given permission, by comital charter, 
to change the date of their fair from the Sunday before September 14 to 
September 29. Th e reason for the request was a wish to avoid competi-
tion with the nearest fair in eastern Friesland, on the other side of the 
Zuiderzee.123 Rescheduling was probably common practice, but the 
fact that Enkhuizen asked offi  cial permission is exceptional: over time 
several small changes in the dates of fairs were brought about without 
any evidence of offi  cial authorisation.124 In this respect Holland diff ers 
from Guelders, where even though the initiative also came from the 
towns, rescheduling usually took place by formal charter.125 However, 
the result was similar: just as in Guelders and, in fact, many other parts 
of Europe, on a regional level systems of fairs emerged that showed 
very little overlap in dates.126
Self-regulation did not always work: in some cases confl icts arose. 
Th e way these confl icts were resolved does not indicate a very active 
involvement of the central authorities. Intervention took place only as 
a last resort, and even then the outcome depended largely on the ability 
of the towns to put up a fi ght and take advantage of favourable circum-
stances. As we saw, the authorities in Hoorn did not comply when in 
1447 Duke Philip the Good withdrew the license for the dairy fair. 
Why the duke let this pass is unknown, but perhaps the reason is to be 
found in problems with Holland’s dairy trade at the Deventer fairs. 
Th ese problems originated in complaints about the weight of the butter 
tons, but gained momentum under the infl uence of the political and 
military struggles between Holland, Guelders, and Utrecht. In 1463 
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132 Van Alkemade, Van der Schelling, and Matthijssen, Beschryving Briele II, 
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the confl ict even led to a temporary embargo: the duke forbade his 
subjects to visit the Deventer fairs.127 Th e possibility of establishing a 
fair in Hoorn, Enkhuizen, or one of the other towns of Holland as an 
alternative to Deventer had already been under discussion during the 
1450s.128 As a consequence, Hoorn may well have profi ted from a leni-
ent attitude of the central authorities. Likewise, the quarrel between 
Gouda and Schoonhoven over the new dairy fair established (by impe-
rial license) in Schoonhoven in 1535 resulted in prolonged judicial 
proceedings at the Grote Raad (Supreme Court) in Malines; and in 
1540 small Schoonhoven was pressured into ‘voluntarily’ giving up its 
dairy fair because it could no longer aff ord to spend time and money 
on the lawsuit.129
Only in the 16th century did the fi rst signs of a pro-active central 
policy become manifest. When Haarlem requested licenses for three 
new horse fairs in 1512, Emperor Charles V fi rst asked for the advice 
of the Council of Holland. Th e fairs were granted, but only two instead 
of three, and only for three days each instead of the four Haarlem had 
wanted.130 Eleven years later the lord of Brederode wished to establish 
a horse fair in Amstelveen; this time not only the Council, but also the 
steward and the treasury were asked for advice.131 Th e request made by 
Brielle in 1551 to split the existing November fair into two new fairs, 
one in November and one in September, was treated with even more 
care: the procedure included an investigation of possible damages to 
the fairs of nearby towns and villages and of the consequences for 
imperial revenues.132 Notably, in England a standardised coordination 
mechanism had come into being at a much earlier stage. Soon aft er the 
year 1200 it had become customary for market licenses to be granted 
with a ‘buyer beware’ clause. If the new fair or market gave rise to pro-
tests by owners of pre-existing nearby markets, the matter was brought 
before one of the royal courts. If the court judged the complaint to be 
justifi ed, the new owner ran the risk of losing his license, plus the eff ort 
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and money he had spent to acquire it.133 Th e fact that in Holland a 
more or less comparable system did not develop until much later is a 
clear sign that central control was not nearly as strong.
In short, urban ambition was an important factor in the pattern of 
development of fairs in Holland. It contributed to the rapid rise of fairs 
in the 14th century, when towns were sometimes able to make use of 
a favourable bargaining position to ensure their rights to hold a fair. 
It also put restrictions on further expansion in the 15th century. Th e 
direction of urban ambition depended on economic possibilities; the 
capacity to act upon it was determined by social and political 
relations.
2.6 Conclusions
In view of earlier research stressing the proliferation of lesser fairs in 
post-Plague Europe, perhaps the most striking aspect of the develop-
ment of fairs in Holland is the fact that many fairs date back to the early 
14th, the 13th, or even the 12th century. By 1350 much of the network 
of fairs was already in place, and densities were not much lower than in 
England. Considering Holland’s ‘late awakening’, this is remarkable, 
and it demonstrates the speed with which the region was catching up 
with the rest of Europe.
Although Holland’s oldest fairs probably had manorial origins, 
urban economic needs and urban ambition seem to have been the 
main driving forces behind the expansion of the 13th and early 14th 
century. With guarantees of immunity from arrest, fairs provided the 
security needed to stimulate commercial activity. For petty traders and 
for peasants selling a small surplus they also reduced search and infor-
mation costs. Holland’s fragmented pattern of urbanisation—large 
towns were lacking, while small and very small towns were plentiful—
ensured a rapid growth in the number of fairs. Th e establishment of a 
fair required comital permission, but the counts could usually be per-
suaded to grant a license without a great deal of trouble: a right to the 
toll revenues or, in times of political turmoil, some much-needed 
fi nancial or military support was probably all that was required.
Th is picture did not change in the second half of the 14th century. 
In fact, in these years an extra element was added that stimulated the 
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rise of fairs: the cost advantages fairs provided were particularly suited 
to the needs of Holland’s growing group of dairy and cattle farmers 
looking for markets for their products. Both pre-existing and newly 
established fairs came to fulfi l a role in the dairy and the cattle trade, 
always as a complement to other trade venues, such as weekly markets, 
permanent trade in towns, or informal trade in the countryside.
In the early 15th century, further intensifi cation of the network 
of fairs slowed because of a combination of factors. Although in times 
of crisis the fair’s traditional immunity from arrest could still be a valu-
able asset in a country characterised by a high degree of urban auton-
omy, under normal circumstances a special legal regime protecting 
fairgoers was no longer needed: regular law provided good alterna-
tives. But the rise of a number of horse fairs in the 15th and 16th cen-
tury suggests that cost benefi ts for small agrarian producers seeking 
distant markets had not disappeared, and the persistence of local fairs 
indicates that this is also true for retailers—or at least for retailers in 
certain specialised products. It is likely that saturation, in combination 
with a reduced pace of economic growth, provides at least part of the 
explanation: in such a situation there was much less room for urban 
ambitions. Inter-urban competition may well be accountable for the 
remainder of the slowdown.
A warning note is in place here. Th e driving force of urban ambition 
in the development of fairs should not blind us to the fact that a pro-
cess of commercialisation also took place in Holland’s countryside. 
In part, trade in rural products took place via urban markets; but rural 
trade venues, many of them of a less formal nature, also had an increas-
ingly important role. It is to these rural trade venues that we now turn.
1 OHZ III, no. 1764 (Akersloot and Uitgeest:); OHZ IV, no. 1926 (Wormer).
2 Brokken, Ontstaan Hoekse en Kabeljauwse twisten, 50; Noordegraaf, ‘Internal 
trade’, 16; NA AGH, inv. no. 220 f 29 nos. 226 and 227.
3 De Vries, Dutch Rural Economy, 155–161; Noordegraaf, ‘Platteland’, 13–14. Cf. 
Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Town and Country in Holland’, 63, who shares Noordegraaf ’s point 
of view.
CHAPTER THREE
RURAL MARKETS C. 1200–C. 1350: A LATE START?
3.1 Introduction
Around 1280 the villages of Akersloot, Uitgeest and Wormer in 
Kennemerland received exemption from the river tolls in Holland as a 
reward for supporting Count Floris V in his war against the Frisians.1 
Th e toll privilege suggests an early involvement of the villages in 
regional or even interregional trade, but for the next fi ft y years or so 
the sources remain silent on the subject of rural commerce in 
Kennemerland. Th en, in the year 1347, at the outbreak of the succes-
sion confl ict between the later Count Willem V and his mother 
Margaretha, Willem signed a document that prohibited weekly mar-
kets in the villages of Kennemerland and ordered the villagers to come 
to the urban market of Alkmaar instead. Th e privilege was most likely 
intended to gain the much-needed support of Alkmaar at this time of 
political upheaval. As we shall see, it is doubtful that it was ever 
eff ectuated.2
Th e commercialisation of Holland’s countryside was briefl y a sub-
ject of debate in the 1970s and 1980s. In his pioneering work on the 
rural economy of the Netherlands, De Vries reported a proliferation of 
rural trade venues in the 16th century, which—he believed—refl ected 
the beginning of a process of rural commercialisation. In a critical 
reaction, Noordegraaf claimed that this process had begun much ear-
lier. Noordegraaf pointed out a number of village markets with medi-
eval origins, but did not attempt a systematic survey.3 Since then, little 
attention has been paid to rural trade venues in Holland. In Reinoud 
Rutte’s work on town formation in the high Middle Ages, for instance, 
markets are referred to as a precondition or accompaniment to the 
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emergence of towns. Th at markets also existed outside an urban con-
text is not mentioned.4
Th e case of Kennemerland demonstrates two important aspects of 
the process of commercialisation of the Holland countryside. Firstly, 
the toll privilege for the three villages and the reference to village mar-
kets suggests that even by the middle of the 14th century this process 
was already underway. Secondly, the Kennemerland example also 
indicates that an attempt to investigate the early stages of rural com-
mercialisation must include more than just formal markets and fairs 
(the village markets that Alkmaar wanted to put an end to were most 
likely unchartered).
Th is chapter compares the organisation of rural trade in Holland to 
both England and Flanders in the 13th and early 14th century. Th e dif-
ferences between the social and political characteristics of the societies 
in the three regions have been outlined before. Here the implications 
of these diverging paths of development for the commercialisation of 
the countryside will be explored by focusing on two elements: the rela-
tions between town and countryside on the one hand, and the role of 
lordship on the other.
In shaping the relation between town and countryside, urban coer-
cion (in the form of regional trade monopolies) plays a vital part. For 
15th- and 16th-century Holland, Peter Hoppenbrouwers has demon-
strated that the increasingly powerful towns did not develop into coer-
cive city-states because their ambitions were kept in check by three 
elements: the power of central government, resistance of village lords 
to urban intrusion, and the continuing competition between towns.5 
Here it will be argued that this situation had older roots. A comparison 
between Holland, England and Flanders shows that in Holland even in 
the 14th century a balance of powers between the count, the towns and 
rural communities on the one hand, and between groups in the towns 
on the other, gave rise to a framework of market institutions that was 
favourable to rural commercialisation.
Th e role of lords will be examined here by comparing their involve-
ment with trade and trade institutions in Holland with the situation in 
England. In England seignorial power and ambition were an impor-
tant stimulus to the development of a dense network of markets and 
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fairs in the countryside in the 13th and early 14th century. As we shall 
see, the English multiplication of rural trade venues was not mirrored 
in Holland. It is argued that while this may have involved a disadvan-
tage in the short run, it laid the foundations for a tradition of informal 
rural trade that made it easier for the inhabitants of Holland’s country-
side to take advantage of new economic opportunities once these 
opened up.
First, however, the thin dividing line between town and village 
requires attention.6 Th e distinguishing criterion that is easiest to use is 
legal urban status: if a settlement possessed a charter of urban liberties 
it was a town, if it did not have such a charter it was a village. But some 
places that did not have offi  cial urban status nonetheless possessed 
some of the physical characteristics of a town, such as high density or 
walls, or they displayed economic, administrative, and religious func-
tions commonly associated with towns. Conversely, there were also 
settlements that did have a charter of urban liberties, but were not for-
tifi ed and had only few urban functions. To complicate matters even 
further, the situation was not static: a village could gradually grow into 
a town, and although this did not happen as oft en, a place that had 
urban characteristics at a certain point in time could lose them aft er-
wards. Ideally, a combination of juridical, physical and functional ele-
ments should be taken into consideration at diff erent points in time. 
Th is, however, requires an in-depth investigation such as the study 
made by Peter Stabel of the Flemish urban network.7 For Holland such 
a study is not available.
Th erefore we have to resort to a method of distinguishing between 
towns and villages that is not as sophisticated, without reverting to an 
approach based on legal status alone. Settlements that were granted 
urban liberties between the early 13th and the middle of the 15th 
century—the time period covered in the book—have been identifi ed 
as urban, but an exception has been made for the many evidently rural 
West-Frisian communities that all received urban liberties around 
1400 (the backgrounds of this remarkable development will be dis-
cussed in more detail below). In addition, Th e Hague, which never 
received urban liberties but clearly functioned as a town in virtually 
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tollen, xxxiii (Ammers).
every other way, has also been identifi ed as urban. Obviously this 
approach does not solve all problems. It excludes, for instance, from 
the list of towns some large villages that may have had one or more 
urban characteristics: Katwijk and Noordwijk are good examples. 
However, in the absence of detailed information, the chosen method at 
least has the advantage of being consistent and objective.8
3.2 Urban intrusion or urban attraction
When the development of trade venues in 13th- and early 14th-
century Holland is compared to England and Flanders, clear diff er-
ences become apparent. In Holland before the middle of the 14th 
century, rural fairs (and a few weekly markets) are recorded in only 
nine villages. Egmond, Voorschoten, Valkenburg and Ouderamstel 
each had annual fairs (already mentioned in Chapter 2). Giessen and 
Alblas should be added to this short list—the fair of Giessen was fi rst 
mentioned in 1259 and a fair in Alblas was recorded in the comital 
accounts for the year 1331. Ammers was granted a weekly market in 
1327 as part of a failed attempt by Count Willem III to allow this river 
toll-post to develop into a town.9 Rijsoord and Heerjansdam each 
received licenses for one or two fairs and a weekly market around 1340. 
We shall return to them shortly.
Even taking into account that some of Holland’s rural markets and 
fairs may not have left  any traces in the sources, the fi gures pale in 
comparison with, for example, the counties of Essex and Suff olk in 
eastern England, each more or less comparable to Holland in size 
although not quite as populous. Here the impressive numbers of 66 
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(Essex) and 77 (Suff olk) non-urban settlements with one or more 
annual fairs, or a weekly market, or both, were recorded before 1348. 
Th ese two counties belonged to the most commercialised part of 
England. But even in Staff ordshire in the West Midlands, a more tradi-
tional and also a smaller and much more sparsely populated county, a 
total of 25 rural settlements with a market or a fair before 1348 can be 
identifi ed.10 Certainly, it is unlikely that all these villages survived as 
market centres until that date, but as we shall see some of the village 
markets in Holland also disappeared in the course of time. Th e diff er-
ence is striking, especially since—as the previous chapter has shown—
in 13th- and early 14th-century Holland a solid foundation was laid for 
the development of a network of urban fairs. However, this increase of 
urban trade venues was not balanced by a similar increase in rural 
markets and fairs.
Unfortunately, no systematic inventory of early rural fairs and mar-
kets is available for Flanders. Nevertheless, it is clear that here, perhaps 
even more so than in Holland, numbers were small. Weekly markets in 
particular were a strictly urban phenomenon. Th ere were a few early 
rural fairs, but their number only began to increase in the 16th cen-
tury. Moreover, by that time some villages, despite urban protests, also 
managed to obtain a license for a weekly market.11 Th e Ghent region 
provides an example. Only three rural market settlements are reported 
here in the 16th century: Zottegem, Izegem, and Sint Niklaas. In all 
three, the markets were formalised only in the 16th century, although 
they may have functioned as informal trade venues somewhat 
earlier.12
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Th e pace and pattern of urbanisation probably provide part of the 
explanation for the scarcity of rural markets and fairs in Flanders and 
Holland. Flanders was already highly urbanised by the middle of the 
14th century: at that point, the percentage of the population living in 
towns was probably even higher than the 35% estimated for the year 
1469, when the fi rst reliable fi gures become available.13 Th e urban net-
work was dominated by the cities of Ghent and Bruges—and in the 
13th century also Ypres. In addition, about 50 medium-sized, small 
and very small towns functioned as market centres on a more modest 
scale. Under these conditions there may have been less need for addi-
tional trade venues in the countryside.14 For Holland, however, the 
situation was diff erent. Urbanisation had started much later than in 
Flanders, and although the urban ratio was rising rapidly, on the eve of 
the Black Death no more than about 23% of Holland’s population was 
living in towns. Admittedly, by pre-modern European standards this is 
a very respectable percentage. It indicates, moreover, a higher level of 
urbanisation than in England: estimates for the share of the English 
population living in towns (including small towns) vary between 15 
and 20% around the year 1300. Ratios probably changed little aft er-
wards.15 Nevertheless, the diff erence in urban ratio between Holland 
and England seems small when compared to the diff erence in the 
number of rural markets in the two countries.
It is true that Holland’s pattern of urbanisation was decentralised: 
Holland had no metropolis like London. In the middle of the 14th cen-
tury, even Holland’s largest city Dordrecht, with its approximately 
7,500 inhabitants, did not equal the size of England’s second-tier towns 
like York, Bristol or Norwich. Instead, the county was dotted with 
small and very small towns, almost all of them endowed with urban 
liberties, even though some harboured no more than a few hundred 
souls.16 Despite their modest size, most of these towns had a weekly 
market and many also had one or more annual fairs, providing ample 
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market opportunities for people living in their immediate hinterlands. 
However, this decentralised urbanisation pattern cannot fully account 
for the near absence of rural markets either. Aft er all, England, or at 
least certain parts of the country, also had its fair share of small urban 
settlements, even if borough status was not granted to all of them. 
Staff ordshire, for instance, numbered 22 urban settlements, Essex 23, 
and Suff olk as many as 34—in all cases, fewer than Holland’s 38 medi-
eval towns, but not in an entirely diff erent range.17 For a more solid 
explanation for the absence of a dense network of markets and fairs in 
the Holland countryside, we must also look at the social and political 
context.
In the past, scholars have stressed the limited control of English 
medieval towns over rural trade. Because they did not usually have 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, these towns could rarely do more than 
restrict access by outsiders to the urban market by conferring trading 
privileges and toll exemptions on their own burgesses.18 Could the 
absence of urban coercion explain why rural markets and fairs prolif-
erated in England but not in Flanders and Holland? In order to answer 
this question, the relationship between town and country will be exam-
ined here from two perspectives. Th e fi rst concerns the instruments 
towns had at their disposal to concentrate trade within their walls and 
inhibit commercial activities in the surrounding countryside. Th e sec-
ond looks at the accessibility of the urban markets for non-burgesses in 
general and the inhabitants of nearby villages in particular.
Towns and rural trade
A closer look at the English situation suggests that relations between 
towns and countryside were not as consistently devoid of coercion as 
they have sometimes been made to look. In the 12th and 13th centu-
ries some English towns did have extraterritorial powers allowing 
them to control rural trade. Th e 12th-century Nottingham charter of 
urban liberties, for example, required peasants from the hinterland to 
bring their products to the town’s weekly market. Th e port towns on 
the eastern coast involved in the herring trade also claimed monopo-
lies—and sometimes even resorted to violence in their attempts to 
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guard their position as herring-trade centres against any upstart neigh-
bours.19 Despite the rise of many rural alternatives, some towns claimed 
trade monopolies even in the 14th century. In 1327 the establishment 
of new markets within a seven-mile radius (11 kilometres) of London 
was forbidden, and fi ft y years later Great Yarmouth was granted a mar-
ket monopoly for a region of the same dimensions.20
Th e pioneering work of Maryanne Kowaleski on the Devon regional 
trade network allows for a more detailed analysis of the role of coer-
cion in the relationship between town and countryside for one partic-
ular city: Exeter. Kowaleski stresses the natural attraction of the Exeter 
market for peasants and merchants from villages and small towns in 
the hinterland, and no doubt the urban market did off er better facili-
ties, a wider range of commodities, and a much larger circle of poten-
tial buyers and sellers than could be found in the countryside.21 Even 
so, Exeter apparently felt the need to employ non-economic means in 
its attempts to dominate trade in the Exe estuary. Here the interests of 
the city clashed with those of the earls of Devon, who tried to exploit 
the favourable location of their manors in the estuary by stimulating 
the development of fairs, markets, and port facilities. Although Exeter 
was never able to fully control trade along the length of the estuary, the 
city did enjoy a considerable degree of jurisdictional control over the 
manor of Topsham, which served as Exeter’s outport. Th e urban 
authorities levied customs on all import commodities landed at 
Topsham (except for one third of the wine custom, which had to be 
handed over to the earl of Devon) and they prohibited unloading else-
where in the estuary unless by special license. Moreover, royal writs for 
custom collections in Topsham were enforced by Exeter offi  cials and 
not by the manor’s bailiff .22
From the 13th century onward, Exeter also tried to gain control over 
the fi sh trade in the estuary. Th e city even resorted to military means 
to achieve this, raiding two small estuarine communities that were 
believed to have transgressed Exeter’s rights. In the early 15th century, 
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aft er lengthy judicial proceedings, Exeter was granted the right to tax 
the fi sh trade at the busy, although unchartered, fi sh market of 
Exmouth. Th e urban authorities also prosecuted forestalling of fi sh in 
villages situated on the roads between the coast and the town, thus 
extending the town’s jurisdiction well outside its walls.23 Th e Exeter 
example shows that some English towns did use non-economic means 
to enforce their central position in trade. Still, extraterritorial privi-
leges like the ones Exeter claimed were limited in their geographical 
range. Th ey were, moreover, diffi  cult to maintain, especially when 
markets multiplied in the 13th and early 14th century.24
Th e situation in Flanders was diff erent. In the late 11th and 12th cen-
turies, Flanders had rapidly risen to a position of economic primacy in 
northwestern Europe. By the middle of the 13th century, the towns of 
Flanders were booming. In particular, Bruges as a trade centre, Ypres 
as an industrial centre, and Ghent in both capacities had expanded 
rapidly. Th e economic success of these three towns gave them consid-
erable political leverage. Between the late 13th and mid 14th century, 
triggered perhaps by a crisis in the urban draperies, Ghent, Bruges and 
Ypres step by step acquired a series of instruments to control the econ-
omies of the surrounding countryside. At the end of the 13th century, 
they gained the right to levy taxes and regulate trade and industry in 
the ‘ban mile’, stretching some six kilometres outward from the city 
walls. In the fi rst half of the 14th century, industrial and trade monop-
olies in a much wider area were added. Th e towns also gained control 
over many roads and waterways, and they used the position of their 
courts as courts of appeal for the region to subordinate villages and 
small towns to their rule. Th e control of the three cities was at its peak 
during the decade of the Artevelde regime in the middle of the 14th 
century, when Ypres, Bruges and especially Ghent governed the county 
by themselves. During these years, the cities’ respective spheres of 
infl uence, which until then had been informal in character, were trans-
formed into offi  cial administrative ‘quarters’.25
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Th e three cities never intended to completely destroy rural industry 
and trade. Aft er all, the links between urban and rural economy were 
vital. Most of the preparatory work for the urban wool industry—such 
as combing, carding, and in particular spinning—was undertaken in 
the countryside and organised and controlled by urban merchant-
entrepreneurs.26 For the small towns, in particular, the incorporation 
into an urban network dominated by the big cities brought advantages 
as well as restrictions: these towns had an important role as intermedi-
aries between the metropoles and the countryside, and they oft en 
managed to acquire some profi table regional monopolies and privi-
leges for themselves.27
Nevertheless, the eff ects of urban domination over the countryside 
on rural trade were deeply felt. We will look at the vital cloth sector 
fi rst. In 1314 the count of Flanders, whose political foothold was not 
strong, had granted Ghent a monopoly on textile production over a 
fi ve-mile zone extending from the city walls (about thirty kilometres). 
Eight years later, Ypres and Bruges acquired the same monopoly, Ypres 
in a three-mile zone and Bruges in the Franc, its own hinterland of 
comparable dimensions. Cloth production in these zones, which 
together covered most of Flanders, was only permitted in the small 
towns that had pre-existing privileges for this purpose. Initially, the 
sale of this cloth was to take place only in the local cloth hall (some-
times directly to foreign merchants, but more oft en to Bruges brokers 
acting in their name) or at the annual fairs in other Flemish towns. 
Later, much of the cloth was sent directly to the Bruges international 
staple market.28 Ghent in particular was adamant in protecting its 
industrial monopoly—if necessary by force. Bruges was more lenient 
when it came to production, but did not permit any transgressions of 
its staple rights.29
As a consequence of the urban cloth monopolies, rural cloth indus-
try and cloth trade—in the 13th century common in many parts of the 
countryside—were now suppressed, except for a very few villages that 
could claim ancient rights. One of them was Th ourout, in the Bruges 
region, the scene of one of Flanders’ famous international fairs. Despite 
84 chapter three
30 Van Houtte, ‘Les foires’, 180–181.
31 Th oen, Landbouwekonomie, 1012.
32 Van Houtte, ‘Les foires’, 178–179; Gilliodts-van Severen, Cartulaire de l’ancienne 
estaple I, 391, 466.
33 Sabbe, Belgische vlasnijverheid, 200–202, 74–78.
34 Stabel, Kleine stad, 226–227.
its urban status, Th ourout was no more than a large rural bourg. It 
probably owed the continued existence of its fair to the protection of 
the powerful Benedictine abbey under whose walls it had originally 
emerged.30 Another example is the annual fair held in Sint-Lievens-
Houtem (in the southern part of the Ghent region) in the 14th and 
early 15th century. Here woollen cloth was sold in addition to various 
other products.31 Likewise, in the village of Jabbeke (in the Franc of 
Bruges) a ‘marchiet’ existed where cloth made in the nearby villages 
was sold—merchants from Holland were among the buyers. In the 
early 15th century, the cloth trade in Jabbeke apparently attracted the 
attention of the authorities in Bruges.32 As later references to the 
Jabbeke market are lacking, Bruges may well have been successful in its 
attempts to suppress it. Th ourout, Sint-Lievens-Houtem and Jabbeke 
were exceptions. In general, village cloth markets were rare in the 14th 
and 15th century. Rural venues for textile trade did not really develop 
until the 16th century, and then it was not woollen cloth but linen that 
dominated them—the towns did not monopolise the linen industry to 
the same extent as they did the production of woollen cloth.33
Urban monopolies were also common in the victualling trade. Here 
they were oft en induced by concern of the urban authorities for the 
town’s food supply. Several small towns compelled peasants living 
nearby to bring the grain they produced to the urban markets; some 
even actively suppressed grain trade in the countryside.34 Sometimes 
other victuals were also included in the monopoly. Late 14th-century 
Ghent, for example, did not allow grain, meat, and fi sh sales in a wide 
region (three to fi ve ‘miles’, or 18 to 30 kilometres) from the city. Th e 
prohibition on grain sales was related to Ghent’s staple privilege for all 
grain transports on the Scheldt and Lys. David Nicholas has pointed 
out that the staple itself was not a serious problem for the surrounding 
countryside. Th is part of Flanders was not producing much grain any-
way, and peasants were free to purchase grain for personal consump-
tion from their neighbours; in fact, restrictions on the amount of grain 
they could buy on a visit to Ghent even encouraged them to do so. 
Th e staple mainly aff ected long-distance trade. Food provisioning of 
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the towns of Flanders was dependent on grain imports from northern 
France, and Ghent— because of its geographical position and its eco-
nomic and political supremacy—was in a position to dominate this 
trade.35
Th e grain staple, however, did allow Ghent to extend its control over 
the other towns in the region and to acquire a dominant position in 
water transport.36 Th e existence of the grain staple also illustrates once 
again how much towns were bent on concentrating every important 
and profi table line of trade within their walls. Certainly, there must 
have been informal trading in daily products in the countryside.37 As 
long as no more than local exchange was at stake, the towns probably 
did not bother too much, but attempts at anything else were carefully 
kept in check.
Th e attitude of the towns of medieval Holland towards rural trade is 
much closer to the English than to the Flemish situation. In 13th- and 
early 14th-century Holland, coercion exerted by towns was rare. Only 
a few towns were able to acquire extraterritorial privileges that allowed 
them to compel people to visit the urban market. Th e most outstand-
ing exception is, no doubt, the staple of Dordrecht. In the late 13th 
century this town—favourably situated at the confl uence of Rhine and 
Meuse—acquired a staple privilege for the river trade in wine, grain, 
wood, and salt, which gave it, at least for the trade in these commodi-
ties, a position not unlike Ghent or Bruges. Th e background to and the 
eff ects of the Dordrecht staple will be discussed in Chapter 5. Here it 
suffi  ces to say that, until the early 15th century, Dordrecht claimed 
monopoly rights only over the transit trade and did not force people 
from the surrounding countryside to visit the urban market.
Regional trade monopolies did exist in some small towns in 
Holland’s few grain-producing regions. Naarden (in the Gooiland 
region) and Goedereede (on the island of Westvoorne in the Meuse 
delta) both boasted offi  cial privileges— dating from 1376 and 1332 
respectively—that made them the compulsory market for their dis-
trict’s agricultural products. Goedereede’s nearest neighbour, Brielle, 
may have had a similar position on the island of Westvoorne, for in 
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1477 the regional monopolies of both Goedereede and Brielle were 
offi  cially confi rmed.38
A second and more important category of towns with regional trade 
monopolies in the 13th or early 14th century had a diff erent profi le. 
Th ey were situated in border areas and were therefore able to profi t 
from their strategic position and the count’s need for their loyalty and 
political support. Geertruidenberg is a good example. We have seen in 
the previous chapter that in the early 13th century Geertruidenberg 
was granted a charter of urban liberties, a charter that made its weekly 
cattle market the compulsory venue for cattle trade for the entire 
region of Zuidholland, the rural district around Geertruidenberg, and 
Dordrecht.39 In his work on medieval town planning, Rutte has pointed 
out that in the border region between Holland and Brabant 
Geertruidenberg was not the only place to receive liberties around this 
time. Similar privileges had recently been given by the lords of Breda 
to nearby Breda and Bergen op Zoom. Further to the east, the duke of 
Brabant had founded Den Bosch in much the same way. Between Den 
Bosch and Geertruidenberg, the lord of Heusden promoted the rise of 
this small river town. All these lords were taking advantage of the rise 
of trade to further their political goals, and they did this by founding 
market centres.40 By making Geertruidenberg into such a centre, the 
count of Holland established his authority in the region and prevented 
a shift  of economic activity and fi scal gains to his adversaries.
Political confl ict continued to determine the position of 
Geertruidenberg as a market centre throughout the 14th century, as is 
demonstrated by the reaction of Count Willem III to the installation of 
a weekly market in Heusden in 1307: he forbade his subjects to visit 
it.41 In 1398 Duke Albrecht of Bavaria once more declared 
Geertruidenberg to be the compulsory market for cattle. He too was 
probably motivated by a wish to bind the town to Holland and keep the 
duke of Brabant out, just like his 13th-century predecessor.42
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It is doubtful if the obligation to conduct all cattle trade in 
Geertruidenberg was very eff ective. Geertruidenberg’s strategic loca-
tion did help: overland travellers from Zuidholland to the south could 
hardly avoid the town. Th e fact that the prohibition to sell cattle any-
where else than in Geertruidenberg had to be repeated several times is 
signifi cant, however; it was clearly not easy to maintain.43 Apart from 
the fact that the pull of market centres dominated by other lords could 
not be easily neutralised by prohibitions, policing the entire country-
side for illegal private cattle transactions must have been an impossible 
task.
More examples of attempts to use monopolies as an instrument of 
political strategy can be found in the border region between Holland 
and Utrecht. When in 1326 a confl ict arose between the count of 
Holland and the bishop of Utrecht over the Woerden region, Count 
Willem III ordained that all butter from that region had to be marketed 
in the town of Oudewater. No doubt, he had the same double agenda 
as in the case of Geertruidenberg: to keep trade and the profi ts it 
brought out of the bishop’s reach and to gain the support of the bur-
gesses of this small border town.44 Th e compulsory market for hemp, 
grease, and hides established in the town of Woerden by Duke Albrecht 
in 1396 illustrates in more detail how far the sovereign was willing to 
go in order to consolidate his position in a contested region.45 Th e 
charter, which explicitly refers to Woerden’s border location, suited the 
requirements of the entrepreneurs in Woerden’s emerging rope indus-
try, as it guaranteed the supply of raw material in the form of locally 
produced hemp.46 Moreover, around this time Woerden’s defences 
apparently were a point of serious concern to the duke: he made sev-
eral attempts to hasten their improvement and to help the town to raise 
funds. He even allowed Woerden to have buitenpoorters (people living 
in the countryside but enjoying—in return for payment—the formal 
status of burgesses) for three years to cover the expenses of the 
fortifi cations.47
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forced most towns to give them up in the middle of the 14th century. Buitenpoorters 
were, because of their burgess status, exempted from rural taxation. Th is threatened to 
erode the foundation of comital tax revenues (Bos-Rops, Graven op zoek naar geld, 
26–27).
48 Van Mieris, Groot Charterboek II, 807; Van der Laan, Oorkondenboek van 
Amsterdam, no. 131. Niermeyer, Delft  en Delfl and, 92. In Holland various local varie-
ties of the mile were used, ranging between approximately fi ve and six kilometres.
In spite of these cases, urban monopolies in 13th- and early 14th-
century Holland are restricted in number and in range: they relate to a 
limited number of towns in regions with specifi c characteristics. Th at 
coercion was not used more widely had nothing to do with a lack of 
enthusiasm on the side of the towns. Events during the civil war in the 
middle of the 14th century show that at times when the power of cen-
tral government was at a low ebb, towns did try to take advantage and 
attempted to extend their domination over the surrounding country-
side. Aft er the death of Count Willem IV, the two contestants for 
power, Willem and his mother Margaretha, were prepared to grant 
towns almost anything they wanted in return for their support. In 1351 
the towns of Leiden, Delft , Haarlem, and Amsterdam all acquired the 
right to prohibit textile industries within a distance of three ‘miles’ (15 
to 18 kilometres) from the town walls; this suggests an attempt to copy 
the industrial privileges of the Flemish cities.48 Alkmaar was appar-
ently more interested in trade than in industry. As we have seen, it 
acquired a market monopoly, which forced the people of Kennemerland 
to off er their products for sale at the Alkmaar weekly market.
Although this privilege off ers an illuminating perspective on the 
ambitions and wishes of the town, it was of little relevance in everyday 
life. Most of the privileges dating from the years of civil war were 
repealed in 1355 and 1356, when Willem was fi rmly established as the 
new Count Willem V and decided on a revocatio generalis. He revoked 
all privileges granted for political reasons by either himself or his 
mother in the previous years, based on the argument that many of 
them weakened the unity and strength of the state. Th e extraterritorial 
rights of the towns mentioned above, including Alkmaar’s market 
monopoly, were no doubt among the privileges that had to be handed 
back. Certainly, the revocatio required extensive negotiations and some 
towns were more successful in this respect than others. Th e Zeeland 
town of Middelburg, for instance, succeeded in having the restrictions 
on weaving and fulling in the surrounding countryside renewed. For 
the Holland towns, however, there is no evidence of a renewal, and it is 
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likely that Alkmaar lost its formal market monopoly only a few years 
aft er it was granted.49
Th e fi rst sets of by-laws of Holland’s larger towns that have survived 
come from Haarlem and Leiden. Th ey date from the late 14th century, 
although many of the regulations incorporated in them are older. 
Th ese by-laws confi rm the impression that restrictions on rural trade 
were not common. Leiden forbade its burgesses to buy fi sh between 
Rijnsburg (situated a few kilometres west of the town) and Ter 
Waddinghe (just south of the town). Th is prohibition may have been 
related to the fact that the fi shing rights on the Rhine and its tributaries 
belonged to the counts, who usually leased them out to members of the 
Leiden elite; the lessees may have discovered that illegal fi shing was 
taking place near the two villages.50 Haarlem imposed a similar restric-
tion on the purchase of grain at Spaarndam.51 Th e reason is not clear; 
perhaps it was a reaction to an incident that had caused commotion 
among the local vendors. Th ere is no indication the prohibitions refl ect 
a general policy of suppression of rural trade.
It is true that this was to change in the 15th and especially the 16th 
century, when many towns, Dordrecht being the most notable exam-
ple, tried to monopolise regional trade in agrarian products (this pro-
cess will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter). But most 
14th-century towns were simply not in a position to impose coercive 
policies on the countryside: the count of Holland, except for the short 
lapse in the middle of the century, did not permit them. Th erefore, 
whereas in Flanders a link between the absence of rural markets and 
urban trade monopolies can safely be assumed, in Holland we will 
have to look for another explanation.
Accessibility of urban markets to outsiders
Complementary to the attitude of towns to trade in the countryside is 
the degree to which they allowed ‘foreigners’—including merchants 
from other nearby towns and country folk—to sell products at the 
urban market. Once again England, Flanders and Holland show 
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 distinctive paths of development. Th e diff erences should not be over-
stated. Th ey were prominent in certain branches of trade, especially 
those dominated by guilds, but much less so in other sectors. Th e grain 
trade, for instance, vital for urban food provisioning, was relatively free 
everywhere. In London, cornmongers from market towns in the region 
and foreign merchants were active besides their London colleagues.52 
Even in Ghent, foreign merchants had no problems selling part of their 
grain in the urban market to the local bakers, brewers, and individual 
burgesses; in fact, the Ghent staple regulations compelled them to do 
so, simply because this was the most effi  cient way to guarantee a steady 
supply of grain.53
However, in England burgesses were oft en privileged when it came 
to access to the urban market in other branches. Outsiders—and for 
that matter also people who lived in town but did not have full burgess 
status—had to deal with all kinds of restrictions and impediments. In 
many English towns, merchant guilds had emerged in the 11th or 12th 
century. Th ese guilds enjoyed important privileges, allowing them to 
enforce trading regulations. Only guild members were permitted to 
trade toll-free, and in some trades they had exclusive monopoly rights. 
As a consequence, access to the market for outsiders (and for non-
members living in town) was restricted.54
Admittedly, there were ways around this obstacle. Outsiders could 
sometimes gain access by joining the local merchant guild as a ‘foreign 
member’. Based on an analysis of the 13th-century membership lists of 
the Shrewsbury merchant guild, James Masschaele has shown that 
joining the guild was a popular option among peasant fi shermen, 
butchers, bakers, and traders from nearby villages. But this privilege 
did not come for free: an entrance fee had to be paid, which of course 
meant that transaction costs (i.e. mainly search costs) were higher for 
outsiders. Moreover, there are clear indications that the Shrewsbury 
guild only admitted outside members when it was in its own interest to 
do so: victuallers were very welcome because of their role in food pro-
visioning, but traders in wool and wine, who might compete with the 
most powerful urban merchants, seem to have been refused.55
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In Exeter the privileges of the merchant guild were probably assumed 
by the ‘freedom’ of the city in the early 13th century. Th e eff ects were 
much the same as in Shrewsbury. Only burgesses—in 1377 no more 
than 21% of all households belonged to this category—could engage in 
retailing without having to pay the regular market tolls on all sales. 
In certain trades, such as the retailing of fi sh, clothing, and hides, bur-
gesses had monopoly privileges.56 In the course of time the exclusion of 
outsiders was mollifi ed in more than one way. Firstly, several small 
towns and villages in Exeter’s hinterland acquired toll exemptions on 
purchases for personal use and on the sale of their own agricultural 
products. Secondly, by the late 14th century the fi nes imposed on ille-
gal retailing by non-burgesses appear to have developed into retro-
spective licensing fees. However, this illustrates once more that even if 
the urban market was not as inaccessible as the offi  cial rules made it 
seem, there was a price to be paid for entering it. People from the sur-
rounding countryside coming to trade in Exeter bore the heaviest bur-
den of urban trade taxation.57
Sometimes local conditions did bring about exceptions to the rule of 
urban dominance. Whereas in London the powerful fi shmongers’ 
guild claimed a monopoly on the retailing of fi sh, in many other towns 
retail sales of fi sh by non-burgesses were allowed, albeit under strict 
conditions.58 Late 14th-century Winchester went further than most: 
the urban authorities, motivated perhaps by a concern for the food 
supply of the poor, actively encouraged fi sh traders from out of town to 
come to the urban market by off ering them better places for their stalls 
and more favourable hours of sale. In practice, however, the urban 
fi shmongers still dominated the retailing trade; and despite repeated 
fi ning for forestalling and regrating, they continued to buy in bulk 
from the outsiders and resell at high profi t to the consumer.59 Th us, in 
a circuitous way, the Winchester case actually reinforces the impres-
sion that outsiders were usually on the receiving end of trade 
restrictions.
Th at the exceptions and mitigations had not solved the fundamental 
problem of limited access to urban markets is demonstrated by the 
fact that the demand for freedom of trade in towns was a (secondary) 
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factor in the Peasant Revolt of 1381. Th is demand was apparently trig-
gered by the privileges granted to the town of Great Yarmouth, which 
had successfully claimed a trading monopoly within a seven-mile 
radius. In June 1381 country folk occupying Great Yarmouth tore up 
the hated charter. In July, at their meeting with King Richard II, the 
rebels secured the promise that all the king’s subjects would be allowed 
to buy and sell freely in all cities, boroughs, market places, and every-
where else in the realm. Needless to say, the promise was not kept.60
Th e institutional arrangements in Flanders were even more exclusive 
and protectionist than those in England. Once again the cloth trade 
deserves special attention because of its vital importance to the Flemish 
economy. In keeping with the urban production monopolies, in gen-
eral only locally-made cloth could be sold in the town cloth-hall. Ghent 
provides an illuminating example. Th e Great Charter granted to the 
city in 1297 stipulated that only cloth that had been fulled within the 
city (or its ban mile) could be sold in the town. Some years later the 
rules were tightened: not just the fulling, but also the weaving of the 
cloth had to be performed in the city.61
Regulations on the sale of cloth were usually strictly enforced by 
inspectors of the local cloth guilds policing the urban markets.62 Here 
too, in the course of time the rules were relaxed to some extent. Th e 
sale of cloth from the town’s hinterland (presumably only from the 
places that had production privileges) was oft en permitted, and allow-
ances were also made for types of cloth from elsewhere that were not 
manufactured locally.63 Moreover, Bruges had been something of an 
exception from the beginning: it had always welcomed cloth produced 
in the Franc at its export market.64
Just as in the cloth trade, protection of the urban market also char-
acterised the trade in victuals. Because of the importance of a regular 
food supply, much of this trade was submitted to strict regulation and 
close corporative control. Selling victuals was, offi  cially at least, the 
privilege of guild members, who by defi nition had to be burgesses. 
Th e  offi  cial line was strictly carried through for the trade in meat, 
fi sh and bread. Th e sale of meat, in particular, was almost completely 
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monopolised by the butchers’ guilds. As the membership of these 
guilds had become hereditary in many towns—a development 
unknown in England—the meat trade was virtually inaccessible to 
outsiders. To a lesser extent, this was also true for fi shmongers and 
bakers. Only in times of dearth were exceptions made to this rule.65
In other branches of victualling, however, the regulations were not 
so strict. Vendors of fruits and vegetables, for example, were oft en per-
mitted to sell their merchandise in town, although they did have to buy 
their way in by paying a recognition fee to the vendors’ guild and had 
to put up with less convenient hours and locations. Peasants were 
almost always permitted to sell their own agricultural products, but 
only if they did so in bulk.66 In practice that would have meant, much 
as in the Winchester fi sh trade, that local traders bought up the stocks 
for retailing at the urban market.
Th e markets of the 14th-century towns of Holland were more easily 
accessible to outsiders than their English and Flemish counterparts. It 
is hard to say how and when this situation developed, as the 13th-cen-
tury sources are almost entirely silent on the subject. We know that 
around 1200 Dordrecht had a merchant guild that monopolised the 
cloth trade in the local market, but most likely the guild disappeared at 
some point during the 13th century: later references are lacking.67 
Because it is mentioned in the urban charter of liberties of the mid 
13th century, we also know that the authorities in Delft  tried to restrict 
the activities of foreign merchants to the annual fair. At the weekly 
market, only local traders were allowed to sell their merchandise.68
But in the late 13th or early 14th century these restrictive policies 
seem to have given way to a more liberal regime. Th e charter of urban 
liberties of Brielle (1343) is very explicit on this issue. It states that 
everybody can come to the weekly market and sell whatever he wants, 
while paying the same excises as the burgesses of Brielle have to pay.69 
Th e late 14th-century by-laws of Haarlem and Leiden display a similar 
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attitude. In these towns people from the countryside were free to come 
and sell their products in town at the weekly market, although usually 
not on other days of the week.70 By-laws from later periods show that 
this also was customary in other towns, and not just for agricultural 
commodities. In mid 15th-century Goedereede, for example, outsiders 
were allowed to sell food, cloth, clothing, shoes, and ‘small items’ at the 
weekly market. Th e early 16th-century by-laws of Hoorn have a similar 
paragraph.71 Likewise, 15th- and 16th-century markets for fi rewood 
and peat in the towns in the central part of Holland were usually open 
to all sellers, whatever their origins.72 Where restrictions did exist, they 
seem to have been relatively mild. In early 15th-century Gouda, for-
eign cloth merchants and butchers from out of town were given less 
favourable places for their stalls than the locals, but during the fairs 
and at the weekly market they paid the same excises. Delft  used a sys-
tem of reciprocity: it was prepared to allow foreign merchants in if 
their hometowns did the same for Delft  merchants.73
Only at the end of the Middle Ages did restrictions on market access 
become more common. It is likely there was a relation with the rise of 
guilds, especially retailers’ guilds. In contrast to the southern Low 
Countries, in Holland most guilds of craft smen and retailers did not 
emerge until the 15th century. Due to the late rise of urbanisation and 
industrialisation—but probably also because of the hostile attitude 
towards guilds adopted by the authorities aft er the guild revolts in the 
south in the late 13th and early 14th century—very few guilds were 
established before 1400.74 Only Dordrecht, Holland’s oldest and largest 
town, already had an elaborate system of guilds in the 13th century. 
Dordrecht was also the only town in Holland where (in 1367) the 
guilds were able to acquire access to the ranks of urban government. 
In this light it is not surprising that in this town the sale of meat and 
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fi sh was monopolised by the butchers’ and fi shmongers’ guilds in much 
the same way as in Flanders. Membership of these two guilds even had 
a hereditary character, common in Flanders but unique in Holland.75 
At the end of the 14th century, a butchers’ guild also existed in Haarlem. 
Th e guild regulated the sale of meat in the meat hall and it seems that 
only guild members could rent a stall there.76 Elsewhere, however, 
trade monopolies for guilds were rare. Th e Gouda situation mentioned 
above makes this clear: butchers from out of town may have had to put 
up with stalls in the back of the hall, but they were not refused entrance.
In the second half of the 15th century, more towns began to intro-
duce restrictions on retailing by non-burgesses, at least for certain 
commodities. While in Amsterdam retailing of fruit on the weekly 
market had been open to everyone in the early 15th century, it now 
became the privilege of the members of the guild of St. John, the guild 
of the fruit vendors.77 Likewise, retail trading in meat and fi sh, equally 
free in the beginning of the 15th century, was in 1488 restricted to the 
members of the guild of St. Peter, the guild of the butchers and fi sh 
vendors. Rotterdam had adopted a similar regulation regarding the 
sale of fi sh in 1465.78 At the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 
16th century, newly emerging bakers’ guilds in Amsterdam, Rotterdam 
and Leiden succeeded in monopolising the sale of bread, banning rural 
bakers from the urban market—although these restrictions usually did 
not apply to the weekly market and were lift ed altogether in years of 
dearth.79 According to W. van Ravesteyn—who studied the regulation 
of trade and production in 16th- and early 17th-century Amsterdam—
measures intended to protect craft smen and retailers against competi-
tion, especially competition from outsiders, gained ground aft er 1500, 
as long as they did not damage the interests of wholesale trade.80
Perhaps the liberal regime of the 14th and early 15th century can 
partly be attributed to the rapid increase of urbanisation and the large 
number of small towns. Th is may have induced urban authorities to 
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provide potential suppliers of victuals with a warm welcome. Th e risk 
that they would turn to another town that off ered better conditions 
was certainly very real. Th e comparison with Flanders and England, 
the position of Dordrecht and also the partial change of attitude that 
took place in some towns in the late 15th and early 16th century, 
strongly suggests a second determining factor. Th e fact that, in most 
Holland towns, guilds emerged late and had little political infl uence 
most likely also contributed to the openness of urban markets. In 
keeping with the model of institutional development outlined in 
the introductory chapter, it seems that when guilds acquired the power 
to dictate conditions, a self-reinforcing process of restricting access to 
urban markets was set in motion.
Holland was not immune to this process, but for reasons connected 
to Holland’s late rise it did have a favourable starting position, and 
until the late 15th century urban markets were relatively open to out-
siders. Th e eff ects are clear: the towns of Holland off ered easily acces-
sible opportunities to peasants and farmers wanting to sell their 
products, thus lowering search costs. Easy access to urban markets cer-
tainly helps to explain the scarcity of rural markets but, as we shall see 
in the next section, there were more reasons for the absence of a dense 
rural market network.
3.3 Lords and their involvement with rural markets
So far we have focused on the relationship between town and country-
side. Th ere is, however, a second element conditioning the institutional 
framework that determines opportunities for rural trade: the role of 
lordship and its implications for commercial activities in the country-
side. It is this aspect that will be discussed in this section, based on a 
comparison between England and Holland. We have seen before that 
in Holland the manorial system had disintegrated at an early stage. 
When in the 11th to 13th centuries the peat district was reclaimed, the 
emerging pioneer communities were placed directly under comital 
authority. Th e count of Holland was represented either by the schout 
(sheriff ), an appointed functionary with lower jurisdictional authority, 
or by an ambachtsheer, a village lord who was granted the same author-
ity, oft en as a hereditary right. By the end of the 13th century, perhaps 
half of all villages had an ambachtsheer, and their number may have 
grown slightly in the 14th and 15th centuries. Most of these local lords 
were noblemen and many owned at least some land in the village, but 
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what made them ambachtsheer was the fact that they owned the banal 
right of lower justice in the seignory, as granted by the count.81 Th ere 
were regional diff erences—we will return to them in the next chap-
ter—but in the greater part of Holland the local lord did not have any 
authority over the villagers beyond the rights to certain revenues, 
granted to him by the count.82 His powers were much more limited 
than those of a manorial lord in England. How this aff ected his involve-
ment with trade is illustrated here by looking at two aspects: market 
licenses and seignorial impositions on rural trade.
Lords and licenses
In Chapter 2 it was argued that Holland’s oldest rural fairs may well 
have developed at or near manorial centres, at a time when parts of the 
manorial system were still functioning. All of these fairs were—as far 
as we know—unlicensed. Only a few of them survived to the end of the 
Middle Ages, Voorschoten and Valkenburg the most prominent among 
them. Th e prolonged success of these two fairs should probably be 
attributed to the fact that they had also acquired a fi nancial and admin-
istrative function: it was here that people from the surrounding coun-
tryside paid their taxes and tithes, as well as their rents.
Licensed rural trade venues were rare before the middle of the 14th 
century. As we have seen, in this respect Holland was very unlike 
England, where in the 13th and the fi rst half of the 14th century thou-
sands of lords acquired a royal license for a market or a fair. In Holland, 
seignorial competition over markets seems to have been almost non-
existent. In the late 13th century the counts of Holland began to regu-
larly issue market licenses to towns, but grants to lords were rare. We 
have information about two of these grants from the late 13th century, 
both set in a semi-urban context. In 1270 Count Floris V issued a 
license for a fair and a weekly market in Schiedam to his aunt and for-
mer guardian, Aleid. Six years later the same Count Floris gave Lord 
Gerard of Velsen permission for a weekly market in Beverwijk.83 Both 
settlements were already showing signs of urban development at the 
time these market rights were granted, and both received charters of 
urban liberties aft erwards and developed into small market towns. 
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In both towns lordly ownership of the market turned out to be tempo-
rary: control over the market and its revenues eventually came back to 
the counts through inheritance.84
Two more cases of market licenses granted to lords, in the country-
side proper, date from the reign of Count Willem IV (1337–1345). At 
fi rst sight they are reminiscent of the English competition for market 
rights, which makes it worthwhile taking a closer look at the circum-
stances. Th e villages of Rijsoord and Heerjansdam are both situated in 
the Zwijndrechtse Waard. Th is river island west of Dordrecht was 
diked in 1332 aft er severe fl ooding. Th e count organised the funding 
for these extensive works by promising potential investors seignories 
on the island. One of these investors was Gerard Alewijnsz., a promi-
nent burgess of Leiden and senior clerk at the count’s chancellery.85 
Alewijnsz. received lower jurisdiction in Rijsoord (as this part of the 
Zwijndrechtse Waard was called) in 1333. In the years to come, this 
grant was followed by a series of additional privileges: the right to build 
a church and nominate its priest, the right to issue by-laws, fi shing 
rights in the river Waal, toll exemptions for the people living in 
Alewijnsz.’ seignory, and fi nally, in July 1339, a license for a weekly 
market and two annual fairs in Rijsoord.86
About a year later, in July 1340, the count granted seignorial rights 
over Heerjansdam (another part of the Zwijndrechtse Waard) to 
Tielman Jansz., an infl uential member of the Dordrecht elite, later to 
become the count’s steward in Zuidholland and a member of the comi-
tal Council.87 Jansz. also received a license for a weekly market and a 
fair in Heerjansdam, together with some other rights, including the 
tithes of the count’s lands in the seignory. Th is twofold accumulation of 
banal rights was rounded off  with the donation, in August 1340, of 
some rents in Rijsoord to Gerard Alewijnsz. and the grant of fi shing 
rights in the Waal to Tielman Jansz. in March 1342.88
At fi rst sight the situation resembles the ‘scramble’ for market 
rights taking place in England, but in Holland seignorial actions like 
this were exceptions, not the rule. We do not even know if Alewijnsz. 
and Jansz. really wished to establish trade venues in their respective 
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seignories or perhaps just tried to outbid each other in collecting sta-
tus-enhancing seignorial rights. In both cases, there are no indications 
the licenses were ever put into eff ect. Th e two men probably owed their 
exuberant series of privileges to the readiness of Count Willem IV to 
sell rights in exchange for some much-needed cash.89 Alewijnsz. and 
Jansz., wealthy, infl uential, and moving in government circles, were the 
perfect candidates to take advantage of the situation—or perhaps we 
should say the count was in a good position to take advantage of them 
and their ambitions.
During the reign of Willem IV’s predecessors as well as his immedi-
ate successors, circumstances were apparently diff erent: there are no 
signs of lords obtaining market licenses. Th is points to a second reason 
why a proliferation of rural fairs and markets did not take place in 
Holland: the absence of a strong feudal aristocracy, the group that in 
England used market licenses to improve its own position.
Seignorial profi ts from trade
Since lords established markets in order to gain from them, we should 
be aware that even if in many respects rural markets facilitated 
exchange, at the same time they facilitated seignorial surplus extrac-
tion. Trade was certainly taxed both in Holland and in England; how-
ever, related to the distinctive position of lords, there were diff erences 
between the two countries. Here the mechanisms of taxation of trade 
will be explored by comparing two aspects that illustrate these diff er-
ences: the regulation of the sale of bread and ale in villages and the 
attitude to informal trade venues, in particular the Sunday gatherings 
of buyers and sellers around parish churches. Th e issue at stake here is 
not an outright denial of the favourable eff ects of a network of rural 
markets outlined by, among others, Masschaele.90 However, it is clear 
that taxation can signifi cantly raise transaction costs. Taking this 
reverse side of the regulation of rural trade into account will allow for 
a more balanced view of the contribution of seignorial power to 
commercialisation.
In the English countryside regulation and taxation by the manorial 
lord of the sale of locally prepared bread and ale was very common. 
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Bread and ale were off ered for sale in village markets by large produc-
ers, such as the baker Adam Pistor, who owned several stalls in the 
market of Botesdale.91 Th ey were also sold informally at an inn, or sim-
ply at a door or window, or in the street. Many people, especially mar-
ried women, engaged in baking and brewing to supplement the family 
income. Th e majority did so only occasionally and infrequently, but 
some were active as bakers and brewers on a more regular basis.92
Regulation in this line of trade rested on the Assizes of Bread and 
Ale, a series of late 12th- and 13th-century national ordinances that 
regulated the prices of bread and ale by connecting them to the market 
price of grain.93 If a market license was granted, the enforcement of the 
royal assizes was usually considered to be part of that grant.94 In prac-
tice, this came down to the annual or bi-annual fi ning by the manorial 
court of everybody engaged in the sale of bread and beer for ‘breaking 
the assizes’, whether he or she was guilty of any real transgression of the 
rules or not. Th ese amercements in turn evolved into a system of retro-
spective licensing fees. Much like the fi nes paid by retailing non-bur-
gesses discussed earlier, they legalised the commercial activities of the 
bakers and brewers since the previous session of the court.95
Th e literature on the subject usually stresses the modest level of the 
amercements, which amounted to no more than a few pennies.96 Th at, 
however, implied that small-scale and infrequent producers could lose 
much of their profi ts, since they made only a few pennies per brewing 
or baking anyway.97 Large producers made much higher profi ts, of 
course, but in their case the fi nes to be paid appear to have been also 
much higher. Adam Pistor, the baker from Botesdale, was amerced a 
total of 68s 6d for ‘breaking the assizes’ of bread and ale in the course 
of the twelve years between 1282 and 1293: on average, a sum of 5s 8d 
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per year.98 In 1385, at the leet court of Brandon, Richard Cook paid a 
total of 7s, and Reginald Chapman and his wife a total of 4s 6d.99 
Th erefore it is safe to assume that the amercements, even if not an 
insurmountable barrier to trade, could signifi cantly raise transaction 
costs.
In the Holland countryside, baking and brewing must also have 
been common by-employments, and here too female participation in 
this line of trade was probably high.100 But seignorial taxation on these 
activities was virtually non-existent. Certainly, in the 13th and most of 
the 14th century a comital tax on brewing (the gruitgeld) was levied 
everywhere in Holland, in the countryside as well as in the towns. Th e 
gruitgeld originated in the gruitrecht, the comital monopoly on the sale 
of gruit, the mixture of indigenous herbs used in brewing before the 
introduction of hops. In many towns, the counts had leased or granted 
the gruitgeld to the urban community at an early stage. When in the 
course of the 14th century gruit was largely replaced by hop, the gruit-
geld made way for, or developed into, a series of urban excises on the 
production and also on the sale of hop beer.101 But in the countryside 
events took a diff erent turn. Some village lords did manage to get hold 
of the gruitrecht when gruit was still commonly used, but apparently 
few were able to turn it into an excise on hop beer aft erwards. When, 
in the early 16th century, Habsburg central government had the fi scal 
potential of all towns and villages investigated, it turned out that only 
in a limited number of villages was a seignorial excise levied on the sale 
of beer. Evidence for seignorial taxation of brewing is lacking 
altogether.102
For bread the situation is even more straightforward. Some villages 
did have local regulations fi xing the weight of a loaf of bread. In early 
15th-century Grootebroek (in West-Friesland), for example, each loaf 
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of rye bread had to weigh eleven pounds. In Assendelft  (Kennemerland) 
the compulsory weight was twelve pounds.103 However, there is noth-
ing to indicate these regulations developed into a system of licensing 
fees similar to the English system, nor is there evidence for any other 
imposition on baking or selling bread in villages.
Th is absence of seignorial taxation on baking and brewing can prob-
ably be attributed to a combination of two factors. Firstly, 13th- and 
14th-century Holland had no national ordinances regulating the prices 
of bread and ale. Town authorities, especially in times of dearth, did 
control bread prices from at least the late 14th century onward.104 Th e 
regulations of the weight of bread in Grootebroek and Assendelft 
mentioned above suggest that villages followed the same strategy. 
However, price regulation was always a strictly local responsibility. 
A  national standard that might have served as a starting point for 
a system of licenses was simply lacking. Considering the fact that 
Holland’s pace of political centralisation was much slower than 
England’s, this is hardly surprising.
Secondly, Holland’s local lords were usually not strong enough to 
bend regulations to serve their own purposes. Th e fact that Egmond 
Abbey demanded moutgeld (probably a tax on making or selling malt) 
from its villein tenants is a telling sign. In the 14th century the Abbey 
was one of the very few manorial lords left  in the county. Manorial 
lordship, with its superior degree of control over tenants, gave the 
Abbey possibilities for taxation that most local lords in Holland did 
not have.105
Seignorial profi ts from the sale of bread and ale were not restricted 
to chartered markets, but taxation of trade in many other commodi-
ties  was. Successful rural markets could provide an attractive addi-
tion to manorial revenues. At the end of the 13th century the market 
of Botesdale, for example, rendered its lord, the abbot of Bury 
St. Edmunds, a total of ₤ 8 to 9 per year in rents, tolls, and fi nes—a little 
under 10% of the total revenues of the manor of Redgrave to which the 
market belonged.106
 rural markets c. 1200–c. 1350: a late start? 103
107 For transaction costs in England, see Kowaleski, Local Markets, 192–196; 
Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants, and Markets, 67–69; Wedemeyer Moore, Fairs of 
Medieval England, 193–202. For Holland, Smit, Rekeningen Hollandse tollen, xv; De 
Boer, Graaf en grafi ek, 295–313; and the enumeration of levies in the charter of urban 
liberties of Geertruidenberg (1213), OHZ II, no. 334.
108 Kowaleski, Local Markets, 200. Th e estimate of the revenues of a yardlander is 
provided by Dyer, Standards of Living, 114–115. Th e sum of ₤ 4 is the higher of the two 
estimates given by Dyer and includes 1s for the sale of poultry and garden produce.
109 Dyer, ‘Hidden Trade’, esp. 147–150.
According to Masschaele, market tolls on transactions were usually 
no higher than about 1% of the value of the goods. However, it should 
be borne in mind that tolls on transactions were oft en only part of a 
package of payments to be made to the lord. Stalls or shops had to be 
rented, and services like weighing had to be paid for. Th e adjudication 
of trade disputes by the court also required the payment of a fee. Fines 
were levied on transgressions of market regulations such as forestalling 
or the use of incorrect measures and weights.107 For Exeter, Kowaleski 
estimates that in total a peasant paid perhaps 1–2d for his weekly trip 
to the urban market in taxes and tolls, or 4–8s a year. Th is was not a 
negligible sum, it amounts to 5 to 10% of the ₤ 4 the ‘average’ yard-
lander was able to make each year by selling his farm’s surpluses.108 
Taxation levels were probably lower at rural markets, which had fewer 
facilities to off er, but there still was a price to be paid for selling one’s 
products at the market.
Th e issue here is the degree of formalisation of rural markets. 
Informal trade venues did exist in both England and Holland. For 
England, Dyer’s exploration of late medieval ‘hidden trade’ has revealed 
the existence of many venues besides licensed fairs and markets: trade 
took place at or near large estates, on the fringes of towns, in country 
inns, and at quays or bridgeheads.109 Holland must have had similar 
informal trade venues. Th e attempts by Alkmaar to have markets in the 
neighbouring villages prohibited suggests that rural trade did take 
place, despite the scarcity of offi  cial and licensed trade venues in the 
countryside. Th e Kennemerland villages of Akersloot, Uitgeest and 
Wormer mentioned in the introduction of this chapter may off er an 
example of informal centres of regional or even interregional trade.
By their very nature these informal trade venues were not systemati-
cally recorded. A quantitative comparison between the two countries 
is therefore not feasible. Th ere is, however, one aspect of informal trade 
that does allow for a comparison, albeit of a qualitative rather than a 
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quantitative nature: the attitude towards informal local gatherings at 
the parish church. Both in England and in continental northwestern 
Europe some of the oldest markets can be traced to informal gather-
ings of people buying and selling foodstuff s on a Sunday near the local 
church. In 13th-century England most of these Sunday assemblies 
were converted into chartered markets on another day of the week. 
Th is was partly due to the views of the Church, which in the early 13th 
century vigorously promoted a strict separation of commerce and wor-
ship.110 On this issue England seems to have been several years ahead 
of the continent: the teachings of Eustace of Flay—a Norman abbot 
preaching in England in 1200 and 1201 on the need to observe the 
Lord’s Day—apparently fell on fertile ground.111
Perhaps the abbot’s admonitions would not have met with so much 
enthusiasm if there had not been a fi nancial motive involved as well. 
Th at this was the case is demonstrated by an example quoted by 
Salzman: in 1306 the collectors of the measures and tolls complained 
that if the gathering of buyers and sellers taking place every Sunday at 
the church of Crosthwaite was allowed to continue, there would be no 
revenues. In fact, Crosthwaite is a late example; even though informal 
Sunday congregaciones never entirely disappeared, by 1300 many of 
them had been either successfully suppressed or transformed into for-
mal markets.112
In Holland the attitude towards informal Sunday commercial gath-
erings seems to have been more lenient. A mid 14th-century comital 
ordinance did prohibit the Sunday market of Middelburg (Zeeland) 
and the surrounding region on religious grounds.113 By that time, the 
infl uence of canon law was probably also felt in Holland (in 1388 the 
market of the small town of Woudrichem was moved from Sunday to 
Wednesday).114 But several 15th- and even 16th-century examples tes-
tify to the fact that although the authorities objected to informal 
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Sunday trading, the practice did not disappear easily. Around 1400 the 
local authorities in the West-Frisian village of Grootebroek prohibited 
buying and selling in the church or at the churchyard, a clear sign that 
it was still going on.115 In the middle of the 15th century, an informal 
market seems to have developed around the church of the village of 
Schagen. In this case seignorial involvement transformed the informal 
gathering into a formal market, and in 1463 Schagen received a license 
from its lord for a weekly market on Th ursday.116 But in the middle of 
the 16th century the lord of Naaldwijk, near Th e Hague, prohibited the 
sale of victuals in the village during Mass—which suggests that if only 
people would postpone their commercial activities until aft er Mass, 
there would be no objections.117
In fact, this is a telling sign: it suggests that in Holland restrictions 
on Sunday trading were probably as much infl uenced by religious 
motives as in England, but much less by seignorial aspirations to 
extract money from trade. It must have been the combination of these 
two elements that contributed to the early suppression of informal 
trade in England. From this perspective, Dyer’s conclusion that the 
decline of many chartered markets aft er 1350 was accompanied by an 
increase of informal trade is not surprising.118 By that time the power 
of lords to channel trade through venues profi table to themselves was 
declining.
Th e presentments in the manorial courts for transgressions of the 
Assizes of Bread and Ale and the early attempts to gain control over 
informal Sunday trading demonstrate that English lords put their 
superior possibilities for profi ting from rural trade to good use. Th at, 
certainly, does not automatically mean the advantages of the English 
network of rural markets and fairs were off set by cost-raising seigno-
rial taxation. In the short term, they were probably not. Even if in prac-
tice the options of going to a market with more favourable trading 
conditions were limited by urban protectionism and by the expenses 
of transport and travelling, competition between lords and mar-
kets must have maintained taxation of market exchange within reason-
able bounds.119 But in the long run the eff ects may have been diff erent. 
106 chapter three
Whereas in England an institutional framework based on formal trade 
venues and seignorial control had developed, in Holland a tradition of 
informal rural trading, free from lordly involvement, was established. 
By its nature it was easily adaptable to changing circumstances.
3.4 Conclusions
At fi rst sight it looks as if Holland in the middle of the 14th century 
had developed hardly anything resembling an institutional framework 
for rural trade; unlike England, the county could not boast a dense 
network of rural fairs and markets. However, the relation between the 
proliferation of markets and the degree of commercialisation of the 
countryside may not be as straightforward as the English literature 
oft en suggests. An analysis of the social and political context and its 
eff ects on market institutions clarifi es this.
Holland’s scarcity of rural markets and fairs was not caused by a 
weakness of central government or by urban suppression of rural 
trade. Except when comital authority was under severe pressure, the 
14th-century towns of Holland were unable to acquire extra-territorial 
powers with which to dominate the countryside. In this respect 
Holland resembled England much more than it resembled Flanders. 
To explain the scarcity of rural markets before 1350, we have to look at 
two other factors. Firstly, urban markets in Holland off ered relatively 
easy access to outsiders, more so than in England or Flanders, thus 
providing good marketing opportunities for rural products. Secondly, 
Holland did not have a class of lords comparable to the English aristoc-
racy with its manorial power base. Consequently, not nearly as many 
rural fairs and markets were established—but, on the other hand, there 
were probably more opportunities for informal exchange.
Looking at the diff erences between Holland, England, and Flanders 
from a long-term perspective, an additional, albeit tentative, conclu-
sion is possible. In England, feudalism—through the active involve-
ment of manorial lords in establishing markets—had stimulated an 
early commercialisation of the countryside, whereas in Holland mano-
rialism had almost entirely disappeared by the middle of the 13th cen-
tury and could therefore not contribute to the development of rural 
fairs and markets in the same way. In Flanders, the early rise of towns 
and urban industry had contributed to the emergence of proto-indus-
trial activities; in Holland, a class of infl uential industrial entrepre-
neurs able to extend its activities in the countryside was still largely 
 rural markets c. 1200–c. 1350: a late start? 107
lacking in the middle of the 14th century. Consequently, while the 
institutional framework for rural trade emerging in England was 
fi rmly based on formal trade venues and seignorial control, and that in 
Flanders on urban domination, in Holland a tradition of informal 
rural trading, relatively free from seignorial or urban control, emerged. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, the farmers and fi shermen of 
Holland could fall back on this tradition and build on it when, in the 
second half of the 14th century, economic conditions changed.
1 Van Mieris, Groot charterboek II, 619. For Philip of Wassenaer, see Van Gent and 
Janse, ‘Van ridders tot baronnen’, 14–15, 33–34; for Jan of Beaumont, see Waller Zeper, 
Jan van Henegouwen, 65–66, 208.
2 Th e West-Frisian ‘towns’ where offi  cially licensed fairs or markets probably did 
take place around 1400 are as follows: Grootebroek, because of a reference in an early 
CHAPTER FOUR
NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR RURAL TRADE (C. 1350–C. 1450)
4.1 Introduction
In January 1341 Count Willem IV of Holland was called upon to adju-
dicate between two parties haggling over the Katwijk sea-fi sh market: 
the villagers from Katwijk, who insisted their fi sh market was the com-
pulsory market for the region, and the people from neighbouring 
Noordwijk, who were equally determined in their claim that no such 
compulsion existed. A disagreement between two communities was 
common enough, but this one required special care because the lords 
of the two villages were also involved. Both actively supported the 
claims of their villagers; moreover, these were no ordinary local lords. 
Th e lord of Katwijk was Philip of Wassenaer, who had recently acquired 
the position of burggraaf (burgrave) of Leiden. Th is had made him a 
very powerful and affl  uent man: the burggraaf owned various rights 
and properties in and around Leiden, the seignory of Katwijk among 
them. Noordwijk belonged to Jan of Beaumont, the count’s uncle and a 
man with great personal prestige and infl uence. Th e charter relating 
the count’s judgement in the confl ict states that investigations had 
shown Katwijk had possessed a fi sh market for a long time, although it 
had never had a compulsory character. Th e count ruled this situation 
was to be continued: Katwijk was to keep its fi sh market, but nobody 
was to be forced to visit it.1
In the second half of the 14th and the early 15th century some newly 
licensed fairs and weekly markets were established in the countryside. 
Many of the West-Frisian villages that acquired urban status in the 
early 15th century also received market rights, even though in most 
cases it is doubtful if these markets ever materialised.2 Schagen and 
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15th-century by-law (Pols, Westfriesche stadrechten II, 270); Schellinkhout, because 
the charter of urban liberties explicitly mentions the market was held on Th ursdays 
(Van Mieris, Groot charterboek III, 773); and perhaps Niedorp, because the mid 
14th-century comital accounts mention revenues from money-changing in Niedorp 
(Hamaker, Rekeningen grafelijkheid II, 270, 361). Th e acquisition of urban liberties by 
the West-Frisian communities is discussed below.
3 Bregman, Schagen, 18; Inventaris van het archief van Purmerend, summary no. 57.
4 Van Limburg Brouwer, Boergoensche charters, 50; ’t Hart, Historische beschrijving 
Heenvliet, 450; Van de Waal and Vervoorn, Beschrijving Goedereede en Overfl akkee, 
412.
5 RAL AG, inv. no. 334–25 f 34.
Purmerend, both in the north of Holland, received market licenses 
from their lords in 1463 and 1484 respectively; both went on to develop 
into small market towns.3 Th e villages Zuidland/Westenrijk (1439), 
Heenvliet (1469), and Oude Tonge (1473) on the islands in the south-
west were also given market licenses by their lords.4
But most new rural trade venues emerging in the late 14th and early 
15th century were not regular weekly markets or fairs providing facili-
ties for local trade in a wide range of products. Instead, they focused on 
just one product in an expanding sector of the economy. Th ey were 
usually not licensed, but they were not illegal either: the authorities, 
local or central, knew these trade venues existed, usually supported 
their functioning, and in some cases also drew revenues from them. 
Connecting production areas to distant markets, the new rural trade 
venues refl ected the growth of interregional trade and at the same time 
stimulated it; for small-scale rural producers, in particular, they pro-
vided easily accessible and low-cost marketing opportunities.
Two categories of late 14th- and early 15th-century rural trade ven-
ues will be discussed in this chapter. Th e aim is to discover which fac-
tors stimulated their rise and shaped the way they were organised and 
to assess their contribution to the commercialisation of the country-
side. Firstly, the rise of commercial sea-fi shing was accompanied by 
the emergence of fi sh markets in villages along the North Sea coast. 
Noordwijk was one of them: in 1417 the wardens of St. Catherine’s 
hospital in Leiden combined a trip to Noordwijk for other purposes 
with the purchase of fi sh in this village.5 Th e development and organi-
sation of these sea-fi sh markets will be explored by looking at three 
factors that helped to determine the structure of these markets: the 
eff ects of seignorial control, the role of towns and urban merchants, 
and the contribution of the fi shing communities themselves. A com-
parison with England will focus mainly on the fi rst of these three ele-
ments, a comparison with Flanders primarily on the second.
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6 Kowaleski, ‘Commercialization of the Sea Fisheries’, 177–178, 228; Salzman, 
English Industries, 259.
7 Degryse, Vlaanderens haringbedrijf, 72.
8 Ervynck, Van Neer, and Pieters, ‘How the North Was Won’, 232–233.
Secondly, parallel to the rise of dairy trade, village weigh houses 
emerged in the north of Holland. Th e factors contributing to the rise of 
these weigh houses and their eff ects on rural commercialisation will be 
analysed in the same way. Here we will focus on two elements: the role 
of towns and urban merchants, and the contribution of rural commu-
nities. No direct equivalents to Holland’s rural weighing facilities were 
found in England or Flanders; as a consequence, the comparative ele-
ment had to be curtailed. It will be shown that the absence of rural 
scales in England and Flanders is in keeping with institutional patterns 
noted earlier and with the diff erence in the balance in power underly-
ing these patterns.
4.2 Seaside fish markets and the sea-fish trade
Th e rise of commercial sea-fi shing
In England the rich herring grounds off  the eastern coast had been 
exploited for commercial purposes from at least the early 11th century 
onwards, stimulated perhaps by the growth of aristocratic wealth in 
combination with a wider adherence to religious dietary rules. Several 
Domesday Book entries on large herring rents payable to a lord or to 
the king bear witness to the existence of large-scale herring fi sheries.6 
In Flanders the fi rst references to sea-fi sh trade date also from the early 
11th century.7 Findings of bones of marine fi sh in inland towns sup-
port the impression that commercial sea-fi shing must have begun 
around the year 1000. Not surprisingly, in Flanders the fast-growing 
urban population rather than the aristocracy is considered to have 
been the driving force behind the development of commercial 
sea-fi shing.8
In Holland, sea-fi shing emerged much later. In the 12th and 13th 
centuries, fi shing probably took place mainly in the waters of the river 
delta, which provided plentiful fi sh and off ered more safety than the 
open sea. Sea-fi sh, primarily salted herring and cod, did become part 
of the diet in Holland’s young towns, but most of it was imported 
from Scandinavia by Hansa merchants. Only in the late 13th century 
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local fi shermen began to venture out to sea in signifi cant numbers. 
As in Flanders, this was probably stimulated by a rising urban demand 
for fi sh.9
Around 1300 the herring shoals off  the coasts of Yorkshire, 
Lincolnshire, Norfolk, and Suff olk were attracting fi shermen not only 
from England but also from abroad, the Flemish and Dutch among 
them. During the herring season, they regularly landed their catch in 
one of the English ports that had by then developed a lively herring 
trade. Th ere the fi sh was smoked, dried or salted, and then sold. Th e 
annual fairs of Scarborough and Great Yarmouth in particular, each 
lasting about six weeks in autumn, were visited by merchants from all 
over England and also from the continent.10
In 14th-century eastern England, off shore fi shery was based mainly 
in the port towns. Professional fi shermen from these ports fi shed for 
several fi sh species, each in the appropriate season, of which the her-
ring fare was the most important. Following the herring shoals on their 
southward journey along the English coast, fi shing expeditions oft en 
took men away from home for long periods. Off shore fi shing was risky, 
and even in the early 14th century it required considerable invest-
ments. Th is explains why fi shery and the fi shing industry was concen-
trated in the hands of an urban elite of ship owners. Many owned more 
than one ship and hired skippers and crew for the season. In numerous 
villages along the eastern coast, sea-fi shing was also practised, but usu-
ally in combination with agriculture or other occupational activities. 
Village fi shermen kept mainly to coastal fi shing, using small boats that 
could easily be drawn up on the beach. Th ey participated in herring 
fi shery but in a much more modest way than the urban specialists, 
fi shing only for herring during the short period when the migrating 
herring shoals passed nearby.11
Village fi shermen in Flanders and Holland—perhaps encouraged by 
the increasing demand for herring in the growing towns or pressured 
by overfi shing in the southern North Sea—ventured out much fur-
ther.12 Th e Great Yarmouth murage records over the year 1344/45 
    9 Boelmans Kranenburg, ‘Visserij Noordnederlanders’, 285–286; Boelmans 
Kranenburg, ‘Visserijbedrijf Zijdenaars’, 322.
10 Kowaleski, ‘Commercialization of the Sea Fisheries’, 180–188; Saul, ‘English 
Towns’, 77–78; Saul, ‘Herring Industry’, 35–36.
11 Bailey, ‘Coastal Fishing’, 103–104, 106; Pawley, ‘Lincolnshire Coastal Villages’, 
154–159.
12 Ervynck, Van Neer, and Pieters, ‘How the North Was Won’, 234–235.
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13 Smit, Bronnen geschiedenis handel met Engeland I, 244–254. A brief description of 
the information on herring fi shery in the murage records is given by Childs, ‘Eastern 
Fisheries’, 21.
14 Th is contradicts the claim of Degryse that only the port towns participated in 
fi shing expeditions to the English coast (Degryse, Vlaanderens haringbedrijf, 31). Cf. 
Danhieux, ‘Visserij Zuidnederlanders’, 280.
15 Smit, Bronnen geschiedenis handel met Engeland I, 244–254.
16 Hamaker, Rekeningen grafelijkheid II, 168–169. About the same quantity of cod 
was bought in Brielle (Ibid., 170–172).
17 Meyer, ‘Fishing in the Western Baltic Sea’, 15.
mention the exact origin of the Flemish vessels visiting this port town.13 
Most Flemish ships came from Blankenberge, Ostend, Sluis, and Heist. 
Sluis was a small port in the Scheldt delta. Th e other three were settle-
ments on the North Sea coast, without—at that time—any harbour 
facilities. Blankenberge and Ostend had acquired legal urban status, 
but Heist never became more than a village.14
Th e murage register also records ships from Holland. More than 
half of the Holland vessels visiting Great Yarmouth came from the 
town of Brielle, in combination with its outport Maarland. By this time 
Brielle, situated favourably in the Meuse delta, with good harbour 
facilities and easy access to the hinterland, was rapidly developing 
into  Holland’s most important fi shing port. But in addition the 
Yarmouth register repeatedly records ships—and they can only have 
been fi shing boats—from a series of villages along the southern half of 
the sandy North Sea coast: Scheveningen, Katwijk, Noordwijk, and 
Wijk aan Zee.15
In addition to their contacts with the Yarmouth fair, by this time 
these villages probably also functioned as fi sh markets in their own 
right. For Katwijk and indirectly also for Noordwijk this has already 
been shown. In mid 14th-century Scheveningen a purveyor of the 
count purchased three porpoises and over 3,000 codfi sh as provisions 
for a military campaign, suggesting that here too trade in fi sh was tak-
ing place.16 Th ese village fi sh-markets were probably simple beach 
markets: fi shermen beached their ships, unloaded their catch, and sold 
it on the spot. Markets of this type were quite common in medieval 
northwestern Europe; they existed in the Baltic region as early as the 
Viking age.17 Beach markets must have provided cheap and easily 
accessible market opportunities, thus lowering search costs for both 
fi shers and fi sh merchants.
Th e role of the North Sea villages is refl ected in their contribution to 
the late 14th-century inland sea-fi sh trade. Th e toll register of the 
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18 Egmond, Visboek, 23.
19 Westermann, Rekeningen riviertollen Gelderland, 47–90. A last of herring equals 
the contents of 12 to 14 herring casks, or about 120 litres.
20 Unger, ‘Netherlands Herring Fishery’, 337–338, 344.
21 Kowaleski, ‘Commercialization of the Sea Fisheries’, 191–198; Saul, ‘English 
Towns’; Bailey, ‘Coastal Fishing’, 108–111.
Guelders river town of Tiel records many shipments of herring, prob-
ably salted or smoked, on their way to towns in Guelders or the German 
Rhineland. Of all herring passing the Tiel toll post between March and 
December 1394, a surprising total of 150 last was transported by ship-
masters from Th e Hague, who had almost certainly bought the fi sh in 
Scheveningen (although geographically and socially a separate com-
munity, Scheveningen was administratively a part of Th e Hague).18 Th e 
quantity of herring from Scheveningen almost equals the 153 last of 
herring that came from Brielle in the same period. In addition, Th e 
Hague shipmasters also transported other kinds of fi sh in the winter 
months, whereas Brielle seems to have focused almost entirely on 
herring.19
At the end of the 14th century, Dutch and Flemish fi shermen began 
curing herring on board their ships. Th e technique itself—gutting and 
salting the herring and packing it tightly into casks—was not new: it 
had been practised before in Scandinavia. Th e use of it on board was 
an important innovation, however: it allowed for longer, uninterrupted 
expeditions to more distant fi shing grounds, thus making a consider-
able increase in production possible.20
Competition from the large herring busses from Holland and 
Flanders has oft en been identifi ed as an important cause of the decline 
of herring fi shery in the east of England, but it is clear that it cannot 
have been the only one. In Great Yarmouth the signs of crisis were 
becoming visible in the late 14th century, before the introduction of 
the innovations in Dutch and Flemish herring fi shery. Th e insecurity 
and damage resulting from the Hundred Years War were probably 
partly to blame, as were coastal erosion and silting. Both Mark Bailey 
and Maryanne Kowaleski have tentatively suggested that the regula-
tion and protectionism characterising the Yarmouth herring trade may 
also have contributed to the decline of the large eastern fi sheries.21
In the meantime, the introduction of the new curing techniques in 
Holland had brought about signifi cant changes in the organisation of 
sea-fi shing, changes that introduced characteristics reminiscent of the 
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22 Boelmans Kranenburg, ‘Visserijbedrijf Zijdenaars’, 326–330; Van Bavel, ‘Early 
Proto-Industrialization’, 1141–1142, 1154; Danhieux, ‘Visserij Zuidnederlanders’, 282.
23 Boelmans Kranenburg, ‘Visserijbedrijf Zijdenaars’, 330–332.
24 Fish from Texel and Callantsoog is reported in the toll register of Kampen over 
the years 1439–1441 (Smit, ‘Kamper pondtolregister’); the fi sh was apparently on its 
way to the fairs of Deventer or one of the other IJssel towns. All villages are mentioned 
in a protest against the revival of the Naarden staple for fi sh, dating from 1452 (Noord-
Hollands Archief, Stadsbestuur van Haarlem (stadsarchief van Haarlem), inv. no. 81; 
this document will be discussed in more detail below.
25 Schoorl, ’t Oge, 165–166, 172–174.
situation in 14th-century eastern England. Curing on board required 
larger ships, and these in turn needed proper harbour facilities, leading 
to a concentration of the rapidly expanding herring industry and her-
ring export trade in the port towns. Th is development was reinforced 
by the more capital-intensive nature of off shore fi shing and the greater 
risks that were involved: urban capital became essential to fi nance fi sh-
ing expeditions. Although villagers were still frequently hired as skip-
pers and sailors, and some of them even owned shares in the large 
herring busses, large-scale herring fi shing and herring trade came to 
be increasingly dominated by wealthy urban entrepreneurs.22
Independent fi shing activities based in the villages now concen-
trated on coastal fi shing; however, this seems to have suff ered little or 
no damage from the rise of the ‘great’ herring fi shery.23 In fact, in addi-
tion to the villages on the southern part of the coast—like Katwijk, 
Noordwijk, and Scheveningen—by the middle of the 15th century sev-
eral villages in the north were also engaged in commercial fi shing: 
Wijk aan Zee, Egmond, Callantsoog, Huisduinen, Petten, and the vil-
lages on the island of Texel.24 All these villages (and also Zandvoort 
and Terheide) are marked on a map of the Dutch coast made by the 
Scheveningen fi sh merchant and auctioneer Adriaen Coenen, showing 
the villages involved in coastal fi shing in the late 16th century (Figure 
7). Th e by-laws of Callantsoog suggest that even in the 15th century 
these villages had beach markets: the fi rst reference to fi sh sales in 
Callantsoog dates from 1415, while a 1452 regulation explicitly refers 
to fi sh sales on the beach.25
Th e explanation for the continued role of fi shing villages in com-
mercial sea-fi shing can be attributed in part to a combination of eco-
nomic and geographic circumstances. Rising standards of living 
stimulated demand for a wider choice of fi sh than just herring—
preferably fresh fi sh—and coastal fi shing was able to provide this. 
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26 Stabel, Dwarfs among Giants, 49–50.
27 Doehaerd, ‘Génèse d’une entreprise maritime’, 9–11.
28 Tys, ‘Landscape and Settlement’, 161.
29 At Walraversijde, extensive archaeological research has been carried out, which 
has resulted in a large number of publications. For a recent survey, see Tys, ‘Expressions 
of Power’, and Pieters, ‘Material Environment of Walravenside’.
Moreover, Holland had no port towns with direct access to the sea on 
the North Sea coast: between the Meuse delta and the northern islands 
no rivers or navigable creeks entered the sea. Th is must have placed the 
North Sea fi shing villages in a favourable position when it came to pro-
visioning the markets of the rapidly expanding towns in the immediate 
hinterland. However, a comparison with Flanders suggests that this is 
not the whole story.
According to Peter Stabel, in Flanders concentration of off shore 
fi shing in towns like Ostend led to a decline of the smaller fi shing 
towns.26 Nevertheless, some Flemish fi shing villages did quite well in 
the 15th century. Small Wenduine, for example, had only three or 
four  fi shing boats around 1400; in 1467 the number had risen to 
twelve.27 More importantly, Heist was, aft er Dunkirk, Nieuport and 
Ostend, still one of Flanders’ major fi shing centres.28 So was the village 
of Walraversijde, near Ostend. Recent archaeological research has 
revealed that the fi shermen of Walraversijde mainly fi shed for herring, 
cod, fl atfi sh, and eel in the southern North Sea. Th ey also processed 
fl atfi sh destined for the urban markets, probably by smoking. Th e fact 
that the village had no harbour and the boats had to be beached, made 
a large-scale herring industry impossible. Coastal fi shing comple-
mented by some agriculture and other activities seems to have pro-
vided the villagers with a livelihood.29
Figure 7 Map of the villages engaged in fi shing for plaice in the late 16th century
Source: Adriaen Coenen, Visboeck (Th e Hague, National Library, manuscript 78 E 54, 
f 138v-139r, detail)
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an additional source of income, as causes of the decline.
31 Van der Woude, Noorderkwartier, 354.
32 Ibid., 410–412; Fruin, Informacie: Wijk aan Zee (20–21), Zandvoort (59–60), 
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33 Boelmans Kranenburg, ‘Visserijbedrijf Zijdenaars’, 332.
But at the end of the 15th century the Flemish and the Dutch paths 
of development diverged. Th e Flemish fi shing villages experienced a 
serious crisis. Th e village of Walraversijde presents an extreme case: 
the eastern quarter of the village disappeared and a century later the 
village was deserted altogether. Th e direct cause of its decline is obvi-
ous: political upheavals in the late 15th century wrought havoc upon 
the Flemish coastal region. Several villages were partially abandoned, 
Walraversijde being one of them. However, unlike the surrounding 
agrarian communities, it did not recover aft erwards. Th e fi shermen 
may have decided to move to one of the ports. At this stage, Stabel’s 
argument that fi shery concentrated in the towns proves correct.30
Holland also had to deal with wars and economic problems in the 
last quarter of the 15th century. Th ere can be no doubt the coastal vil-
lages suff ered from the disruptions; Petten and Wijk aan Zee, for 
instance, were attacked by pirates.31 Nonetheless, Ad van der Woude’s 
claim that the coastal villages, plagued by coastal erosion and sand 
drift , never fully recovered aft erwards seems too pessimistic. Th at the 
villages declined in the 17th and 18th centuries is clear enough, and it 
is also true that the Informacie—an assessment of economic and demo-
graphic conditions made for fi scal purposes in 1514—does not present 
a rosy picture for most seaside villages.32
However, in contrast to the situation in Flanders, other sources indi-
cate that Holland’s fi shing villages continued to play a successful role in 
coastal fi shing and in the fi sh trade. Th e Scheveningen fi sh merchant 
and auctioneer Adriaen Coenen, born in 1515, wrote that in his boy-
hood the fi shermen of Scheveningen, Katwijk, Noordwijk, Wijk aan 
Zee, Egmond, Petten, Callantsoog, and Huisduinen exported dried 
plaice to the Antwerp fair, where it was bought by merchants from 
Germany.33 Coenen’s story is supported by a document concerning a 
confl ict on the existence of toll privileges for Callantsoog. In 1527 a 
shipmaster from Alkmaar and the widow of a fi sh merchant from 
Callantsoog testifi ed that they had repeatedly transported fresh, salted, 
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and smoked fi sh from Callantsoog over Holland’s inland waterways to 
Zeeland and Brabant, without having to pay the river tolls.34 Clearly 
the coastal villages had retained, or regained, a role in the interregional 
fi sh trade. In this respect their position was diff erent from their Flemish 
counterparts.
Th e reasons for the diff erence are not immediately obvious. Th e 
absence of port towns on the North Sea coast may have placed the 
Holland villages in a favourable position when it came to provisioning 
the markets of the rapidly expanding towns in their immediate hinter-
land, but it does not explain how these villages could acquire and 
maintain a vital role in interregional trade as well. Aft er all, from a 
geographical perspective the towns in the Meuse delta and on the 
Zuiderzee coast were in a better position to develop as interregional 
fi sh trade centres. An explanation of the continued success of the 
coastal villages must therefore look beyond the development of sup-
ply  and demand: social and political factors were involved. One of 
these factors was the extent of seignorial control over sea-fi shing and 
the fi sh trade.
Impositions and beach markets: seignorial control?
Since almost every stretch of the English coastline belonged to some 
manor, sea-fi shing could hardly escape the attention of lords. Th at was 
not necessarily a bad thing. In their eff orts to improve their own 
income some lords created conditions that benefi ted their tenants as 
well. Th e lord of Blythburgh, for instance, forcefully opposed the 
attempts of the neighbouring town of Dunwich to establish a trade 
monopoly and supported his tenants’ boycott of the Dunwich fi shing 
and trading tolls.35 Th ere were also lords who actively invested in the 
construction of quays or harbour facilities.36 Nevertheless, many lords 
seem to have been satisfi ed with simply expropriating part of the fi sh-
ermen’s products or profi ts. Th e most common way to do this was by 
requisition: tenants involved in fi shing had to surrender part of the 
catch to their lord, originally in kind and later in cash. Alternatively, 
purveyance systems were used, forcing tenants to off er their fi sh at a 
fi xed price to the lord fi rst.37 Requisitioning already existed in the 11th 
34 Schoorl, ’t Oge, 189–191.
35 Bailey, Bailiff ’s Minute Book, 11–13.
36 Fox, Evolution, 16.
37 Ibid., 52–55, 122–129.
118 chapter four
38 Salzman, English Industries, 267–269; Fox, Evolution, 55–57; Kowaleski, 
‘Expansion of the South-Western Fisheries’, 441.
39 Enno van Gelder, Nederlandse dorpen, 14–32, 32–39, 67–89, esp. 67–69.
40 De Boer, ‘Roerende van der visscheryen’, 118, 124–125.
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century, as is shown by the Domesday Book herring rents mentioned 
earlier. In the course of time, impositions became more varied and 
probably also heavier. In the 13th and 14th century, rural fi shermen 
usually paid a ‘dole’ or ‘share’ to their lord, which could take the shape 
of a tax on the boats, the nets, the fi shermen in person, or their catch.38
In Holland also, lords profi ted from sea-fi shing. In his comparison 
of the social structure and the organisation of community life in vil-
lages in various parts of the Low Countries in the 16th century, the 
Dutch historian Enno van Gelder concludes that in the coastal district 
lordly control over village aff airs was stricter than elsewhere.39 It is no 
wonder: the sandy strip behind the dunes had been inhabited since 
Carolingian times, many of Holland’s most powerful noble families 
originated in this region, and it was here that remnants of the manorial 
system survived longest. It is true that seignorial control over fi shing at 
sea was light when compared to the regulation of fi sheries in inner 
waters. Freshwater fi shing rights traditionally belonged to the regalia; 
over the centuries many of these rights had been granted to local lords 
while others were still in the hands of the count of Holland. Even 
though some rural communities had managed to obtain fi shing rights 
in nearby waters, on the whole freshwater fi shing was allowed only to 
the lessees of comital or seignorial fi shing rights. Fishing at sea, on the 
other hand, was open to everybody who was prepared to take the risk 
of sailing out40—although upon their return to the beach, fi shermen 
were still confronted with seignorial power.
It is therefore not surprising to fi nd that requisitioning of sea-fi sh 
took place. Egmond Abbey, for instance, traditionally claimed a small 
portion (in kind)—the so-called hofvis—of the fi sh caught at sea by its 
villein tenants for consumption by the monks. In the early 15th cen-
tury, the abbey was forced to give up the hofvis, together with almost 
all other customary duties. Many of these duties were abolished alto-
gether, but some—and the hofvis was probably among them—were 
transferred to the lords of Egmond.41 It is likely this kind of due 
also  existed in other coastal villages. In the Informacie of 1514, the 
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representatives of Zandvoort reported that the local fi shermen had to 
give up a small portion—by then transferred into a money due—of 
their cod, haddock, and plaice to their lord, the lord of Brederode.42
In Katwijk seignorial exactions were more oppressive. Th e lords of 
Katwijk, the Van Wassenaers, were not only entitled to the hofvis, but 
also levied an imposition of 5% of the value of all fi sh brought ashore 
(the pondgeld). Both dues were also imposed on foreigners bringing 
their fi sh to Katwijk. In the 14th century the local fi shermen moreover 
paid an additional tax per person, the riemgeld.43 Katwijk is directly 
adjacent to Valkenburg and had probably been part of the comital 
manor there, before it was dissolved in the middle of the 13th century. 
Even in 1333 the hofvis was still in the hands of Count Willem III, as 
his instructions to a man named Hughe Jansz. to ‘keep’ his fi sh in 
Katwijk indicate. Perhaps these origins explain the far-reaching 
arrangements in Katwijk.44 Despite numerous protests from local fi sh-
ermen and outsiders, the Van Wassenaers held on to the lucrative 
pondgeld until the early 19th century.45
Yet it is exactly the frequency of the protests against the impositions 
levied in Katwijk that suggests these dues exceeded what was consid-
ered normal. Th e impression is confi rmed by the fact that the repre-
sentatives of Zandvoort, reporting to the government inquisitioners in 
1514, mention only the hofvis and do not refer to an additional tax like 
the Katwijk pondgeld; it is unlikely they would have overlooked such 
an imposition if it had existed. In other respects too the situation com-
pares favourably to what was customary in England. Egmond Abbey 
did not impose labour services for villein fi shermen, as the Devon 
manor of Stokenham did even in the middle of the 14th century. Nor 
are there any indications of the existence of a common type of due in 
England: a levy on the use of the foreshore, the area between the high- 
and low-water marks, where fi shermen drew up their boats, dried their 
nets, or placed stakes for fi shing.46 Moreover, no revenues from fi shing 
or from the use of the foreshore are recorded in the few medieval sei-
gnorial accounts from Holland’s coastal district that have survived: 
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they are not mentioned in the late 14th-century accounts of Jan of 
Beaumont and his successors as lords of Noordwijk, nor in the rem-
nants of the 16th-century accounts of the lords of Brederode for 
Callantsoog.47
Th ere is a parallel with ecclesiastical taxation of fi shery and fi sh 
trade. Whereas in England tithes were commonly levied on sea-fi sh-
ing, in Holland fi sh tithes did not exist.48 Admittedly, from about the 
middle of the 15th century onwards we do fi nd evidence of payments 
by fi shermen in seaside villages to the local church, but they have a dif-
ferent background. At least in some villages they originally bore the 
character of a bilateral agreement rather than a tax. Moreover, they 
served a purpose that was of direct interest to the community: the 
maintenance of a fi re beacon. Noordwijk is a good example. In 1444 a 
contract between sixteen Noordwijk shipmasters and the churchward-
ens of the local church was drawn up. Th e fi shermen agreed to the 
payment of a yearly sum which would be used by the churchwardens 
to light a fi re beacon to guide the ships.49 Scheveningen by-laws of the 
mid-16th century also mention contributions to the churchwardens 
for a fi re beacon; but despite the fact that the impositions were modest 
(in 1550 the rate was set at 3 schelling per crew member for the season), 
it seems to have been a problem to get the shipmasters to pay. Th is sug-
gests that by then the voluntary character of the arrangement was fad-
ing out.50
Th e reasons for the absence of fi sh tithes in Holland are best under-
stood by looking at the situation in the southwestern part of Flanders. 
Here the abbeys and convents holding patronage rights over the parish 
churches of the coastal towns and villages acquired papal permission 
to levy herring tithes in the late 12th and early 13th century; it is no 
coincidence that this happened at a time when the commercial impor-
tance of herring fi shery was increasing rapidly. Th e introduction met 
with fi erce protests in towns such as Calais and Nieuport, but with 
the support of the count of Flanders resistance was broken and tithe 
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payment was enforced.51 As we saw, in Holland commercial sea-fi shing 
along the North Sea coast did not develop until the late 13th century. 
By that time in Holland many of the regular tithes on grain, other 
crops, and cattle had fallen under the control of worldly lords.52 
Fragmentation and lay ownership probably diminished possibilities to 
obtain ecclesiastical support for attempts to introduce fi sh tithes. Th at 
in turn must have made it diffi  cult to overcome the usual resistance to 
new tithes.53 Nevertheless, even Egmond Abbey—entitled to corn 
tithes and cattle tithes in Noordwijk and Egmond—apparently did not 
tithe sea-fi shing in these villages.54
Diff erences between Holland and England are also refl ected in the 
extent of seignorial authority over seaside fi sh markets. When the 
commer cialisation of sea-fi shery began, beach markets emerged in 
England as well as in Holland; but in keeping with the general ten-
dency of lordly grip on markets, most were soon brought under the 
control of a manorial lord. Th e lord fi led for a formal market license 
with the Crown and, once he had obtained it, set rules to regulate trade 
and levy taxes.55 Only a few coastal fi sh markets, such as those of 
Exmouth and Brixham in Devon, seem to have escaped seignorial 
attention—perhaps because of their remoteness from the seat of mano-
rial authority.56
As far as we know, none of the lords of the seaside villages in Holland 
ever obtained a formal license for the village beach market. It is clear 
that despite the absence of a market charter, the fi sh market in Katwijk 
was controlled and regulated by the lord of Wassenaer, who put it to 
use as a source of revenues. But we have already seen that Katwijk, with 
its remnants of a past as a comital manor, was exceptional. In 
Callantsoog, the lord of Brederode did issue rules for the fi sh auction 
on the beach, but these bear the character of a confi rmation of local 
customs regulating transactions between parties. In 1452, for instance, 
the lord established that if a buyer could not pay in cash on the spot, 
the seller was allowed to cancel the transaction and fi nd himself 
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another buyer.57 Some years later the lord of Brederode allowed the 
churchwardens to tax the fi sh auction for the benefi t of the church, but 
this too might just as well be a confi rmation of a local arrangement 
between fi shermen and churchwardens, similar to the Noordwijk con-
tract mentioned earlier.58
In short, as a consequence of a combination of social and political 
factors (the early demise of the manorial lordship) and economic 
developments (the late rise of sea-fi shing), seignorial control over 
beach markets in Holland was not as strong as in England. Th e rise of 
informal fi sh markets along the North Sea coast must have contributed 
to a reduction in transaction costs: at little expense, fi shermen could 
off er their catch for sale at a series of easily accessible locations.
Inland trade, staple markets, and beach market auctioneers: the role 
of towns and merchants
Having established the relative freedom of the sea-fi sh trade from sei-
gnorial control in Holland, it is time now to turn to the involvement of 
towns and merchants. To what extent did they control the fi sh trade 
and shape the organisation of the beach markets? One way to discover 
more about their role is by looking at the next stage of the marketing of 
sea-fi sh: the transport from the beach to inland urban markets. Th e 
toll registers of Heusden, on the Meuse, over the years 1378–1380, are 
interesting because, as will be shown below, since the middle of the 
14th century Heusden was a compulsory staple market for sea-fi sh 
transported upstream. Th e toll register should therefore provide a 
good survey of at least the river-bound part of sea-fi sh exports. Th e 
register mentions frequent payments for sea-fi sh by shipmasters from 
Th e Hague and Katwijk. Large quantities of haddock, plaice and cod—
all three probably smoked, dried or salted—were brought to Heusden 
from both villages. Th e Hague shipmasters paid a total of 106 lb. Holl. 
5s to the toll guards, whereas Katwijk shipmasters paid a total of 84 lb. 
Holl. 2s. Th is suggests that Scheveningen was a slightly larger fi shing 
centre than Katwijk.59
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Th e Katwijk shipmasters registered in Heusden may well have been 
fi shermen taking their catch directly up river to the Heusden fi sh mar-
ket. Heusden was a convenient alternative for the fi sh market in 
Katwijk, which at this time was the object of a confl ict regarding its 
location.60 However, the shipmasters from Th e Hague were doubtless 
merchants who transported fi sh bought in Scheveningen to inland 
markets. Fish merchants from Th e Hague had played an important 
role in the inland fi sh trade since at least the middle of the 14th cen-
tury. Th eir frequent presence at the Guelders river toll of Tiel at the end 
of that century has already been noted.61 Although the possibility can-
not be excluded, there is not much evidence for merchants from other 
towns buying fi sh in Katwijk, Scheveningen or any of the other coastal 
fi sh markets and sending it up river. Research by Fred van Kan on late 
14th- and early 15th-century Leiden has revealed the involvement of 
some of the members of the Leiden elite with freshwater fi shing and 
the freshwater fi sh trade: they acted as lessees of the rich fi shing waters 
north of Leiden.62 But only in one case has Van Kan tentatively identi-
fi ed a shipmaster passing the toll in Lobith in 1326 with sea-fi sh as a 
member of a family of Leiden fi sh merchants.
Even if merchants from Leiden, or another town, did engage in the 
inland sea-fi sh trade, they did not push village merchants out of this 
line of trade. Indeed, as we have seen earlier, there is evidence that 
merchants from coastal villages such as Callantsoog were still involved 
in the interregional sea-fi sh trade in the early 16th century.
A second element of urban control over the sea-fi sh trade—or at least 
an attempt in that direction—is illustrated by the existence of staple 
markets for sea-fi sh trade in two towns. Even though the Katwijkers 
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had failed in their attempts to monopolise the fi sh trade on the North 
Sea coast, compulsory staples for the interregional sea-fi sh trade were 
established in the 14th century elsewhere in the county. One of them 
has just been mentioned: in 1357 Count Willem V granted the town of 
Heusden, on the Meuse, a staple right for all fi sh transported upstream. 
Fift een years earlier, in 1342, a similar privilege had been granted to 
Naarden, on the Zuiderzee shore, ‘for all fi sh caught between Kampen 
and Muiden’.63
In Flanders, the same kind of staple privileges had been granted to 
some of the small towns in the Zwin estuary when in 1323 Bruges 
received its general staple privilege. Dried fi sh was to be sold only in 
Monnikerede and Hoeke, and all trade in herring—at the time still 
imported by German Hansa merchants—was to take place in Damme 
(as Bruges’ outport).64 When, in the early 15th century, on-board cur-
ing techniques were introduced, their use was at fi rst prohibited by the 
count of Flanders. Th is probably happened under pressure from the 
merchants of the German Hansa, who until then had monopolised the 
herring trade, and from the authorities in Bruges, Ghent, and Ypres, 
who feared that the curing industry would reduce the supply of fresh 
fi sh to urban consumers. But as the prohibition benefi ted the position 
of Zeeland’s and Holland’s fi sheries on the international herring mar-
ket at the expense of the Flemish, it was lift ed in 1420.65 Aft erwards 
cask herring could be bought in Damme and in the main fi shing ports, 
but not elsewhere. No doubt herring was also sold illegally outside 
these designated markets, but as the records of the water bailiff  in Sluis 
show, off enders were prosecuted even in the late 15th century.66
In Holland, on the other hand, by that time attempts to concentrate 
the sea-fi sh trade in the two staple towns were no longer very eff ec-
tive—as a protest fi led in 1457 against the Naarden fi sh staple shows. 
Apparently, Duke Philip of Burgundy had recently issued an ordinance 
reviving the obligation to market all fi sh from the Zuiderzee in 
Naarden; obviously the staple right had not been maintained for some 
time. Th e protest voices a series of objections, ranging from com-
plaints about Naarden’s inconvenient location and lack of facilities to 
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the statement that the fi sh trade, backbone of the nation’s wealth, had 
always been free and should remain so. Th e complainants also stated 
that in Naarden they could not fetch the best price for their fi sh because 
the town did not attract enough foreign merchants. Th e document is 
not signed, but in addition to almost all towns in Holland it mentions 
the North Sea villages Scheveningen, Katwijk, Noordwijk, Zandvoort, 
Petten, Callantsoog, Huisduinen, and Texel as victims of the revival of 
Naarden’s staple right.67
It looks as if the protest was successful: the Naarden fi sh staple did 
not survive long aft erwards.68 Its Heusden counterpart may have 
declined even earlier: there are no records of its existence aft er the 14th 
century. A later attempt by Haarlem, in the early 16th century, to 
acquire a monopoly on the herring industry and herring trade, came 
to nothing. Even though the privilege was granted, it was probably 
impossible to eff ectuate in view of the protests raised by other towns.69
A fi nal aspect of merchant involvement in the sea-fi sh trade that needs 
to be mentioned here concerns the role of merchants in the day-to-day 
running of the fi sh markets at the North Sea beaches. Little is known 
about the practicalities of the organisation of these markets in the 
14th and early 15th century; but by looking at some 16th-century evi-
dence and comparing it with the scraps of information available for 
previous centuries, it is possible to get an idea of some of the main 
characteristics.
We saw earlier that in the 15th century the off shore herring fi shery 
concentrated in the towns and that it was increasingly dominated by 
urban merchant-entrepreneurs, who hired villagers as crewmen for 
their ships. Similar relations have been demonstrated for freshwater 
fi shing and the freshwater fi sh trade in the Haarlem region in the late 
15th and early 16th century. Th is trade was controlled by a few mer-
chants from the young town of Purmerend, men who ran their aff airs 
as proto-capitalist entrepreneurs. Th ey did business on a large scale 
both in Holland and abroad, and they employed village fi shermen in 
their service, providing them with boats and fi shing gear and paying 
them a salary.70 However, it seems proto-capitalist relations did not 
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aff ect coastal fi shing and, in particular, the village fi sh markets to the 
same extent.
In early 16th-century Scheveningen the fi sh market was bound to 
detailed rules set by the Th e Hague authorities on the advice of a num-
ber of Scheveningen shipmasters. First independent inspectors 
checked the quality of the fi sh brought ashore. Th en the fi sh was auc-
tioned via a system of descending bids. Th e ship that had arrived fi rst 
had priority, with the others following in a fi xed order.71 A late 16th-
century confl ict between the Scheveningen fi shermen and the auction-
eer Adriaen Coenen provides some additional information on the role 
of this functionary. In 1580 a group of fi shermen fi led a request with 
the Prince of Orange. Th ey stated that they had accepted Coenen’s 
appointment as Scheveningen’s auctioneer some years earlier because 
he was a local and would not be in offi  ce for long since he was of 
advanced age and weak health. However, they wanted to be certain 
that aft er Coenen’s death the old situation was to be restored. Th ey 
added testimonies, not just from Scheveningen but also from Katwijk 
and Terheide, explaining that in Scheveningen and in every other fi sh-
ing village along the North Sea coast it had always been the custom for 
each shipmaster to choose his own auctioneer. For the course of one 
year this man was not only to put up the shipmaster’s catch for auction 
and keep account of the sales but also to advance him money to pay his 
crew, maintain his fi shing gear, and even buy a new boat if necessary. 
Th e appointment of Coenen as the only auctioneer in Scheveningen 
had been a deviation from tradition—and since Coenen was appar-
ently unable to provide the fi shermen with credit, it was causing seri-
ous trouble.72
Th e role attributed to the auctioneers is reminiscent of that of the 
‘hosts’ operating in the Flemish fi shing towns and villages, best known 
from 15th-century Wenduine. Here in the beginning of that century 
the local fi shermen had contracted a wealthy burgess from neighbour-
ing Blankenberge to act as their moneylender and auction their fi sh. 
Aft erwards this role was taken over by a Bruges merchant. Th e arrange-
ment is not to be confused with the widely known system whereby 
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foreign merchants were assigned to townsmen who provided housing, 
mediation on the market, and other commercial services: the host in 
Wenduine had local fi shermen under his care, not foreigners.
For the fi shermen, the host solved several problems simultaneously. 
Th ey could leave the marketing of the fi sh to someone who knew his 
way about in commerce and leave them free to sail out again. As the 
host guaranteed payment to the fi shermen every week, advancing the 
money from his own pocket if the urban fi sh merchants had not paid 
in time, they were assured of a regular income. Moreover, credit was 
available to them on fl exible terms, and even young fi shermen without 
any possessions of their own were able to get a loan.73 Of course there 
was a price to be paid. Th e host received a commission of 5% on all fi sh 
sales; but as Jean-Claude Hocquet has made clear, his rewards were 
much more substantial than that. Th e interests on the loans he pro-
vided may have been as high as 20%; moreover, his investments in 
boats and fi shing entitled him to a signifi cant part of each catch.74
Th is hosting system is in keeping with the domination of Flemish 
urban merchant-entrepreneurs in other sectors of the economy. Some 
of the characteristics that came with the system are also familiar: an 
obligation for the fi shermen to bring all fi sh to the auction in his home 
town or village, a tendency towards monopolisation, and the wish to 
restrict the position of host to locals.75 In the early modern period, the 
hosting system in some places—Hocquet mentions Boulogne—
evolved into downright exploitation of subservient fi shermen, who 
were tied to their host for life. Moreover, the position of host became a 
hereditary offi  ce.76
Did hosts resembling those in Flanders also operate in the late 14th- 
and early 15th-century fi shing villages on Holland’s North Sea coast? 
Th e purchases of codfi sh made in Scheveningen in the year 1345 in 
preparation for the campaign against the Frisians do not show any 
signs of it. On this occasion the count’s purveyor purchased cod in 
small portions, usually a few dozen to a few hundred at a time, from a 
large number of men. Th e accounts of the purveyor’s activities also 
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show that part of the fi sh was bought directly from the hoekers, the 
shipmasters of a type of boat used in coastal fi shing. However, wartime 
provisioning may have been a special case; and even though in Holland 
there is nothing to indicate a system of arbitrary exactions like the 
13th-century English purveyances, regular market practices may tem-
porarily have been pushed aside.77
Th e situation in Callantsoog throws a little more light on what these 
regular practices were. For one, as we saw earlier, the fi shermen of 
Callantsoog were not obliged to sell their fi sh at the local market. More 
detailed information can be gleaned from a set of mid 15th-century 
customs. Th ey stipulate that if someone wanted to buy fi sh at the beach 
auction or in the village and he could not pay in cash, the shipmaster 
had the right to sell his fi sh to somebody else.78 Auctioneers are not 
mentioned. Th e fi nancial arrangements suggest direct contacts 
between buyer and seller and leave no room for an auctioneer in the 
role of moneylender or intermediary.
All indications point to the same conclusion: in Holland the posi-
tion of villages and villagers in the fi sh trade was stronger—and that of 
towns and urban merchants weaker—than in Flanders. Th e inland fi sh 
trade was not channelled through urban markets or compulsory sta-
ples, or only very partially so. Fishing villages had direct links to inter-
regional trade networks; moreover, in addition to urban merchants, 
local merchants from the villages participated in the inland fi sh trade. 
Finally, beach markets were not completely dominated by urban capi-
tal and urban merchants: the fi shermen themselves remained at least 
partly in control.
River tolls and the vagaries of the Katwijk fi sh market: the bargaining 
position of fi shing communities
Th e suggestion of a strong position of the fi shing communities receives 
support from the fact that some of them acquired exemption from the 
comital river tolls. From at least the early 11th century onwards, the 
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III, 741.
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counts of Holland had been levying tolls in the delta of the rivers Rhine 
and Meuse in order to profi t from the growing river trade. Gradually a 
system of toll posts had developed that eff ectively controlled all main 
waterways. It was virtually impossible to enter or leave the delta by 
ship without passing a toll post. Th is meant that toll exemptions were 
of vital importance for everyone engaged in interregional trade. 
Although until at least the late 14th century the revenues from the 
river tolls were an important source of income to the count, by the 
middle of the 14th century almost all towns in Holland had negotiated 
toll exemptions. As a consequence, the brunt of the tax burden fell on 
foreign merchants, who usually had to pay toll upon entering Holland 
and upon leaving it, and on those villages that were engaged in inter-
regional trade.79
In addition to the towns, however, some villages acquired toll exemp-
tions. Th e villages of Akersloot, Uitgeest and Wormer had secured this 
privilege at an early stage, as a reward for supporting Count Floris V in 
his wars against the West-Frisians.80 By the early 15th century, two of 
the fi shing villages on the North Sea coast had also managed to secure 
toll exemptions: Scheveningen (in 1387) and Katwijk (in 1401).81 Th e 
importance of toll exemption for the role of villages in the fi sh trade is 
illustrated by the early 16th-century discussions around the toll privi-
leges of Callantsoog mentioned above, even though it is not clear if the 
attempts of the fi sh merchants of Callantsoog to ensure toll exemption 
in Holland and Zeeland were successful.82
Th at fi shing communities were quite capable of defending their inter-
ests can also be deduced from the peculiar sequence of events around 
the location of the Katwijk fi sh market at the end of the 14th and the 
beginning of the 15th century. In 1388 the fi shermen of Katwijk 
requested that the fi sh market be moved from Katwijk aan de Rijn, 
situated a few kilometres inland, to Katwijk aan Zee, the actual fi shing 
village directly on the coast. Th ey claimed it was too troublesome and 
too costly for them to transfer the fi sh from their ships onto carts and 
take them to Katwijk aan de Rijn. Duke Albrecht assented to their 
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thanks to Ronald van der Spiegel for bringing this to my attention).
85 Cornelisse, Energiemarkten, 229–234, 286.
request, but explicitly stipulated that Katwijk’s lord, Van Wassenaer, 
was to lose none of his rights as a result of the move.83
In the next 25 years the fi sh market was moved back and forth 
between Katwijk aan de Rijn and Katwijk aan Zee four more times. 
Each move was motivated primarily by protests and complaints of the 
communities of Katwijk aan Zee and Katwijk aan de Rijn, with the lord 
of Wassenaer usually on the side of Katwijk aan de Rijn—he must have 
felt having the fi sh market closer by gave him more control of what was 
occurring there. Th e Katwijk fi shermen probably grew frustrated, 
because in 1408 it was actually thought necessary to forbid them to 
move elsewhere with their families. Finally, in 1413 the fi shermen in 
Katwijk aan Zee obtained what they wanted: the market was estab-
lished permanently on the coast. Th e payment of 20 gold nobels to the 
treasury had doubtless facilitated the decision.84 Once more, the 
Katwijk fi shermen had shown themselves quite capable of promoting 
their commercial interests.
Th e claims of the coastal villages to a strong bargaining position can 
partly be explained by their considerable contribution to the fi sh 
industry and the fi sh trade and by their importance for wartime provi-
sioning. But the most important reason seems to be rooted in the 
structure of the society of medieval Holland: the lack of seignorial and 
urban domination. Even in Katwijk, where lordly control was excep-
tionally strong, the lord in the end was unable to withstand commu-
nity pressure when it came to the location of the market.
In summary, although late medieval Holland witnessed the rise of 
large-scale urban herring industry and herring trade, coastal fi shing 
did not decline. In part this can be attributed to the new opportunities 
that were created by urbanisation and rising standards of living, result-
ing in a growing demand for fresh fi sh and fi sh species other than the 
traditional herring. Changes in demand stimulating regional speciali-
sation and interregional trade can also be demonstrated for other 
commodities. Charles Cornelisse has, for instance, shown that at the 
end of the Middle Ages peat exports from Holland to the southern 
Low Countries increased signifi cantly. As Cornelisse notes, this was 
a  stimulus to the Holland rural economy.85 Nevertheless, it is not 
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87 Register van Hollandt en Westvrieslandt, 76–81.
self-evident that villagers were able to profi t from new commercial 
opportunities. In Holland village fi shermen were able to take full 
advantage of these opportunities because of the existence of a favour-
able institutional framework, developed under the infl uence of a bal-
ance of powers between the count, village lords, merchants, and rural 
communities. Th e prolonged success of the coastal fi sh markets—and 
especially their pivotal role in the interregional fi sh trade—suggests 
that in the long run this fi rm institutional foundation paid off .
4.3 Rural weigh houses and the dairy trade86
In 1597 the Estates of Holland, then the leading province in the Dutch 
Republic, issued a proclamation on weighing in the countryside.87 Th e 
proclamation was intended to concentrate weighing connected to 
whole sale trade at offi  cial urban weigh houses. Village communities 
were no longer allowed to install new scales without explicit permission 
from the Estates. Th e use of existing weigh houses in the countryside 
could be continued, but only if there was proof they had been in opera-
tion before the 1570s, or if they had been installed by formal privilege.
Th e proclamation included the results of an investigation conducted 
to determine whether this was the case: villages had been requested to 
produce evidence of either the respectable age or the legal basis of their 
weigh house. Th e document mentions approximately sixty villages 
possessing weigh houses. With the exception of the region around 
Dordrecht, they were found in almost every part of the county. Th e 
locations are indicated in Figure 8.
Under the circumstances, it was to be expected that in many villages 
the people testifi ed their weigh house dated back to ‘time immemorial’. 
More surprising is the fact that in several cases this actually turns out 
to be true. In the part of Holland north of the IJ, although not in the 
central and southern part of the county, the origins of a number of 
rural scales can indeed be traced to the late 14th or early 15th century. 
A systematic check of the Gousset index (an 18th-century index of 
all  the rights and privileges granted by the counts of Holland in the 
pre-Burgundian era) for all the villages listed in the 1597 resolution 
provided references to seven village scales in the north of Holland, all 
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Figure 8 Villages listed in the proclamation of 1597 as possessing a weigh house
Source: Register van Hollant en Westvrieslandt van den jaare 1597, 76–81
Map: G-O graphics, Wijk bij Duurstede
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88 NA LLRK, inv. nos. 203–232. Th e index, composed by Martinus Gousset, a clerk 
at the Leenkamer, lists summaries of all feudal rights Gousset was able to retrace in the 
archives of the counts of Holland, the counts of Blois, the lords of Voorne and some 
other noble families with extensive possessions, grouped by town or village, in chrono-
logical order. Th e Gousset index is probably incomplete. Besides the usual fl aws in the 
original recording of privileges and in the preservation of records, there is also 
Gousset’s selection of the records included in the index to consider, and the possible 
mistakes he made in the compilation of the summaries. Nevertheless, within these 
limits the index provides the most comprehensive overview of its kind. For more 
information on Gousset and the compilation of the index, see Van Riemsdijk, Tresorie 
en kanselarij, 703–704.
89 For Waterland and Zeevang, accounts are available for the years 1351 to 1369 and 
for the year 1375; they were all consulted (NA AGH, inv. nos. 1662–1679). For 
Kennemerland and West-Friesland, accounts are available for the years 1344 to 1428, 
with some gaps. All accounts between 1382 and 1405 were consulted, and aft er that the 
accounts for every fi ft h year (NA AGH, inv. no. 1566–1577, 1583, 1588, 1593, 1599).
90 Including settlements with formal urban status (sometimes not until later) but 
with a decidedly rural character at the end of the 14th and early 15th century: 
Purmerend, Grootebroek, Niedorp and Schellinkhout.
91 Th e accounts mention a weigh house ‘in Waterland’ between 1359/60 and 
1367, a weigh house in Udam in 1368, 1369 and 1375, and a weigh house in Broek in
dating from the years 1390 to 1425.88 A survey of the accounts of the 
comital stewards in Waterland and Zeevang and in Kennemerland and 
West-Friesland in the same period rendered information on four or 
fi ve more weigh houses.89 Table 2 and Figure 9 summarise the results.
Table 2 Rural weigh houses in the north of Holland around 1400
















Sources: see Appendix B
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1375. It is probable that either the weigh house in Udam or the one in Broek—which 
of the two is not clear—was the same as the earlier weigh house ‘in Waterland’. 
Boschma-Aarnoudse (Tot verbeteringe, 122–123) believes that there is a mistake in the 
accounts; she thinks the weigh house of ‘Udam’ is actually the urban weigh house in 
Edam. I fi nd this hard to believe, especially since other revenues from Edam were 
recorded correctly. Unless more conclusive evidence is found, I am inclined to believe 
‘Udam’ is Uitdam and not Edam.
Not all scales continued to function until 1597. Th e 1450 accounts 
for Waterland, for instance, report that the weigh houses in Akswijk 
and Broek had declined; but a new weigh house had emerged in 
Figure 9 Rural weigh houses in the north of Holland around 1400
Sources: see Appendix B
Map: G-O graphics, Wijk bij Duurstede
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94 Generale privilegien Kennemer-landt, 176–177.
95 Hoek, ‘Hof te Vlaardingen’, 85.
96 NA AGH, inv. no. 228 f 6v.
97 NA AGH, inv. no. 198 f 46.
‘Udor mgerdam’ (present-day Durgerdam?).92 Th ere are other indica-
tions that new rural weigh houses continued to be established in the 
north  of Holland throughout the 15th century. In 1441 the village of 
Assendelft  apparently had scales: in that year the lord of Assendelft  set 
the tariff  for weighing.93 In 1466 the villages of Sloten and Osdorp, just 
south of the IJ but still in Kennemerland, were granted a weigh house.94
In the central and southern part of Holland rural weighing facilities 
probably did not emerge until later. Th e only reference to village scales 
predating the 16th century in this region comes from Valkenburg: a 
weighing facility in this village is mentioned among the possessions of 
the burggraaf of Leiden in 1360.95 Th e Valkenburg scales were probably 
linked to the well-known fair in this village, as were the other rights of 
the burggraaf in Valkenburg (the market tolls, the measures for cloth 
and butter, and the rights to the exploitation of various facilities for 
games and gambling). Apparently, the scales were not available 
throughout the year: in 1597 the villagers reported there was no public 
weighing facility in Valkenburg. Neither do the Gousset index nor the 
comital accounts suggest a 14th- or early 15th-century origin for any 
of the other late 16th-century rural weigh houses in the central or 
southern part of Holland.
Th e weigh houses in the north were clearly established with the 
dairy trade in mind. Th e entry, for instance, in the comital registers 
allowing Niedorp in West-Friesland to install scales in 1391 states that 
villagers were to have their butter and cheese weighed at the scales and 
that this was also where these products should be sold.96 Similarly, 
when in 1392 Duke Albrecht allowed a man named Voppe Berwoutsz. 
to install and exploit a weigh house in Graft  in Kennemerland, he 
ordered that all butter and cheese produced in the village was to be 
weighed and sold at this weigh house.97
Th ere can be little doubt that the development of rural weigh-
ing facilities in late 14th- and early 15th-century Holland was related 
to the rise of the dairy trade around the same time. But just as the 
exact nature of the link between fi sh markets and fi sh trade was diffi  -
cult to establish, the chain of cause and eff ect is anything but clear. 
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98 Smit, ‘Kamper pondtolregister’; Cf. Sneller, Deventer, 56–63 (trade from Holland 
to Deventer) and 94 ff . (trade between Deventer and the German lands).
Were  village scales simply an institutional response to the economic 
needs of the dairy trade—or were they a driving force behind this 
trade, themselves originating from other factors? Th e fact that village 
scales concentrated in the north of Holland adds to the question. It is 
true that here towns were fewer and wider apart than in other parts of 
the county. On the other hand, many weigh houses were not situated 
in the most isolated and least urbanised parts of the north, but in 
Waterland, Zeevang, and the south-east of Kennemerland—all regions 
with several small towns, located moreover within relatively easy reach 
of Amsterdam on the other side of the IJ (see Figure 9). A better under-
standing of the mechanisms underpinning these patterns requires, 
fi rst of all, a clarifi cation of the position of the weigh houses in the 
dairy trade.
Rural weigh houses and the rise of dairy production and dairy trade
As has been shown in Chapter 2, dairy production developed strongly 
in late medieval Holland under the infl uence of both ecological 
changes—the subsidence of the peat soil reduced possibilities for ara-
ble farming—and an increasing demand for dairy products at home 
and abroad. Even in the late 14th century, dairy was being exported to 
the German lands and the southern Low Countries. Exports grew rap-
idly, as is shown by the Kamper Pondtol register. In Kampen, at the 
mouth of the river IJssel, a toll was levied between 1439 and 1441 on all 
ships coming from Holland. Th e toll was collected by an Amsterdam 
functionary, to be handed over to the towns of Kampen and Deventer 
aft erwards. It was intended as compensation for the damages infl icted 
on merchants from these towns by Holland pirates in the war between 
Holland and the German Hansa towns, which had just ended. Th e reg-
ister shows large shipments of cheese and butter from the north of 
Holland, to be sold in Deventer to merchants from the Rhineland or 
other parts of Germany.98
Th e Kampen toll register gives fairly detailed information about the 
origin of these shipments. Notably, a considerable part of the dairy 
from Kennemerland, West-Friesland, and Waterland seems to have 
by-passed the urban markets in these districts. As Table 3 shows, a 
quarter to one third came straight from the rural production areas to 
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Table 3 Dairy shipped to the IJssel towns by ships from Waterland and Zeevang, 
Kennemerland, and West-Friesland, 1439–1441






indicated: number of 
cheeses
Towns:
Edam 211 139 82,200 small cheeses
Monnickendam 230 289 2,000 small cheeses
Hoorn 1,928 1,390 3,000 small cheeses
Enkhuizen 490 260
Medemblik 566 325 150 small cheeses
Haarlem 405 958 25 small cheeses
Alkmaar 406 337 6 baskets with cheese
Beverwijk 39 72
Total from towns:    4,273 (75%)     3,769 (67%) 87,375+ small cheeses
Villages:
Purmerend 444 546 5 cheeses and 5,400 
small cheeses
Bumma 545 607
Westzaan 318 450 100 cheeses
Akersloot 77 117
Texel 3 73 2,100 cheeses and 
4,500 small cheeses
Other villages 20 24
Total from villages:    1,407 (25%)     1,815 (33%) 2,205 cheeses and 
9,900 small cheeses
Total from towns 
and villages
   5,680 (100%)     5,584 (100%) 2,205 cheeses and 
97,275+ small cheeses
Other parts of Holland:
Amsterdam102 432 661 191 cheeses
Naarden, Muiden, Weesp 375 285 400 cheeses
Leiden 52 12
Other/unknown 198 217 100 cheeses
Total for Holland 6,736 6,795 2,896 cheeses and 
97,275+ small cheeses
Source: Smit, ‘Kamper pondtolregister’
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 99 Sneller, Deventer, 76–77. Th e villages where the prohibition was proclaimed 
were Purmerend, Schagen (both were by this time rapidly growing into small towns), 
Oosthuizen, Grootebroek, Winkel, Akersloot, Uitgeest, Krommenie, Assendelft , 
Westzaan, Zaandam, and Oostzaan.
100 Th e toll offi  cials registered the location the ship had set out from; probably this 
was oft en—but not always—also the home town of the merchant or captain (Smit, 
‘Kamper pondtolregister’, 211).
101 A schippond was the equivalent of 300 pounds.
102 Th e fi gures for Amsterdam have been copied from Smit, Opkomst, 313; these 
fi gures are also based on the Kamper Pondtolregister.
103 De Boer, Graaf en grafi ek, 364–374, esp. 365.
104 According to Smit, ‘Bumma’ or ‘De Bom’ is a polder in Waterland (‘Kamper 
pondtolregister’, 211). I have not been able to trace its exact location; possibly the edge 
of the Beemster lake (with thanks to Jaap Haag at the Waterlands Archief for the sug-
gestion) or the region around the Burkmeer, a small lake south of Broek.
the IJssel region. Th e situation resembles the direct lines between 
production centres and foreign markets we have already seen in the 
sea-fi sh trade.
Th e impression that many northern villages had direct trade rela-
tions with the IJssel region receives support from events in 1463, when 
a confl ict that originated in disagreements about the size of butter tons 
erupted into political enmities. Duke Philip of Burgundy prohibited 
his subjects to visit the Deventer fairs, and the prohibition was pro-
claimed not just in Holland’s main towns but also in a large number of 
villages in the north.99
One of these villages, Akersloot, had a fair where, in the late 14th 
century, dairy was sold. In the year 1390/91 cheese and butter bought 
at this fair was transported south via the toll of Spaarndam, near 
Haarlem.103 Th e data from the Kampen toll register show that Akersloot 
also had a role in the dairy trade at other times of the year: butter and 
cheese from Akersloot arrived in Kampen throughout the season. But 
Akersloot was by no means the most important rural export centre; 
much larger quantities of dairy came from two villages that had weigh 
houses in the late 14th and early 15th century (Purmerend and 
Westzaan) and from a third village or district called Bumma,104 also 
situated in the region where the concentration of village scales was 
highest. Th is suggests that, in the middle of the 15th century, village 
scales in the north of Holland provided basic links in the interregional 
dairy trade to the IJssel region.
Transaction costs theory helps to explain why. For two reasons rural 
weigh houses must have provided Holland’s many small-scale dairy 
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105 Th e weigh house in Waterland, for instance, rendered between 2 and 4 lb. Holl. 
per year in the 1360s (NA AGH, inv. no. 1670 f 18 to inv. no. 1676 f 11); the weigh 
house in Wormer rendered between 1 and 2 lb. Holl. per year in the last two decades of 
the 14th century (NA AGH, inv. no. 1568 f 18v to inv. no. 1572 f 10v).
farmers with an attractive alternative to selling at the farmhouse gate 
on the one hand, and making frequent trips to one of the urban 
markets on the other. Firstly, an accurate and reliable assessment 
of weights obviously helps to reduce information costs for buyers 
and sellers alike. Th at Holland’s village scales thus contributed to a 
lowering of transactions costs in the interregional dairy trade is con-
fi rmed by the fact that the Kampen toll register records a large part 
of the cheese coming from Holland, including the cheese coming 
directly from the countryside, in units of weight. Apparently, notes or 
tokens issued by rural weigh houses in Holland were accepted in 
Kampen. Admittedly, these advantages were provided by urban weigh 
houses as well as by rural ones, but for farmers who did not live in the 
vicinity of a town, the presence of a reliable weighing facility near 
home meant that the reduction in transaction costs was not off set by 
high transport costs. Th ere was a price to be paid: weighing did not 
come for free. But although the tariff s of the rural weigh houses are 
unknown, judging from the very moderate revenues in the comital 
accounts they cannot have been high.105 Th ere are no indications of any 
kind of quality control taking place at the rural weigh houses. Th is may 
seem surprising, but it is in keeping with the character of these low-
profi le facilities.
Secondly, a dense network of weigh houses reduced search costs. 
Farmers could be fairly certain to meet suitable buyers at the weigh 
houses: merchants and traders who came to buy butter and cheese for 
resale at nearby or more distant urban markets. In this respect, the 
function of these weigh houses for the dairy trade is not unlike the role 
attributed by Masschaele to rural markets in England with regard to 
that country’s primary export product: wool. Masschaele argues, fi rstly, 
that peasants—or rather the well-to-do top tier of the peasantry—
supplied the greater part of agricultural produce for the market, includ-
ing more than half of England’s most important export product wool; 
and, secondly, that it was precisely this group of peasants that needed 
rural trade venues to sell their produce. Large ecclesiastical institutions 
or lay landlords did not need village markets: if they wanted to sell 
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wool for export, they had opportunities to negotiate private contracts 
with merchants engaged in international trade. Peasants, however, 
were dependent on England’s network of markets to pool small indi-
vidual surpluses in an effi  cient way.106
Notably, in England and in Flanders rural weigh houses similar to 
those in Holland apparently did not exist. It is worthwhile to briefl y 
investigate the reasons for the diff erence. Th e diff erent organisation of 
dairy production doubtless played a part. On the small and very small 
farms that dominated inland Flanders, dairy was a by-product of the 
cattle that were held for their manure and for the meat they provided 
to the peasant and his family.107 In the fertile lowland coastal region, 
however, farms that specialised in cattle and dairy farming had 
emerged as early as the 12th century, growing in numbers aft erwards.108 
Th e polders of the castellany of Veurne, in particular, stand out as a 
dairying region. In this part of Flanders, farms were usually large and 
leasehold was common. In the 16th century many of these leasehold 
farms specialised in the production of butter and cheese.109 Th e whole-
sale dairy trade seems to have concentrated in the two main towns of 
the district, Veurne and Diksmuide. Th ese towns both had weekly 
dairy markets and annual fairs that attracted many wholesale dairy 
merchants.110 Th e comital accounts of the late 14th and early 15th cen-
turies report revenues from a few weigh houses in small towns—the 
weigh house in Veurne among them—but not from rural facilities. 
Although exploitation of rural scales by some local lords cannot be 
ruled out without more detailed research, until now no evidence has 
come to light to support this possibility.111
In England also, dairying was usually a by-product in a system of 
mixed farming. However, in the 13th and early 14th century large-
scale dairy production as a part of demesne farming was not uncom-
mon. Dairying demesnes were mainly concentrated in the more 
commercialised and densely populated parts of the country: the 
London region and East Anglia, especially eastern and central Norfolk. 
It is estimated that on average half of the dairy produce of dairying 
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demesnes was sold.112 Just as in the wool trade, the sales were mainly 
conducted by private contract.
Both in coastal Flanders and in England the scale of dairy produc-
ing  farms may have precluded the need for small-scale rural weigh-
ing  facilities. Nevertheless, explaining the absence of rural weighing 
facilities in Flanders and England by property structures alone is 
unsatisfactory: in both cases, the social and political context should 
also be taken into account. For Flanders, it is unclear whether urban 
concentration of the dairy trade as it developed in the Veurne district 
was enforced by non-economic means, but the tendency to restrict 
wholesale trade to the urban market is certainly in keeping with gen-
eral practice in Flanders. Th is at least suggests that a tradition of urban 
dominance, supported by social and political relations, may have 
played a part.
In England the increase in labour costs aft er 1350 induced many 
lords to lease out their dairy herds to their tenants, who did not have 
access to the same marketing channels and might have benefi ted from 
facilities such as those in Holland. But then, in England weighing was 
organised in a diff erent way altogether. In London and other major 
ports weighing beams were installed by the Crown and operated by 
royal offi  cials; in the rest of the country scales and weights were usually 
the property of private merchants, although both royal offi  cials and 
local authorities checked if the weights that were used accorded with 
the national standards.113 Much of the rural dairy trade was conducted 
via middlemen and itinerant cheesemongers who purchased cheese 
and butter at the farmhouse to retail at a nearby fair or market.114 
In 18th-century England this was considered a practice that went 
against the interests of the dairy farmers, who preferred to sell their 
cheese at one of the specialised dairy fairs of that period.115 Perhaps 
similar fairs already existed in the Middle Ages. Rural weigh houses, 
however, did not.116
112 Campbell, English Seigniorial Agriculture, 143–150. For an example of an estate 
that produced a signifi cant amount of butter and cheese, cf. Biddick, Other Economy, 
91–99.
113 Zupko, British Weights and Measures, 34–70, esp. 42–45, 63–64. A more detailed 
discussion of diff erences between the English and the continental systems for weigh-
ing (and measuring) follows in Chapter 6.
114 Farmer, ‘Marketing’, 401–403.
115 Mitchell, ‘Changing Role of Fairs’, 557–558.
116 Personal communication by Prof. Christopher Dyer.
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Th is brief comparison suggests that Holland’s weigh houses had 
roots that went beyond a mere response to the economic needs of 
small dairy farmers. It is to these roots that we now turn.
Towns and rural weigh houses: trade networks or competition
Th ere are no indications whatsoever that in late 14th-century Holland 
towns undertook coordinated political attempts to curtail the activities 
of village scales, as they were to do two centuries later. Indeed, there is 
very little to suggest that they objected to the presence of the rural 
weigh houses at all. Part of the explanation is probably that dairy prod-
ucts did not belong to the categories of essential food stuff s in short 
supply or to the group of raw materials vital to the urban industries, 
both of which never failed to arouse urban interest. A second reason 
could be that possibilities to compel the people in the district to visit 
the urban market or, in this case, the urban weigh house, were limited. 
Under normal circumstances, urban authorities could do little more 
than enforce the use of the town’s weigh house (and the payment that 
went along with it) for transactions that took place within the bounda-
ries of the freedom.117
Certainly, this did to some extent put village weigh houses at a dis-
advantage: a farmer taking his dairy to town to sell it would choose to 
have it weighed just once—in town—and not bother with the village 
scales. Village authorities and lessees of rural weigh houses were clearly 
aware of the danger: they tried to counter it by imposing an obligation 
on villagers to use the local weigh house. In early 15th-century 
Grootebroek, for example, villagers were not permitted to take butter 
or cheese to the nearby town of Enkhuizen unless the products had 
fi rst been weighed at the village scales. Th e customs actually added that 
weighing in Enkhuizen was prohibited, which must have placed 
Grootebroek dairy farmers who wished to sell their products in 
Enkhuizen in dire straits: they were either to disobey the rules of their 
own village or those of the Enkhuizen authorities.118 In other villages 
the imposition for weighing had to be paid even if no use was made of 
117 E.g. in Leiden in 1406 (Hamaker, Middeleeuwsche keurboeken Leiden, 52–53). 
Other towns probably had similar rules, although in most cases we do not fi nd them 
in the by-laws until later; e.g. in Amsterdam around 1500 (Breen, Rechtsbronnen 
Amsterdam, 314).
118 Pols, Westfriesche stadrechten II, 275.
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the weighing facilities, as in Schellinkhout.119 Regulations such as these 
are not found in the late 14th- and early 15th-century by-laws of 
Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Haarlem, or Amsterdam—although in Amsterdam 
they do show up about a century later.120 Th is once more suggests that, 
around 1400, towns did not feel much threatened by the presence of 
rural weigh houses.
Th ere is a third explanation for the fact that towns did little to oppose 
the rise of rural weigh houses. Even if urban consumers and town 
authorities would have preferred a monopoly on the dairy trade, the 
presence of rural weigh houses off ered important advantages to a spe-
cifi c group in urban society: merchants who ventured out into the 
countryside to buy dairy products. It is clear that urban merchants 
were not the only ones to buy at rural weigh houses: traders of local 
origin also visited them. In the Kampen toll register, for each of the 
four villages shipping large quantities of dairy to the IJssel region, a few 
names regularly appear. In the course of the almost two years covered 
by the register, Jan Auwels, Lourens Gerijtsz., and Jan Jacobsz. made 
the trip from Purmerend to Kampen seven times or more; they were 
never recorded bringing dairy from any of the other three villages. Th e 
same is true for Symon Claesz. from Bumma, Hasse Claesz. and Florijs 
Remboltsz. from Akersloot, and Ysebrant Barentz. from Westzaan. 
From each of the villages a much larger number of shipmasters made 
the trip less oft en, but here too local connections are strong: they 
invariably came from the same village each time they sailed.121 Probably 
many of these men were not fulltime traders and shipmasters; they 
may well have been fi shermen, or perhaps they combined dairy farm-
ing with some trading activities.
However, other dairy traders visiting the rural weigh houses came 
from the towns in the region. Th e Kampen toll register only once 
refers  to an Amsterdam merchant arriving in Kampen with dairy 
from Westzaan,122 but we know that in the course of the 15th century 
the infl uence of Amsterdam merchant capital was increasingly felt 
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in Waterland. Towards the end of the century, Amsterdam ship owners 
recruited sailors in the Waterland villages, and Amsterdam drapers 
had wool for the town’s textile industry spun there.123 Economic rela-
tions between Amsterdam and Waterland probably go back to at least 
the middle of the 14th century. In 1351 the count of Holland inter-
vened in a confl ict between the lord of Waterland and the burgesses of 
Amsterdam. Th e Amsterdammers received guarantees they could 
freely come and go to Waterland with their goods.124 Th e document 
that records these guarantees does not actually say so, but—as by this 
time Amsterdam merchants regularly sailed to Deventer and other 
IJssel towns with dairy products125—it seems safe to assume that one of 
the reasons traders from Amsterdam went to Waterland was to buy 
cheese and butter from the local farmers.126
Forays of urban traders into the countryside to buy agricultural 
products were also common in England. Considering the competition 
from other towns and from rural merchants, an active quest for mar-
kets was necessary to guarantee a regular supply of victuals and raw 
materials for the urban industry. Th e merchants who engaged in these 
forays were certainly not all petty traders buying up small surpluses at 
individual farmhouses. Rather, they concentrated on the larger rural 
markets in the region—these had a wider range of supplies and better 
facilities to off er.127
Th e rural weigh houses in Waterland and Kennemerland fulfi lled 
much the same role for the merchants of Amsterdam who wanted to 
buy dairy in the countryside. Although evidence is lacking, merchants 
from Monnickendam and Edam probably acted in a similar way. 
Competition from Amsterdam and from the Waterland traders must 
have forced them to buy dairy in the countryside, and where better to 
do it than at a weigh house? Th e suggestion that the weigh houses 
suited the needs of urban merchants is supported by the geographical 
location of the village scales: many were situated within easy reach of 
Amsterdam or one of the smaller towns.
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It can be concluded that the attitude of towns in the late 14th cen-
tury was very diff erent from their policies two centuries later when 
they were pressing for prohibitions on rural weighing. In Chapter 3 we 
saw that, around the end of the 15th century, towns began to introduce 
new restrictions on retailing by non-burgesses. Successful urban resist-
ance to rural trade also dates from the end of the Middle Ages—in fact, 
it was mainly a 16th-century phenomenon. In the 15th century, towns 
increasingly managed to establish ‘ban miles’ around their walls, zones 
where their authority was recognised and activities considered an 
urban prerogative were banned. Haarlem is a good example. Th e town 
made use of the fact that in the late 14th century Duke Albrecht had 
allowed the town to extend the limits of its freedom to a radius of 100 
roeden (400 metres) outside the walls for defensive purposes. In this 
area new buildings were forbidden.128 In 1409 the urban authorities 
translated the privilege into a prohibition to live in this zone, to engage 
in any industrial activities there (an exception was made for shipbuild-
ing, one of Haarlem’s main industries), or to buy or sell ‘bread, beer, 
metalwork, wood, butter, cheese or any other product’.129 Two years 
later Duke Willem VI permitted Haarlem to levy excises within a 
radius of 300 roeden (some 1200 metres) from the walls, in order to 
enable the town to fi nance a loan it had promised him.130 Th is was 
probably directed against the alehouses in the vicinity of the town: 
their duty-free pricing drew large numbers of clients. Th e authorities 
lost no time in also extending the zone in which industry was prohib-
ited to 300 roeden.131
‘Beer miles’, zones where taverns were banned or subjected to urban 
excises, were also common around other towns.132 Th e same is proba-
bly true for attempts to extend restrictions to other products and activ-
ities. But these ban miles usually covered a very limited area: a radius 
of 300 roeden, as in Haarlem, was common. Th ere were attempts to go 
further. In 1471 the Amsterdam authorities, for instance, prohibited 
ships partly owned by Amsterdammers and returning from the Baltic 
region to unload in one of the villages in nearby Waterland; they 
were expected to come to the Amsterdam harbour instead. In order to 
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eff ectuate this rule, burgesses were not permitted to operate as co-
owners of ships unless the other owners had undertaken beforehand to 
unload their cargo in Amsterdam.133 Perhaps the complicated nature of 
this arrangement reveals better than anything else the limitations of 
urban extraterritorial authority.
Th ere is in fact only one exception, one 15th-century town that went 
much further in repressing rural trade: Dordrecht. In many respects, 
the attitude of Dordrecht towards rural trade resembled that of the 
Flemish towns described in Chapter 3—with one major diff erence: 
whereas in Flanders urban control over rural trade was at its height in 
the middle of the 14th century, in Dordrecht it did not fully develop 
until about a century later. Dordrecht started out in 1422 with a prohi-
bition on selling fi sh along the dikes near the town.134 In itself this was 
innocent enough: we have seen that Leiden had a similar rule. But 
from 1440 onwards, the Dordrecht authorities issued a series of proc-
lamations ordering that an increasing number of agricultural products 
grown or produced in Zuidholland (the rural region around Dordrecht) 
had to be brought to the urban market, dairy products among them.135 
Th e end result was that by the early 16th century some 25 villages in 
the region were forced to market all their produce in Dordrecht; 
another 15 or so were to be left  undisturbed only if they paid the urban 
excises.136
Th ere are several reasons why these policies were implemented in 
Dordrecht and not in other towns. Firstly, owing to its early rise and its 
wealth, Dordrecht had gained some extraterritorial privileges the other 
towns in Holland did not have—for example, the right to have debtors 
in the countryside arrested by the count’s bailiff  for debts registered at 
the Dordrecht court.137 Even though these privileges were not as exten-
sive as the administrative control of the Flemish towns over their quar-
ters, the townspeople of Dordrecht did regard the surrounding region 
of Zuidholland as ‘their’ district. Extending this concept to rural trade 
must have seemed only a small step.
Secondly, like the Flemish cities Dordrecht had a history of trade 
privileges, most of them not in regional but in international trade. 
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Th e staple privilege on the river trade had brought the town great pros-
perity. Th e staple right was originally confi ned to grain, wine, wood, 
and salt; but partially extending it to other products was, once again, 
just a small step. In 1401, for example, Dordrecht acquired a privilege 
prohibiting the sale of beer on the river within two miles of the town.138 
Moreover, urban institutions were tuned to the requirements of 
enforcement: the guards that patrolled the river for trespassers of the 
staple privilege could at the same time keep an eye out for transgres-
sions of the rules on regional trade. Several 16th-century documents, 
among them an enquiry initiated by the Habsburg government in 
1553—aft er complaints had been fi led by the towns of Rotterdam, 
Schoonhoven and Gorinchem—testify that this is indeed what hap-
pened: villagers on their way to the markets of towns other than 
Dordrecht were arrested, their goods were confi scated, and they were 
fi ned.139
Th irdly, at the end of the 14th century the Dordrecht guilds had 
gained access to urban government, Dordrecht being the only town in 
Holland where they had been able to do so. As a result, commercial 
policies acquired a more protectionist character.140 Finally, there 
was probably also a very pragmatic drive behind Dordrecht’s increas-
ingly restrictive policies: the catastrophic fl ood of November 1421—
St. Elizabeth’s fl ood—had wiped away a large part of Dordrecht’s hin-
terland and isolated the city.
Most of the Dordrecht restrictions were not based on privileges 
granted by the count of Holland: the town initiated them without prior 
authorisation. Th is caused tensions with the Burgundian rulers, who 
followed an inconsistent course of sometimes supporting Dordrecht 
and at other times resisting it, but in 1520 Charles V granted the town 
the Groot Octrooi that legalised its regional trade privileges for a period 
of ten years. Despite the protests of other towns and the villages in 
Zuidholland, the Groot Octrooi was renewed time and again.141 Th e 
fact that Dordrecht was able to carry its schemes through testifi es to 
the continuing infl uence of its wealthy elite.
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In the rest of Holland, comparable attempts to restrain commercial 
activities in the countryside beyond the usual ban mile did not take 
shape until the early 16th century. Th e dairy trade in fact provides a 
good example. In 1516, Habsburg central government—apparently 
reacting to complaints about farmers who sold casks of butter from 
their house—prohibited the sale of butter in the countryside and 
ordered farmers to visit the nearest market town instead.142 Ordinances 
against forestalling were also issued in 1544 and in 1556, always with 
an appeal to dearth.143
Th e prohibitions on dairy sales in the countryside are closely related 
to general developments in rural trade taking place in the early 16th 
century. In 1515 the towns began pressuring the Habsburg govern-
ment into banning buitenneringen (rural trades and industries)—and 
sixteen years later in 1531 Charles V issued an ordinance to this eff ect. 
But the towns’ victory was far from complete. Th e Order op de 
Buitennering prohibited only new activities in the countryside: existing 
trades and industries were left  undisturbed.144
Moreover, the regime was never watertight, as the following exam-
ple shows. In 1525 the Estates of Holland discussed the option of 
allowing farmers in distant or isolated villages somewhat more breath-
ing space: the Estates graciously admitted that, especially when villages 
did not have much that was worth selling anyway, there would perhaps 
be no need to force them to come to an urban market.145 In the same 
year, the people of Westzaan, Krommenie, and Krommeniedijk—three 
neighbouring villages in Kennemerland—referred to this discussion 
when they requested permission to sell their dairy products in their 
own village to local dairy merchants. Th e villagers claimed that dis-
tance, the tide, and weather conditions (they had to cross the IJ to visit 
Haarlem or Amsterdam) prevented them from visiting an urban 
market on a regular basis. Th ey also stated that dairy merchants were 
paying them a normal price and had no intention of exporting the 
dairy: it would all end up in the market of Haarlem or another nearby 
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town anyway. Th ey added that they badly needed the income from the 
dairy sales to catch up with their payments of taxes and rents.146 
Perhaps that was a convincing argument; in any case, the Habsburg 
government granted the villagers what they had requested.
It is against this background of an increasingly restrictive policy 
against rural trade that we should view the late 16th-century attempts 
of the Estates of Holland to prohibit rural weighing. In fact, the fi rst 
offi  cial prohibition of illegal weighing dates from 1526. In that year, 
Habsburg central government explicitly forbade weighing merchan-
dise in quantities of 25 pounds or more anywhere but in the offi  cial 
weigh houses in Kennemerland, West-Friesland, Amstelland, 
Waterland, and Gooiland. Th e proclamation stated that weighing facil-
ities set up in private homes not only used incorrect weights, but also 
cheated the government out of its revenues.147 Th e ordinance was 
repeated almost literally in 1541 and in 1563.148 Although the ordi-
nances recognised the existence of offi  cial rural weigh houses in addi-
tion to urban ones, it is clear that they paved the way for the repressive 
actions of the Estates in the years to come.
Exactly why urban resistance against rural trade became so much 
stronger at the end of the Middle Ages is diffi  cult to determine without 
more detailed research concentrating on the late 15th and 16th centu-
ries, but the long-term perspective presented above makes it possible 
to formulate a hypothesis. It is unlikely that the change of attitude was 
caused merely by a sudden rise of rural trade venues; as we saw, this 
process had begun much earlier. In his study of the Order op de 
Buitennering, E. Brünner pointed to the economic problems towns 
were facing as a result of this economic crisis, followed by several wars 
in the fi rst decades of the 16th century. Towns attempted to alleviate 
the increasing fi nancial pressure by a combination of protectionist 
measures and higher taxes—but as trade and industry moved to the 
countryside to escape taxation, more and more coercion was needed.149
Urgent fi nancial needs may well explain why restrictions on rural 
trade were imposed, but the fact that towns did not relent when at the 
end of the 16th century the economy revived suggests that—besides 
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acute fi nancial considerations—more structural developments played 
a part. Th ey can be found in a shift  in the balance of powers between 
the towns and central government. Th e harsh regime of Charles the 
Bold had reinforced the towns’ aspirations for more regional auton-
omy; when Charles died in 1477 leaving only his daughter Maria to 
succeed him, they took their chances. In addition, the economic crisis 
made the new Habsburg rulers Maximilian and Philip more depend-
ent on the support of wealthy and infl uential towns like Amsterdam.150 
Towns now not only had a motive for trying to restrict economic activ-
ities in the countryside, they also had the strength to make their wishes 
come true.
Rural weigh houses now became the object of urban protest, as 
16th-century events show. Th at their number probably grew despite 
this resistance testifi es to the vitality of village communities, who con-
tinued to install scales when they needed them. Th is brings us to a 
fi nal factor that deserves attention: the role of these rural communi-
ties in the rise of village weigh houses. As we shall see, in the north of 
Holland—where these weigh houses fi rst emerged—this role was 
important.
Rural community organisation
From the 10th or 11th century onward, and possibly even earlier, in 
many places in Europe there developed rural communitates: local bod-
ies of free men, with some degree of self-government, and with public 
tasks in jurisdiction, the maintenance of roads and waterways, and the 
use of common lands and collective rights. Th ese communities chal-
lenged the existing feudal order and in the long run their existence 
drastically changed rural life.151 Th e formation of these communities 
was stimulated by population growth and the need to share resources, 
intensify agriculture, and colonise more land, but it was also a reaction 
against the seignorial regime and, in particular, the rise of banal lord-
ship: peasants closed ranks in an attempt to resist violation of tradi-
tional rights and customs by lords. Th e process is in many respects 
similar to the urban communal movement, the struggle of the towns 
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for self-government that began around the same time. Peasant com-
munities able to attain a bargaining position could negotiate privileges 
with their lords: acknowledgement of their traditional rights, mitiga-
tion of their duties, and self-government in some respects. Oft en, 
although not always, these privileges were put in writing in a charter of 
liberties.152
England diff ered from the European pattern. Th e manorial system, 
including villeinage, was confi rmed and strengthened in the 13th cen-
tury, and charters of liberties as contracts between rural communities 
and lords were unknown.153 It is true that the diff erence should not be 
exaggerated. Lords sometimes did put existing local customs into writ-
ing; and via the tithing system, the frankpledge, and the manorial 
court, peasants were involved in local jurisdiction. Villages sometimes 
even acted as tenants of a demesne or a fi shery.154 Nevertheless, there 
was obviously a diff erence, and it was closely related to the persistence 
of villeinage and feudal structures in England.
H. van der Linden linked the development of strong rural commu-
nities in Holland to the reclamations of the vast peat marshes in the 
centre of the county, and indeed peasant communities oft en emerged 
in newly cultivated lands.155 However, the fi rst time the sources inform 
us of the existence of something that looks like a rural communal 
movement, it is in the north of Holland, and in the oldest inhabited 
part of it at that: Kennemerland. In 1274 and 1275 the Kennemers 
rebelled; soon they were joined by the Waterlanders and the West-
Frisians. Th e rebels demanded a better organisation of local adminis-
tration and justice, more self-governing powers, and more equality in 
the duties of common men and those of high birth. Th ey protested 
against the growing power of noblemen, who used the lands and rights 
they had acquired from the count of Holland to strengthen their posi-
tion, undermined the rights of villages, and frustrated their attempts to 
gain more autonomy. Th e rebellion ended in 1275, when Count Floris 
V granted a charter to the Kennemers. Th e charter had the character of 
a peace treaty. Many of the rebels’ demands were met, such as the 
installation of courts of aldermen with well-defi ned judicial and 
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administrative powers in all communities and the restriction of the 
fi scal privileges of the well-born. Aft erwards, the Kennemer charter 
was granted in slightly changed versions to the people of Waterland 
and West-Friesland.156
It is not a coincidence that the process of formation of rural com-
munities found this early and forceful expression in the north of 
Holland. Th e reasons can be traced to the region’s early medieval his-
tory. In the 11th century, the counts of Holland (at the time their entire 
territory was referred to as ‘Frisia’) lost much of their control in the 
north of their lands. Th eir power base shift ed to the south, to the region 
around Leiden and the river delta of Rhine and Meuse. It was this 
region that in the second half of the 11th century came to be called 
‘Holland’. With the exception of parts of the coastal strip of 
Kennemerland that the counts managed to retain, in the region north 
of the IJ central authority was largely absent, as it was in the linguisti-
cally and culturally related Frisian lands east of the Vlie.157 Th e counts 
of Holland made great eff orts to regain control in the north: they 
waged war aft er war in the 12th and 13th centuries. First, the remain-
der of Kennemerland and fi nally—at the end of the 13th century—
Waterland and West-Friesland were conquered. However, the region 
was never entirely subdued: rebellions and uprisings were frequent, 
especially at times when comital power was at a low ebb.158
In recent years it has become increasingly clear that despite the leg-
endary Frisian freedom, medieval Friesland was not a collection of 
egalitarian, democratic ‘farmers’ republics’, as has sometimes been 
claimed. Frisian society knew important inequalities in wealth and 
social status, based on noble birth and landownership. Recent research 
has shown that even the notion that Friesland was not feudalised is not 
entirely correct. However, it remains true that due to the weakness of 
central authority local communities in Friesland, governed commu-
nally by local elites, enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy.159
Th is was also the case in 12th- and 13th-century West-Friesland and 
Waterland, and to a lesser extent in Kennemerland. Th e conquest by 
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the count of Holland brought changes. First, a sheriff  embodied the 
count’s authority at the local level. Second, the boards of aldermen 
introduced at the end of the 13th century took over part of the jurisdic-
tional and administrative duties that had previously been shared by a 
larger group of villagers.160 Nevertheless, many of the characteristics of 
rural communalism and a considerable degree of autonomy were pre-
served. Th e main administrative body at the local level was the banne 
or buurschap. It was dominated by the collectivity of the ‘neighbours’, 
that is, those villagers who owned land. Participation and infl uence 
strongly depended on the extent of one’s landed property. Th e neigh-
bours organised the maintenance of dikes and roads and regulated the 
use of common lands.161 Elsewhere in Holland, local water manage-
ment tasks were oft en brought under the control of separate water 
boards, but in the north of Holland they remained in the hands of the 
banne, which no doubt reinforced the position of this body.162 Each 
banne had its annual gading, a session of the court of justice where 
neighbours were required to be present and actively participate.163 
Signifi cantly, the neighbours had considerable infl uence on the elec-
tion of the aldermen, even if in some cases it was the count’s sheriff  
who offi  cially appointed them.164
In Kennemerland, brought under control before West-Friesland or 
Waterland, the counts managed to introduce more elements of seigno-
rial lordship and a hierarchical power structure. A baljuw (bailiff ) was 
appointed to take care of regional administration and high jurisdiction 
on behalf of the count. Local noblemen were persuaded to accept the 
count’s authority in return for land, banal rights, and the privilege to 
participate in the baljuwsgerecht, the administrative and jurisdictional 
court presided over by the bailiff .165
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In Waterland similar attempts were successful only in a few loca-
tions, resulting in a blotched pattern of ‘free’ and ‘seignorial’ villages. 
In  West-Friesland, endeavours to introduce elements of banal lord-
ship  and a centralised power structure usually met with failure.166 
Complaints about malfunctioning government offi  cials were ubiqui-
tous. It is diffi  cult to believe these people were behaving much more 
reprehensibly here than elsewhere; it seems more likely that problems 
arose because their presence was considered a break with tradition. In 
the end, an inventive and radical solution was found: clusters of rural 
communities were proclaimed to be towns, which—once again—gave 
them the right to govern themselves.167
Considering the self-governing powers of rural communities in the 
north of Holland, it is not surprising to fi nd some of them actively 
promoting their commercial interests in the outside world at an early 
stage. Th e villages of Akersloot, Uitgeest, and Wormer—with their toll 
exemptions—are good examples. It is tempting to think that rural 
communities like this, used to taking care of their own business and 
not subjected to lordly power or urban domination, would not hesitate 
to install weighing facilities as soon as opportunities opened up for the 
marketing of dairy.
Some support for this hypothesis can be found in the fact that—in 
contrast to the situation elsewhere—in the part of Holland north of the 
IJ the activities of hunting, fi shing, and milling were not, or only par-
tially, considered to be comital rights. Instead, Waterlanders and West-
Frisians claimed these rights as the traditional and inalienable property 
of the local community.168 When in 1393 Duke Albrecht of Bavaria 
encroached upon these rights (he had probably been trying to lease 
them out to a third party), he met with resistance. Th e duke was forced 
to retract his claims and once more guarantee the local communities 
the same rights to hunt, fi sh, and mill as they had always enjoyed.169 
In West-Friesland, although not in Waterland, the community did pay 
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an annual rent for these rights; but as the duke was not free to choose 
another lessee, this rent should be seen as no more than a token recog-
nition of the duke’s sovereignty.170 Th e data collected from the Gousset 
index confi rm the special position of the northern part of Holland in 
this respect. Th e index provides several examples of rural communities 
in this region leasing fi shing waters, grain mills, locks, and sluices.171 
No such examples were found south of the IJ.
With weighing rights the situation was not quite similar, as the refer-
ences to rural weigh houses collected from the Gousset index show 
(see Appendix B). In most cases, the counts granted the exploitation of 
the weighing facilities to an individual, much as they did in other parts 
of the county. Even if this individual was a well-to-do member of the 
local community—he probably usually was—this is not the same as 
granting the privilege to the community as such.
Th ere are, however, a few exceptions, and they are signifi cant. In 
March 1391 Duke Albrecht granted the right to install scales to the 
West-Frisian village of Niedorp; the local community had apparently 
requested permission to do so.172 Clearly the organisation of weighing 
was based on the existing model for renting out rights to the commu-
nity. However, only eight months later, in November of the same year, 
the duke rented out the scales to a certain Henrick Dirksz. for a period 
of four years.173 At some point in time, the villagers had probably 
voiced their discontent with the situation because when the four years 
of Dirksz.’ term had almost passed, the duke gave the people of the 
district Niedorperambacht and Schagerambacht permission to sell 
their dairy wherever they wanted, thus permitting them to by-pass 
Dirksz. and his scales.174
In order to interpret these events it should be borne in mind 
that weighing facilities—connected as they were to the recent rise 
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of dairy farming—were not part of the traditional West-Frisian com-
munity rights, even if villagers were inclined to think they should be. 
Since elsewhere in Holland (and abroad) weighing facilities were 
controlled by the central authorities or by a lord,175 Duke Albrecht 
probably viewed the introduction and renting out of weigh houses in 
the north of Holland to members of the local elite as a good opportu-
nity for reinforcement of his position in the region. But as this did not 
meet with the expectations of the rural population, confl icts were inev-
itable, especially if people like Henrick Dirksz. abused their position. 
It was exactly this kind of situation that shortly aft erwards was to lead 
to the grant of urban status to many West-Frisian rural communities. 
Niedorp was one of them, acquiring a charter of urban privileges 
in 1415.176
Niedorp is the only example from this period we know so much 
about: detailed information on the genesis of other late 14th or early 
15th-century weighing facilities is simply lacking. Th e data from the 
Gousset index suggest that at least some of the village scales were 
rented out to well-to-do individuals. However, the example of Niedorp 
shows that even if a weigh house was eventually rented out in this way, 
it could still originate from a community initiative. Signifi cantly, com-
munity action was also at the basis of the weigh house granted to the 
villages of Sloten and Osdorp by Duke Philip of Burgundy in 1466. Th e 
charter stating the privilege is very clear: the villagers requested they 
should be allowed to install scales in their village and were given per-
mission to do so, in return for an annual payment to the duke’s 
steward.177
In Kennemerland seignorial infl uence was stronger than in West-
Friesland, as shown by the fact that the 15th-century weigh house of 
Assendelft  belonged to the lords of Assendelft . Nevertheless, Assendelft  
is actually the example given by Enno van Gelder to demonstrate that 
rural communities in this region were in many respects similar to 
those in West-Friesland: even if there was a seignorial lord, his role in 
the organisation of village life was limited and the community largely 
governed itself.178 Two events related to the Assendelft  weigh house in 
the 15th and 16th century may illustrate this.
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At the end of the 15th century the lord of Assendelft  permitted his 
people to bring their dairy to markets elsewhere, without weighing it 
in Assendelft  fi rst. Obviously this was not to his advantage. It was most 
likely in answer to a request from the villagers: it meant they were able 
to avoid paying twice.179 And can it be a coincidence that in the late 
16th century, less than three weeks before the proclamation against 
illegal rural scales by the Estates of Holland in 1597, the lord of 
Assendelft  transferred the scales to the local community?180 Th e act 
gave the villagers a clear title to their weigh house—just what they 
needed to substantiate its legal basis. Th ey would have had to pay for 
the favour, but the fact that they were able and willing to do so demon-
strates their initiative and organisational capacities.
Strong rural communities not only existed in the north of Holland. 
Th ey also developed in the rest of the county, with its free colonists and 
its need for cooperation in water management. However, their forceful 
presence in the north, supported by a legacy of autonomy, no doubt 
contributed to the early rise of village weigh houses in this region.
4.4 Conclusions
At the end of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th century, a 
new category of trade venues emerged in the Holland countryside. 
By focusing on just one commodity in an expanding sector of the 
economy and by providing direct links with interregional trade net-
works, these new trade venues off ered farmers and fi shermen opportu-
nities to market the products of a specialising rural economy.
Th eir emergence was certainly stimulated by the growth of urban 
demand and the rise of interregional trade, but it can only be fully 
understood if the balance of powers between towns, the count, lords, 
and rural communities is taken into account. In Holland, seignorial 
control over rural trade was light in comparison to England, and towns 
were unable to dominate the rural economy to the extent they did in 
Flanders. At an earlier stage that may have been a disadvantage: English 
seignorial competition, for example, by giving rise to a dense network 
of fairs and markets at an early stage, may have been able to stimu-
late  rural commercialisation in ways that were absent in Holland. 
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But Holland’s tradition of informal rural trade suited economic condi-
tions in the late 14th century; it facilitated fl exible and adequate reac-
tions to new opportunities for trade.
Along the Holland North Sea coast a string of seaside fi sh markets 
developed, situated at sites convenient to fi shermen. Th ese markets 
were usually not heavily burdened by seignorial exactions, nor were 
they completely controlled by urban merchants. Moreover, none of the 
coastal villages was able to develop into a compulsory fi sh market, and 
staples for the interregional sea-fi sh trade established in the towns of 
Heusden and Naarden were probably short-lived. Some fi shing com-
munities were able to negotiate favourable trade conditions: Katwijk 
and Scheveningen acquired exemptions from the comital river tolls.
Village weigh houses for butter and cheese fi rst appeared in the 
north of Holland, where rural communities traditionally had a strong 
position. Rural aspirations were increasingly frustrated by the ever 
more persistent attempts of towns to concentrate trade at the urban 
market. In the end, this did not prevent rural weigh houses from also 
developing elsewhere in Holland, but it probably slowed down their 
rise and also meant they emerged as unauthorised institutions.
Whereas in many parts of Europe—Flanders is a good example—
more opportunities for rural trade opened up as an increasingly strong 
central state was able to overcome trade barriers raised by the towns,181 
Holland seems to have moved in the opposite direction. Urban coer-
cion became more pronounced over time, not less so. However, the 
foundations for an institutional framework favourable to rural trade 
had been laid in the 14th and early 15th century and were in many 
cases strong enough to overcome 16th-century urban restrictions. 
Many rural trade venues were by then fi rmly established, supported by 
privileges and tradition. As a result, rural communities maintained at 
least part of their ability to resist urban intrusion.
Th e region around Dordrecht is an exception. Hardly any rural 
weigh houses were established here: urban control seems to have been 
too strong. But then, as the next chapter will show, Dordrecht had a 
history of trade privileges, most of them not in regional but in interna-
tional trade.
1 Van de Wall, Handvesten Dordrecht, 195.
2 Th e distinction between the two types is outlined by David Nicholas. Th e defi ni-




In the summer of 1345 three merchants—two of them came from the 
Hansa towns Zutphen and Kampen—ran into trouble. Th ey had 
ignored Dordrecht’s staple privilege on the river trade in wine, grain, 
wood, and salt: having entered the river delta from the North Sea, they 
had not proceeded to Dordrecht, as they should have, but sold their 
cargo elsewhere. Th is had most likely been in Brielle, since it was Lady 
Machteld of Voorne, the seignory in which Brielle was situated, who 
pleaded with Count Willem IV on behalf of the three merchants. Her 
intercession met with partial success: the count forgave the merchants 
their transgression, but only aft er they had promised to compensate all 
damages to himself or to any other party.1
Medieval staple privileges were of two types. Th e fi rst type has already 
been discussed in Chapter 3: towns could claim a monopoly on trade 
in certain commodities within a district of limited dimensions, usually 
with the intention of guaranteeing the provisioning of the urban popu-
lation with basic foodstuff s or raw materials for the local industry. In 
Flanders these regional trade monopolies were a very common phe-
nomenon; in Holland and also in England much less so. Th e second 
type of staple privileges related to interregional or international trade. 
A staple of this type was ‘the right of a certain centre to act as an exclu-
sive depot for one or more commodities which are in transit through a 
given area, not necessarily the territory appertaining to the town, but 
destined either for consumption within the town or, more frequently, 
for reshipment’.2
Staple rights of the second type were much coveted, but seldom 
granted. In Flanders, only Bruges and Ghent managed to acquire 
substantial privileges of this kind; in England, the one equivalent of 
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similar dimensions is the wool staple system. In Holland, Dordrecht 
was the only town that possessed important staple privileges regard-
ing  international trade. Th e fi sh staples of Naarden and Heusden 
discussed in Chapter 4 had some characteristics that looked like a 
monopoly on interregional trade, but these staples were limited in 
scope and short-lived. Th e same is true for the monopoly on the trade 
in imported beer granted to Amsterdam in 1351.3 Dordrecht’s privi-
leges were not only far more extensive, but also survived, at least par-
tially, into the early modern era.
Bernard van Rijswijk, who in 1900 published his dissertation on the 
staple right of Dordrecht, did not try to hide his unfavourable judge-
ment on the subject of his research. He argued, fi rstly, that the ‘artifi -
cial’ position of Dordrecht as the compulsory market for the river trade 
in wine, grain, wood, and salt had had more disadvantages than bene-
fi ts: the obligation to buy and sell in Dordrecht had raised transport 
and transaction costs, and it had, moreover, posed serious obstacles to 
the development of trade elsewhere. In addition, Van Rijswijk sug-
gested that the staple right was atypical for Holland’s development as a 
region of free trade: he compared Dordrecht’s indolence, induced by its 
privileged position, with the vigorous and daring spirit of enterprise of 
towns like Amsterdam, to which Dordrecht eventually gave way.4
Van Rijswijk’s suggestions are coloured by late 19th-century patriot-
ism and free market ideology; but when the rhetoric is discounted, he 
still has a point that merits attention. If, as has been argued in the pre-
vious chapters, Holland’s history of occupation and settlement had 
given rise to a society in which non-economic constraints on trade 
were almost absent and rent-seeking was held in check by a balance of 
powers, then how to explain that Dordrecht not only managed to 
acquire its staple privilege, but also to extend and consolidate it aft er-
wards? Van Rijswijk’s ideas on the eff ects of the staple give rise to 
another question. Dordrecht’s privileges reached their widest legal 
scope in the middle of the 14th century, and the city fl ourished in the 
second half of this century.5 Yet we have seen that at that very time 
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Holland as a whole experienced a phase of strong economic growth. 
In contrast to the gloomy picture presented by Van Rijswijk, the staple 
right apparently did not prevent or stifl e this development.
Th is chapter focuses mainly on the late 13th and 14th centuries and 
thus covers the period of the rise, expansion, and consolidation of the 
Dordrecht staple. First the origins of the staple are investigated and 
compared with the factors that gave rise to the staples of Bruges and 
Ghent in Flanders, and to the English wool staple system. It will be 
shown that in each case local circumstances and political relations 
aff ected the organisation of the staple, and through the organisation 
also its eff ects in the long run.
Th e remainder of the chapter focuses on the Holland river region. 
It is devoted to an analysis of the 14th-century confl icts of Dordrecht 
with two smaller towns, Brielle and Schoonhoven. Both towns were 
involved, or aspired to be, in commercial activities that were in confl ict 
with Dordrecht’s trade monopoly. Th e many confl icts between 
Dordrecht and the other towns in the river region have been 
researched—although not always in depth—for the late 15th and early 
16th centuries.6 Much less attention has been paid to events in the cru-
cial 14th century. Th e confrontations between Schoonhoven and 
Brielle on the one hand and Dordrecht on the other illustrate not only 
the mechanisms that created and sustained the existence of the 
Dordrecht staple, but also show why the staple did not seriously dam-
age the development of trade elsewhere in the river region.
5.2 The Dordrecht staple in an international perspective
Origins
When in 1299 the staple privilege was granted, Dordrecht cannot have 
had much more than 5,000 inhabitants,7 but even so it was already a 
thriving commercial centre. Originally an agrarian settlement in a rec-
lamation area, it began to develop into a small town from the middle of 
the 12th century. By the beginning of the 13th century, Dordrecht mer-
chants were probably already involved in long-distance trade—in 1204 
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when the town was taken by force during a succession confl ict, large 
stocks of wine and grain were captured.8 Th e river trade in wood, grain, 
salt, and particularly wine intensifi ed in the 13th century and brought 
the town great wealth.9
Two mutually reinforcing factors had contributed to Dordrecht’s 
rise to prominence. Th e fi rst was the town’s favourable location on a 
crossroads of waterways, which allowed its inhabitants to profi t fully 
from the east-west interregional river trade and from the development, 
in the 13th century, of a north-south trade route through Holland’s 
network of inland waterways (see Figure 10). Th e second was the 
favour of the count of Holland, who actively promoted Dordrecht as a 
trade settlement by making it the centre of his system of river tolls and 
by granting privileges to foreign merchants visiting the town.10
Elements of coercion gradually crept in. When in 1273 Count Floris 
V set new rules for the measuring of salt and wine in Dordrecht, he 
promised that the comital salt measure would not be established any-
where but in the Dordrecht toll house. Th e intention was clearly to 
concentrate the salt trade there.11 Th e grant of the staple right in 1299 
must therefore be seen as just one more step, albeit an important one, 
in a process that had started much earlier.
Aft er Dordrecht had been declared the compulsory market for the 
river trade in oats in February 1299, in November of the same year a 
comital charter ordained that henceforth ‘all goods’ transported down 
the Lek and Merwede (the lower reaches of the two main branches of 
the Rhine) had to be sold in Dordrecht. Since wine, wood and grain 
were mentioned specifi cally, Dordrecht’s position as a compulsory 
depot was most likely restricted to these commodities.12 Th e 1299 
charter does not refer to salt, transported upstream, but in view of the 
history of Dordrecht’s salt trade and the fact that salt is mentioned in 
later documents, it is safe to assume this was a staple commodity as 
well.13 Th e charter also granted visiting merchants a safeguard: the 
count of Holland guaranteed their safety on the journey to and from 
Dordrecht, and in the town itself they had the same rights as the local 
merchants, including immunity from arrest for debts.
 the dordrecht staple 163
14 Ibid. II, 26. Th e exchange is mentioned in Ibid. I, 12–14.
Dordrecht’s position as a compulsory depot meant that every ship car-
rying wine, grain, wood or salt had to stop in Dordrecht and off er its 
cargo for sale there during a specifi ed number of days (at fi rst fourteen; 
later eight). Th is was done by commissioning a local broker to fi nd a 
buyer. Unloading was not always necessary or compulsory: there were 
also brokers ‘at sea’, who accepted commissions for commodities still 
on board. However, if wine, grain or salt were unloaded and sold in the 
city, measuring was compulsory. If the cargo had not been sold at 
the end of the prescribed number of days, the ship could continue its 
journey. If a transaction was concluded, it had to be recorded at the 
Dordrecht exchange. Here the buyer received a token, to be shown at 
the toll posts elsewhere along the rivers, as proof that the merchandise 
was indeed bought in Dordrecht.14 Over time other elements were 
added, such as a transport monopoly for local shipmasters. Around the 
middle of the 15th century, the practice of buying off  part of the obliga-
tions was introduced. By the late 16th century, merchants were usually 
allowed to pass Dordrecht without further ado, as long as they con-
sented to paying a tax for ‘brokerage’ (even if no such brokerage had 
taken place ). However, they were always dependent on the grace of the 
Figure 10 Geographical situation of Dordrecht, Schoonhoven, and Brielle
Map: G-O graphics, Wijk bij Duurstede
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Dordrecht offi  cials, which could be withdrawn without warning and 
for no apparent reason.15
Th e early history of the staple of Bruges resembles that of the Dordrecht 
staple in more than one respect. In the 12th and 13th century, Bruges 
had developed into an important interregional trade centre, with 
English wool, Flemish cloth, and French wine as the main commodi-
ties being traded. As in Dordrecht, this function was supported by a 
series of privileges to foreign merchants.16 In 1323 the count of Flanders 
granted Bruges a monopoly on the trade in all imports entering the 
Zwin estuary. An exception was made for bulk commodities such as 
wine, herring, and other merchandise loaded in barrels, which had to 
be unloaded in Damme, Bruges’ outport situated on the Zwin a few 
kilometres seaward from Bruges. Dried fi sh, grain, and shipping equip-
ment went to the small towns of Hoeke and Monnikerede, also in the 
Zwin estuary. All other goods were to be taken to Bruges in order to be 
stored and sold there.17
Ghent presents a slightly diff erent case. Th e city emerged as a grain 
trade centre because of its location at the confl uence of the Scheldt and 
Lys, the two main rivers connecting the rich grain fi elds of Artois and 
Hainault to the towns of Flanders. Th e fi rst reference to a compulsion 
to sell grain in Ghent dates from 1351; an urban by-law issued in this 
year compelled all merchants bringing grain to Ghent to sell half of it 
in the city. Th e obligation concerned only wheat and rye transported 
downstream on the Scheldt and Lys; oats and barley were free. Th e 
share of the grain that was subjected to the staple (originally half; at the 
end of the 15th century, one sixth) was to be unloaded, measured, reg-
istered, stored, and then sold; and at the sale, the bakers, brewers, and 
private burgesses of Ghent were given priority over foreigners. Th e rest 
of the grain had to be transferred to a Ghent vessel, aft er which it could 
be transported further downstream.18
Unlike Bruges, Ghent was not promoted as an interregional trade 
centre by the Flemish count. Th e grain staple was initiated and 
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 originally also enforced by the city itself. Th at was feasible as long as 
the staple concerned only grain that was brought to Ghent anyway; but 
when in the early 15th century the urban authorities began to object to 
grain being unloaded before it reached the city, authorisation of the 
position of Ghent as a compulsory depot by central government 
became important. Indirectly it was granted in 1424, when Duke Philip 
the Good prohibited the transit grain trade through Warneton (on the 
Lys) and Ypres: this act eff ectively gave Ghent the monopoly it desired.19
In 1313, fourteen years aft er Dordrecht acquired its staple privilege 
and ten years before Bruges did so, the fi rst compulsory English wool 
staple on the continent was established by royal ordinance in Saint-
Omer.20 In the late 13th century several continental towns in a row—
including Dordrecht for a short period—had functioned as the centre 
of the English wool trade, but none of them bore the character of a 
compulsory depot. Th e 1313 ordinance not only prescribed the com-
pulsory market for all merchants exporting English wool to the Low 
Countries, it also superimposed a corporative organisation of mer-
chants later referred to as the Company of the Staple. Each merchant 
was to dispatch his wool to the staple, which was administered by the 
commonalty of merchants.
In 1326 the continental staple was temporarily replaced by a series 
of domestic staples. Th ese were towns in England where the wool was 
to be stored, weighed and registered, and then sold to foreign mer-
chants. Englishmen were no longer permitted to export wool. Only 
two years later, the domestic staples were abolished and a continental 
staple was re-established, this time in Bruges. In the following decades, 
policy shift ed frequently between the alternatives of the continental 
staple on the one hand, and the home staples (combined with prohibi-
tions on exports for denizens) on the other. An important step was 
taken in 1363 when the staple was transferred from Bruges to Calais. 
At the same time a syndicate of 26 merchants was created which was to 
govern the town on behalf of the English king. Although the syndicate 
did not have a formal monopoly, its members came to dominate the 
wool trade at the staple.
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It has been suggested that Dordrecht’s staple right was the inevitable 
sequel to the town’s development as a centre of interregional trade.21 
However, a comparison with events in Flanders and England makes it 
clear that there is nothing automatic about compulsory staples: they 
result from a set of conscious decisions, shaped by the interests of 
groups and individuals.
Th e compulsory staples of Bruges and Ghent were both initiated by 
urban pressure groups with the objective of limiting outside competi-
tion. In Bruges the commercial elite reacted to the aspirations of the 
towns in the Zwin estuary, and particularly of Bruges’ outport Sluis. 
Owing to silting of the Zwin, in the course of the 13th century seagoing 
vessels found it increasingly diffi  cult to reach Damme. By the end of 
the century Sluis, situated close to the mouth of the Zwin, had begun 
to take over part of Damme’s functions.22 Because of its location, closer 
to the sea and further from Bruges, Sluis was much more dangerous as 
a potential competitor than Damme had ever been. Th e problem 
became acute in 1322, when Jean of Namur, who held the seignory of 
Sluis, persuaded his great-nephew, the young and inexperienced count 
of Flanders, to grant him the function of waterbaljuw (water bailiff ). 
Th is function included jurisdictional authority in the entire Zwin estu-
ary, a capacity in which Jean of Namur would have the instruments to 
obstruct transports to and from Bruges. Th e Bruges authorities were 
quick to react to imminent danger: they cajoled the count into grant-
ing the city the staple privilege that was to direct all trade towards the 
city or the small towns under its control. When Jean of Namur refused 
to comply, the Brugeois took Sluis by force.23
In Ghent the initiative behind the rise of the staple also came from 
within the town, although not from the same mercantile elite. 
According to G. Bigwood, Ghent needed a monopoly position in order 
to guarantee a plentiful supply of grain for its urban population.24 
However, before the 14th century Ghent had apparently been able to 
do without a compulsory staple, even though the city had become 
dependent on grain imports from France as early as the 12th century.25 
Th is makes it hard to believe that concern for the urban food supply 
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was the sole reason for the development of the compulsory staple. Of 
greater signifi cance was probably the rise of the guild of ‘free skippers’, 
a corporative organisation that—from the second half of the 14th cen-
tury onwards—gradually came to dominate water transport on the 
Scheldt, Lys, and Lieve (the latter a canal constructed in the 13th cen-
tury to connect Ghent and Bruges). Step by step the guild succeeded in 
monopolising shipping on these waterways. It is easy to see how the 
staple, with its obligation to unload and register, suited the interests of 
the skippers’ guild; in fact, staple obligations can be seen as part of the 
guild’s overall transport monopoly. Th e privileged position of the 
Ghent skippers’ guild was offi  cially recognised by central govern-
ment in the late 14th century, and again in 1436 and 1475 in a more 
extended form.26
Both in Ghent and in Bruges the role of the central authorities in the 
creation of the compulsory staple was restricted to formally sanction-
ing the fait accompli they were faced with. Th e creation of the English 
wool staple system, on the other hand, bears the marks of royal initia-
tive. It is true that the great wool merchants usually supported the con-
tinental wool staple—off ering as it did opportunities to control exports 
and monopolise the wool trade.27 Yet events also show that the wool 
merchants could not dictate conditions. Th e installation of the home 
staples in 1326 was forced upon them; many of the new staple towns 
were inland towns; and of the four main wool ports, only London was 
constituted a staple. Th e Ordinance of the Staple issued in 1353, which 
re-established the home staples and forbade exports by English mer-
chants, was also a top-down arrangement. So too was the move of the 
staple to Calais in 1363: in this case merchants had not even been con-
sulted.28 For the Crown the staple served a political goal: it could be 
used as an instrument to put pressure on the authorities on the other 
side of the Channel. Th is partly explains the frequent shift s of the sta-
ple from one place to another. Th e staple also had important fi scal 
advantages. Th rough the staple, the riches of the wool trade could be 
taxed profi tably and easily. When levied via the Company of the Staple 
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the custom revenues could, moreover, be used as sureties on loans the 
Crown might wish to raise.29 In short, until the late 14th century, when 
the infl uence of Parliament—and particularly of the merchant repre-
sentation in Parliament—increased markedly, staple policy was to a 
large extent determined by the interests and actions of the Crown.30
In Dordrecht the decisions and interests of social groups are perhaps 
not as visible, but all the same they were the driving force behind the 
Dordrecht staple privileges. Notably, Dordrecht received the privilege 
that made it a compulsory and exclusive depot more than two decades 
before Bruges did. Th e Dordrecht staple right also preceded the instal-
lation of the fi rst compulsory English wool staple in 1313. Th e staple as 
a compulsory depot for the interregional trade was not a Holland 
invention. Cologne, for instance, having attempted to monopolise the 
transit trade on the Rhine from at least the late 12th century onward, 
in 1259 became the fi rst town in the German empire to obtain a formal 
staple privilege, granted by the archbishop of Cologne.31 Nevertheless, 
in view of the late rise of towns and trade in Holland and—even more 
so—of the lack of a tradition of political constraints on trade, the early 
date of the grant to Dordrecht is surprising.
In the past the search for the origins of the Dordrecht staple right 
has given rise to several theories. H.J. Smit has stressed the role of Jean 
of Avesnes, count of Hainault and sworn enemy to the Flemish count 
Guy of Dampierre. During the troubled and chaotic years aft er the 
death of Floris V in 1296, Dordrecht had supported the claims of 
Avesnes to the guardianship of Floris’ young son Jan I. Only weeks 
aft er Avesnes had fi nally assumed the role of regent, he and his ward 
together granted Dordrecht the staple right, as a reward—according to 
Smit—for the town’s support to the Avesnes cause.32
Although the genesis of the staples in Flanders and England shows 
that political events may act as a catalyst, it is also clear that in both 
cases the way had already been paved by structural factors. In Dordrecht 
it was no diff erent. Firstly, just as the English wool staple was advanta-
geous for the king of England from a fi scal point of view, a compul-
sory  depot for the river trade was in the interests of the count of 
Holland because it increased the effi  ciency of the comital river tolls. 
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Th e close connection between the staple and the river tolls can only 
be fully understood if the specifi c characteristics of the Holland toll 
system are taken into account. From the 11th century onwards, a sys-
tem of toll posts had developed—with Dordrecht as its centre—which 
allowed the counts of Holland to control shipping in the delta of the 
Rhine and Meuse. In the 15th century, toll payments were due only 
upon leaving or entering the county; but in the 14th century, the toll 
post in Dordrecht still had an important function. At an early stage, 
the counts had begun to grant toll exemptions to the towns of Holland 
and Zeeland. Before the end of the 13th century, all major towns, many 
smaller ones, and also a few villages were the lucky owners of privileges 
guaranteeing them toll exemption. Although some foreign merchants 
enjoyed toll reductions—merchants from the Hansa towns fi rst and 
foremost among them—few were completely exempted.33
Th is contrast between the toll status of Holland merchants on the 
one hand and foreigners on the other provided opportunities for eva-
sion of the tolls. J.F. Niermeyer has pointed out that the toll exemptions 
granted to the towns of Holland and Zeeland usually included the con-
dition that the merchandise had to be bought at the ‘highest market’: 
Cologne on the Rhine, or Venlo on the Meuse. Th is was to prevent 
merchants from the Rhineland or Guelders from selling, or even trans-
ferring pro forma, their cargo to Holland merchants before arriving at 
the easternmost toll post, thus robbing the count of Holland of the 
revenues he was entitled to. Th e staple right was supposed to discour-
age this kind of toll evasion. It forced ships to stop in Dordrecht and 
have their cargo checked for commodities subject to the staple. If at 
that point a merchant was unable to prove—by way of a token or note 
issued by the proper authorities—that he had indeed bought his mer-
chandise at the highest market, he had to pay the river tolls. Th e staple, 
Niermeyer concluded, was an instrument in the count’s continuous 
eff orts to increase revenues.34
On one point Smit and Niermeyer agreed: although neither denied 
the interests of the Dordrecht elite were also at stake, both assumed the 
staple right was primarily based on an active and conscious policy of 
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the count of Holland. However, recent research has shown that in 
other respects the Dordrecht elite did not merely react to the count’s 
actions. For the reign of Floris V, Eef Dijkhof has shown that many of 
the privileges granted to Dordrecht were probably initiated by the 
Dordrecht elite. Dordrecht was in good position to bargain, because 
the town supported Floris’ fi nancial transactions, providing security 
for many of the count’s loans.35 In the autumn of 1299, Dordrecht’s 
infl uence was probably greater than ever: Jean of Avesnes needed to 
consolidate his new position and the cooperation of Dordrecht was 
necessary to achieve that goal. It therefore makes sense to assume that 
the grant of the staple privilege was partly due to pressure exerted by 
the Dordrecht elite.
Still, Dordrecht was not Bruges. Around the year 1300 the latter was 
a metropolis with a fl ourishing interregional trade and with suffi  cient 
clout to stand up to the Flemish count. In comparison, Dordrecht—
although on the rise—was but a secondary trading centre. It is diffi  cult 
to believe that mere pressure from the Dordrecht merchants would 
have been enough to cajole the count of Holland into granting the 
town a privilege as far-reaching as the 1299 staple right. Dordrecht can 
only have been able to achieve its goal because two other factors helped 
promote its cause. One factor was the political situation of the moment: 
the accession of a new ruler who badly needed the support of the 
Dordrecht elite and could easily be persuaded to anything that might 
challenge the hegemony of Flanders as the focus of international trade. 
Th e other, more fundamental factor was the unique connection 
between the river toll system and the staple. Even if the staple right was 
not his idea to begin with, it must have been clear to the count that he 
stood to gain from it as much as the Dordrecht merchants.
Th e toll system contributed greatly to what makes the Dordrecht 
staple stand out from its counterparts in England and Flanders. 
In England, the interests of the king and those of the large wool mer-
chants frequently coincided, but there were also intervals when this 
was not the case and—at least until the end of the 14th century—
on these occasions the demands of the Crown usually prevailed. 
In Flanders, the urban elite and the count were usually on opposing 
sides. Certainly, the Flemish count did levy tolls in the Zwin estuary—
in fact, the Damme wine toll was the most profi table part of the Flemish 
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river toll system, and its revenues must have benefi ted from the estab-
lishment of a compulsory staple. However, the toll in Bruges itself did 
not belong to the count: it was enfeoff ed to the lords of Ghistel.36 
Moreover, any advantages a compulsory staple in Bruges might have 
off ered to the count were probably overshadowed by the dangers of 
making the city even more powerful than it already was. In Dordrecht, 
on the other hand, the interests of the count of Holland and that of the 
urban elite ran parallel from the beginning and, as we shall see, largely 
continued to do so.
Eff ects
Infl uenced perhaps by the never-ending protests against the Dordrecht 
staple in the Middle Ages and the early modern period, the negative 
eff ects of the Dordrecht staple right have drawn far more attention 
than the potential benefi ts. Nonetheless, even Van Rijswijk—certainly 
no friend of the staple policy—believed that in its early stages the sta-
ple made a positive contribution to the development of trade. Th e 
Dordrecht staple linked regional trade patterns to interregional net-
works and provided buyers and sellers with a fi xed meeting point and 
with the services and facilities they needed.37 Th e positive benefi ts are 
also stressed by Dick de Boer. He sees the Dordrecht staple as a catalyst 
of the emerging market economies of Holland and Zeeland, at least 
during the fi rst decades of the 14th century: the combination of tolls 
and market rights on the one hand and well-chosen exemptions on the 
other provided structure and direction.38
Th ere is no doubt that a certain degree of concentration of trade had 
advantages in an age when aggregate trade volumes were small. Like 
fairs, staple markets helped to reduce the costs of matching supply and 
demand. Th ey allowed buyers to come into contact with a large group 
of sellers at the same time and vice versa. Economies of scale also 
allowed for the development of a number of market services that were 
not readily available elsewhere. Fourteenth-century Bruges is a perfect 
example. Th e city provided a physical infrastructure in the shape of 
quays, cranes, carriers, and storage space, and it guaranteed reliable 
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weighing and measuring. Foreign merchants could make use of the 
services of money changers who off ered banking services and short-
term credit, brokers who provided mediation, and hostellers who did 
all of these things and in addition off ered storage space and acted as 
local agents for absent merchants.39 Since Dordrecht was a much 
smaller trade centre than Bruges, the level of the services provided was 
probably more modest. Nevertheless, a system of standardised meas-
ures, carrying services and storage capacity, and brokerage and money 
changers were all in operation by the end of the 13th century.40
However, it does not necessarily follow that coercion, in the form of 
a staple privilege, was needed to achieve all this. As long as value for 
money was off ered, concentration and the services coming with it 
could surely be depended upon to develop of their own accord: mer-
chants would be willing to pay for facilities that materially improved 
trading conditions. A positive contribution of coercion is conceivable 
only in two situations. Firstly, at least in theory, it could help solve free-
riding problems. However, it is doubtful if in practice this carried 
much weight. For most, if not all, facilities off ered by staple towns, it is 
hard to see how anybody could have profi ted from them without actu-
ally doing business at the staple and paying for the services provided. 
Secondly, a staple privilege may have stimulated investments in the 
physical infrastructure or in the institutional framework that might 
not have been made without the guarantee of a good return.41 Again 
some doubts are justifi ed: in Bruges, for instance, the foundations of 
the institutions just mentioned were already in place before a formal 
staple came into existence.
In other words, while voluntary concentration can be explained as 
an effi  cient response to the economic needs of an age of ‘thin’ trade, 
compulsion must have other roots. It is clear where to look: as we have 
seen, staple rights were very much the result of political power-play. 
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By implication, these rights were benefi cial for some, while for others 
the negative eff ects dominated. In judging their impact, it is easy to 
be misled by the litany of protests: complaints were part of the game. 
A more realistic assessment of the eff ects of the Dordrecht staple 
requires us to look behind this façade. Two kinds of potentially nega-
tive eff ects can be distinguished: fi rstly, coercion could facilitate and 
support surplus extraction at the staple; and secondly, it could suppress 
the development of trade elsewhere.
Surplus extraction at the staple covered more than just the tolls, cus-
toms, and dues that were demanded: the eff ects of a trade monopoly 
on price formation, for instance, cannot be captured in this way. 
Nevertheless, the rate of taxation does provide an indication of possi-
bilities for rent-seeking by those in power, even if only a partial one.
Impositions at the Dordrecht staple consisted of several compo-
nents. Firstly, there was the comital toll—levied at the Dordrecht toll 
house—on transactions taking place at the staple. Th e toll had to be 
paid by both the buyer and the seller, unless they enjoyed toll exemp-
tion. Th e Dordrecht toll accounts over the years 1380 to 1385, the only 
ones that have been preserved, give rates of less than 1% for wine and 
grain purchased in Dordrecht.42 Th e toll payment probably included a 
fee for the compulsory use of the Dordrecht exchange, which as we saw 
served as a registration offi  ce for all transactions.43 For goods not sold 
in Dordrecht, rates payable at the Dordrecht toll were negligible. Of 
course it should be remembered that the owners had to pay a transit 
toll when entering and leaving the county. Th e rates for these transit 
tolls varied widely: the standard rate was 5%, but whenever tolls were 
expressed as a fi xed sum per product or unit, rates tended to be much 
lower as a consequence of the gradual depreciation of currency—and 
probably also as a consequence of the resistance to changing what was 
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regarded as a given right. Moreover, in many cases, exemptions or 
reductions eased the burden considerably.44
Th e other dues to be paid were related to the services provided by 
the town and its burgesses. Th e earliest Dordrecht by-laws, dating from 
1401, give the offi  cial tariff s for brokerage and measuring. For wheat 
and rye, the brokerage fee was 6d Hollands per hoed (to be shared by 
buyer and seller); the due for measuring the grain was 4d Hollands per 
hoed. Together, these charges amounted to 1% of the value at most.45 
Th e brokerage fee for wine was set at 24 groot per roede (just over 2,000 
litres) when the purchase took place on the water and 4 groot per aam 
(one tenth of a roede) when it took place in the town: a rate of 1 to 2%.46 
Scattered account data confi rm the impression that tariff s were moder-
ate. In 1284/85 the Dordrecht authorities bought a large amount of rye 
from a Rostock merchant; on this occasion the brokerage fee was 0.4% 
of the value of the grain.47 Another example comes from the purchase 
of wheat for the household of the count of Holland in 1355/56; in this 
case the brokerage fee was 0.8% of the price, while another 0.8% was 
spent on dues for measuring.48 In addition, dues had to be paid for 
handling: wine barrels had to be rolled or dragged to and from the 
ships, and grain sacs had to be carried. Th e wine account of Egmond 
Abbey over the year 1344/45 gives a clue to the level: for each of its 
purchases of wine in Dordrecht, the abbey paid 0.4 to 0.5% for the 
handling of the wine barrels.49 Finally, there were the urban excises. 
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No 14th-century excise tariff s are extant, but if the late 13th-century 
situation is any guide, these were also moderate: the sum paid as excise 
over the rye transaction with the Rostock merchant amounted to 1.3% 
of the value.
In summary, the merchants who traded at the Dordrecht staple paid 
offi  cially around 5% in dues on the value of their cargo. Th e sum is 
certainly not negligible; but at these rates impositions hardly qualify as 
extortionate either. In practice, there were no doubt situations where 
costs rose to higher levels. Offi  cials must have had opportunities for 
exactions over and above the offi  cial rates. In the 1270s and 1280s, for 
instance, Count Floris V had to intervene aft er complaints about the 
impositions on the measuring of salt and the handling of wine barrels. 
Th e count fi xed the tariff s for both activities and set additional rules on 
how they were to be conducted; but the fact that his orders had to be 
repeated more than once suggests that these rules were not readily 
obeyed.50 A more subtle example of exaction is provided by the toll 
registers for the Dordrecht toll for the years 1380 to 1385. Th ey show 
that toll payments had to be made in gold écus or some other stable 
currency according to the offi  cial conversion rate, which meant that at 
times of rapid depreciation of the Holland coinage—and these were 
frequent in the late 14th and early 15th century—the actual toll rates 
could be much higher than the tariff s suggest.51
Even if these factors are taken into account, it is clear that the English 
wool trade presents a far more extreme case of surplus extraction via 
taxation. Th e total level of customs and additional subsidy on wool 
exports for English merchants rose steeply from a moderate 5% of the 
value of the wool in the beginning of the 14th century to around 50% 
by 1350. In the late 14th and early 15th century, it usually fl uctuated 
between 35 and 50%; at that stage there was also a small additional 
due to be paid for the defence of Calais. During the intervals when 
176 chapter five
52 Munro, ‘English “Backwardness”’, 110–111, 164–165.
53 Lloyd, English Wool Trade, 218–220, 227–228, 233.
54 Ormrod, ‘England’, 32; Harriss, King, Parliament and Public Finance, 469–470.
55 Harriss, King, Parliament and Public Finance, 421–422.
56 Lloyd, English Wool Trade, 241–242, 314–317.
57 Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold, 88–90.
alien merchants were allowed to export wool, they paid rates that 
were even higher.52 Certainly, the customs system and the staple sys-
tem were not identical. Th e fi rst predated the last, and customs were 
also levied on products other than wool. However, customs and staple 
did support and reinforce each other. Moreover, the staple provided 
additional  means for exactions. At the end of the 14th century, for 
instance, the Crown frequently issued licenses that allowed individual 
merchants to by-pass staple obligations—and these, of course, had also 
to be paid for.53
A tax burden of these proportions was made possible by a combina-
tion of two factors. Th e superior power of the Crown is one factor. 
Particularly during the fi rst half of the 14th century, royal attempts to 
tap the wealth of the wool trade were not held in check by countervail-
ing powers. Around the middle of the 14th century, Parliament did 
gain the right to authorise the wool subsidy; however, the Commons—
rather than agree to a direct taxation—used this right not to abolish 
the subsidy, but to grant it in an almost uninterrupted sequence.54 
A second factor is that, until the late 14th century, the monopoly posi-
tion of English wool was unchallenged. Here the staple helped: by the 
simple expedient of raising sales prices in Calais—the only market for 
high quality wool accessible to Low Countries clothiers—English wool 
merchants were able to pay the customs and still make a profi t.55
In the late 14th century, English wool exports began to fall. Although 
internal problems in the cities of Flanders and Brabant may have 
played a part, it is clear that much of the decline can be attributed to 
the taxes on wool exports, in combination with rigid staple  regulations. 
High duties aff ected the position of English wool on the continental 
market, particularly that of medium-quality wool; Low Countries 
manufacturers could buy Spanish or other wools of similar quality for 
a lower price.56 Th e bullion ordinances of 1429, enforcing cash pay-
ment and prohibiting credit at the staple in Calais, made matters worse 
by confronting buyers with almost insurmountable barriers.57 As an 
unintentional side-eff ect of the heavy taxes on wool exports, the 
English cloth industry and cloth exports developed rapidly from the 
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63 Van Houtte, Geschiedenis van Brugge, 201 (2 groten per barrel for the crane); 
Gilliodts-van Severen, Cartulaire de l’ancienne tonlieu II, 52–53 (4–6 groten for the 
transport of a wine barrel, for Hansa merchants). Based on a retail wine price estimate 
of 2.9 to 4.5 lb. groten Vlaams, this results in a rate (for crane plus handling) of 0.7 to 
1.2%; again, the actual rate was probably higher because wholesale wine prices were 
lower than retail prices.
late 14th century onwards.58 Th is, however, does not detract from the 
fact that for a century or more heavy exactions—caused and main-
tained by the inability of merchants to resist rent-seeking by the 
Crown—seriously disadvantaged the English wool trade.
Seen from this perspective, it is hardly surprising that in Flanders 
impositions on staple trade were no higher than in Dordrecht. Th e 
Bruges wine trade provides an example. Just like the Dordrecht wine 
trade, it was taxed in several ways. Firstly, there was the comital toll of 
Damme, levied on all merchandise entering the Zwin. According to a 
mid 13th-century tariff  list, the toll for a barrel of wine was 4d—but 
since price data for this period are unavailable, it is impossible to trans-
late this into a percentage of the value.59 However, we do know that in 
1368 at the toll of Dendermonde, which taxed the interregional trade 
on the Scheldt between Ghent and Antwerp, the tariff  for the better 
wines was 3s 2d parisis Vlaams per queue of approximately 457 litres, 
which meant a rate of less than 1%.60 It is unlikely that the Zwin toll was 
much higher than this. In addition, there was a comital toll on wine 
sold in Damme, but it was negligible. In the late 14th century, only the 
trade in the popular Poitou wines was taxed, at a rate of 8d parisis 
Vlaams per barrel.61 Brokerage fees were usually no higher than 1% of 
the value, and in some cases even considerably lower.62 Somewhat 
more substantial were the dues for the use of the crane and the  dragging 
of the wine barrels, which added another 2% or so.63 Th e end result was 
178 chapter five
64 Abraham-Th isse, ‘Lakenhandel’, 68.
65 Nicholas, Town and Countryside, 144–147.
66 Lambert, ‘Merchants on the Margin?’
67 Sosson, ‘Les “petites villes” du Zwin’.
a level of impositions similar to what was customary in Dordrecht. 
Th is assessment receives support from the calculations made by 
German cloth merchants in the early 15th century. In a complaint to 
the Bruges authorities, they estimated their expenditure on brokerage, 
handling, tolls, and other dues in Bruges at 6 to 8% of the price of the 
cloth. Considering the source of the information, this is likely to have 
been the upper limit.64
However, Bruges does provide a very clear example of the second 
way in which staples could have detrimental eff ects: via the suppres-
sion of trade elsewhere. Aft er the offi  cial instatement of the Bruges sta-
ple in 1323, the Bruges merchant elite continued to look upon the 
Zwin towns as a potential threat to the city’s own trade. Bruges’ extra-
territorial powers were used to keep competition in check: from the 
middle of the 14th century the city used its position as court of appeal 
(chef de sens) for the other towns in the quarter to administratively and 
fi nancially subordinate the Zwin towns.65 Th e Bruges staple imposed a 
veritable stranglehold on the Sluis economy, which was only partially 
relieved by the rise of a lively black market, used mainly by local people 
and individual merchants who could not fall back on networks and 
trade privileges in Bruges.66 For the smaller Zwin towns, the situation 
was even worse. Jean-Pierre Sosson has argued convincingly that their 
total dependence on the Bruges trade cut off  all possibilities for an 
independent development, and in the end this was responsible for the 
towns’ economic and demographic decline in the 15th century.67
Ghent’s attempts to monopolise the transit grain trade were closely 
connected to the aspirations of the city (that is, of its skippers) to dom-
inate the waterways. An illustration of the link between the grain trade 
and domination of the rivers is provided by a prolonged confl ict with 
Ypres in early 15th century. Th e city of Ypres had undertaken the 
improvement and extension of the Ieperleet, a waterway that con-
nected Ypres to Nieuport and Bruges. Th is had opened new opportu-
nities for the interregional grain trade: grain transported from northern 
France to Ypres could now be re-exported via Nieuport or Bruges. 
In 1424 Ghent persuaded Duke Philip the Good to issue a prohibition 
on the use of this route for grain exports; this meant that the Ghent 
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skippers acquired a virtual monopoly on the interregional transit grain 
trade. A vicious confl ict between Ghent and Ypres erupted, but even an 
appeal by Ypres to the Parliament of Paris, as supreme court, did not 
change matters.68
Ypres was not the only victim of Ghent’s attempts to control the 
waterways. Ghent also clashed with various other towns. Until the late 
15th century, when the city was unable to stop the advance of Antwerp, 
Ghent successfully suppressed the emergence of competitive river 
trade centres in Flanders.69 Th e two case studies in the next section will 
show why Dordrecht, despite comital support for the staple, did not 
have the same hold on commercial activities in the towns of the 
Holland river region.
5.3 Dordrecht and its neighbours
Almost immediately aft er Dordrecht had received its staple privilege, 
protests arose from other towns. In 1304 the Zeeland towns Zierikzee 
and Middelburg received the explicit permission of Count Willem III 
to by-pass Dordrecht with their cargoes of oats and wine.70 It is not a 
coincidence that the fi rst protests came from Zeeland and not from 
Holland. Trade and industry were only just beginning to develop in the 
towns of Holland, but the Zeeland towns—favourably situated with 
respect to Flanders—had already built up a fl ourishing wine trade. Th eir 
wealth, and probably also the fact that sovereignty over Zee land was 
contested by the counts of Holland and Flanders, gave the Zeeland 
towns a negotiating position that the emerging towns of Holland 
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simply did not yet have. Admittedly, Middelburg and Zierik zee did not 
get everything they wished for: wine transports were only permitted if 
the wine was meant for consumption in the towns. However, the provi-
sions made in the 1304 charter to ensure this restriction was adhered 
to—in case of doubt a toll offi  cial was to accompany the ship to Zeeland 
to keep an eye on the proceedings—suggests that the towns made use 
of this loophole to develop their own wine trade with Flanders.
Schoonhoven
Two decades later protests against the Dordrecht staple arose from 
another direction: the towns of Holland now also raised their voices. 
Th e fi rst among them to do so was the small town of Schoonhoven, 
situated on the Rhine near the Utrecht border. Jan of Beaumont, 
brother to Count Willem III of Holland, had received Schoonhoven in 
the early 14th century as part of his apanage (the fi ef granted to a rul-
er’s younger son) and had made it his main residence in Holland. 
Schoonhoven was a small and relatively young settlement. It had fi rst 
developed in the second quarter of the 13th century around a newly 
constructed harbour that connected the peat stream Vlist to the river 
Rhine. In the early 14th century, Schoonhoven may have had around 
500 inhabitants.71
At fi rst sight it seems unlikely that an inconsequential settlement 
like this should feel the Dordrecht staple right as a burden. However, 
there is good reason to believe that even at this stage the Schoon-
hoven  townspeople participated in the interregional river trade. 
In 1280 they acquired exemption from the river tolls in Holland as part 
of a charter of urban liberties; one year later they received a similar 
privilege for the tolls in Utrecht.72 In addition, thanks to its location, 
Schoon hoven was in a good position to attract foreign merchants. 
Situated east of the easternmost Holland river toll post in Ammers, 
it was one of those places that off ered tempting opportunities for 
toll evasion to merchants from Guelders or the Rhineland. If they 
succeeded in selling their merchandise to Hollanders here, they 
cut expenses on tolls and moreover shortened their journey. Th at 
the towns people profi ted from this opportunity is suggested by the 
fact that the count of Holland moved the toll post of Ammers to 
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Schoonhoven in 1398. Th is was immediately aft er the last of the counts 
of Blois—the descendants of Jan of Beaumont—had died and the Blois 
territories had reverted to the rule of the count of Holland.73
In 1321 Schoonhoven ships, according to the complaints of the 
urban authorities, were suddenly confronted with demands to pay tolls 
and comply with staple obligations in Dordrecht, even though in the 
past they had been free from both. Th e townspeople probably realised 
that on their own they were no match for Dordrecht, and therefore 
looked for support, requesting the help of their lord, Jan of Beaumont. 
Twenty years later Beaumont was to back the fi shermen of Noordwijk 
in their attempts to fi ght the claims of Katwijk to a monopoly in the 
sea-fi sh trade.74 In 1321 we witness him as champion for Schoonhoven 
in its struggle against Dordrecht. In November of that year, Beaumont 
informed the Schoonhoven authorities that he had talked things over 
with his brother, who had promised to look into the matter. It seems 
the count kept his promise because a few weeks later statements were 
recorded from (amongst others) the magistrates of Gouda, Oudewater, 
and Nieuwpoort, and the lords of Vianen, Montfoort, and IJsselstein. 
In view of the fact that the interests of these towns—all situated in the 
river region—would be best served if Dordrecht’s economic power 
was  not permitted to grow unchecked, it is not surprising that all 
were  perfectly willing to testify Schoonhoven had never paid tolls 
and had never been subjected to the staple of Dordrecht. Th e result 
was  at least a partial victory for Schoonhoven: in May 1322 Count 
Willem III issued a charter that granted the town toll exemption, 
although it does not explicitly state that this also meant exemption 
from the Dordrecht staple.75
But matters did not end here, as the events of a few years later 
show. Th ere are at least two versions of what happened. Th e story told 
by the chronicler Willem Procurator is straightforward enough. 
According to the chronicle, Dordrecht had received new privileges and 
this had evoked a reaction from the other towns of Holland, to the 
point where goods from Dordrecht merchants had been confi scated. 
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In turn, Dordrecht abused its position by exacting tribute from the 
burgesses of other towns. Th e count regarded this as insubordination 
and ordered an armed expedition. On the mere rumour of an approach-
ing army, Dordrecht backed down and begged for the count’s forgive-
ness, but without success: the staple privilege was withdrawn.76 Th e 
story certainly has the advantage of a strong moral, but it is not neces-
sarily true.77
Firstly, there is no indication Dordrecht received new privileges 
around this time. Secondly, contemporary administrative sources con-
fi rm that Dordrecht’s staple privilege was withdrawn in 1326, but 
allow for a diff erent interpretation of the events leading up to the revo-
cation. Perhaps the partial success of Schoonhoven’s earlier protests 
had raised hopes in other towns, or perhaps they had triggered a more 
determined enforcement of the staple right by Dordrecht offi  cials. 
Quite possibly it was a combination of both. In any case, in 1325 six 
towns (Delft , Gouda, Haarlem, Leiden, Alkmaar and—once more—
Schoonhoven) and three villages (Akersloot, Uitgeest, and Wormer) 
argued that since their toll privileges were older than Dordrecht’s 
staple rights, they did not feel obliged to buy, sell, or unload at 
Dordrecht.78 Certainly, Dordrecht’s privilege of 1299 explicitly stated 
that staple obligations also applied to those who were exempt from the 
river tolls, but the towns obviously disagreed. Th e relation between toll 
exemption and exemption from the staple was to become a recurrent 
theme in later years, with each party interpreting the rules to its best 
advantage.
Th e protest against the Dordrecht staple probably marks the fi rst 
attempt of the towns of Holland to join forces in order to infl uence 
economic policy. It is worth noting that towns and villages from the 
north of the county were just as much involved as towns in the river 
delta, a clear indication of the increasing integration of the northern 
part of Holland in the interregional trade network.79 Th e involvement 
of three Kennemerland villages is not as surprising as it may seem. 
As we saw earlier, around 1280 they had all received exemption from 
the river tolls.80 Th is gave them reason to partake in the protest and, 
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since the seniority of toll privileges was the argument on which the 
entire case rested, they would have made a welcome addition to the 
party. Th e fact that Schoonhoven was again going to the trouble of put-
ting up a fi ght raises more questions: it suggests that if in 1322 freedom 
from staple obligations had been intended by the ruling of the count, it 
had not been observed by Dordrecht.
Asked for advice in the matter, the count’s Council recommended 
upholding the oldest privileges, thus lending its support to the claims 
of the alliance of towns of Holland. It is likely that the same mechanism 
was at work as four years earlier in the region around Schoonhoven: 
many Council members were lords of seignories in the river delta and 
therefore hoped to benefi t from a containment of Dordrecht’s trade 
monopolies. Count Willem III, it seems, did not decide immediately. 
Th e advice was recorded in the registers of the chancellery in 1325, but 
the fi nal decision was not proclaimed until a year later: Dordrecht’s 
staple right was withdrawn altogether.81
It is tempting to speculate on the reasons for the delay. Did the count 
realise he could not possibly satisfy both parties? Did he waver between 
the familiar connection between Dordrecht’s staple right and river toll 
revenues on the one hand, and the as yet unfulfi lled promise of com-
mercial development in other towns on the other hand? Apart from 
the time lapse, there is another reason to believe the decision may have 
been a diffi  cult one. In the 1326 register of chancellery clerk Gerard 
Alewijnsz., a comment is included—clearly formulated by a jurist 
trained in Roman law—about the conditions allowing a ruler to with-
draw privileges granted by his predecessors. Dordrecht and the staple 
privilege are not mentioned; the comment is in fact based on a case 
(probably fi ctitious) of a market privilege granted by the count of 
Flanders. However, because of the place of the document in the regis-
ter and the remarkable resemblance to the confl ict over Dordrecht’s 
staple, Van Riemsdijk has argued that the comment was probably used 
to defend the revocation of the staple privilege in June 1326.82 Th e 
comment states that revocation is permitted if a privilege is abused and 
becomes detrimental to the common good, or if it detracts from privi-
leges granted earlier to others. Both arguments can be said to be rele-
vant here; in fact, the second argument is identical to the claim about 
184 chapter five
the seniority of the toll privileges made by the towns of Holland. If Van 
Riemsdijk’s conclusion is correct, it is acknowledged here for the fi rst 
time that a trading privilege granted to one town can be obstructive to 
the economic development of others. Also, it is suggested the ruler is 
in a position to remedy this.
But the situation soon changed again. Step by step Dordrecht’s staple 
privileges were restored; ten years later they were almost back to where 
they had been in 1325. Th is restoration has been attributed to the 
desire of Count Willem III to recover toll revenues,83 but again we may 
safely assume a combination of factors. At least as much was at stake 
for Dordrecht, and doubtless the Dordrecht elite did not hesitate to use 
its infl uence with the count to have the staple right reinstalled. However, 
the protests of the other towns did have some lasting eff ects. In 1335 
the towns of Holland received an exemption from the staple for salt for 
local use.84 Seven years later, a similar exemption was granted for wine, 
but only if this was bought at the ‘highest market’: Cologne. Th e num-
ber of days the wine had to remain at the staple before it could be taken 
elsewhere was reduced from fourteen to eight.85 Th is proves the towns 
of Holland had gained strength: Dordrecht was no longer able to dic-
tate conditions. Th e exemptions left  the towns some room to manoeu-
vre: wine and salt allegedly for local consumption could be resold upon 
arrival, even if this was illegal.
It is time to return to Schoonhoven and examine what the restoration 
of the staple privilege meant for this town. According to an 18th-
century local author, the burgesses of Schoonhoven made their town 
into a ‘staple town, more free than Dordrecht’.86 Th is rosy picture 
of Schoonhoven’s role in commerce must be exaggerated. However, 
there is reason to believe Schoonhoven continued to play a part in 
interregional trade. Th e late 14th-century accounts of the Meuse river 
toll near Heusden occasionally refer to merchants or shipmasters 
from Schoonhoven, transporting products like grain, fl ax, woad, and 
wool. A certain Coenraet Heinricxz., for instance, appears several 
times in the accounts in relation to payments for transports of wine 
83 Van Rijswijk, Geschiedenis Dordtse stapelrecht, 34; Van Herwaarden et al., 
Geschiedenis van Dordrecht, 83.
84 Niermeyer, Bronnen Beneden-Maasgebied, no. 291. It is not quite clear whether 
this exemption regarded all the towns in Holland or only some of them.
85 Van Mieris, Groot charterboek II, 665–666.
86 Van Berkum, Beschryving Schoonhoven, 332.
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(and occasionally fi sh).87 We do not know how and where he sold his 
cargo, but it is useful to look at the options.
First of all, Heinricxz. could play the game by the rules: he could 
bring the wine to Dordrecht and off er it for sale there. Th is would 
mean he had to pay the regular dues, which as we saw were not outra-
geously high. More problematic was the fact that if Heinricxz. could 
not fi nd a buyer, he would have to wait for eight days before he could 
continue his journey. If he did fi nd one, he had to face yet another 
problem: it might be diffi  cult to fi nd a return cargo. Th is was directly 
related to the guild revolution that had taken place in Dordrecht in 
1367. Against the background of continuous faction confl icts, the 
guilds had fi nally managed to gain a foothold in the town’s govern-
ment. As a result, attempts were made to introduce some protectionist 
elements into the organisation of trade. Th e Dordrecht skippers’ guild, 
for example, claimed a monopoly on all transports originating in 
Dordrecht, a privilege similar to the rights enjoyed by the Ghent skip-
pers’ guild. Duke Albrecht did not consent, but complaints from for-
eign shipmasters suggest that the skippers’ guild was not overly 
concerned with the refusal. Around 1390 the duke intervened more 
than once and admonished the Dordrecht skippers to respect the 
rights of competitors, but the early 15th-century by-laws of the town 
still mention the guild monopoly on shipping.88
Heinricxz. had a few other options. He might pretend the wine he 
transported was for local use in his home town and upon arrival in 
Schoonhoven sell it to another merchant. For the transports via 
Heusden, this is not a very likely option; if this was his intention, he 
would probably have chosen a more northerly route. However, for 
other transports it was certainly a possibility. If Heinricxz. was believed 
by the toll offi  cials, which probably depended on the quantity of wine 
he was carrying and perhaps also on his reputation, he would be free 
from staple obligations. However, Schoonhoven did not have a good 
connection by water to the northern part of Holland, so it may not 
have been that easy to fi nd a customer.
Alternatively, Heinricxz. could try to sell the wine between Heusden 
and Dordrecht, somewhere on the river, or in one of the small towns or 
87 Niermeyer, Bronnen Beneden-Maasgebied, 624 (fi sh), 631, 632, 653, 654 (wine); 
on other merchants or shipmasters from Schoonhoven in the Heusden toll accounts, 
cf. Ibid., 620, 624, 625, 644, 653, 664. Heinricxz. had probably bought the wine in 
Venlo or Roermond, or perhaps in Den Bosch.
88 Niermeyer, ‘Dordrecht als handelsstad’ V, 93–94; VI, 149–150, 164–165.
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villages on its banks. Th is was illegal and it involved the risk of being 
caught. It is hard to estimate how great this risk was, but it was cer-
tainly not negligible. We have seen that, even in 1304, ships were some-
times accompanied by offi  cials to ensure that no transactions took 
place along the river. In the early 15th century—but probably the prac-
tice began earlier than that—Dordrecht offi  cials actually patrolled the 
rivers, and transgressors were taken to Dordrecht by force if neces-
sary.89 Moreover, it might have been diffi  cult to fi nd a buyer who was 
prepared to run the risk of being caught at some toll post without being 
able to show the compulsory token of the Dordrecht exchange. 
Nevertheless, commerce along the river did take place. Th e comital 
accounts for Zuidholland over the year 1331 mention only two fi nes 
for violations of the staple privilege, but repeated exhortations to the 
toll offi  cials to be vigilant for this kind of ‘abuse’ indicate that trans-
gressions were much more frequent than that.90
Th e conclusion seems to be that the staple right severely curtailed 
Schoonhoven’s options. On the other hand, Schoonhoven experienced 
its strongest growth in the late 13th and the fi rst three quarters of the 
14th century,91 which suggests that at least at this stage its economic 
base was not eroded by the Dordrecht staple. At the end of the 14th 
century, the tide turned: the revenues from the Schoonhoven boter-
maat (an imposition on the measuring of butter) and the town’s weigh 
house—revenues which had been rising gradually since at least the 
middle of the 14th century—dropped sharply around 1380.92 However, 
this can hardly have been the eff ect of the Dordrecht staple, to which 
neither dairy nor cloth was subjected. It is equally unlikely that the 
decline was the eff ect of Dordrecht’s regional monopoly: as explained 
in Chapter 4, the city did not force the rural population of Zuidholland 
to off er their products for sale at the Dordrecht market until the mid-
dle of the 15th century. A more credible explanation is provided by De 
Boer, who believes that the decline may have been caused by a shift  of 
the administrative centre of the Blois territories from Schoonhoven to 
Gouda in the late 14th century.93
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Th e fact that Schoonhoven experienced its strongest growth exactly 
in the same century when the staple of Dordrecht fl ourished seems a 
paradox. One way to solve it has been presented by Visser in his study 
of the physical structure of medieval Schoonhoven. Visser concludes 
that the town owed its prosperity mainly to its position as a market 
centre for the surrounding district.94 It is certainly true that Schoon-
hoven had a well-developed regional market function at an early stage. 
Market tolls are mentioned in the 1280 charter of liberties; by the mid-
dle of the 14th century the town had a weigh house and cloth hall and 
hosted three fairs every year.95 However, the references to Coenraet 
Heinricxz. and his fellow burgesses in the late 14th-century river toll 
accounts suggest that Schoonhoven merchants were active in interre-
gional trade as well.
Furthermore, Schoonhoven merchants continued to be involved in 
the river trade in the 15th century. At the end of the century, Schoon-
hoven merchants were actively engaged in long-distance trade, visiting 
Flanders and Guelders and participating in the grain trade with the 
Somme region. Visser acknowledges this fact, but he seems to under-
estimate the extent of the activities.96 In the late 15th and early 16th cen-
tury, testimonies recorded in a series of confl icts between Schoonhoven 
and Dordrecht on the staple privilege illustrate that Schoonhoven had 
trade relations with many towns in Holland and Brabant.97
In addition, Schoonhoven never relinquished its ambition to develop 
a depot function. In the middle of the 15th century, the town took 
advantage of a confl ict that had arisen between Dordrecht and the 
towns of Guelders and the Rhineland: when these towns boycotted 
Dordrecht, Schoonhoven did not hesitate to welcome their merchants. 
Th e report in the Dordrecht urban records is revealing: Schoonhoven 
skippers had tried to by-pass Dordrecht with cargoes of chalk and 
wood purchased from foreign merchants in or near Schoonhoven. 
Th e Dordrecht authorities were clearly afraid that Schoonhoven was 
going to take over as a leading trade centre. Pressed by Dordrecht, cen-
tral government prohibited all contact between Schoonhoven and the 
eastern towns, but the people of Schoonhoven did not obey. On the 
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contrary, they started work on a new set of locks in the Vlist which 
would give the town direct access to the north of Holland over water. 
Th e Dordrecht authorities did not wait for the construction works to 
be fi nished: they sent out an armed expedition to destroy the locks and 
thus forced Schoonhoven to at least temporarily submit.98
In spite of this, there are indications that in the second half of the 
15th century Schoonhoven did serve as a trade centre for foreign mer-
chants who wished to exchange up-river commodities for the products 
of specialised agriculture for sale at the Schoonhoven market. In 1496, 
Schoonhoven joined forces with Arnhem to plead the continuation of 
the mutual toll exemption the two towns had always enjoyed, stating 
that as long as they could remember Arnhem merchants had been vis-
iting Schoonhoven freely to sell wood, coal, and grain and to buy fi sh, 
dairy, and hemp.99 Signifi cantly, the relation with Arnhem seems to 
date back to the late 14th century: Schoonhoven merchants were 
granted toll exemption in Arnhem in 1372 by Count Jan of Blois, son-
in-law to the duke of Guelders.100
In short, there can be no doubt that the Dordrecht staple limited 
Schoonhoven’s options. However, the small town was never entirely 
pushed out of the interregional river trade; Dordrecht failed to impose 
a watertight monopoly. Schoonhoven had two pillars to build on, both 
dating back to the 14th century. One was the aid of an infl uential lord 
who helped to open up new opportunities. Th e other was the town’s 
regional market function—not as an alternative to a role as river trade 
centre, but as a way to diversify and sustain this role.
Brielle
Brielle, situated on the island of Oostvoorne near the mouth of the 
Meuse, was the main town of the seignory of Voorne. Th e lords of 
Voorne were offi  cially vassals of the count of Holland, but they enjoyed 
a considerable degree of autonomy and in most respects ruled their 
lands as sovereign lords.101 Brielle does not come into focus in relation 
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to Dordrecht until the 1340s—and with good reason. Around this time 
the Maasrecht, the right to control trade on the Meuse as well as on the 
Lek and Merwede, was added to Dordrecht’s privileges. Th is occurred 
in two steps. In 1338 Hansa merchants entering the Meuse from the 
North Sea were ordered to unload and sell only in Dordrecht. In 1344 
the clause was broadened to include other ships following the same 
route. Only vessels that used the Meuse estuary as an entrance to 
Flanders were allowed to pass undisturbed, as long as they did not sell 
part of their cargo in Holland or Zeeland.102
It is clear why the Maasrecht caused problems for Brielle. Th e town 
had emerged as a modest fi shing and trading settlement in the second 
half of the 13th century. In 1280 the people of Brielle had received toll 
exemption in Holland, suggesting that by that time they were already 
engaged in trading activities.103 By the early 14th century, a fl ourishing 
herring fi shery seems to have developed: Brielle’s two charters of urban 
liberties, dating from 1330 and 1343, and an urban by-law from 1346, 
repeatedly refer to the herring industry and herring trade.104 At this 
stage herring was still cured on land, either by smoking or salting, with 
the latter method gradually gaining ground.105 Th is explains why 
Brielle also became a market for salt: around 1330 the salt trade was 
large enough to warrant regulation of the tariff s and conditions for 
measuring the salt.106 However, the Maasrecht meant that salt traders 
entering the Meuse were no longer permitted to unload and sell in 
Brielle: they had to proceed to the Dordrecht staple. Th e Brielle fi sher-
men and fi sh merchants were therefore obliged to go to Dordrecht to 
buy this indispensable commodity. Even if we leave aside the costs of 
the impositions at the staple—aft er all, measuring and possibly also 
brokerage would have had to be paid for in Brielle as well—this meant 
an unwelcome loss of time and extra expenses on transport.
Count Willem IV, as we have seen before, was easily persuaded into 
granting economic privileges in return for a sum of money. It is not 
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clear whether the count received payment for the 1338 version of the 
Maasrecht, but for the extension in 1344 the Dordrecht authorities 
paid the very considerable sum of 800 écus.107 Still, there was a more 
fundamental reason for the grant and it had everything to do with 
Brielle. Th e town of Brielle was a threat to Dordrecht’s position as a 
trade centre and, therefore, to the interests of both the Dordrecht elite 
and the count.108 A fi rst example of what this could lead to is the case 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter: the predicament of the 
three foreign merchants who in 1345 required the intercession of Lady 
Machteld of Voorne to be acquitted for their transgression of the 
Dordrecht staple privilege. And there was more to come.
Aft er the death of Willem IV in 1345, his sister, Margaretha of 
Bavaria, assumed sovereignty. Her position was not strong. Dordrecht 
probably had little trouble having its existing privileges confi rmed, 
including the Maasrecht in the extended version. One exception was 
made: the towns of Holland and Zeeland received exemption from the 
Maasrecht for products for their own use.109 In this, the Maasrecht fol-
lowed the changes that had taken place for the transport of wine and 
salt on the Lek and Merwede in previous years. But Brielle, it seems, 
was treated more harshly than the other towns of Holland. Margaretha 
explicitly forbade the salt trade in Brielle; she ordered the toll offi  cials 
to prevent ships from sailing to Brielle to unload salt unless this had 
been bought, measured, and trans-shipped in Dordrecht.110 Th e 
exemption granted to other towns to freely transport salt for local use 
was therefore denied to Brielle, doubtless because it was considered 
too much of a risk to the Dordrecht monopoly.
Th e succession confl ict between Margaretha and her son Willem 
that erupted soon aft erwards made matters worse. In 1351 Margaretha, 
in urgent need of assistance because Willem was raising armed forces 
all over the county, granted Dordrecht a greatly extended version of 
the staple right. It covered all products, transported both upstream 
and  downstream, on the Lek, Merwede and Meuse and also on the 
Hollandse IJssel.111 With indignation Niermeyer describes the conse-
quences of this ‘immoderate and totally unnatural’ extension of 
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Dordrecht’s staple rights, based on purely political considerations and 
not on economic grounds. Dordrecht was now proclaimed the com-
pulsory market for commodities until then not sold there in any sig-
nifi cant quantities, such as dairy from the north of Holland, beer from 
Delft , cloth from Leiden, and—we may add—fi sh from Brielle.112 Th e 
burgesses of Dordrecht itself were exempted from their own town’s sta-
ple obligations; if anything, this shows how much the Dordrecht elite 
was able to dictate conditions.
In 1355/56, when Willem had been established in full power as 
Duke Willem V, he revoked all privileges granted for political reasons 
by his mother and himself during the succession confl ict.113 Although 
the treatise De cura reipublicae et sorte principantis by Philip of Leyden, 
at the time the duke’s principal legal adviser, was probably not written 
in direct defence of this action—a fi rst draft  was ready years before the 
revocation took place—it is clear the revocation and the treatise were 
inspired by the same considerations.114 Th e treatise discusses the nature 
of sovereignty and stresses that a ruler has a moral obligation to care-
fully preserve his inheritance, his authority, and his fi scal base. He not 
only has the right but the duty to revoke any privileges that weaken the 
state. In this regard, Philip of Leyden went one step further than the 
anonymous author of the note found in the 1326 registers of Philip’s 
predecessor Gerard Alewijnsz., who had merely pointed this out as a 
possibility.
Th e extended staple right granted to Dordrecht in 1351 was revoked 
in May 1355: this is not surprising, for if ever there was a privilege 
granted for purely political reasons, this was surely it. Th e surprise is in 
what happened next: exactly the same privilege was re-issued immedi-
ately aft erwards.115 Th e duke may have felt that granting such a far-
reaching privilege to Dordrecht might anger the other towns of 
Holland, but that it did not threaten his own power or his fi scal base. 
More importantly, accommodating the Dordrecht elite was essential in 
order to obtain the substantial loans and guarantees needed to realise 
Willem’s political and military ambitions.
In reality, Dordrecht never managed to develop a staple for beer, 
cheese, or fi sh. It was one thing to have the duke promise such a thing, 
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but something entirely diff erent to actually make it work. Th at would 
have required an enormous control eff ort, which the central authori-
ties were obviously not prepared to make. However, Dordrecht did use 
the 1355 charter to maintain its traditional staple privileges for salt and 
for products from the Rhineland and the upper Meuse region.
Brielle felt the consequences. On the same day that Willem V re-
issued Dordrecht’s extended staple privilege, he also repeated the order 
given by his mother nine years earlier: no salt was to be unloaded or 
loaded in Brielle.116 Moreover, it appears that around 1370 Dordrecht 
tried to gain control of the market in herring, Brielle’s main trade com-
modity. It is possible there is a relation with the guild revolution that 
had recently taken place in Dordrecht. As we have seen, this had 
resulted in the introduction of some protectionist elements in the 
organisation of trade. Th e guilds probably also strove to maintain more 
strictly than before Dordrecht’s privileges in the river trade, including 
the Maasrecht.117
A letter from Machteld of Voorne to the authorities in Dordrecht, 
most likely dating from 1369 and clearly one in a long series, shows 
how the lady of Voorne once more put up a fi ght to protect the Brielle 
herring market, including her own revenues from the fi sh tolls that 
were levied there.118 She used a combination of tactical delays, fi rm-
ness, and diplomacy. Aft er apologising profusely to her ‘dear friends’ 
for not answering sooner, Machteld insisted that her subjects were free 
to sell their herring in Brielle instead of in Dordrecht. She did not see 
why Dordrecht should object to this: nobody was going to be forced to 
engage in any sort of transaction, but all—including the burgesses of 
Dordrecht—were welcome to do so: ‘If they sell here, we do not inter-
fere. If they don’t, they can go anywhere they want to, and may God 
guide them’.119 Th is of course was not what Dordrecht wanted to hear. 
In the end Duke Albrecht had to intervene.120 Th e verdict of Albrecht 
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has not been preserved, but we can be sure about the outcome: herring 
remained free of staple obligations.121 Th is was a new line of trade, car-
ried by the coastal towns; Dordrecht could not fall back on ancient 
privileges. Albrecht’s decision was probably also facilitated by the fact 
that at the end of 1369 the guild regime was accused of acting against 
the duke’s authority.122
Between 1391 and 1394 a large alliance of towns once more opposed 
the Dordrecht staple privilege. Relations between Dordrecht and Duke 
Albrecht had cooled because of political controversies between the 
rival factions of the Hoeken, in control in Dordrecht, and the 
Kabeljauwen, at the time dominating central government. Moreover, 
Jan of Arkel, who as lord of the river town of Gorinchem was much 
opposed to the Dordrecht staple, had just been appointed chancellor. 
Almost all towns of Holland participated in the protest, including 
Brielle. Th e result was a treaty forced upon Dordrecht by Duke 
Albrecht, compelling the Dordrecht authorities to acknowledge the 
freedom of the allied towns from the staple.123 Dordrecht probably lost 
this battle because its strategies were outdated. Th is time there was no 
succession confl ict to exploit, and the infl uence of the other towns of 
Holland had increased considerably since 1355. Internal confl icts 
within the Dordrecht elite and between elite and guilds did not help 
either.124
However, once more the staple revived in due course: Dordrecht 
unilaterally denounced the treaty one year later. Reconciliation with 
the duke took longer this time, but in 1401 Albrecht restored the staple 
privilege.125 During his long reign Duke Albrecht had had every chance 
to realise the importance of the Dordrecht staple for his own position. 
Around 1370, for example, a succession confl ict in Guelders had seri-
ously damaged the river trade and therefore also the toll revenues in 
Holland. In order to restore them when the war was over, Albrecht 
had given orders for a strict implementation of the Dordrecht staple 
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privilege. It had worked.126 At the end of the 14th century, the alliance 
between Dordrecht and central government had not lost it value. 
In the heat of political turmoil it might have weakened temporarily, 
but the bond was still too advantageous to both sides to be severed 
permanently.
Still, the Maasrecht and the attempts of Dordrecht to include other 
products in the staple privilege appear to have left  Brielle’s role in the 
herring industry and herring trade largely unharmed. In the second 
half of the century, Brielle fl ourished—and in the 15th century the 
town developed into Holland’s largest interregional herring market. 
Th e fact that in 1423 Duke Willem VI ordained that in the interests 
of the herring export the Brielle herring casks were to be the standard 
for the rest of Holland is a telling sign.127 It is not surprising then that 
we fi nd burgesses of Brielle transporting herring to Guelders and the 
Rhineland in the late 14th century. In the year 1387/1388 Brielle ship-
masters passed the toll at the Guelders town of Tiel with a total of 92 
last of herring. Th is easily exceeded the amount of herring transported 
by burgesses of Dordrecht, whereas only forty years before it had been 
the other way around.128 In 1394 the shipments of herring from Brielle 
even reached a total of 153 last.129
Because of the herring industry, the salt trade had always been of 
major importance to Brielle. As we saw, it had been at the heart of the 
clashes with Dordrecht in the middle of the 14th century. But despite 
Dordrecht’s attempts to prevent salt merchants from unloading their 
cargo at Brielle, it is doubtful if this was ever a real possibility. In 1377 
Duke Albrecht ordered his toll offi  cials to stop the illegal sale of salt to 
merchants from the east on the Dieze, a small stream entering the 
Meuse east of Heusden.130 If salt could be brought this far inland, an 
experienced and determined shipmaster could surely manage to escape 
the Dordrecht patrol ships on the short stretch from the mouth of the 
Meuse to the harbour of Brielle. Moreover, until the second decade of 
the 15th century, Brielle had a second entrance to the sea: the Goote, 
cutting through the island of Oostvoorne, connected the town to the 
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Haringvliet. Ships entering the Haringvliet were not subjected to the 
Dordrecht staple. Large vessels would probably have had trouble using 
this route, but small ships could pass. Th is ‘back entrance’ must have 
been of vital importance in times when Dordrecht was taking the 
enforcement of the Maasrecht seriously.131 It is not surprising that in 
the early 15th century Brielle tried to stop attempts to dam the Goote.132
Th e wine trade was of secondary importance for Brielle. Th e Tiel toll 
accounts of 1394/1395 show a few ships from Brielle transporting 
wine. In some cases this may have been an independent line of trade.133 
In others, wine was probably taken in by herring traders as a return 
cargo. At the end of September 1394 Jan Vranckensz. from Brielle paid 
tolls for the herring he transported. A few days later he passed the toll 
again, this time with wine. In November, Ael Hugensz. made a similar 
trip. Vranckensz. and Hugensz. appear in the toll accounts many times, 
but these were the only times they carried wine; usually it was just 
herring. Th is, and the relatively small quantities of wine the two were 
taking with them (some 500 and 1,000 litres respectively) suggest they 
were not experienced wine traders. It is possible they profi ted from 
the temporary withdrawal of the staple privilege in 1394 by trying 
their hand at something new.134 Th is suggestion receives some support 
from indications in other towns that the opportunities off ered by these 
years of respite were diligently exploited. In the early 1390s the author-
ities of the river towns of Heusden and Gorinchem issued new tariff s 
for the use of the cranes in the towns’ harbours. Th e lists mention, 
among various other commodities, wine, wood, and barley—products 
Dordrecht claimed to have a monopoly on.135
However, Brielle did not focus on the river trade, as Gorinchem and 
Heusden did. First and foremost it looked towards the sea. As a side 
eff ect of the salt trade, Brielle had probably developed some trade 
in  products from the Baltic region as early as the middle of the 
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14th century.136 Around 1370 Brielle merchants were actively involved 
in the Baltic trade. Th e Swedish king allowed them to establish a vitte 
(a temporary trade settlement) in Skania in 1368, and one year later 
Brielle co-signed a trade agreement between Denmark, the German 
Hansa towns, and a group of towns in Holland and Zeeland.137 Brielle 
merchants also visited the east coast of England: they appear in the 
customs account of King’s Lynn over the year 1392/1393, exporting 
cloth and corn.138 Moreover, in the codifi cation of Brielle’s laws and 
customs recorded in the fi rst years of the 15th century, the town clerk 
Jan Matthijssen stressed Brielle’s character as a ‘free trading town’ (vrye 
coopstede) where all merchants were welcome and could go about their 
business in freedom and safety. It is as if we hear Machteld of Voorne 
speaking again. In fact, Matthijssen argued that the foundations for 
Brielle’s free status were laid during her reign and that of her predeces-
sors. As independent lords, he claimed, they had had absolute author-
ity and were not bound by any actions of the counts of Holland.139
Th e late 15th and early 16th centuries witnessed a new series of con-
fl icts between Brielle and Dordrecht. In the documents relating to 
these confl icts, 15th-century Brielle appears as a fl ourishing centre of 
international trade, visited by merchants from Scandinavia, the Baltic 
region, England, France, and even Spain.140 However, Brielle’s prosper-
ity began to decline at the end of the 15th century. Considering the fact 
that previously the Dordrecht staple privilege had not stopped Brielle’s 
ambitions, it is hard to believe that the staple was the cause. A general 
economic crisis and reclamation activities which cut off  direct access 
to the sea are more likely to have been the reasons.141 Th at it was 
Dordrecht, of all places, that in the early 16th century took over as a 
regional centre for the herring trade—this time not based on any kind 
of privilege—must have been hard to digest for the people of Brielle.142
Th e Dordrecht staple did not stop Brielle’s 14th-century economic 
development. Th at is not to say it did not cause problems: it probably 
prevented Brielle from developing its river trade more fully, and it cer-
tainly presented diffi  culties for the salt trade. But just as was the case in 
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Schoonhoven, the burgesses of Brielle, with the full support of their 
lady, found ways around these obstacles: concentrating on the staple-
free herring trade, taking advantage of a secondary access to the sea, 
and possibly also using the periods when the staple right was lift ed to 
expand their trade.
5.4 Conclusions
In medieval Holland, characterised by the near absence of non-
economic constraints on trade, the Dordrecht staple privilege appears 
to be an anomaly. Its origins can be found in a combination of 
two circumstances. One is Dordrecht’s early rise in comparison to the 
other towns of Holland and the superiority in wealth and power of its 
elite that resulted from this. Th e second element is the connection 
between the staple and the river toll system which was vital to comital 
fi nances. Th e power of the Dordrecht elite remained an infl uential fac-
tor throughout the 14th century: in times of political tensions or fi nan-
cial problems, the count of Holland could not do without its support. 
Th e connection between the tolls and the staple was probably even 
more fundamental. It continued to reinforce the alliance between the 
count and Dordrecht, despite occasional lapses.
Yet this alliance did not lead to unchecked extractions in the form of 
taxation on trade. Th ere no doubt were excesses; but in general, impo-
sitions at the Dordrecht staple were modest. Th ey certainly compared 
favourably with the dues on English wool exports, which rose to 
unprecedented levels in the middle of the 14th century. Th e two factors 
that contributed to the increase of the English wool customs were 
absent in Dordrecht and Bruges: a monopoly position that allowed the 
tax burden to be shift ed to the buyers, and a ruler with the authority to 
overcome resistance against substantial tax increases.
Although the Dordrecht staple did limit commercial opportunities 
for the smaller and younger towns in the Holland river region, here too 
the eff ect of the staple was not as devastating as has sometimes been 
assumed. Dordrecht did not stifl e all growth elsewhere; in this respect, 
it compares favourably with Bruges and Ghent, which—thanks to their 
political clout and extraterritorial powers—managed to suppress 
unwelcome competition more eff ectively.
Th e causes are partly to be found in the economic circumstances of 
the era. Towns like Brielle and Schoonhoven were able to profi t from 
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the rise of trade in products like dairy and herring. Th ese new lines of 
trade were not subject to the staple. Th ey did not emerge until 
Dordrecht had lost at least part of its superiority and was no longer 
able to bend the institutional framework to its will. Trade in these 
commodities did not so much replace the traditional river trade as 
supplement and support it. In Brielle, for instance, the herring indus-
try stimulated the salt trade, and the Schoonhoven dairy products 
seem to have been an attractive return cargo for merchants from 
Guelders and the Rhineland carrying grain, wood, and wine.
Institutional factors, however, also played a part. Th e fact that Brielle 
and Schoonhoven were both under the protection of lords (or ladies) 
with a relatively autonomous position turned out to be an advantage: 
at crucial moments they were able to counterbalance the combined 
demands of Dordrecht and the count of Holland. It was probably their 
own interests that drove these lords, but the result—in the form of 
temporary withdrawals, partial exemptions, or at the least a check on 
further extensions of Dordrecht’s privileges—also benefi ted the bur-
gesses of Schoonhoven and Brielle.
Fairly soon the towns of Holland developed a second technique for 
opposing Dordrecht’s hegemony: they formed alliances. Th e structure 
of the urban network in Holland probably played an important role 
here, consisting as it did of a large number of small towns, each with 
enough autonomy to put up a fi ght but none strong enough to win it 
without allies. Th e technique of forming alliances was eff ective. It did 
not end Dordrecht’s privileged position, but it did mitigate it. 
Opportunities for illegal trading were materially enlarged by the 
exemptions of the staple granted to towns for wine and salt for local 
use. Th e years the staple privilege was temporarily withdrawn off ered 
another loophole: towns could use the respite to build up new trade 
networks, to be used to advantage later on.
Just as the staple privilege and the confl icts evolving around it seem 
to have contributed to the articulation of an ideology of the role of the 
ruler and the unity of the state, it also made towns aware of the neces-
sity to cooperate on economic issues. As we shall see in the next chap-
ter, this was also to prove a useful strategy in other respects.
PART II
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: RULES AND PRACTICES




Th e earliest by-laws of Amsterdam, dating from 1413, give detailed 
instructions for the measuring of salt, which had to be done by sworn 
measurers, with measures verifi ed by the town and kept by the warden 
of the guild of Our Lady, the measurers’ guild. When the measurers 
picked up a measure before starting work, they also had to check the 
straightness of the strickle. Measuring was to be performed with great 
care: the measure should be positioned on a level surface and it had to 
be emptied by carefully turning it upside down instead of just knock-
ing it over. If the crew of a ship with a cargo of salt did not want to 
cooperate with these rules, the measurers were supposed to stop meas-
uring, leave the ship, and report the matter to the local court.1 Rules 
like this underline the importance attached by urban authorities in 
Holland to correct weighing and measuring, but also the diffi  culties 
they faced in this area.
In the fi rst part of this book, three types of trade venues were discussed, 
each with diff erent institutional characteristics: annual fairs, rural 
trade venues, and the Dordrecht staple. Th is second part of the book 
adopts a diff erent, complementary approach. Th e aim remains the 
same: to discover whether and how social and political relations in 
medieval Holland—in turn related to the county’s history of settlement 
and reclamation—aff ected the organisation and thus ultimately the 
effi  ciency of commodity markets. But instead of looking at diff erent 
types of trade venues, this chapter and the next focus on two clusters of 
commercial institutions that cannot be tied to a specifi c time and place. 
Here, in Chapter 6, the organisation of weighing and measuring is 
studied as a refl ection of a larger set of rules and practices that primar-
ily aff ected the matching of supply and demand. Chapter 7 discusses 
mechanisms for the enforcement of contracts and thus focuses on 
institutions that in the fi rst place aff ected security.
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808–811 (Flanders); Britnell, Commercialisation, 91–93 (England).
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Munro, ‘Medieval Woollens’, 247–248 (southern Low Countries).
In the Middle Ages, public authorities oft en attempted to regulate 
commodity trade by subjecting it to various rules and decrees. In part, 
market regulation was motivated by the medieval ideal of justice in 
trade.2 Th is ideal did not imply equal opportunities for all: as we have 
seen, trade privileges like tax reductions or priority access to markets 
granted to local burgesses, guild members, or merchants from a cer-
tain town or country were nothing out of the ordinary. Rather, the 
medieval concept of justice in trade referred to a balanced, equal rela-
tion between buyer and seller. Monopolies in basic necessities—and 
related off ences like forestalling and regrating (the purchase of prod-
ucts before market time, or the interception of products on their way 
to the market with the intention of reselling them at a profi t)—
disturbed this balance because they created artifi cial scarcities and 
thus forced ‘unjust’ prices upon society. Th is explains why fi xed market 
hours and prohibitions on forestalling and regrating were as common 
in Holland as elsewhere.3 Incomplete or misleading information 
regarding the quantity and quality of commodities also violated the 
notion of a fair and just exchange. Th erefore, the control of quantity 
and quality was oft en the object of public care. Concern for product 
quality is evident, for instance, from the inspections of perishable 
foodstuff s for sale at the market, as described in several urban by-laws, 
and from the elaborate systems of quality prescriptions imposed by 
many towns with export industries—particularly cloth—on produc-
ers.4 However, we should be alert to the fact that authorities may also 
have had less noble motives: aft er all, regulated and formalised markets 
were much easier to control—and therefore exploit—than private 
trade. Th e organisation of weighing and measuring demonstrates this 
aspect quite clearly. Th is is why it takes centre stage in this chapter.
In his seminal book on the eff ects of power on metrological systems, 
Witold Kula argues that rulers strove to impose their weights and  meas-
ures in their territories because it symbolised—and ultimately rein-
forced—their authority. He also gives full attention to the continuous 
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pressure exerted by the nobility to increase the measures used for col-
lecting land rents in kind.5 But in a highly urbanised and commercial-
ised society like late medieval Holland, something else was also at 
stake: weighing and measuring mattered from a fi scal point of view, 
because it provided an ideal opportunity for the taxation of trade. Dues 
could be imposed on the compulsory use of standardised weights and 
measures. In addition, other taxes on exchange—for instance, the 
urban excises on a wide range of products that in the late Middle Ages 
became the main source of revenues of many towns in the Low 
Countries—were frequently linked to the weight or volume of the 
commodities that changed hands.6 Th is was only possible if weighing 
and measuring took place under the control of the authorities.
Th is chapter compares the organisation of weighing and measuring 
in Holland with the situation in England and in the southern Low 
Countries. Although there were many similarities between the three 
countries in rules and practices, signifi cant diff erences also existed, 
diff erences that were related to a diff erent balance of powers between 
central and local authorities, and also between local authorities and 
guilds. In the next section, we begin by mapping the offi  cial roles of 
central government, urban authorities, and local lords in the organisa-
tion of weighing and measuring for Holland, England, and the south-
ern Low Countries. Th e two sections that follow assess the eff ects of 
formal structures on the actual development of standard weights and 
measures and on the functioning of enforcement mechanisms.
6.2 Control over weights and measures
One of the ways in which the early rise of central power in England 
made itself felt was through the control the Crown attempted to 
assert—even at an early stage—over weights and measures. It is unlikely 
that under the Anglo-Saxon and Norman kings these attempts were 
very successful. At that stage, they were mainly restricted to the issu-
ance of laws prescribing the use of correct and uniform measures 
throughout the realm. As the measures to be used were not accurately 
specifi ed and, moreover, the enforcement apparatus to back up the 
decrees was lacking, many communities probably continued to use 
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local measures evolved from, and suited to, everyday practice. Under 
Angevin rule, royal control over weights and measures reached fi rmer 
ground. Between the late 12th and the middle of the 15th century, 
standard weights and measures for just about every commercial com-
modity were specifi ed.7 As a consequence, the role of local authorities 
in weighing and measuring in England was not as prominent as in the 
Low Countries. As we shall see, English towns acquired a role in the 
enforcement of the royal standards, but they usually did not issue leg-
islation of their own making, nor did they provide public weighing or 
measuring facilities: this was a royal prerogative.
Even in late medieval England, royal authority over weighing and 
measuring was not absolute. Th e eff orts of the Crown concentrated 
mainly on the towns as centres of trade. In the countryside, control 
over weights and measures was an essential part of lordship; here the 
eff ects of national legislation and national enforcement policies were 
much less pervasive.8 Nevertheless, in comparison with much of conti-
nental Europe, a considerable degree of metrological centralisation 
was achieved at an early stage. In this regard, a parallel can be drawn 
with other aspects of market regulation. In England, forestalling prohi-
bitions, for instance, were incorporated in royal statutes, binding 
throughout the kingdom, as early as the late 13th or early 14th cen-
tury.9 In Holland, these prohibitions were at that stage purely local in 
character. Central ordinances against forestalling did not become a 
regular phenomenon until the 16th century.10
Exactly what moved the Angevin kings to tighten control over 
weights and measures is not entirely clear. Part of the explanation can 
perhaps be found in Kula’s argument about the role of a unifi ed system 
of weights and measures as an expression and confi rmation of central 
power. However, it is clear that economic considerations also contrib-
uted. Richard Britnell suggests that the Crown’s growing interest in 
the enforcement of a unifi ed system of weights and measures in late 
    7 Britnell, Commercialisation, 25.
    8 Zupko, British Weights and Measures, 16–70; for more detailed references see 
below.
    9 Britnell, ‘Forstall’, 95–96, 99.
10 Forestalling prohibitions were issued in 1544 (Andries et al., Inventaris en 
beschrij ving Noord-Nederlandse processtukken beroepen uit Holland V, fi les 460 and 
463) and in 1556 (Regionaal Archief Alkmaar, Gemeentebestuur Alkmaar (oud 
archief, 1325–1815), inv. no. 2877); a reference in the proceedings of the Estates of 
Holland in 1525 suggests that there had been similar proclamations before (Van der 
Goes, Register, 15–16). Cf. Noordegraaf, ‘Platteland’, 13–14.
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12th-century England may have been related to the court’s position as 
a buyer of provisions in a wide region: royal purveyors had an easier 
job if measures were the same everywhere.11 In addition, the effi  ciency 
of taxation—in the 18th century one of the main reasons for the crea-
tion of universal standards for weights and measures in many European 
countries12—must have provided a powerful motive. Th e customs sys-
tem as it developed in England from the late 13th century onwards 
allowed for an effi  cient taxation of international trade by the Crown. 
During the reign of Edward I a number of duties on overseas trade 
were introduced, fi rst and foremost among them a custom on the 
export of wool, fells, and hides. More subsidies on a wide range of 
import and export commodities were added in the course of the 14th 
century. In order to collect the customs, the coastline was divided into 
customs jurisdictions, each managed from a designated customs head 
port.13 Since many customs were levied by weight or volume, control of 
weights and measures was of vital importance to custom revenues.
It is therefore not surprising that in 1350 Edward III took action to 
correct false weighing practices in the ports. Th e issue at stake here was 
most likely the weighing of wool: irregularities might jeopardise the 
very profi table wool customs. Likewise, it is not a coincidence that in 
1421 custom duties for coal were set on the chalder, a measure of fi xed 
proportions, instead of on the total load of a ship: the tendency to build 
larger ships was threatening to reduce custom revenues.14 In short, the 
desire of the English kings to control weights and measures can, at 
least in part, be explained by their relation with royal taxation of inter-
national trade.
At fi rst sight the organisation of metrological control in Flanders 
and Brabant seems to have followed a course that was almost diametri-
cally opposed to events in England. Th e early medieval starting point 
was not very diff erent: like their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, the 
Carolingian kings prescribed uniform weights and measures. In fact, 
in many parts of Europe the memory of a golden age of Carolin-
gian standardisation lived on until the modern era, even though it is 
unlikely that royal Carolingian weights and measures were adopted for 
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19 Soens, Rentmeesters, 249, 250, 301, 312, 325.
20 Cf. Boone, Geld en macht, 167–168, on the usurpation of the weighing revenues 
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commercial use throughout the empire—the Carolingian rulers were 
no more able to enforce uniformity than the early medieval English 
kings.15
In the high and late Middle Ages, however, authority over weights 
and measures in the southern Low Countries had largely become a 
matter for the individual towns. For 13th-century Brabant, Herman 
Van der Wee has suggested that control over weights and measures 
passed, as part of the regalia concerning the regulation of economic 
life, from the dukes to the urban authorities via the bannum (originally 
the ruler’s right to command, elements of which could be transferred 
to lower lords, offi  cials or—as in this case—urban communities).16 Van 
der Wee does not explain exactly how the transition took place; we 
shall return to this question shortly.
In Flanders, urban authority over weights and measures probably 
dates back to an even earlier stage. Th e existence of urban standards is 
mentioned in a charter granted by Count Philip of Alsace to the castel-
lany of Bruges around 1190.17 Urban control was also more complete 
than in Brabant. Whereas the duke of Brabant could hold on to certain 
profi table elements (such as the Antwerp scales),18 by the end of the 
14th century the count of Flanders possessed only the weigh houses in 
the small towns of Aalst, Sint-Anna-ter-Muiden, and Veurne and the 
measures for madder in Aardenburg and Oostburg. What this meant 
in practice was the right to collect the revenues for the compulsory use 
of these small town facilities.19 In the larger towns and certainly in 
Flanders’ three main cities, by that time rights such as this usually 
belonged to the urban authorities.20
Th e main exception was the Bruges weigh house, which had been 
enfeoff ed to the lord of Ghistel, together with the Bruges toll. When 
around 1280 problems rose around this weighing facility, the Flemish 
count did try to intervene. Aft er vehement complaints by foreign mer-
chants about irregularities and arbitrary exactions at the Bruges scales, 
Count Guy of Dampierre—together with Lord Jan of Ghistel and the 
Bruges authorities—ordered that the traditional auncel, a one-legged 
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instrument which was notoriously unreliable and could easily be tam-
pered with, was to be replaced by a number of modern even-legged 
balances and that these balances were, moreover, to be operated by a 
team of sworn urban offi  cials.21 Nevertheless, the fact that the count 
required the cooperation of the lord of Ghistel and the Bruges alder-
men to carry through these reformations demonstrates that his powers 
were limited.
Th e situation in Holland—where, just as in Flanders and Brabant, 
much of the control over weighing and measuring passed to the urban 
authorities—reveals more about the underlying process. It appears to 
have been anything but a neat transfer of rights from the sovereign to 
the emerging towns. Th e count of Holland (at that time referred to as 
the count of the Frisians) was one of the territorial lords that assumed 
sovereign power aft er the decline of the Carolingian empire, but the 
little information that we have about the 10th- and 11th-century 
counts reveals nothing about an involvement with weighing and meas-
uring. It is quite possible that, with the contraction of long-distance 
trade aft er the 9th century, the need for central regulation was no 
longer felt. For the collection of rents in kind and for local exchange, 
local measures suffi  ced. Originally these measures probably developed 
informally, from local custom. In the case of a manorial organisation 
they might be formalised by the lord.22
Th e fi rst reference to any kind of measure in Holland supports this 
suggestion. As so oft en, it comes from the sources of Egmond Abbey. 
In the early 12th century, the abbey collected rents in grain, measured 
in the measure of Alkmaar (Alcmerensem modium) in various nearby 
villages. Th is was probably originally a local customary measure, 
adopted for use in the management of some of the abbey’s posses-
sions.23 A document from the middle of the 13th century mentions the 
abbot of Egmond as the owner of this measure; that is, the abbot was 
entitled to the imposition on its use (the muddepenning). Th e docu-
ment arranges for the transfer of the muddepenning, together with 
other rights and property in Alkmaar, to the count. In return, the abbot 
received considerable properties on the island of Texel.24 Th is exchange 
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was at least partly motivated by expansionist considerations: as the 
grant of urban liberties to Alkmaar a few years later shows, Willem II 
took pains to re-establish his power in this strategically situated settle-
ment on the border with rebellious West-Friesland.25 However, the 
inclusion of the muddepenning in the exchange may also have had 
another reason: it suggests that by this time there was money to be 
made out of weighing and measuring, which in turn may have aroused 
comital interest.
Th is hypothesis receives support from the fact that around the mid-
dle of the 13th century the count also owned measures in other emerg-
ing trade centres: the butter measure in Delft  and the measures of salt 
and wine in Dordrecht.26 Th e Delft  butter measure was important only 
in a local context, but ownership of the Dordrecht salt and wine meas-
ures had much wider implications: it gave the count full control 
over the measuring of these two vital commodities of the international 
river trade.
However, there is no evidence that at this stage the rights to weights 
and measures were seen as prerogatives of the sovereign in principle. 
Th e Alkmaar example, in fact, suggests otherwise: here the count had 
to off er compensation to secure the grain measure. Moreover, even 
before the count makes his appearance as the owner of measures, the 
fi rst signs of urban claims to control over weights and measures are 
already evident. Th e Geertruidenberg charter of liberties of 1213 and 
the Haarlem charter of 1245 prescribe the use of correct weights and 
measures. Th e Haarlem charter, moreover—following the Den Bosch 
example on which it was based—states that off enders will be punished 
by the local court. A draft  version of the Haarlem charter in turn served 
as model for the charters of Delft  (1246) and Alkmaar (1256), which 
have the same clause.27 Clearly, the urban authorities in these young 
towns claimed the enforcement of metrological rules as their responsi-
bility almost from the start.
In Chapter 2 it was argued that the counts of Holland did not begin 
to regularly grant market licenses until about 1270; before that time 
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they were simply unable to eff ectuate their authority over markets and 
fairs. For weighing and measuring, the course of events appears to 
have been similar: the extension of comital control over weights and 
measures coincided with the establishment of eff ective sovereign 
power.28 Still, even in the middle of the 14th century, weights and 
measures were probably not seen as sovereign rights by defi nition: 
Philip of Leyden, staunch defender of the public powers of the counts, 
does not mention them in so many words among the regalia.29
In some places where the counts had obtained the rights to weights 
and measures, they retained them for centuries. In Rotterdam, for 
instance, the revenues from weighing and measuring were reserved for 
the count in the charter of urban privileges of 1340; these revenues are 
still recorded in the comital accounts at the end of the Middle Ages.30 
Hoorn presents a similar case.31 In other towns, the counts retained 
only part of the business of weighing and measuring. Just like the 
dukes of Brabant—but in contrast to the counts of Flanders—they fre-
quently managed to hold on to some of the more profi table elements. 
Th e important Dordrecht salt measure, for instance, still belonged to 
the count in the 15th century; so too did the weigh house in Gouda, a 
lively regional trade centre for dairy and hemp.32
In many other towns, all or most of the rights to weighing and meas-
uring over time came to be acknowledged as urban possessions. 
Offi  cially the count gave or sold them to the town, but probably 
the grant frequently implied comital authorisation of de facto urban 
control. Where this process can be traced in any detail, it appears to 
have been part of a broader recognition of rights related to trade. 
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Schiedam provides a good illustration. In 1339 Count Willem IV 
granted the beer toll, the scales, the corn measure, and the mudde-
penning to the townspeople, ‘in the manner as they had always held 
and used them’. In 1346 the town also received the rights to brokerage, 
followed fi ve years later by the rights to change money.33 Elsewhere, the 
recipients were occasionally urban institutions such as a hospital or a 
militia, but in most cases the rights to weighing and measuring went to 
the urban authorities.34
Towns certainly had good reason to pursue these rights: merchant-
dominated town governments were no doubt well aware that a reliable 
system of weights and measures paid off  in the long run. It saved indi-
vidual merchants a great deal of costs and trouble, and it ensured con-
ditions attractive to trade and competitive with other commercial 
centres. However, fi scal motives were probably at least as important. 
Th is was not because of the impositions levied on weighing and meas-
uring itself. Research on transaction costs at peat markets in late medi-
eval central Holland suggests that measuring costs remained at very 
modest levels until the end of the 15th century.35 Excises, however, 
were a diff erent matter.
Just as in England the Crown’s ambition to enforce royal weights and 
measures was partly driven by taxation policy, in Holland urban gov-
ernments depended on a correct assessment of quantities for the levy-
ing of excises. First introduced in the second half of the 13th century, 
excises on the production and sale of a wide range of commodities 
developed in the late Middle Ages into the single most important 
source of urban revenues for Holland’s rapidly expanding towns.36 
Weighing and measuring, as long as it took place under the control of 
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the authorities, provided an easy opportunity for setting and levying 
the excises. In early 16th-century Gouda, for instance, the measurers 
of peat were expected to accompany the seller to the collector of the 
excises in order to inform this functionary of the quantity being sold. 
Th e corn measurers in Amsterdam had the same responsibility towards 
the collector of the corn excise.37
Most town governments in Holland did not have to compete with a 
local lord for control over weights and measures. Some of the relatively 
autonomous lords in Holland’s periphery controlled weighing and 
measuring in their territories (including their small towns). Th e lord of 
Voorne, for instance, owned the salt measure in Brielle; in a 1330 ordi-
nance he set rules for the way in which the measuring was to be per-
formed. Th e lord of IJsselstein, near the Utrecht border, was still in 
possession of the measures in this small town in the second quarter of 
the 15th century.38
In the larger towns in the central part of Holland, however, the only 
case of a local lord holding the rights to weighing and measuring was 
the burggraaf of Leiden. Th e burggraaf had originally been a military 
commander in the service of the count, but by the middle of the 13th 
century had acquired important administrative and jurisdictional 
powers, among them the right to appoint the sheriff  and aldermen of 
Leiden.39 Exactly when and how the rights to weighing and measuring 
were added is not clear; the fi rst information dates from 1333, when 
Count Willem III confi rmed the burggraaf ’s claims to them.40 In the 
middle of the 14th century, the urban elite took advantage of the suc-
cession confl ict between the later Count Willem V and his mother 
Margaretha to settle some old disputes. With the help of Willem, the 
Leiden elite robbed the burggraaf, who supported Margaretha, not 
only of the much-resented right to appoint the sheriff  and alder-
men, but also of the rights to weighing and measuring in the town.41 
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With this, Leiden joined the ranks of most other Holland towns, which 
by this time had largely acquired authority over weighing and measur-
ing within the urban freedom.
It can be concluded that, although the count of Holland was more suc-
cessful than his Flemish counterpart in his claims to the ownership of 
weights and measures, he could by no means exert the kind of central 
control over weighing and measuring imposed by the king of England. 
Th is situation remained essentially unchanged until the end of the 
Middle Ages. In the late 15th and 16th centuries, many parts of conti-
nental Europe witnessed a ‘second wave of standardisation’: for the 
fi rst time since the Carolingian era, central governments again tried to 
impose national standards. Success, however, was limited.42
Th e Low Countries, both north and south, were no exception. In the 
early 16th century, the importance of troy weights for coinage induced 
the Habsburg government to make the use of these weights compul-
sory for the trade in gold and silver and even to appoint an offi  cial 
responsible for the verifi cation of the copies used by the goldsmiths’ 
guilds.43 In 1563 the Habsburg authorities also intervened when weigh 
house offi  cials in the central part of Holland were found to be using 
weights heavier than the regular Cologne weights in order to attract 
more customers. Th e intervention was probably motivated by self-
interest: the documents complain of unfair competition to comital 
weigh houses in towns like Gouda and Rotterdam. Nevertheless, here 
at least an eff ort to enforce standards was made.44
For other units, attempts at central regulation failed because urban 
authorities were unwilling to comply. Th ey were probably afraid—and 
considering the link with the urban excises, they had good reason—
that handing over control over weights and measures might endanger 
their fi nancial autonomy. Around 1530 discussions about the possible 
introduction of a national system of measures in Holland took place, 
but in the face of urban resistance they soon petered out.45 In 1571 the 
Habsburg government ordered a general inspection of grain measures, 
which was carried out in the following year. Th e aim was to facilitate 
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the introduction of a series of new taxes on movable assets and trade. 
Characteristically, however, this action was not directed at the intro-
duction of uniform measures, but merely at the registration of all local 
grain measures used in the Low Countries and their equivalents in 
Brussels gelten.46
6.3 Standards and standardisation
Th e assumption that the absence of a standardised system of weights 
and measures hindered the development of trade is not uncommon or 
illogical. A lack of uniformity, the argument goes, means higher costs 
for ascertaining the quantity of products being exchanged and increases 
opportunities for fraud.47 From this point of view, medieval Holland 
was not in a favourable position. As control over the organisation of 
weighing and measuring was largely a local aff air, the diversity in 
weights and measures was considerable. Grain measures provide a 
good example. Each town had its own set of measures, also used in the 
surrounding countryside. Between towns, even though measures fre-
quently bore the same name, dimensions varied considerably. Th e ach-
tendeel or achtel, for instance, was used in many places for measuring 
grain in retail trade since at least the fi rst half of the 14th century—as 
is shown by the entries for grain purchases in the earliest comital 
accounts and the accounts of Egmond Abbey.48 Yet the inventory of 
grain measures carried out in 1572 brought to light considerable vari-
ations in the size of the achtendeel: in Gorinchem, for instance, it was 
14% larger than in Alkmaar, 26% larger than in Delft , and 40% larger 
than in Dordrecht.49 In wholesale trade, variation was reduced by the 
fact that the measures of Delft  (which had long been an important 
grain trade centre) and increasingly also those of Amsterdam (which 
was rapidly rising to prominence) were widely used; but between 
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themselves these two measures were completely unrelated, the 
Amsterdam last being almost three times as large as the Delft  hoed.50
For the southern Low Countries, the 1572 investigation revealed 
very similar results: diversity in measures was considerable. In some 
cases, for instance in the Franc of Bruges, secondary towns appear to 
have adopted the measures of the central city; but elsewhere, for 
example in the Brussels district, there is no sign of internal conver-
gence whatsoever—even the smallest towns used their own grain 
measures.51
In Angevin England, on the other hand, national standards were 
more than just an ideal. Detailed specifi cation of measures started 
with a section in Magna Carta (1215) that set the London quarter as 
the standard measure for grain to be used in all of England. It quickly 
gained momentum. Th e Assizes of Bread and Ale (1266), for instance, 
regulated the weight of bread depending on the price of grain. 
It ordered that bread had to be weighed according to a strictly defi ned 
standard pound (the ‘tower’ pound). Th e Composition of Yards and 
Perches (late 13th century) introduced a national system of meas-
ures  of length and area based on a standard yard, the ‘iron ulna’. 
Several additions and refi nements followed in the 14th and early 15th 
centuries.52
Th e advance of England over Holland and the southern Low Countries 
seems undeniable. However, the consequences of fragmentation were 
probably not as damaging as one might suspect. Local trade was most 
likely not much aff ected. Peasants selling their products at the nearest 
market and local retailers had few problems: for most of their com-
mercial dealings a reliable system of local measures was all that was 
needed. Merchants engaged in regional or interregional trade faced 
greater diffi  culties, but many of them visited only a limited number of 
towns. For instance, the books of the mid 15th-century merchant 
Gerrit Claesz.—engaged in trade in cloth and dairy products—reveals 
a concentration of transactions in Hoorn and the surrounding villages 
on the one hand, and in Deventer on the other. Hoorn was Claesz.’ 
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home town; in Deventer he visited the fairs in order to do business 
with merchants from the eastern Netherlands and the German 
Rhineland. Surely for a man like Claesz., like many other merchants 
literate and numerate, conversions between two sets of measures can-
not have been an insurmountable obstacle.53
Merchants in international trade faced the greatest diffi  culties, but at 
the same time they were best positioned to cope with problems arising 
from the existence of multiple systems of weighing and measuring. 
In the large trade centres they could hire a broker or a local agent to 
help them fi nd their way in unfamiliar surroundings. In some cases 
they could also take recourse to manuals. Merchants’ manuals that 
gave information on weights and measures in the Low Countries began 
to appear in print around the middle of the 16th century.54 However, in 
the main trade centres, handwritten documents were in use earlier 
than this: Pegolotti’s La pratica della mercatura, for instance, dating 
originally from the middle of the 14th century, listed specifi cations for 
the measures and weights used in Bruges and Antwerp and also gave 
equivalents for some of the measures used in other towns in the south-
ern Low Countries.55
It will not do to entirely dismiss the issue. Conversions did not block 
trade, but they were cumbersome; they might result in extra costs for 
multiple acts of weighing or measuring and could lead to mistakes and 
fraud. Nevertheless, there are other reasons to doubt whether England 
with its statutory weights and measures really held an advantage over 
Holland: in practice, uniformity of weights and measures in England 
was far from complete, while in the Low Countries consistency and 
coherence were greater than they appeared.
In England, local measures continued to be used for much longer 
than the multitude of acts and statutes on weighing and measuring 
suggests. In Yarmouth, for instance, and also in Newcastle and Ipswich, 
weights and measures for salt were ten times as large as the statutory 
units.56 While this may have been nothing but a simple and logical 
adaptation to the circumstances of bulk trade, in Exeter we encounter 
a diff erent situation: here all trade was based on a corn bushel that was 
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about 20% larger than the statutory measure. Although no documents 
to prove it have been recovered, it is very unlikely that Exeter would 
have been able to consistently use non-statutory measures if it had not 
had royal permission, explicit or unspoken, to do so. Th e Exeter bushel 
remained in common use until 1670, when a royal act enforced con-
formity with the national standard. Because in the Middle Ages bread 
prices had to be based, according to the Assizes of Bread and Ale, on 
the grain price per statutory bushel, using a local measure made it 
more complex to calculate the correct bread price—but apparently that 
was less of an objection than exchanging it for the national standard.57 
Exeter was not a unique case: in Winchester the local corn bushel was 
also signifi cantly larger than the national standard.58
In fact, in the course of the 14th century several new exceptions 
were made to the obligation to use the statutory weights and measures. 
Most were introduced not by the king but by Parliament, thus demon-
strating how the growing infl uence of merchants, but even more so of 
the landed gentry, was able to at least partly erode the policy of uni-
formity of weights and measures. First, in 1324, Parliament lift ed the 
obligation to level the shallow measures used for oats, malt, and meal. 
Th ese products could henceforth be sold by heaped measure: the com-
modities could be heaped up in a cone above the brim. Th is favoured 
lords collecting rents in kind, who obviously preferred large, heaped 
measures. It also favoured grain merchants, who could now try to pur-
chase in large local measures and sell in the smaller statutory ones. Th e 
Statute of Purveyors of 1351 once more prohibited the use of heaped 
measures, but it made an exception for manorial lords who at their 
estates had been using measures that did not conform to the national 
standards. Th is amounted to nothing less than a general permit to the 
landed gentry to use non-statutory as well as heaped measures. Th e 
privilege was offi  cially reconfi rmed ten years later.59 What we see hap-
pening here is the ability of power holders to infl uence measures to 
their advantage.
It is possible that in England only a minority of lords actually made 
use of the option of using non-statutory measures: manorial accounts 
57 Beveridge, ‘Statistical Crime’, esp. 526.
58 Beveridge, Prices and Wages in England, 12–17. Winchester College used yet 
another bushel, slightly larger than the local one, for collecting rents in kind, but 
Beveridge believes this diff erence may have gone unnoticed until the 18th century.
59 Zupko, British Weights and Measures, 22–26.
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rarely show adjustments for diff erent measures.60 On the other hand, it 
is also clear that a multitude of local weights and measures lived on 
until—and in some cases even aft er—the introduction of the British 
Imperial System of weights and measures in 1824.61 If anything, this 
demonstrates that despite the Crown’s ambitions, uniformity in pre-
modern England was far from complete.
In Holland evidence of the use of more than one set of weights or 
measures in one location is scarce, at least in a legalised form. No doubt 
abuse did take place. A mid 16th-century charter from Assendelft , for 
instance, records that some traders in this village had been using dif-
ferent measures for buying than for selling. However, the local authori-
ties stated very clearly that this was not permitted and attempted to put 
a stop to it. Only in one case the use of other measures, besides the 
regular urban ones, appears to have been accepted as legal: in Brielle 
merchants were able to purchase locally produced grain in a landmate 
(rural measure) that was slightly larger than the measure used for retail 
sales at the urban market.62 Th is system dated back to at least the mid-
dle of the 15th century, when the existence of a separate rural measure 
for grain was confi rmed in an ordinance issued by the bailiff  of 
Voorne.63 Th e exceptional character of this arrangement can perhaps 
be attributed to the fact that in this part of Holland, which in many 
respects followed Zeeland customs, the infl uence of the nobility was 
relatively strong. In 1371 Voorne had lost its position as an independ-
ent seignory with its own lord; from then on the bailiff , as all other 
bailiff s in Holland, represented the authority of the count. However, 
the Voorne bailiff  performed his administrative and jurisdictional 
duties in close conjunction with a group of ten men who held fi efs on 
the island. Th e ordinance on weights and measures was issued in coop-
eration with this group, and the continued existence of the landmate 
may have been the result of pressure from these men.64
Whereas in England the diversity of measures seems to have increased 
towards the end of the Middle Ages, in Holland several factors contrib-
uted to a mitigation of the fragmentary character of metrological units. 
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For example, from a very early stage onwards, weights displayed far 
greater uniformity than measures. In the 11th and 12th centuries, the 
mark—originally a Scandinavian weight which, aft er the Danish con-
quest of England, became the weight standard for the English coin-
age—was adopted in large parts of northwestern Europe as the standard 
unit for a newly emerging monetary system.65 In its wake, in the Low 
Countries Cologne commercial weights which were derived from the 
mark rose to prominence—in Brabant and Flanders (although in 
Ghent a pound with diff erent specifi cations survived) and also in 
Holland.66
Th e fi rst conclusive evidence for the dominance of Cologne com-
mercial weights in Holland dates from 1346. In that year the urban 
authorities in Brielle stipulated that in this town only Cologne weights 
were to be used. A similar rule can be found in the late 15th- and early 
16th-century Gouda by-laws.67 It is true that by that time Cologne 
weights had been partly superseded by troy weights. Troy weights had 
been introduced for minting and subsequently also for the trade in 
silver and gold in Flanders and Brabant in the 13th century, and in this 
capacity they reached Holland in the 14th century. In Flanders, troy 
weights were by then also widely used for general commercial pur-
poses, but Brabant and Holland merchants clung to the traditional 
Cologne weights for much longer. Certainly, in 14th- and early 15th-
century Antwerp, for some purposes ‘Flemish’ (troy) weights were 
used besides ‘Brabant’ (Cologne) weights; but as Flemish infl uence 
receded and Antwerp asserted its commercial hegemony in the second 
half of the 15th century, Cologne weights regained their dominant 
position. Shift s between Cologne and troy weights also took place in 
Amsterdam about a century later. Here both types were in use for some 
years, but troy weights ultimately prevailed.68 Despite these shift s and 
the occasional coexistence of the two standards at the same time,  diver-
sity in weights was much more limited than diversity in measures.
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In addition, a tendency to adopt the units of a major trade centre 
can be discerned for the measures of content for some of the most 
important import and export commodities. Commercial practice was 
the driving force. We have already seen that, at the end of the Middle 
Ages, the Delft  hoed and increasingly also the Amsterdam last were 
widely used in the wholesale grain trade. On a smaller scale, similar 
developments took place for other measures. For instance, in the mid-
dle of the 16th century, Hoorn voluntarily adopted the Delft  vat as the 
standard measure for beer.69
Holland was certainly not unique in this respect. Convergence of 
measures for important wholesale trade commodities also took place 
in the southern Low Countries. Although each town maintained its 
own rules for the length and the width of locally produced cloth, both 
in Flanders and in Brabant a standard ell developed which, with minor 
variations, was in common use. As far as we know, the development of 
the standard ell was not a top-down process, initiated and enforced by 
central government; instead, pressure from customers may have been 
instrumental in the process of standardisation. In the late 14th and 
early 15th century, the Hansa Kontor in Bruges, for instance, compelled 
its members to check, at every purchase, the dimensions of the cloth 
against a rope with a length of exactly ten Flemish ell.70
Th e early and mid-15th-century attempts to standardise measures 
for one of Holland’s vital export commodities show that here too 
buyers’ preferences played a part, but they also suggest that what 
turned the scale was urban initiative and cooperation between towns. 
As explained in Chapter 4, in late 14th- and 15th-century Holland a 
rapidly expanding large-scale herring fi shery and a fl ourishing herring 
export trade developed. Soon problems arose with the size of the her-
ring casks. In 1423 Duke Jan of Bavaria issued an ordinance that, in 
severe terms, condemned the ‘perfi dy and deviousness’ of the con-
struction of herring casks of incorrect dimensions. Foreign merchants 
had been duped and as a result the reputation abroad of the Holland 
towns had been seriously damaged. Th e ordinance proclaimed that 
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henceforth all herring casks in Holland and Zeeland had to be con-
structed according to the standard of Brielle, Holland’s main herring 
port. Local authorities were to prescribe the Brielle measurements to 
the coopers in their town and to inspect and verify all casks by mark-
ing them with the urban stamp. Central or urban functionaries who 
came upon an unmarked barrel—at one of the comital toll posts, for 
instance—were to confi scate and destroy it.71 Although the ordinance 
does not literally say so, it was most likely based on a request by at least 
some of the herring ports, with Brielle as their leader. We fi nd Brielle 
actively involved in the implementation of the new rules: a year later 
the Brielle authorities sent a copy of the iron hoop that encircled the 
Brielle casks to Cologne in order to allow for a check on the casks that 
arrived in that city.72
Th e 1423 ordinance did not put an end to all problems. One year 
later the towns of Holland informed the duke that something had been 
overlooked: casks were not only produced in the cities but also in the 
countryside, where according to the urban authorities the new rules 
were not observed. Th e duke now ordered that casks made in the coun-
tryside would have to be marked with the stamp of the nearest town.73 
Exactly how this was to be organised remains unclear; the charter only 
stated that all comital offi  cials were to confi scate casks that did not bear 
a mark. Considering the limited extraterritorial powers of the Holland 
towns, it is hardly surprising that this time urban offi  cials were not 
included in the enforcement eff ort. However, since the herring indus-
try was largely an urban industry, the casks at some point must have 
arrived in town, where a check on their dimensions was at least 
possible.
Th e charters of 1423 and 1424 show that the herring towns joined 
forces and were able to convince the duke to support their case by issu-
ing rules for the county as a whole. Precedents for comital involvement 
in measuring in the international river trade—via the salt measure and 
wine measure of Dordrecht— may have been helpful; at least they 
showed that central regulation was an option. However, harmonisa-
tion of the size of herring casks, produced in many places, was a much 
more complex challenge than enforcing the use of a standard measure 
in just one trade centre. Th erefore, another factor was probably of 
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greater importance. Th e Holland towns had already shown themselves 
capable of successfully mounting a collective lobby in a diff erent fi eld 
of economic policy: resistance to the Dordrecht staple. Th ey had joined 
forces because no town was strong enough on its own. Only by form-
ing alliances were the small towns that constituted the Holland urban 
network able to achieve their goals. It was probably on this kind of 
experience that they built in their attempts to harmonise the dimen-
sions of the herring casks.
Th e ultimate eff ects of these attempts are diffi  cult to assess. When in 
1456 and 1457 the authorities in Cologne addressed Brielle and the 
other herring ports in Holland with complaints about their export her-
ring, they focused on the way of packing the herring and did not refer 
to the dimensions of the casks.74 Th is suggests problems with size were 
more or less under control. On the other hand, the dimensions of the 
casks did become an issue again aft erwards. Around 1470, Frankfurt—
with its international fairs an important centre for the export trade to 
southern Germany—complained to Brielle, Vlaardingen, Schiedam, 
and a number of Zeeland towns about the herring casks.75 Eleven years 
later, the Estates of Holland issued a lengthy ordinance that not only 
gave detailed instructions on the origins and quantity of the salt to be 
used for preserving the herring, the sorting of the herring according to 
quality, and the method of packing the fi sh into the casks, but also 
confi rmed the compulsory use of standardised casks for the export 
trade. In 1494 a revised version of this ordinance prescribed the 
Dordrecht cask as the standard for all of Holland instead of the Brielle 
version. Casks had to be marked with three stamps, the fi rst identify-
ing the cooper who had made them, the second identifying the ship-
master on whose ship they had been fi lled with herring, and the third 
identifying the port where the herring had been brought ashore. Th e 
authorities in these towns had to appoint offi  cials to supervise the 
stamping and address any confl icts that might arise.76
Th ere are indications that attempts to standardise the dimensions of 
the herring casks also took place in Flanders. Signifi cantly, the process 
followed a diff erent route there. In the course of the 15th century the 
coastal towns and villages of Flanders, led by the three main fi shing 
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ports Nieuport, Ostend and Dunkirk, increasingly joined forces to 
promote the interests of shipping and fi shery. However, the results of 
their exertions ultimately depended on the compliance of the authori-
ties in Bruges, Ghent and Ypres. As we saw earlier, the three cities were 
originally opposed to the curing industry; only in 1420 was the prohi-
bition on on-board curing lift ed. Subsequently, problems regarding the 
dimensions of the herring casks similar to those in Holland developed. 
Just before the middle of the 15th century this resulted in an ordinance 
on the packing and salting of the herring issued by the three cities. Th e 
coastal towns were consulted, but their involvement was not as direct 
as in Holland.77
When in the early 16th century competition between the herring 
industries of Holland and Flanders was at its peak, the Habsburg gov-
ernment intervened with an ordinance that covered both countries. 
It included rules for the sale of herring caught before and aft er the 
actual herring season and prescribed an even more elaborate system of 
markings, including the introduction of a register recording coopers’ 
marks.78 Th is 1519 ordinance is oft en seen as the beginning of national 
regulation of the herring fi shery in the Dutch Republic.79 Th e fact that 
it was built on earlier foundations has received much less recognition, 
but there can be no doubt that the Holland ordinances of the 15th cen-
tury had paved the way.
Admittedly, attempts to harmonise other measures were not nearly 
as successful. Th is is illustrated by the problems that arose around the 
middle of the 15th century with the casks for another important export 
commodity: butter. Apparently butter casks were sometimes deliber-
ately made from thicker and heavier wood than usual: when full, these 
casks had the correct weight, but consisted of too much wood instead 
of butter. Complaints from Cologne and pressure from the authorities 
in Deventer, where much of the dairy trade with German merchants 
took place, induced Holland towns to try and put a stop to this prac-
tice. Each town, it was agreed, was to issue the same set of rules regard-
ing the weight of the casks, not just in the town itself but also in the 
surrounding district. In addition, a coordinated system of verifi cation 
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and marking of the casks was to be introduced.80 However, as far as can 
be established, no local ordinances were issued, and in the following 
years complaints from Cologne continued to arrive.81 Moreover, there 
was no follow-up in the shape of central regulation. Possibly the fact 
that dairy was produced by a large number of small farmers living in 
the countryside contributed to the failure. Th e inspection and verifi ca-
tion of the butter casks they used may simply have been beyond the 
administrative capacities of the towns—especially since, as Chapter 4 
has shown, in contrast to the herring trade a signifi cant part of the 
dairy trade by-passed urban markets altogether.
We will return to the maintenance of standard weights and meas-
ures in the countryside in the next section. At this point we can con-
clude that if economic interests required it and the task at hand did not 
exceed their competence, Holland towns were prepared and able to 
harmonise measures. In contrast to England, central legislation was a 
complementary factor in this process of harmonisation, not the driv-
ing force behind it.
6.4 Enforcement
Prescribing standards, however well-defi ned, was of little value if it was 
not combined with mechanisms to promote and enforce their use. Th e 
fi rst step was to make copies of the standards available to those who 
needed them. In addition, it was necessary to ensure the standards were 
used in the right way. Th is could be done by giving directives about the 
handling of measures, weights, or equipment. Th e use of the standards 
could also be entrusted to one or more qualifi ed functionaries. Next, 
there was the regular inspection and verifi cation of  measures and weights 
and the prosecution of off enders who tried to enrich themselves by 
using units that deviated from the standards. A body of offi  cials was 
needed to carry out these tasks. Recurrent complaints about false 
weights and measures make it clear that enforcement was never easy.
In England, distribution of models was organised on a national scale. 
Copies of the royal standards were sent to all urban centres, where 
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more copies were made for both public and private use.82 Th e frequent 
inspection and verifi cation of all weights and measures was necessary 
to keep the system in working order. Th e main functionary active in 
this fi eld was a royal offi  cial, the ‘clerk of the market’. From at least the 
late 13th century onward, the clerk, with a staff  of assistants, was 
responsible for the supervision of the royal standards; he had to see to 
it that local weights and measures conformed to them. In the middle of 
the 14th century, the activities of the clerk of the market were limited 
to an area with a radius of 12 leagues (just under 60 kilometres) from 
the royal court; since the court travelled, this implied an annual inspec-
tion tour that covered large parts of the country.83
Th e clerk of the market was by no means the only functionary 
engaged in inspection and enforcement of weights and measures on 
behalf of the king. In his survey of the British metrological system, 
Ronald Zupko devotes many pages to a detailed description of all the 
other offi  cials active in this fi eld, varying from country court coroners 
and royal justices to manorial lords, religious institutions, and local 
commissioners appointed by the Crown with the specifi c aim of 
inspecting weights and measures in their home town. For some of 
these functionaries, metrological duties belonged to their regular tasks, 
but others were appointed on an ad hoc basis, in return for services 
rendered or in order to ensure support. Th ese men were probably more 
interested in the fi nancial rewards of their offi  ce than in the benefi ts of 
a reliable system of weights and measures. Moreover, in many cases 
duties were poorly defi ned, let alone clearly demarcated. Th e result was 
a complex situation characterised by overlapping jurisdictions, rival-
ries, and ample opportunities for corruption and abuse.84 Recent 
research suggests that many offi  cials were indeed engaged in the very 
off enses they were supposed to be preventing, either by intent or owing 
to a lack of expertise.85
From a continental point of view, the most striking element in the 
English enforcement system is the apparent lack of involvement of 
town governments and urban offi  cials until the 1320s. Only then, and 
probably at least partly out of dissatisfaction with the existing situa-
tion, urban authorities were given the right to inspect and verify the 
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weights and measures used within the urban freedom. For an increas-
ing number of towns, the power to prosecute and punish off enders was 
added later in the 14th or in the 15th century.86
In Holland, and also in the southern Low Countries, enforcement 
was fi rst and foremost an urban responsibility. Admittedly, in the cases 
where the count of Holland was the owner of one or more local meas-
ures, he too was involved. In the late 13th century, for instance, the 
count repeatedly issued instructions for the measuring of salt and wine 
in Dordrecht. Th e instructions mainly concerned the tariff s of the 
impositions that were levied, but it was also stipulated that the salt 
measure had to stand upright on a level surface when it was being 
fi lled.87 Th e comital accounts of the middle of the 14th century also 
record expenses for the construction of 26 new achteldelen and 100 
pounds of lead for making weights, all to be used in Rotterdam, where 
the count owned the grain measure and the weigh house.88 Yet since 
most weights and measures were owned by the towns, the count’s role 
in maintaining the standards was limited in comparison with the tasks 
of the urban authorities.
Th e provision of physical models for the large number of urban 
weights and measures was the responsibility of the towns themselves, 
and the urban authorities also gave instructions on how to use these 
standards. As we have seen, the Amsterdam by-laws of 1413 described 
in exact detail how the salt measure was to be fi lled and levelled, and 
the Dordrecht by-laws of 1401 did the same not just for salt but also for 
hops.89 In addition, several towns employed sworn offi  cials to do the 
weighing and measuring of important wholesale commodities. 
Sometimes the restrictions were only partial: in early 15th-century 
Amsterdam, for instance, foreigners were allowed to do their own 
measuring on Monday—the day of the weekly market—but not on 
other days of the week.90
Th e active role that the towns took upon themselves is perfectly 
understandable in light of the importance of weighing and measuring 
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for urban revenues (via the urban excises). It is true that the rights to 
weigh and measure—and to collect the fees that came with it—were 
usually leased out to the highest bidder. In Leiden, for instance, this 
was common practice at the end of the 14th century.91 However, the 
lessee would still have to employ the town’s sworn measurers or the 
urban weigh master.
Th e presence of a corps of sworn measurers limited the risk of 
metrological fraud by merchants, but the offi  cials themselves might 
also prove unreliable. Checks on that possibility therefore had to be 
provided too. In the early 15th century, both in Amsterdam and 
in Dordrecht fraudulent measurers were not only fi ned, but also—
temporarily or permanently—expelled from offi  ce.92 Th e Dordrecht 
authorities, moreover, fi xed tariff s for all types of measuring and also 
ordered that for grain transactions the buyer and the seller should each 
appoint a measurer.93 None of this could entirely prevent fraud by 
measurers, as is shown by the examples of fraudulent peat measurers 
in early 16th-century Gouda and Leiden referred to by Cornelisse;94 
nevertheless, it did reduce the risks.
We know that around the year 1300 London also had a corps of 
‘meters’ for corn and salt.95 Likewise, in 1319 a royal charter gave 
London control over the weights and scales used in the city: from that 
time onwards the offi  cials operating the king’s great beam (for heavy 
goods) and the small beam (for luxury products like silk) were 
appointed by the urban authorities, or later by the members of one of 
the city’s companies.96 However, for other English towns evidence of 
urban offi  cials of this type seems to be absent. In the major port towns 
alnagers, weighers, and measurers were at work, but these were royal, 
not urban functionaries. Th ey assessed weight and dimensions of 
imported cloth, imported wine, and exported wool as a basis for levy-
ing the national custom duties.97 Th at urban weighers and measurers 
were not more common is no doubt related to the limited autonomy of 
especially the smaller seignorial towns.
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Holland town governments were also involved in the maintenance 
of standards in another way. From a very early stage, urban authorities 
actively enforced the use of the local standards by inspection and veri-
fi cation.98 Th e Dordrecht accounts of the early 1280s (the oldest urban 
accounts extant in Holland) mention expenses for the forging of a 
stamp by a local goldsmith and for the bread, cheese and wine con-
sumed by the aldermen and council members while supervising the 
verifi cation and branding of the wine vessels.99 It is not quite clear if at 
that stage inspection and verifi cation were already recurrent activities, 
but a century later they probably were. Although the Dordrecht by-
laws of 1401 do not specify the procedure for the verifi cation of weights 
and measures, they state that the strickles used for rasing the grain and 
salt measures had to be checked every two months. Likewise, the 
Leiden by-laws of 1406 order innkeepers to serve beer in recently veri-
fi ed measures.100 Over time, verifi cation by the aldermen in person 
made way for lease contracts: like weighing and measuring, the verifi -
cation of weights and measures could be leased out. Th is meant the 
introduction of impositions on verifi cation. Th ere are indications that 
this process largely took place in the 15th century.101
Th e prosecution and punishment of off enders was also an urban 
responsibility: as mentioned earlier, even the oldest charters of urban 
liberties are very clear about the duties of the urban court in this 
respect. Inspection, verifi cation, and enforcement remained an urban 
activity until the end of the Middle Ages (and in fact for a long time 
aft erwards). As we saw, even when—as in the case of the herring 
casks—standards were coordinated at a supra-local level, the towns 
were still ultimately responsible for inspecting and verifying the casks.
For Holland a lack of accurate medieval information puts hard proof 
beyond our reach, but Van der Wee has been able to show that the 
grain measures of Antwerp and Brussels remained constant in the 14th 
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and 15th centuries—that is, if variations due to technological limita-
tions of production and measurement are taken into account.102 Th is 
suggests that a system based on local enforcement mechanisms could 
work well: measures may not have been uniform, but they were stable 
and reliable.
While the diff erences between Holland and England in mechanisms 
for maintaining standards were considerable, those between Holland 
and the southern Low Countries were small. Just as in Holland, urban 
authorities in Flanders and Brabant actively inspected and verifi ed 
weights and measures; just as in Holland, they frequently employed 
sworn offi  cials to do the weighing and measuring.103
Th ere was one diff erence, though: in the southern Low Countries 
guild involvement in metrological control appears to have been more 
prominent than in the north. Admittedly, sworn measurers were also 
frequently organised in guilds in Holland, and these guilds shared in 
the responsibility for maintaining the standards. In early 15th-century 
Amsterdam, for instance, the urban measures for corn and salt were 
held in custody by the wardens of the measurers’ guild, and in later 
years the verifi cation of these measures usually took place in the guild’s 
chapel.104 Th ere were other cases of guild involvement, but they were 
restricted to a few specialised guilds with a very direct connection to 
weighing and measuring. In mid 15th-century Haarlem, for example, 
the four wardens of the coopers’ guild were entrusted with verifying 
the vessels made by the guild members.105
Other guilds of craft smen and retailers, however, appear to have had 
few responsibilities with regard to the enforcement of weights and 
measures. Th is was diff erent in the southern Low Countries, where—
in the important cloth industry—enforcement of local regulations on 
the length and width of cloth was usually left  to the local cloth guilds.106 
In Holland the urban authorities took this upon themselves. Inspection 
and verifi cation of the dimensions of the cloth were largely the respon-
sibility of the waardijns, urban offi  cials who—in Leiden at least— were 
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forbidden to actively engage in the production of, or trade in, cloth for 
the duration of their term of offi  ce. If guild offi  cials were involved, as 
was the case in Haarlem, they acted as aids to the waardijns. Off enses 
had to be reported to the local court, which then called the culprit to 
justice.107 No doubt there is a relation with the fact that, in Holland, 
craft  guilds were almost never represented in local government and 
therefore could not be expected to fulfi l public tasks. Notably, aft er 
1500 the role of the craft  guilds in the enforcement of weights and 
measures appears to have increased. Th e 1510 ordinance on the use of 
troy weights in the silver and gold trade, for instance, indicates a super-
visory responsibility for the wardens of the goldsmiths’ guilds.108
Th e diff erence between Holland and the southern Low Countries 
presents us once again with an interesting parallel to another aspect of 
market regulation: quality control. In the cloth industries of the south-
ern Low Countries, quality control also rested in part on the active 
cooperation and internal modes of enforcement of the cloth guilds.109 
In Holland, however, it remained fi rmly in the hands of the urban 
authorities, who did not permit the guilds to set the rules, supervise 
compliance, or punish transgressions.110
In Chapter 3 it was argued that guild domination of urban markets 
disadvantaged outsiders, who were faced with extra costs to gain 
access. With regard to the enforcement of standards, however, the con-
tribution of guilds deserves a diff erent assessment: by providing relia-
ble guarantees on quantity and quality of products to customers, guilds 
were probably able to reduce transaction costs related to information 
asymmetries.111 However, the Holland system of government-based 
control seems to have achieved exactly the same. Urban authorities 
were well aware of the vital importance of a good reputation of the 
urban export industries. In late 14th-century Leiden, for instance, the 
authorities ordered that cloth produced for export to the Hansa 
towns had to have a standard length of 19 ells, and all cloth was to be 
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measured by the urban offi  cials, who saw to it that this standard was 
maintained. Hansa merchants did at times still protest that cloth from 
Leiden fell short, but then similar complaints were raised against the 
Flemish cloth staple in Bruges.112
So far this analysis has focused on the mechanisms for inspection, ver-
ifi cation, and enforcement of standards in towns. For the southern 
Low Countries this covers the bulk of interregional trade because the 
towns monopolised virtually all exchange above the mere local level. 
Certainly, there were problems with the dimensions of rural canvas 
and linen off ered for sale at the urban markets; but urban authorities 
could at least partially address these problems by fi xing the minimum 
length and width of rural cloth that could be marketed—as Antwerp 
did in the early 16th century.113 In England, rural trade was of greater 
importance: in the wool trade, for instance, village fairs and markets 
served as a marketing channel for small-scale producers. Th e lord who 
owned the market or fair was responsible for the maintenance of stand-
ard weights and measures. Th e abbot of Bury St. Edmunds, for exam-
ple, provided supervision on weighing and measuring at the market of 
Botesdale, for which he held the market rights.114
In Holland, rural trade was also important; but as Chapter 4 has 
shown, a signifi cant amount of trade took place at informal trade ven-
ues—which, moreover, had direct links with interregional trade net-
works. Seignorial control over seaside fi sh markets was usually weak. 
Although the count owned some of the village scales for dairy and 
could thus regulate weighing practices at these scales, an increasing 
number of unoffi  cial rural weighing facilities also emerged. Th e 15th-
century problems with the casks for herring and butter suggest that 
although the countryside was expected to follow the standards of 
the nearest town, enforcement of these standards was not always easy. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, informal, small-scale rural trade venues 
off ered easily accessible marketing options to farmers and fi shermen; 
but did they perhaps, precisely because of their informal character, 
also increase the risk of fraud with weights and measures?
To make a long story short: they probably did, but in the course 
of time solutions were found to reduce these risks. Events in the twin 
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villages of Westzaan and Krommenie in 1526 illustrate what these 
solutions looked like. Apparently the aldermen of the two villages had 
refused to take the weights and measures used locally to the bailiff  for 
inspection and verifi cation. Th e matter was brought before the bailiff ’s 
court in Beverwijk. Th e verdict of the four members of the court, all 
well-born men from the district, suggests an attempt at reconciliation. 
In future, verifi cation of the local weights and measures was to take 
place in the sheriff ’s house in Westzaan, under the supervision of the 
sheriff , two aldermen, and a representative of the bailiff . Th e revenues 
were to be spent in food and drink on the spot; and if there was a sur-
plus, this was to be divided between all parties.115
Two elements stand out: the coordinating and law-enforcing role of 
the bailiff  and the involvement of local representatives in the actual 
inspection and verifi cation of measures. Th ere is reason to believe that 
they were relatively new innovations. Bailiff s were probably introduced 
in Holland in the 13th century, based on the Flemish example. Th ey 
represented the count’s supreme jurisdictional authority in the coun-
tryside. In his district, the bailiff  presided over the high court and exe-
cuted its verdicts; he usually also appointed the village sheriff s and 
frequently had a say in the selection of the village aldermen. In addi-
tion, bailiff s had administrative duties—for instance in water manage-
ment and in military matters.116 However, late 14th-century bailiff s’ 
accounts do not mention revenues from verifi cation of weights and 
measures. In itself this is not conclusive: aft er all, the bailiff s received a 
fi xed salary for their work.117 In addition, however, the 1424 ordinance 
on beer casks made in the countryside makes no mention of a  legislative 
or supervisory role for the bailiff s. Surely, if at that stage inspection, 
verifi cation, and enforcement of rural measures had been part of the 
bailiff s’ regular duties, the logical choice would have been to order 
them to deal with the problem.
Th e fi rst reference to involvement of the bailiff s comes from the mid 
15th-century Voorne ordinance just mentioned. With this document 
the Voorne bailiff  gave directives for the inspection and verifi cation of 
weights and measures in his district. Privately owned measures had to 
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be stamped with the bailiff ’s mark as proof of their correctness; the 
sheriff  and the village aldermen were to regularly inspect whether all 
measures bore the required mark.118 Th e chronology suggests that the 
coordinating duties of the bailiff  with regard to the enforcement of 
weights and measures in the countryside developed in the fi rst half of 
the 15th century, as a response to the needs that arose from the expan-
sion of rural trade in this period.
However, the system probably also had its disadvantages. It is not 
quite clear exactly why the Westzaan aldermen did not want the bailiff  
to inspect the village weights and measures, but they were prepared to 
go to some lengths to avoid the obligation. Abuse of power by bailiff s 
was a recurrent problem throughout the Middle Ages.119 Th e solution 
proposed by the bailiff ’s court in the Westzaan case suggests that it also 
played a part here. We saw earlier that in England centralised enforce-
ment structures provided opportunities for fraud and rent-seeking: 
unlike local magistrates, functionaries appointed by the Crown were 
frequently more interested in the revenues of their duties than in the 
result for the maintenance of standards.
From this perspective it is not at all surprising that the Westzaan 
aldermen did not trust the bailiff . However, a charter granted a few 
years later to two other villages in the north of Holland, Wormer and 
Jisp, suggests that other considerations also played a part. Th e charter 
stipulated that taverners, bakers, petty traders, and sellers of cloth in 
Wormer and Jisp had to use the measures and weights of the town of 
Haarlem and that all measures and weights were to be inspected and 
verifi ed by the village aldermen. Th e charter was granted by Emperor 
Charles V in response to a request from these aldermen, who—the text 
states—wanted a fi rm basis for the regulation of commercial practices 
in Wormer and Jisp.120 It is unlikely that this desire was related to the 
levying of excises: like the great majority of villages in Holland, Wormer 
and Jisp did not impose excises on the sale of beer, wine, bread, or any 
other commodity.121 Instead, the growing involvement of the villages 
in shipping seems to have spurred the village authorities into action. 
Th e charter states that the welfare of the villages depended upon their 
role in the provisioning of merchant vessels: this was why regulation 
was deemed a necessity.
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Th e aldermen of Wormer and Jisp obviously reacted to changing 
economic circumstances that were not of their own making. However, 
the fact that they were able to react adequately is signifi cant. It takes us 
back to the relatively strong position of villages in Holland, especially 
in the north of the county, discussed in Chapter 4. Once it became 
clear that there was a growing need for a system that guaranteed the 
maintenance of standard weights and measures, the village authorities 
in Wormer and Jisp—just like their colleagues in Westzaan and 
Krommenie—felt quite capable of organising it themselves and had no 
need for the strong arm of the bailiff .
In fact, there is an earlier, albeit indirect indication that village 
authorities were involved in the maintenance of standards as soon as 
the needs of trade required it. We have seen that in the middle of the 
15th century the authorities in Cologne complained to Deventer and 
the other IJssel towns about the butter casks used by Hollanders. Th is 
was not all they did. In 1447 Cologne also directly addressed the main 
dairy exporting communities in Holland: the towns of Haarlem, 
Amsterdam, Alkmaar, and Hoorn, and the village of Akersloot.122 
Obviously the Cologne magistrate assumed that the village authorities 
in Akersloot could and should take action just as well as their urban 
colleagues.
In short, whereas in the early 15th century the maintenance of 
standards in the countryside probably caused problems, gradually a 
combination of central coordination and local initiative brought 
improvement. Th e changes were no doubt triggered by the growing 
involvement of the countryside in interregional trade networks. 
However, the prior existence of rural communities experienced in gov-
erning themselves and defending their own economic interests pro-
vided the basis for a fl exible and adequate response to newly arising 
needs.
6.5 Conclusions
In itself, there is nothing remarkable about the development of a reli-
able system of weighing and measuring in late medieval Holland. 
Metrological systems that reduced information asymmetries also 
developed in the southern Low Countries and England, and for that 
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matter in many other European countries. However, the organisation 
of weighing and measuring did not take the same shape everywhere. 
Besides similarities there were also signifi cant variations, related to the 
underlying balance of powers.
Diff erences between Holland and England are best explained by the 
diff erent positions of central and local authorities. Both were bent on 
gaining control over weights and measures, not just as a symbol of 
their authority or from a desire to accommodate merchants, but also 
because this served their fi scal interests. In England the early rise of 
central power was accompanied by the development of national stand-
ard weights and measures and a centralised enforcement system that 
contributed to an effi  cient royal taxation of imports and exports. 
In Holland on the other hand—and even more so in the southern 
Low Countries—urban authorities successfully claimed control over 
measures and weights at an early stage, thus helping to create a system 
that allowed them to levy the urban excises that were essential to their 
fi scal autonomy.
It can be doubted whether the early centralisation of metrological 
control really put England at an advantage. Firstly, the diff erences 
between England and Holland were less impressive in practice than 
they look in theory. English uniformity was eroded by changes in the 
balance of powers: Parliament used its growing infl uence to authorise 
exemptions from the national standards that benefi ted local interests, 
in particular those of the landed gentry. Conversely, in Holland meas-
ures used in wholesale trade tended to converge under the infl uence of 
interregional commerce. Secondly and more fundamentally, the disad-
vantages of a lack of uniformity were probably counterbalanced by a 
reduced risk of fraud and abuse: local enforcement mechanisms were 
not as complex as national enforcement systems, and local authori-
ties—instead of just being in it for the money—had good reason to be 
genuinely concerned about maintaining the standards.
Diff erences between Holland and the southern Low Countries were 
more subtle. It is true that the urban authorities in the south shared 
their responsibilities in enforcing standard weights and measures with 
craft  guilds to a greater extent than they did in the north, but evidence 
that this made a signifi cant diff erence to the maintenance of standards 
is lacking. More important was probably the specifi c pattern of urbani-
sation in Holland, where—in contrast to the southern Low Countries—
urban giants were absent. Th e eff ects are highlighted in the process of 
standardisation of herring casks in the early 15th century, initiated by 
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the Holland herring towns. Th e driving force was clearly economic 
necessity: customers abroad demanded uniformity. But an adequate 
response to economic requirements was facilitated by the fact that 
none of the herring towns was large and powerful enough to set the 
agenda on its own. Th e alternative, which had proved its value before, 
was to form an alliance.
Th ere is one other element in the organisation of weighing and 
measuring in Holland that deserves attention, and this too is closely 
related to the specifi c balance of powers that characterised Holland’s 
society: the improvement in the enforcement of weights and measures 
in the countryside in the 15th and early 16th centuries, and the role 
village authorities had in this improvement. Again, stricter regulation 
of rural weights and measures was in the fi rst place a reaction to eco-
nomic circumstances: rural trade had expanded and direct links with 
interregional trade networks had developed. However, a tradition of 
vigorous rural communities with self-governing powers made it easier 
to accommodate these changes. Local control mechanisms could sim-
ply be embedded in existing administrative structures; they thus pro-
vided a complement to—and at the same time an eff ective check 
on—central control mechanisms.
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One of the paragraphs in the charter of urban liberties granted to the 
Holland town of Haarlem in the year 1245—it was copied from the 
charter of the Brabant town of Den Bosch that served as model for 
the Haarlem document—deals with debts incurred by women ven-
dors. It states that husbands of women selling beer, bread or yarn were 
liable for the risks of their wives’ commercial transactions up to the 
equivalent of one oven of bread, one brewing tub of beer, or one steen 
(a substantial weight) of yarn. For husbands of women not engaged in 
commerce, liability was more restricted: they could lose at most 
four pence through the actions of their wives. Th e paragraph must be 
seen in the light of the legal status of married women in the Middle 
Ages, who were considered to be under their husbands’ guardianship 
and did not have full legal capacity. In the case of women vendors, this 
may well have caused problems: if a married woman could not be 
brought to justice, creditors risked being left  empty-handed. A hus-
band partly answerable for the debts contracted by his wife may have 
provided at least some sort of solution.2
Non-simultaneous trade—trade that involves a time lapse between 
payment and delivery—induces risks that do not exist in spot transac-
tions: the party that has entered into an obligation to pay or to deliver 
at a later date may renege on the agreement aft erwards. Th is ‘funda-
mental problem of exchange’ and the institutional arrangements that 
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developed to keep it under control take centre stage in this chapter.3 
Non-simultaneous exchange and the problems related to it are some-
times seen exclusively in connection to the rise of interregional trade 
between merchants not personally known to each other.4 Th is chapter 
has a wider perspective and also takes contract enforcement in local 
and regional trade into consideration. As the example from the 
Haarlem charter of liberties suggest, many transactions in local trade—
even very small ones—also involved deferred payments or advances 
for future delivery. Th is is hardly surprising: in medieval trade, credit 
was omnipresent at every level, and consequently so were problems of 
shirking one’s responsibilities.5
Most mechanisms that were used to deal with defaulting were prob-
ably of an informal nature, relying on long-lasting personal contacts 
and reputation. If even in international trade amicable settlement was 
the preferred method of handling commercial confl icts, this would 
certainly have been the case within the small circle of villagers or fel-
low-townsmen.6 However, more formal institutional arrangements 
also played a role. Th ey provided a last resort, thereby constituting a 
strong incentive to settle the matter and helping to defi ne norms 
and rules.
Here two of these institutional arrangements will be discussed: 
merchant guilds as a form of self-organisation based on a community 
responsibility model, and debt litigation as an exponent of a govern-
ment-dominated system of law enforcement centred on individual 
responsibilities. According to Greif, the emergence in the 13th century 
of more powerful states heralded the transition from a communal to 
an individual responsibility system and thus the decline of the mer-
chant guild.7 But as Gelderblom and Grafe have shown, various types 
of merchant organisations continued to exist throughout the Middle 
Ages. Gelderblom and Grafe state that the degree to which mer-
chants were able to delegate control to a collective body depended on 
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economic and political circumstances.8 Against this background, 
medieval Holland presents an interesting case. As we shall see, mer-
chant guilds were rare, whereas mechanisms for individual contract 
enforcement through the local court were in place at an early stage and 
maintained their dominant position aft erwards.
As before, a comparison is made with Flanders and England. First 
we turn to the role of merchant guilds. In order to bring out regional 
diff erences more clearly, the analysis is restricted to indigenous mer-
chant guilds; these may have been active in local and regional or in 
international trade, or—as was frequently the case—in both. 
Organisations of foreign merchants operating in Holland, Flanders 
and England, such as the German Hansa, are not discussed. Th e three 
sections that follow deal with the organisation of debt litigation 
through courts of justice. An exhaustive discussion of all legal instru-
ments for debt litigation is not intended; instead, the aim is to bring 
out the main similarities and diff erences between Holland, Flanders 
and England. Th e discussion therefore focuses on three elements: the 
transition from traditional methods of proof based on a belief in divine 
intervention to fact-fi nding, the development of sureties, and the pub-
lic registration of debts.
Much of the content of this chapter deals with developments 
that took place before the middle of the 14th century. Th e charters of 
liberties of Holland towns provide an important source of information 
on the organisation of contract enforcement in this period. Other 
sources (such as urban by-laws or court records) are only rarely 
available before the late 14th or early 15th century. In Holland, the 
best-known and largest ‘family’ of charters is the Brabant-Holland fi li-
ation, and the Haarlem charter of liberties belongs to this family. 
A large part of the Haarlem charter was based on the liberties of 
the Brabant town of Den Bosch. In turn, a draft  version of the 
Haarlem charter served as a model for several other towns in Holland. 
In this chapter a great deal of attention is paid to the liberties of this 
Brabant-Holland fi liation, liberties which—because of their detailed 
character and stress on what we would now call civil justice—off er 
the best clues for an analysis of contract enforcement. Elements from 
other charters are used to complement the information. Appendix C 
lists the charters that have been used, explains the methodological 
8 Gelderblom and Grafe, ‘Rise, Persistence and Decline of Merchant Guilds’.
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    9 Th e elementary studies on merchant guilds in each of the three regions dating 
from the late 19th and the fi rst half of the 20th century are Gross, Th e Gild Merchant 
(England); Planitz, ‘Kaufmannsgilde’, and Planitz, ‘Frühgeschichte’ (Germany); Van 
der Linden, Gildes marchandes (Low Countries).
10 Gelderblom and Grafe, ‘Rise, Persistence and Decline of Merchant Guilds’, 7–9. 
For a contrasting opinion, cf. Dessí and Ogilvie, ‘Social Capital and Collusion’. Dessí 
and Ogilvie state that guilds served only one purpose: they were rent-seeking institu-
tions, who owed their existence to the monopoly privileges granted to them by a ruler 
in exchange for fi nancial support.
11 Alpertus Mettensis, De diversitate temporum, 81. Alpertus does not actually men-
tion a guild, but the description makes it perfectly clear that the merchants he refers to 
had formed a corporative organisation. Cf. Akkerman, ‘Koopmansgilde Tiel’, 
414–417.
problems involved in working with them, and briefl y reviews the 
historiography.
7.2 Merchant guilds
Merchant guilds in northwestern Europe (Germany, the Low Countries, 
and England) are documented from the late 10th or early 11th century 
onward.9 Th ese guilds were, to all appearances, multi-purpose institu-
tions: they provided protection against violence and cheating, negoti-
ated favourable trade conditions, and catered for social and religious 
needs.10 One of the earliest (and most frequently cited) references 
comes from the writings of the cleric Alpertus of Metz. It dates from 
around the year 1020 and deals with the merchant guild of Tiel, situ-
ated in the Guelders river area and heiress of the early medieval trade 
emporium Dorestad. In his description of the Tiel merchants, Alpertus 
expressed his disapproval of their unruly and impious ways. He was 
reluctant to accept that they really possessed a charter from the 
emperor permitting them to administer justice according to rules of 
their own device, as they claimed.11
With this last remark Alpertus hits on an essential aspect of mer-
chant guilds: their self-governing powers. In this sense, merchant 
guilds can be seen as a representation of a much wider development 
that drastically transformed society from the 10th century onwards. 
Certainly, associations with a corporative identity cemented by an oath 
already existed in the early Middle Ages. In the Carolingian period, for 
instance, village guilds united villagers from all layers of society: they 
organised collective meals and provided assistance to impoverished 
or  sick members. Nevertheless, the role of corporative associations 
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12 Here it is not possible to do justice to the impressive bodies of literature on each 
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and Dilcher, ‘Genossenschaft lichte Struktur’. For a recent contribution that stresses the 
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world, see De Moor, ‘Silent Revolution’.
13 Oexle, ‘Conjuratio und Gilde’, 155–164; Akkerman, ‘Koopmansgilde Tiel’, 
422–4243.
14 Nicholas, Growth of the Medieval City, 146–150; Ennen, Europäische Stadt, 
105–124.
15 Trio and Bijsterveld, ‘Van gebedsverbroedering naar broederschap II’.
became much more pronounced aft er the decline of the Carolingian 
empire and the break-down of central authority that accompanied it. 
Th e 10th to 13th centuries witnessed the emergence of corporative 
bodies of various kinds: urban communes, rural commons, religious 
confraternities of laymen, and fi nally craft  guilds acquired a certain 
degree of autonomy.12
Corporative institutions sometimes clashed with sovereign, lordly 
or ecclesiastical authorities. Th e prohibition of guilds—whatever their 
exact nature may have been—in the Carolingian era is a clear sign of 
confl ict. When in 852 Bishop Hincmar of Reims advised the reforma-
tion of all village guilds into religious associations supervised by the 
parish priest, indignation about the vulgarity of collective meals and 
the participation of women and clerics in them were probably only 
part of the problem. More important was the fact that the village guilds 
were not under the control of the regular secular and ecclesiastical 
authorities—the same objection Alpertus voiced with regard to the 
Tiel merchant guild.13
Th e revolutionary character of corporative institutions should not 
be overrated: in many cases their relation with the authorities is better 
characterised in terms of interaction and cooperation than of confl ict. 
Th e urban communal movement, for example, only rarely led to a rad-
ical overthrow of lordly authority. Townspeople were more likely to 
achieve their goals by negotiating compromises that suited both them 
and their lord.14 Similarly, many religious confraternities initially 
developed under the patronage of a monastery: religious institutions 
encouraged the participation of laymen in their community of prayers 
as a way to attract additional funding. Only gradually did the confra-
ternities develop into independent bodies.15 Likewise, the early mer-
chant guilds of the Low Countries and Germany probably owed part of 
their special status to the custom of Carolingian and Ottonian rulers to 
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16 Dilcher, ‘Genossenschaft lichte Struktur’, 98.
17 Other archival data come from Valenciennes (customs partly dating back to the 
middle of the 11th century), Malines (late 13th-century customs) and Bruges (see 
below). A full description and references to the sources are provided by Van Ommeren, 
Koopmansgilderol Deventer, 30–32. Van Ommeren also lists the archival data available 
for merchant guilds in the northern Low Countries and in Germany.
18 Espinas and Pirenne, ‘Coutumes de la gilde marchande’ (edition of the customs 
in Latin); Derville, Histoire de Saint-Omer, 45, 267–269 (description and translation in 
French). For the characteristics of sworn associations in general, cf. Dilcher, 
‘Genossenschaft lichte Struktur’, 103–106.
19 Both points of view are discussed by Van Ommeren, Koopmansgilderol Deventer, 
34. A translation of the 1210 customs in French is provided by Derville, Histoire 
de Saint-Omer, 271–272. Th e dating of this document is uncertain: Derville dates it 
to  around 1210, Carlos Wyff els to about 1240, even though he states the customs 
themselves may date back to the 12th century (Wyff els, ‘Vlaamse hanzen opnieuw 
belicht’, 6).
20 Derville, Histoire de Saint-Omer, 38–44.
permit merchants certain liberties—for instance, the right to travel 
freely—not given to others.16
Th e fi rst evidence for the existence of merchant guilds in the southern 
Low Countries dates from the second half of the 11th century. Th e best 
documented case is Saint-Omer.17 Th e late 11th- and early 12th-cen-
tury customs of Saint-Omer’s merchant guild deal with all of the ele-
ments essential to sworn associations: not only the organisation of 
collective meals and religious activities, but also the obligation to assist 
each other in cases of illness and—of greater relevance here—in cases 
of a commercial dispute abroad. Th e customs state that if a merchant 
from Saint-Omer has refused to join the guild and is arrested some-
where, or fi nds his goods seized, or is challenged to a duel, he will 
receive no help. Th is does indeed suggest a role for the collectivity of 
the guild in contract enforcement. Th e customs also defi ne the trading 
privileges guild members had in their home town: they enjoyed pre-
emptive rights in all commercial transactions.18
It is not quite clear if the Saint-Omer Hansa mentioned in the fi rst 
half of the 13th century was the direct successor of the earlier mer-
chant guild or a newly founded corporation.19 By this time Saint-Omer 
had developed into a fl ourishing international trade centre for wine, 
grain, cloth, and sea-fi sh.20 Th e Hansa customs claim a monopoly on 
this international trade for guild members. Th e exclusivity of the Saint-
Omer Hansa, and in its wake of other Flemish merchant guilds, has 
been an issue of debate. Alain Derville, following a tradition that goes 
back to the writings of Henri Pirenne, envisages the Hansa as an elitist 
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21 Ibid., 56–57; cf. Pirenne, ‘La Hanse Flamande de Londres’, 173–174, and Van 
Werveke, ‘Wesen’, 14, 16.
22 Wyff els, ‘Vlaamse hanze van Londen’, esp. 17–18; Wyff els, ‘Vlaamse hanzen 
opnieuw belicht’, 8–13.
23 Van Ommeren, Koopmansgilderol Deventer, 60–65.
24 Ibid., 66, 73–74.
25 Wyff els, ‘Vlaamse hanzen opnieuw belicht’, 13–17.
club. He stresses the formal restrictions: entrance fees for those other 
than the sons of members were high, and craft smen who did manual 
work, retailers and brokers could not join at all. Membership was thus 
limited to men of substantial wealth and to merchants active in long-
distance trade.21
A contrasting approach is presented by Carlos Wyff els, who points 
out that the 1241 membership list of the Saint-Omer guild mentions 
more than 500 members and that many of them were not descended 
from ancient merchant families. For the Flemish Hansa of London, an 
association of international wool merchants from several Flemish 
towns led by Bruges, Wyff els arrives at similar conclusions. Th e offi  cial 
rules suggest exclusivity, but the new admissions recorded in the 
Bruges city accounts for the last two decades of the 13th century men-
tion several men from more humble origins: craft smen or retailers 
who had acquired enough wealth to purchase membership in order to 
engage in international trade.22 No membership lists of other merchant 
guilds in the southern Low Countries have survived, but the late 13th- 
and 14th-century register of the merchant guild of Deventer, in the 
eastern part of the present-day Netherlands, indicates the same dis-
crepancy between offi  cial regulations and practice.23
Th ese fi ndings show that the demarcation between elite and middle-
class was permeable. Lineage was not as important as wealth; the ‘nou-
veaux riches’ could buy their way in. Nevertheless, in Deventer the 
majority of guild members belonged to upper layer of society, even 
though not all of them were merchants. Th e Deventer merchant guild, 
at least at this stage in time, probably also served as a social club for 
the  local elite, regardless of their occupation.24 Likewise, for Bruges, 
Wyff els admits that the Flemish Hansa did exclude traders with 
insuffi  cient fi nancial means and that its members monopolised the 
international trade.25 Moreover, instead of a ‘democratisation’ of 
merchant guilds in the late 13th century, as Wyff els initially assumed, 
or of relative openness throughout the 13th century, as he advocated 
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30 Bateson, Records of the Borough of Leicester I, xxxii, xxxiv.
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aft erwards,26 for Saint-Omer at least there are clear signs that exclusiv-
ity increased. In 1263 the entrance fee for those other than children of 
members was raised dramatically. Membership aft erwards fell to 200 
to 300 individuals.27 Even if the decline was also related to the reduced 
role of the Flemish in the English wool trade, the nature of the reaction 
shows that the elite used the Hansa as an instrument to exclude outsid-
ers. Th e merchant guilds in Saint-Omer and Bruges disappeared aft er 
the revolts of the early 14th century, when merchant elites lost part of 
their power.28
Sources on merchant guilds in the British Isles are, as so oft en, more 
abundant than on the continent. Charles Gross collected evidence for 
the existence of merchant guilds in 129 towns in England and Wales. 
Th ese guilds were actively engaged in the regulation of the local mar-
ket—for instance, by prohibiting retailing for outsiders and reserving 
toll privileges and pre-emptive rights for members.29 Th e exceptionally 
rich archives of the merchant guild in Leicester show that in this town 
guild members who engaged in dishonest dealings could be disci-
plined in the meeting of the guild members, the morningspeech. 
Notably, this institution also provided guild members with a way to 
recover debts owed to them by fellow guildsmen. Th is means that here 
too we fi nd guilds involved in contract enforcement, although appar-
ently exclusively in confl icts between guild members and in a manner 
that has little to do with collective liability.30
Just as on the other side of the North Sea, royal, seignorial and eccle-
siastical authorities were frequently suspicious of the guilds’ ambitions 
at self-regulation. Th e powerful English Crown was rather successful 
in its attempts to control guilds. By the 13th century, the right to estab-
lish a guild had become a privilege that had to be paid for, and occa-
sionally royal enquiries were initiated to uncover and prosecute illegal 
guilds.31 However, there were also instances of cooperation between 
authorities and guilds. As we have just seen, the merchant guild of 
Leicester was given wide discretion to regulate local commerce, includ-
ing the power to levy entrance fees and possibly also to collect the tolls 
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Dutch:  Luzac, Holland’s Rijkdom III, 31–36 (second paging)). In his survey of 
of the earl of Leicester. Th e situation benefi ted the merchants, who 
gained the right to organise trade much as they wanted to. But the earl 
also profi ted. Th e guild freed him from all kinds of executive tasks, 
gathered his revenues for him, and cost him nothing. In fact, the guild 
was probably prepared to pay for the favours granted.32
It should be remembered that English towns, and certainly seigno-
rial towns like Leicester, lacked the autonomy of their continental 
counterparts. In this situation, the merchant guild provided the towns-
people with a way to realise a least a modicum of self-determination. It 
is therefore not surprising that in the towns that received self-govern-
ing powers in the late 12th or 13th century, merchant guilds oft en dis-
appeared (or were transformed into social or religious fraternities), 
while in seignorial or ecclesiastical boroughs they tended to survive for 
much longer.33
Th e fact that guilds served as the communal organisation of the 
townspeople also helps to explain a signifi cant diff erence between the 
English guilds and their Flemish counterparts: even if for the latter the 
discrepancy between theory and practice is taken into account, English 
merchant guilds were more comprehensive. Guild membership was 
usually open to all urban traders, large, middling, or small. Whereas in 
Flanders craft smen who worked with their hands were not welcome or 
at least had to pay a much higher entrance fee, such restrictions usually 
did not exist in England. Craft smen who were also active in retailing 
were freely admitted; in some towns it looks as if almost every adult 
male was a guild member. In addition, villagers from the surrounding 
countryside could frequently also join. Where merchant guilds contin-
ued to exist aft er the 12th century, there is no sign that they became 
more exclusive aft erwards.34
Merchant guilds were also known in the towns in the northern Low 
Countries. Two cases have already been mentioned: Tiel and Deventer. 
Others can be added: in the 13th century, merchant guilds existed 
in Groningen, Utrecht, and Middelburg.35 In the county of Holland, 
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Middelburg but not Utrecht (Van Ommeren, Koopmansgilderol Deventer, 30–32).
36 OHZ I, no. 241.
37 In the late 15th and 16th centuries many towns in Holland did have local retail-
ers’ guilds and shipmasters’ guilds, but merchant guilds engaged in foreign trade were 
very unusual. Dordrecht had a guild of wood merchants and a guild of wholesalers 
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ings with foreign merchants coming to Dordrecht, but did not venture out themselves 
(Van Herwaarden et al., Geschiedenis van Dordrecht, 115, 119). To my knowledge the 
only organisations that did organise trade expeditions abroad were the Haarlem 
Schonenvaarders, the Gouda Schonenvaarders, and the Amsterdam Bergenvaarders, 
three guilds of merchants engaged in trade with Scandinavia. Th e best documented 
case is that of the Haarlem Schonenvaarders (Van den Bosch-Nord Th omson, 
‘Haarlems Schonenvaardersgilde’).
38 OHZ III, no. 1681 and no. 1632.
however, references to merchant guilds from the 12th or 13th century 
are extremely scarce; in fact, there is only one. In 1200 the count of 
Holland ordained that the sale of cloth in Dordrecht was to be restricted 
to the cloth merchants (wantsnijders), who had to be members of the 
Dordrecht fraternitas et ansa.36 Nothing is known about the role of the 
Dordrecht guild in the resolution of commercial confl icts. Th e guild 
does not appear to have been long-lived. Th ere are no references to its 
existence aft er 1200: it is not mentioned in Dordrecht’s charters of lib-
erties of 1220/1221 and 1252, or in any of the other extant documents. 
Th at probably means the guild disappeared at some point in the 13th 
century, most likely in the fi rst half of that century.
In the other towns of Holland, there is no sign of a 13th-century 
merchant guild either.37 It is unlikely that this is simply a matter of a 
scarcity of sources. Th e Haarlem Accijnsbrief of 1274—a comital char-
ter allowing the Haarlem authorities to levy excises on trade in, and 
production of, various goods—stipulates that merchants (and artisans) 
are to pay these dues individually. Likewise, the 1273 charter of liber-
ties of Vlaardingen states that anybody engaged in commerce in the 
town has to contribute to the expenses for the town’s defences in pro-
portion to his income.38 Apparently, in these towns the authorities 
addressed merchants as individuals and not as members of a corpora-
tive body.
How to explain the early demise of the Dordrecht guild and the absence 
of merchant guilds in the other towns of Holland? Based on compara-
tive research in four major European towns between the middle of the 
13th and the end of the 18th century, Gelderblom and Grafe argue that 
the main factor that determined the degree to which merchants were 
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willing to give up individual freedom and delegate control to a corpo-
rative organisation was market size. Th e larger the market, the less 
likely merchants were to form a corporative body. Th is was possibly 
because the costs of establishing a guild in such an environment were 
too high, or because alternatives—either private solutions such as 
insurance, or public goods such as courts—were more readily available 
in large markets.39
Yet in the case of 13th-century Holland it is highly unlikely that 
market size was the main determinant. Although Dordrecht grew sig-
nifi cantly in the 13th century, by 1300 it was still a small town—by no 
means too large for a merchant guild. Other towns in Holland were 
even smaller and apparently did without a guild altogether. Another 
factor seems to have carried greater weight: the overlap in activities 
between guild and local government.
Th e possible link between merchant guilds and local authorities has 
been the subject of debate ever since Pirenne advanced his hypothesis 
about the emergence of towns in northwestern Europe in the high 
Middle Ages. Pirenne and his followers believed that travelling mer-
chants, organised in guilds, established new trading suburbs near 
existing fortifi ed strongholds. Th ese guilds became the predecessors of 
urban communities and the driving force behind the urban communal 
movement. As guild customs acquired a territorial character, ‘mer-
chant law’ became the prime source of urban law.40 Later research has 
uncovered several fl aws in Pirenne’s theories. Th e hypothesis of travel-
ling merchants settling down could not be maintained in the face of 
empirical evidence, and it became evident that industry and local trade 
were more important as motors of urban development than long-dis-
tance trade.41
Nevertheless, even if urban institutions were not the direct off spring 
of merchant guilds, the English situation described earlier does suggest 
that local merchant guilds were no longer needed where and when 
urban self-government took shape. In towns that acquired administra-
tive and judicial powers, the urban authorities took upon themselves 
duties that elsewhere—in the absence of a viable alternative—were 
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executed by the guilds. In towns such as these, mechanisms for the set-
tlement of commercial disputes evolved from a ‘club good’, available 
primarily for guild members, to a public good: local government pro-
vided a basic set of rules and enforcement mechanisms binding on 
anyone who did business within the limits of the urban jurisdiction.42
At fi rst sight, this seems to take us back to Avner Greif ’s argument 
that merchant guilds disappeared when their role in contract enforce-
ment was taken over by a new mechanism. However, two important 
comments need to be made. Firstly, as argued by Gelderblom and 
Grafe, the transformation was not automatic: it did not take place 
everywhere. And secondly, the new mechanism that replaced the mer-
chant guild appears to have had little to do with the rise of a strong 
central state, as Greif claims; instead, developments at the local level 
were decisive.
For the southern Low Countries, an early role for urban authorities 
and urban institutions in the settlement of commercial disputes is 
irrefutable. As we saw in Chapter 2, the 13th-century international 
fairs of Bruges and Ypres did not have a special fair court, as was com-
mon in England and in the Champagne region. It was the local court 
of aldermen that administered justice when confl icts arose between 
visiting merchants. Holland was probably not far behind in this devel-
opment. In a treaty concluded by the count of Holland and the duke of 
Brabant in the year 1200, the two rulers agreed that a creditor in one 
county who wanted to collect a debt from a debtor in the other county 
should fi rst apply to the authorities in the debtor’s place of residence. 
Only if they refused to administer justice was the creditor allowed to 
seize any property of the debtor he could lay his hands on.43 Th e treaty 
thus demonstrates, even at this early stage, the elementary role of local 
courts in the settlement of debts—in the southern Low Countries and 
also in Holland.
Notably, by this time the towns of Holland were only just beginning 
to emerge. Th eir late rise, in combination with the early demise of the 
manorial system, meant that the young towns usually did not have to 
deal with a powerful local lord on their way to self-government. From 
the 13th century onward, the count of Holland was a force to be reck-
oned with; but he seems to have been fully prepared to grant the 
towns administrative and jurisdictional powers in return for fi nancial 
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and military support. Of course, by then the concept of urban self-
government was well known in neighbouring regions. More impor-
tantly perhaps, contracts that defi ned relations between sovereign and 
subjects in terms of a voluntary exchange of duties and rights were also 
common in Holland: the reclamation of the Holland peat district 
between the 11th and 13th centuries was based on agreements between 
groups of colonists and the count originating in the same principle. 
Th e result was that the towns of Holland possessed self-governing 
powers almost from the moment they emerged. Th e Dordrecht town 
charter (1220 or 1221), for example, shows that by that time the 
Dordrecht court of aldermen already had the authority to issue by-
laws and to administer justice.44
In itself this rapid and smooth development of urban self-govern-
ment, urban law, and urban enforcement mechanisms may well explain 
the early disappearance of the Dordrecht merchant guild; at a very 
early stage it had become redundant. However, a comparison with 
Flanders reveals that another factor also contributed. Th e Flemish 
towns acquired self-government in the course of the 12th century—
before the Holland towns—but in Flanders merchant guilds were 
active until the end of the 13th century. Admittedly, the Flemish guilds 
did change in character. In the 13th century, they were no longer pri-
vate associations of merchants: they became public institutions, con-
trolled by the local authorities.45 As we have just seen, 13th-century 
Flemish merchant guilds tended to defend the economic interests of 
the local merchant elite, even if that elite was not as narrow as previ-
ously thought. In other words, in Flanders—to a certain extent—petri-
fi cation of merchant guilds took place, whereas in Holland this did not 
happen.
Probably part of the explanation can be found in the fact that, in the 
13th century, Dordrecht was a young town without signifi cant urban 
industries: craft smen simply did not pose much of a threat to the posi-
tion of the urban elite. In addition, the balance of powers between the 
count and the urban elite most likely played a part. As was shown in 
Chapter 5, the 13th-century Dordrecht merchant elite—although 
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increasingly wealthy and infl uential—was not in the same position as 
the well-established elites of the much older Flemish cities. Dordrecht 
owed its prosperity to its close cooperation with the count of Holland. 
Although the count usually went along with the Dordrecht elite if it 
suited his own interests, he did not permit the elite’s powers to grow 
unchecked. Th e Dordrecht elite had therefore much more to gain by 
playing along than by opposing the count, as the ambitions of a power-
ful guild could easily have been construed. In short, once the Dordrecht 
merchant guild had outlived its initial function, the town’s merchants 
had probably neither the inclination nor the possibility to turn it into a 
rent-seeking institution.
In the other towns of Holland, the factors that in Dordrecht contrib-
uted to the early demise of the merchant guild carried even more 
weight. Th ese towns were younger than Dordrecht; therefore, develop-
ment of urban self-government did not lag much behind the rise of 
urban trade. Moreover, the 13th-century traders of Haarlem, Leiden or 
Delft  were certainly not in the same league as the Dordrecht mer-
chants. If merchant guilds ever existed in these towns, they must have 
been very short-lived.
Th e late rise of towns and trade—and the absence of pre-existing 
merchant organisations connected to this trade—meant that from the 
moment they emerged urban courts were the obvious bodies to take 
up the regulation of debt confl icts resulting from non-simultaneous 
trade within their jurisdiction. What remains to be seen is how they 
carried out this task and how this aff ected the enforceability of 
contracts.
7.3 From divine judgement to schepenkenning
It is tempting to think that individual debt litigation, by defi nition, 
means the use of modes of proof comparable to modern ones—but the 
facts show that this was not necessarily the case. In the high Middle 
Ages, a process of change of judicial procedures did take place all over 
Europe: modes of proof based on the belief in a revelation of divine 
judgement disappeared, and procedures resting on fact-fi nding gained 
ground. However, remnants of traditional modes of proof lingered for 
a long time.
Th e unilateral ordeal probably appeals most to our imagination as a 
fascinatingly alien practice. Th e accused had to carry a red-hot iron, 
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plunge his hand in boiling water, or perform a similar action. When 
the wounds healed well, this was seen as a sign from God that the 
accused was innocent. In civil justice, however, the judicial duel seems 
to have been preferred to the unilateral ordeal. Th e judicial duel, also 
referred to as trial by battle or trial by combat, was a bilateral ordeal: it 
pitted claimant and defendant against each other in a fi ght with the 
aim of revealing divine judgement. In keeping with the emphasis 
placed by Pirenne and his followers on the role of merchant settle-
ments in the rise of medieval towns, the disappearance of the judicial 
duel has oft en been attributed directly to the needs of a rising mer-
chant class. Huizinga, for instance, argued that the prohibition of the 
judicial duel in the Haarlem charter of liberties (1245) demonstrates 
the infl uence of mercantile customs on urban law: merchants had no 
wish to jeopardise their lives and their profi ts by duelling over every 
trade confl ict.46 Huizinga’s opinion is echoed in the view of later histo-
rians, who explain the turn away from the traditional modes of proof 
by pointing to the profound economic, social, and mental changes that 
northwestern Europe experienced in the 12th century.47
It is true that this point of view is open to discussion. Recently, 
scholars have shown a renewed interest in the role of the Church: the 
ordeal was condemned by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.48 
Others point out that urban hostility to the judicial duel does not nec-
essarily have to be an expression of the rational and progressive out-
look of merchants. It may also have been an attempt to prevent fi ghting 
in the urban community or to protect urban autonomy by ensuring 
that outsiders could not challenge burgesses.49
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that—from the 12th century 
onward—trial by combat declined, and it is also clear that towns were 
in the vanguard everywhere. In Holland, Haarlem was by no means 
the only town with a prohibition on the duel. Similar paragraphs can 
be found not only in the charters of the Brabant-Holland family, but 
also in the unrelated charters of Dordrecht, Leiden, Vlaardingen, 
Schiedam, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam, all charters dating from the 
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13th or early 14th century.50 With this clause, these Holland towns 
joined their counterparts abroad that had obtained a privilege to the 
same eff ect, some of them at a much earlier date—for instance Ypres 
(1116), Saint-Omer (1127), and London (c. 1130).51 In the Holland 
countryside, trial by combat was more resilient, but for commercial 
confl icts this most likely had little relevance. At the end of the 14th 
century, bailiff s’ courts still occasionally resorted to a judicial duel as a 
way to decide guilt or innocence: comital accounts from this period 
mention expenses for the services of champions.52 However, these were 
exceptions rather than everyday practice: trial by combat had become 
a voluntary option applied only in criminal justice, and moreover one 
which was probably mainly used by the nobility.53
However, wager of law (proving one’s innocence by swearing a pur-
gatory oath) is a diff erent matter. Th is oath, oft en taken together with 
a number of oath-helpers or compurgators prepared to vouch for the 
trustworthiness of the accused, was closely related to the ordeal in its 
reliance on divine intervention—perjurers knew that eventually they 
would not be able to escape God’s vengeance—and in the demand for 
correct pronunciation of the oath formula down to the smallest detail: 
almost a physical test in its own right.54 Only very gradually did wager 
of law give way to more modern methods of proof. It certainly fi gures 
prominently in the mid 13th-century Haarlem charter of liberties, 
including the demand for correct pronunciation and adherence to the 
ritual.55 Moreover, whereas Huizinga assumed that the requirement for 
correct pronunciation of the oath would soon disappear from daily 
legal practice, the early 15th-century law code of Brielle—put in writ-
ing by the town clerk Jan Matthijssen—still refers to it in very explicit 
terms.56 Th is persistence of wager of law is not unique to Holland. Both 
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in England and in Flanders remnants of the purgatory oath in civil 
cases outlasted the Middle Ages.57
Th e replacement of traditional modes of proof by new ones was, it can 
be concluded, a very gradual process—in Holland no less than in the 
neighbouring regions. Nevertheless, in the 13th century, a transition 
was taking shape, as illustrated by the same Haarlem charter of liber-
ties. A Haarlem burgess who was sued for a debt could demonstrate his 
innocence by oath only when the claimant had merely uttered a com-
plaint and failed to provide any proof. However, if the claimant off ered 
documents or testimony from witnesses to support his case, compur-
gation was not accepted. In that case, the court would base its verdict 
on an investigation of the evidence. For this purpose a special session 
was organised which did not observe the rigid ritual of the traditional 
court sessions and took place behind closed doors.58
Th is procedure is one of several inquests or ‘truths’ that developed 
in northwestern Europe from the 12th century onwards. Th eir com-
mon feature is the eff ort to uncover the truth by seeking the opinion of 
well-informed locals.59 Th e English jury system provides a good exam-
ple. It probably developed from the royal inquisition, an administra-
tive device aimed at establishing the Crown’s rights to lands and 
rents—and also made available, as a royal favour, to individuals who 
wished to have their rights ascertained. As is well known, from this 
point onwards England, under the infl uence of the increasing control 
of the Crown over the judicial system, followed a course of its own. Th e 
Angevin reforms carried through in the second half of the 12th cen-
tury brought an extension and formalisation of the jury system, in 
both criminal and civil justice. Th e jury members were ordinary men 
from the surrounding area, but the juries functioned as part of the 
developing system of royal justice and royal courts.60
In Flanders the introduction of inquests led by comital functionar-
ies evoked hostile reactions from the powerful towns, who viewed 
them as an attack on their judicial autonomy. As with trial by battle, 
they tried to acquire an exemption or, alternatively, they claimed the 
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right of inquest for their own magistrates. It was this development that 
gave rise to the ‘truth of the aldermen’ or veritas scabinorum, used in 
criminal justice.61 When a case was brought before the local court of 
aldermen, two or three of these men were to investigate the matter by 
consulting witnesses or other sources and using their own experience 
and expertise. Subsequently, they pronounced a verdict that was bind-
ing on the court as a whole. Th e introduction of the ‘truth of the alder-
men’ in Flanders took place just aft er the middle of the 12th century, 
when it fi rst appeared in the charters granted to several towns by 
Count Philip of Alsace.62 Other parts of the southern Low Countries 
adopted the Flemish model, although in Brabant ducal offi  cials 
retained a greater degree of control over inquisitorial procedures than 
in Flanders.63
Th e procedure for investigating the claims in a debt case outlined in 
the Haarlem charter of liberties closely resembles the Flemish ‘truth of 
the aldermen’, but it relates to civil and not to criminal justice. Th e 
sources from 15th-century Holland refer to this civil law procedure as 
schepenkenning.64 It is tempting to conclude that the Holland schepen-
kenning simply followed the Flemish example, applying it to civil 
instead of criminal cases. Notably, however, Holland already had its 
own type of inquest. From at least the last quarter of the 13th century, 
in the north of Holland and also in a few other places in the county, the 
so-called zeventuig or landsage was in use for confl icts over real estate: 
seven neighbours were asked to investigate the claims of both parties 
to a disputed plot of land. A little later we also encounter the zeventuig 
in water management throughout the county and also in other parts of 
the northern Netherlands. Here its task was to investigate who was 
responsible for the maintenance of a stretch of dike.65
Certainly, the origins of the zeventuig are disputed. A.J. Allan, the 
author of a recent study on the Kennemer landrecht (the 1274 law code 
for Kennemerland) suggests that it was newly introduced as part of 
this code because there was a need for more modern methods of 
proof.66 With this statement, Allan contradicts the sometimes overly 
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romantic views of earlier generations who were convinced that the 
zeventuig was an ancient Germanic institution, deeply embedded in 
tradition.67 Allan is probably correct in his interpretation that the 
incorporation of the zeventuig in the Kennemer law code should be 
seen in the light of a general tendency towards rationalisation of justice 
in the 12th and 13th centuries. Even so, there is little support for the 
hypothesis that it was introduced only then as a new institution. Th e 
code itself does not off er any clues that this was the case; rather, the 
wording of the text seems to indicate that the zeventuig already existed. 
In fact, a charter dating from just one year later suggests that Holland 
was perfectly familiar with the institution: it refers to the zeventuig as 
the ‘right that in the common language is called the lantsaghe’.68 
Moreover, late 12th- and early 13th-century law codes from Friesland 
proper, on the other side of the Zuiderzee, also mention bodies of 
seven men with the same role as the Kennemer zeventuig—to assess 
the facts relating to ownership of real estate.69 Th e kinship of legal insti-
tutions in Holland with those in Friesland confi rms the impression 
that the Holland zeventuig was not a late 13th-century innovation. 
Th erefore, the incorporation of the zeventuig in the Kennemerland law 
code probably did not mean the creation of a new institution, but 
merely a more detailed defi nition of the role and functioning of an 
existing one.
Th e similarities between the zeventuig and the schepenkenning have 
been pointed out long ago by Fruin. Th e institutions are obviously 
related; however, as Fruin explains, there are also signifi cant diff er-
ences. Not only was the competence of the zeventuig restricted to mat-
ters of land use and water management, but the zeventuig was also an 
ad hoc committee consisting of common local people, probably direct 
neighbours of the parcel of land under dispute. In this respect the 
zeventuig closely resembled the English jury.70 Th e schepenkenning as it 
took shape in the Holland towns was, just as the Flemish ‘truth of the 
aldermen’ conducted by the local authorities themselves. In short, 
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Holland towns probably did borrow from the Flanders model of the 
inquest; but because of a familiarity with other fact-fi nding mecha-
nisms, the innovation fell on fertile ground and could be implemented 
quickly and easily.
7.4 Sureties
Th e introduction of methods of proof based on fact-fi nding was an 
important step towards a more effi  cient institutional framework for 
debt litigation, but the process did not stop there. Between the late 12th 
and the middle of the 14th century a wide range of additional instru-
ments developed that facilitated the recovery of commercial debts 
through legal proceedings.
Again, to a considerable extent the rules on debt recovery men-
tioned in the charters of liberties of Haarlem and the other members of 
the Brabant-Holland fi liation also refl ect practices common in neigh-
bouring regions. For example, there is the procedure of distraint in 
cases of reneging on obligations: the seizure of the debtor’s property as 
security, or his arrest in person, with the aim of inducing him to appear 
in a court of law.71 Th e Haarlem charter states that a defaulting debtor 
would fi rst be held under arrest by the authorities for two weeks. 
Aft erwards he was handed over to the creditor, who could keep him in 
custody until payment of the debt had been arranged. It is probable 
that the cumbersome and costly arrest was normally preceded—and 
ideally for both parties prevented—by seizure of property. Even though 
the Haarlem charter does not explicitly refer to it, panding (seizure) is 
mentioned in the 13th-century liberties of Dordrecht and in many 
later charters.72
Distraint was also in common use in the southern Low Countries, 
under almost identical conditions; here the prevalence of seizure of 
property over arrest in person is explicitly recorded in urban by-laws 
and privileges from the late 12th century onwards.73 A striking instance 
of distraint in England was the power of a lord to seize the property of 
71 A more detailed discussion of the instruments of seizure and arrest is provided by 
De Blécourt and Fischer, Kort begrip, 262–263; and Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital 
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a tenant for rents or services in arrear, usually by taking cattle. Th is 
power was exercised extra-judicially: no court order was needed to 
seize the goods. Nevertheless, the lord’s rights were limited: he could 
not sell or use the beasts but had to surrender them when the arrears 
were paid.74 In the English towns, creditors who found their debtors 
unwilling or unable to pay could also resort to distraint, but here safe-
guards against abuse had been introduced at an early stage. Th e debtor 
fi rst had to be summoned three times; if that failed, permission from 
the authorities was required in order to distrain the debtor’s goods. 
Extra-judicial distraint was allowed only against foreigners.75
Likewise, from the 12th century onwards, several towns in Flanders 
and Brabant acquired formal privileges that gave their burgesses free-
dom from seizure and arrest unless they had previously been tried and 
found guilty by the local court of aldermen, thus putting an end to 
extra-judicial distraint. Here too, foreigners did not enjoy the same 
privilege. On the contrary, the entire urban community was expected 
to collaborate in the arrest of a foreign debtor, who aft er all might think 
it best to simply leave town when summoned to court.76 Th e charters of 
the Brabant-Holland fi liation do not have a paragraph to guarantee 
their burgesses freedom from seizure and arrest, but there is one in the 
Dordrecht charters of 1220/21 and 1252 and in the Vlaardingen char-
ter of 1273: they state that seizure of the property of a burgess cannot 
take place unless the aldermen have permitted it.77
As with the introduction of the ‘truth of the aldermen’, the chronol-
ogy suggests that Dordrecht—and other Holland towns at a later 
stage—copied a successful institution developed in the southern Low 
Countries. Th e treaty between Holland and Brabant from the year 
1200 indicates how this may have occurred. Th e paragraph on the 
recovery of debts in this treaty must have been inserted primarily in 
the interests of Brabant merchants, who at the time no doubt had a 
large share in the trade between the two countries. It therefore makes 
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sense to assume that, when Holland’s trade began to develop, regula-
tions were adapted to those of the southern neighbours under the 
infl uence of commercial relations.
Guarantees of this kind may have provided protection from unlaw-
ful confi scations. But for creditors trying to recover their money, these 
guarantees brought serious disadvantages: proving the existence of a 
debt was oft en diffi  cult, and debtors could easily obstruct the course of 
justice by fl eeing or transferring ownership of their goods.78 In reac-
tion, a series of instruments evolved that reinforced the position of the 
creditor by off ering additional securities to ensure the debt’s repay-
ment. A tendency for change in favour of the creditor seems to have 
been a general phenomenon: it can also be observed in England.79 
Even the ways in which it was achieved were oft en the same—but not 
always, as we shall see.
Pledges—guarantors who assumed liability in cases of default by the 
original debtor—were frequently required to guarantee repayment of 
all kinds of debts, including commercial ones, throughout the Middle 
Ages. Frequent references to the use of pledges make it clear that this 
was common practice in Holland as well as elsewhere. Th e Vlaardingen 
charter of liberties (1273), for instance, states that debts could be 
claimed from a pledge aft er three unsuccessful exhortations to the 
debtor; and in 1396 the Amsterdam burgess Pieter Smit Claessoen 
insisted on a pledge to ensure the timely repayment of a debt of 10 lb. 
Holl. owed to him by a fellow townsman.80
Gaging of movables or immovables as non-possessory collateral was 
another widely used way to improve security: the creditor acquired a 
right to a specifi c property of the debtor, to be claimed if the debt was 
not repaid when scheduled. Th e extent to which mortgaging of real 
estate could be used for raising commercial credit partly depended on 
land ownership structures. Local merchants and craft smen were, 
almost by defi nition, in a much better position to make use of the 
credit-raising possibilities off ered by local land ownership than foreign 
merchants, who usually did not own much real estate. Likewise, in the 
countryside of the Low Countries, where freeholding was common, 
78 Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, 119.
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mortgaging of land probably off ered wider opportunities to peasants 
and farmers than in England, where many peasants did not possess full 
ownership rights to their land. Th is may well explain why in rural 
England security for loans was oft en based on movables, usually agri-
cultural produce.81
In the Low Countries, on the other hand, mortgaging of land, tene-
ments, or land rents was very common.82 In Flanders and Brabant this 
practice was known even in the 11th century, although it seems it was 
but rarely used until the early 13th century.83 Th e Haarlem charter also 
refers to collaterals.84 Chronology suggests that here too a model may 
have been introduced that had already proved its value elsewhere. On 
the other hand, this is one of the very few instances where the Haarlem 
charter gives customary law explicit preference over the Den Bosch 
rules and regulations: it states that, with regard to pawns and collater-
als, local customs will be respected. Moreover, this paragraph was not 
incorporated in the Delft  charter of 1246,85 although it was included in 
the charters of all towns in the northern part of Holland that belonged 
to the Brabant-Holland fi liation. Th is suggests that a system of mort-
gages may have existed in customary law in this part of the county.
Besides legal procedures, informal pressure based on the necessity 
to avoid reputational damage continued to play a part in debt recovery 
throughout the Middle Ages. An example is the system of leisting (vol-
untary custody) that was in use in Holland in the 14th and 15th centu-
ries. Upon contracting a loan, the debtor promised that if he should 
not fulfi l his obligations, he (or somebody else in his name) would go 
to an inn—usually in the place of residence of the creditor—where he 
would lodge at his own expenses until the loan was repaid. Th e high 
costs of the arrangement were to spur the debtor into doing everything 
possible to repay. Moreover, if he failed to turn up at the inn, the credi-
tor was free to make his dishonourable behaviour publicly known. In 
1319 leisting was prohibited by comital orders; perhaps because it 
interfered with the monopoly of formal law-enforcing institutions?86 
Leisting continued to be widely practised all the same. In a society that 
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held the concept of honour in high esteem, this is hardly surprising; 
however, the fact that over time it lost its character as a voluntary 
arrangement and developed into a system of involuntary custody of 
debtors by the authorities, indicates once again that in the long run 
informal mechanisms alone were insuffi  cient to secure repayment.
7.5 Public registration of debts
Until now we have observed mainly similarities in the organisation of 
debt litigation in the three countries. However, in one area there was 
an important diff erence: the recognisance of debts. In itself, the intro-
duction of ratifi cation and registration of debts by the authorities was 
a development of international dimensions, but there were signifi cant 
variations in the way it took shape.
Of course there were other, easier and less costly mechanisms of 
ensuring the existence of a commercial debt could be substantiated 
than having it offi  cially registered: witness testimony, for instance, or 
the tally. In local trade in particular, people continued to rely on these 
simple but oft en eff ective strategies throughout the Middle Ages and 
beyond. Holland was certainly no exception. Th e Brielle and 
Goedereede charters of liberties, for example, make it clear that the 
testimony of three reliable burgesses or merchants was considered 
valid proof that a transaction had taken place.87 Witness testimony was 
oft en combined with the practice of wijnkoop (also referred to as 
lijfk oop): in order to consolidate a deal, the buyer was expected to lay 
out a small sum to be spent on drinks for the seller and the witnesses. 
If aft erwards a confl ict arose about payment or delivery, the testimony 
of these witnesses (the wijnkoopslieden) was accepted by the local court 
as evidence.88 Expenses for wijnkoop over various purchases are repeat-
edly mentioned in the comital accounts of the middle of the 14th cen-
tury and in the accounts of Egmond Abbey from around 1390.89
Tallies were used all over medieval Europe from at least the 11th 
century onwards. In its simplest form (a squared stick on which 
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notches were carved) the tally was not much more than a counting aid. 
Th e more complex split tally (here the stick was split lengthwise in 
what came to be called the ‘stock’ and the ‘foil’) also allowed for a reg-
istration of obligations between two parties: the two halves bore the 
same notches and each party received one half as proof. Tallies could 
be used for many purposes; for instance, for the registration of pay-
ments in kind or labour in a manorial context, or for the recording of 
tax payments, as in England where the Exchequer habitually used tal-
lies to record the tax revenues brought in by the sheriff s. Tallies also 
provided a practical instrument for recording commercial debts. In 
this capacity they were widely used in local retailing in the 13th and 
14th centuries and sometimes also in international trade—for instance, 
by late 13th-century Flemish merchants doing business in England.90 
Medieval Holland provides examples of both. Around 1390 Egmond 
Abbey purchased large quantities of nails and other metalwork for 
building purposes, and the local smith kept a record of what the Abbey 
owed him on a tally.91 Likewise, in the middle of the 15th century, the 
Hoorn merchant Gerrit Claesz. sometimes used a tally to record post-
poned payments related to his transactions at the Deventer fairs.92
In the early modern period, tallies were widely accepted as valid 
proof of the existence of a debt in legal procedures.93 It is questionable 
whether this was also common practice in the Middle Ages. Tallies 
were, aft er all, private records, and in the Low Countries private docu-
ments do not appear to have been accepted as legal proof before the 
15th century. By the middle of that century, accounts of shipmasters 
were accepted as proof in commercial disputes, followed in the 16th 
century—aft er the introduction of double entry bookkeeping—by 
merchant account books and documents such as promissory notes and 
bills of exchange.94
Long before this, however, the possibility had emerged to have debts 
resulting from deferred payment or delivery ratifi ed by the authorities, 
presumably mainly to be used under high-risk conditions. Formal rec-
ognisance off ered material advantages: it was considered to be absolute 
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proof of the existence of the debt. A creditor who possessed a docu-
ment issued by the proper authorities stating that a debt had been 
incurred and was to be repaid at a certain date could, if payment was 
not forthcoming, demand summary execution: immediate distraint of 
the debtor’s property—suffi  cient to cover the debt—without a preced-
ing lawsuit.95 Notably, the principle of formal recognisance of debts 
was much the same in England, Flanders, and Holland. Th e diff erence 
was in the public bodies that assumed the leading role in non-conten-
tious jurisdiction (voluntary jurisdiction).
In the Low Countries, local courts were pivotal. Simple written con-
tracts stating the indebtedness of one person to another were issued by 
aldermen’s courts in Flanders as early as the 12th century.96 Among 
these contracts were the well-known lettres de foire issued by the local 
court of Ypres in the late 13th century. Just as at the Champagne fairs—
where similar documents were issued by the special fair courts—these 
letters were used to register agreements between merchants to post-
pone payment or delivery from one fair to the next.97
Local courts in Holland also had a vital role in non-contentious 
jurisdiction. In the Meuse delta, where Frankish infl uence had been 
strong, these courts were from the beginning courts of aldermen—as 
in the southern Low Countries. Th e rest of Holland, however, origi-
nally followed Frisian customs. Aldermen were unknown; instead, the 
assembly of the buren (‘neighbours’) adjudicated, sometimes assisted 
by a travelling judge (the asige) with a thorough knowledge of custom-
ary law. Over time the general assembly made way for representation: 
courts were staff ed by a limited number of locals (gezworenen or heem-
raden) and functioned in much the same way as the aldermen’s courts 
in the south. Both aldermen’s courts and neighbours’ courts were pre-
sided over by the sheriff , a comital functionary, who also executed the 
sentences; judgement, however, was pronounced by the aldermen or 
by the neighbours. Th e transition of courts of neighbours to aldermen’s 
courts took place in the emerging towns around the middle of the 13th 
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century. In the countryside in the north of Holland it occurred at the 
end of the 13th century and in the rest of the county more gradually 
between the 14th and 16th century. In many cases it was probably little 
more than a change of name.98
All Holland courts—that is, both aldermen’s courts and neighbours’ 
courts—had a central position in voluntary jurisdiction. Th is was an 
outcome of the role of the courts in monitoring land transactions. 
Customary law prescribed that land transfers had to take place in pub-
lic, and this evolved into ratifi cation by the local court. Ratifi cation was 
not mandatory, but it provided extra legal security. For the same rea-
son, people had mortgages and renten (annuities secured on land) reg-
istered; thus local courts also acquired a crucial role in the capital 
market.99 Although ratifi cation did not have the same signifi cance for 
commodity markets, the advantages it off ered were available to any-
body who entered into a commercial contract. Th e fi rst evidence of 
registration of debts by local courts in Holland dates from the second 
half of the 13th century,100 but ratifi cation by the local court took place 
earlier than that—even if it was not yet put in writing. Th e Dordrecht 
charter of liberties of 1220/21 explicitly states that the existence of a 
debt had to be known to the court of aldermen in order to permit the 
creditor to take action.101 Th e Haarlem charter, although not in the 
same clear words, also refers to the ratifi cation of debts.102
In England, registration of commercial debts was organised in a dif-
ferent way, in keeping with the superior degree of control of the Crown 
over the judicial system. Firstly, a growing number of cases could only 
be initiated through a writ, to be obtained from the royal Chancery. In 
the late 13th century, a royal writ came to be required for all litigation 
concerning debts over 40 shillings. Secondly, a system of royal courts 
was introduced. Th ese courts did not replace the pre-existing manor 
and borough courts, which retained a prominent place in the adjudica-
tion of debt confl icts throughout the Middle Ages.103 However, the 
royal courts did off er certain advantages for creditors attempting to 
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collect a debt, one of them being the possibility of summary execution 
for debts recorded on the plea rolls of the royal courts or on the rolls of 
the Chancery.104
In the late 13th century, a new system for the registration of com-
mercial debts was introduced, which, although it involved the urban 
authorities in the larger towns, also had a marked national component. 
Th e Statute of Acton Burnell of 1283, and the Statute of Merchants suc-
ceeding it in 1285, allowed merchants to have debts they incurred rec-
ognised by the mayors of a limited number of cities and towns. If such 
a debt was not repaid in time, the creditor could present the document 
that had been drawn up by the mayor and demand summary execu-
tion—as in Holland and Flanders. Moreover, if the debtor lived else-
where, the mayor would forward the documents to the Chancellor, 
who could then issue a writ to the sheriff  of the debtor’s county of resi-
dence, ordering him to pursue execution. Judging from the number of 
certifi cates issued to non-merchants and to people from out of town, 
the system was a success, and not just for commercial debts. While the 
two Statutes did not outlaw pre-existing forms of registration—apart 
from the rolls of the royal courts and the Chancery registries we know 
that in some towns registers were also kept—these earlier methods 
seem to have lost much of their function to the statutory bonds.105
English statutory registration diff ered in two respects from debt reg-
istration as it took place in Holland. Firstly, although statutory regis-
tration soon became possible in more towns than the number at the 
initial introduction, it was still limited to the larger commercial cen-
tres. Th e system was not extended to small town courts and certainly 
not to manor courts. In Holland, on the other hand, ratifi cation of 
debts could take place at all urban courts and also at rural courts, 
although in the countryside it probably took longer before oral testi-
mony was replaced by written statements.
Secondly, with the possibility of recourse to central bodies and their 
powers of enforcement, the statutory registers provided England with 
a solution to the coordination problem that towns in Holland—and 
indeed in Flanders—were struggling with: how to cope with debts owed 
by someone living in another town or in the countryside. As trade 
grew, this must have been an increasingly frequent problem, and one 
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for which an effi  cient remedy was not readily available. Certainly, in 
Holland the beginnings of a system of central justice (adjudication by 
the count and his Council) did develop from the late 13th century 
onward. Comital justice was not as much bound by customary law and 
tradition as local justice, and therefore constituted an innovative force: 
it contributed signifi cantly to the replacement of traditional by  modern 
methods of proof, the introduction of less formal court proceedings, 
and the introduction of the concepts of equity and fairness as corner-
stones of justice. However, central justice was limited in its range. Th e 
comital Council functioned as court of the fi rst instance only for pub-
lic bodies and for specifi c groups such as noblemen, foreigners, and 
clerics, while its role as court of appeal was, until the Burgundian era, 
restricted to the countryside—towns anxiously guarded their jurisdic-
tional autonomy.106 It is therefore not surprising that, although the 
comital Council adjudicated in confl icts about land and also about 
credit secured on land, up until the early 15th century very few cases 
involving commercial debts appear to have been brought before it.107
Coordination problems are also refl ected in the organisation of debt 
collection in Holland. Th e procedure for the collection of debts indi-
cated in the Haarlem charter of liberties, partly of Den Bosch origin 
and partly newly added, clearly originates in a tradition of collective 
responsibility. When a foreigner reneged on an obligation ratifi ed by 
the court, he would be called to justice three times. If he did not appear, 
he would be convicted. Th is meant that as soon as he re-entered the 
city he was to be arrested and forced to pay not only his debt but also a 
compensation for damages and a fi ne. Th is was, of course, hardly an 
encouragement to fulfi l one’s obligations, and many debtors probably 
decided to stay away. In such cases, the sheriff , joined by the entire 
community, was to go to the debtor’s place of residence and seize his 
property. Th is procedure was called bannen.108
What this amounted to, in fact, was the right of the urban commu-
nity—acting in defence of its members’ interests—to take justice into 
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its own hands. During an earlier period, this custom was probably 
widespread: almost exactly the same procedure is outlined in the early 
12th-century charter of liberties of Saint-Omer.109 But even then it was 
probably regarded as a custom that ought to be abolished or at least 
regulated. In fact—as the Haarlem charter indicates—it was a last 
resort, to be used only if attempts to reclaim the debt through the regu-
lar judicial channels had failed. In an increasingly complex and regu-
lated society, this kind of self-help must have become more and more 
problematic. Th e mid 15th-century law code of the small town of 
’s-Gravenzande proves the point. Although the author of this codifi ca-
tion accepted most of the regulations from the Haarlem charter of lib-
erties as still valid, he explicitly warned against the use of the procedure 
of bannen, especially if the debtor was the burgess of another town: it 
could damage relations and cause trouble.110
Th e alternative that developed in the southern Low Countries was 
in keeping with the dominant position of the towns in the region: it 
involved the extension of the urban enforcement mechanisms over the 
surrounding countryside. In Brabant, in particular, the role of urban 
courts in debt ratifi cation was much reinforced by privileges which the 
dukes granted to the large towns. In the late 13th century, Louvain and 
Brussels received a privilege that later came to be known as the right of 
ingebod. It gave the courts of aldermen of these towns the right to call 
to justice all defaulting debtors who had registered their obligations at 
the court, even if they did not live in town. Th e practice was aft erwards 
also found in Antwerp and Den Bosch.111 Th e right of ingebod off ered 
the creditor a substantial advantage: he no longer had to go to the trou-
ble of applying to the court of the debtor’s place of residence. But there 
was a reverse side: the towns were able to use this privilege to increase 
their dominance over the surrounding countryside.112
In Holland, arrangements such as this were known only in the south 
near the Brabant border. Dordrecht and Geertruidenberg both man-
aged in the late 13th century to have the validity of their aldermen’s 
charters extended to the surrounding countryside. Th e small towns of 
Heusden and Woudrichem claimed the same rights—although for 
266 chapter seven
113 Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, 189–190; OHZ III, no. 1815 (privilege to 
Geertruidenberg); OHZ IV, no. 2154 (to Dordrecht); Hoppenbrouwers, Heusden II, 
610–612 (Heusden); Korteweg, Rechtsbronnen Woudrichem I, 68–70 (Woudrichem).
114 De Monté Ver Loren, Hoofdlijnen, 146–147; Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Op zoek’, 
230–232.
Woudrichem these were successfully contested by the rural communi-
ties and their lords in the 15th century.113
In the rest of Holland, urban courts were unable to usurp the rights 
to voluntary jurisdiction in the countryside. Th ere is a direct relation 
to the structure of the Holland society. When in the 11th to 13th cen-
turies Holland’s extensive central peat district was reclaimed, the 
emerging pioneer communities were placed directly under comital 
authority. As we have seen, voluntary jurisdiction was the responsibil-
ity of a local court in which both the local population (the ‘neighbours’ 
or the aldermen) and a government agent, the sheriff , were repre-
sented. Th ese courts formed the relatively homogeneous bottom layer 
of the public jurisdictional system; with only a few exceptions, private 
courts comparable to the English manorial courts were non-existent. 
Admittedly, the count frequently granted lower jurisdiction and the 
revenues it rendered to an ambachtsheer (village lord), who then 
appointed a sheriff  to do the work; but these courts operated as part of 
the regular system of public justice and did not compete with it.114 
Consequently, once towns began to emerge, the foundations for the 
role of local rural courts in non-contentious jurisdiction were already 
established.
Th e strong position of urban and rural courts in non-contentious 
jurisdiction never became an absolute monopoly. Ecclesiastical courts 
were a potential competitor. Th ey were active in non-contentious as 
well as contentious jurisdiction and had some attractive advantages to 
off er to litigants in debt confl icts, advantages that included the possi-
bility of penitence or even excommunication as punishments. 
Moreover, in Holland, the districts of the lower ecclesiastical courts 
usually included several parishes, which may have provided at least a 
partial solution to the problem of debt recovery across local bounda-
ries. However, aft er the 13th century, the lower ecclesiastical courts in 
the diocese Utrecht—to which Holland belonged—lost much ground 
to the secular courts. Th e position of the ecclesiastical courts probably 
suff ered from the drawn-out struggles between the bishop and the 
powerful archdeacon, and by the continuous eff orts of the counts of 
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Holland to reduce the worldly power of the bishop in their territories. 
Meanwhile, the competence of the offi  cialis (the highest ecclesiastical 
judge in the diocese) in voluntary jurisdiction was restricted to con-
tracts and deeds that involved a religious institution as one of the 
parties.115
In theory, public notaries provided another alternative, but notaries 
were an Italian invention that did not reach the Low Countries until 
relatively late. Around the year 1300, public notaries did make their 
appearance in the southern Low Countries, but they found a forceful 
competitor in the local courts. With the exception of Bruges, where 
notaries were frequently employed by Italian merchants in commercial 
matters, their role in voluntary jurisdiction was usually limited to the 
recording of wills and marriage arrangements. In Holland, the posi-
tion of notaries in the recording of contracts and debts was even more 
marginal. Public notaries appeared in the Holland towns only in the 
second half of the 14th century; by then the monopoly of the local 
courts in non-contentious jurisdiction was too well-established to be 
easily budged. Until the end of the Middle Ages, the activities of public 
notaries in Holland remained narrowly linked to the church and to 
canon law. Almost all notaries were clergymen, and most of their cli-
ents were religious institutions or laymen who were involved in a law-
suit before an ecclesiastical court.116
In short, whereas in England contract enforcement beyond the lim-
its of the town’s freedom was ultimately ensured through the interven-
tion of the Crown, and in the southern Low Countries through the 
courts of the large cities, in Holland the position of local courts in 
towns and villages remained intact. On the one hand this was the 
Achilles’ heel of Holland’s system of debt litigation. It meant that there 
was no easy way to get hold of evasive debtors. A creditor had no other 
option but to travel to the debtor’s place of residence and fi le his claim 
with the local court. In a small country like Holland, travelling expenses 
were perhaps not decisive. Since the habit of adopting successful prac-
tices developed elsewhere had led to convergence of regulations, dif-
ferences in legal systems can hardly have posed insurmountable 
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problems either. Still, aldermen were likely to give the interests of a 
fellow-townsman greater weight than those of a mere stranger. In addi-
tion, there was a formal complication: local courts did not simply 
accept registration before another local court as proof of the existence 
of a debt.117
Th e consequences are illustrated by a case from late 15th-century 
Leiden.118 Two Leiden burgesses, a father and son, had closed a deal 
about the purchase of a loom in neighbouring Noordwijk; the deal and 
the obligations that it created were registered with the court of alder-
men in that village. When the loom was delivered in Leiden, the buyers 
claimed it was of an inferior quality; they refused to pay and wanted to 
undo the purchase. Th e Noordwijk seller fi led a claim with the Leiden 
court and demanded payment. He stated that the buyers had promised 
him to have the Noordwijk charter ratifi ed in Leiden, but the buyers 
maintained they had made no such promise. In the end the Leiden 
court decided the buyers had to swear that they had never promised to 
have the Noordwijk charter ratifi ed in Leiden; if they refused to do so, 
the court would accept the claim of the seller and therefore also the 
existence of a debt. Th e case shows that the fact that a Leiden charter 
did not exist was a serious complication for the claimant. Even though 
he had a Noordwijk charter, summary execution was not an option if 
this charter had not been ratifi ed in Leiden.
Yet in other ways the equal position of both urban and rural courts 
in voluntary jurisdiction was an advantage. For example, it meant the 
absence of overlapping jurisdictions and the endless legal fi ghts that 
could result from them. Moreover, it prevented the systematic bias in 
favour of burgesses that was almost inevitable if urban courts dealt 
with all confl icts between burgesses and villagers from the nearby 
countryside. Finally, the absence of a central corrective mechanism, 
even if it made debt collection across local borders more diffi  cult, 
seems to have also had positive eff ects: left  to their own devices, local 
courts were stimulated to take an active role in debt collection.
Th is is perhaps best illustrated by the way the court of Brielle dealt 
with debt cases, as is documented in both the charter of liberties and 
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Jan Matthijssen’s early 15th-century law code.119 In this small town, the 
sheriff —at the request of the aldermen—made a tour through the 
streets of the town three times a year, collecting complaints about 
unpaid debts. Upon arrival at a debtor’s house, the sheriff  would 
‘administer justice’: if the debtor admitted he had not fulfi lled his obli-
gations, an arrangement was concluded to ensure that payment would 
be forthcoming within two weeks. A clerk would write down the details 
and the debtor would hand over a collateral to the creditor, either to be 
redeemed within two weeks or to be left  in the creditor’s hands as com-
pensation.120 Th e system is reminiscent of the poortgedingen held in 
15th-century Leiden, special court sessions almost completely devoted 
to problems with debts.121 Th e ommegangen in the Brielle charter seem 
to have had the same function, but here the authorities did not merely 
wait for creditors to fi le their complaints; they also took steps to actively 
trace unpaid debts.
In Holland, central jurisdiction in commercial confl icts was of little 
signifi cance before the middle of the 15th century. Only aft er the incor-
poration into the Burgundian empire, and in conjunction with the 
growing power of the state, central judiciary institutions acquired a 
position as courts of appeal against the verdict of urban courts. In the 
second half of the 15th and the early 16th century, the Court of Holland 
(Hof van Holland, the highest court in Holland) and the Supreme 
Court in Malines (Grote Raad, the highest court for the Low Countries 
as a whole) quickly gained in popularity. Plaintiff s were apparently 
attracted by the objectivity and sophistication of the central courts, 
which were soon almost entirely staff ed by university-trained jurists.122
In theory, these bodies created new possibilities for debt recovery 
across local borders: it now became possible to take cases against oth-
ers than fellow townsmen to the central level. In practice, however, the 
role of central courts in the settlement of commercial disputes remained 
very limited: court records reveal only very modest numbers of busi-
ness confl icts. Merchants were probably deterred by the expenses and 
the time-consuming nature of procedures: it might take years before a 
decision was reached.123 Also, expertise in business disputes was most 
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likely better represented at the local level. In short, for the resolution of 
commercial confl icts, the development of central judiciary bodies 
from the middle of the 15th century onwards had little to add to 
Holland’s pre-existing solid foundation of local debt litigation and debt 
registration, based on a homogeneous and well-functioning network 
of rural and urban courts.
7.6 Conclusions
Th e previous chapter discussed the organisation of weighing and 
measuring as representative of institutions that primarily aff ected the 
matching of supply and demand; this chapter has dealt with institu-
tions that in the fi rst place relate to security. It has focused on what 
Greif termed ‘the fundamental problem of exchange’. Th e ubiquity of 
credit in medieval trade, not just in long-distance trade but also in 
local trade, gave rise to problems of shirking that could not always be 
solved by mechanisms based on trust and personal relations. Attention 
has been paid to the contribution of two complementary solutions, fre-
quently stressed in the literature: merchant guilds as a form of self-
organisation based on a communal responsibility model, and debt 
litigation as an exponent of a government-dominated system of law 
enforcement centred on individual responsibilities.
Th e only reference to an indigenous merchant guild in Holland 
dates from Dordrecht in the year 1200. Market size could not possibly 
explain the near absence of merchant guilds: Holland’s medieval towns 
were small even by contemporary standards. It is more likely that, in 
keeping with Greif ’s views, a new mechanism developed that made 
merchant guilds redundant at an early stage because it achieved the 
same goals in a diff erent way. Th is mechanism was not embodied in 
the rise of a strong central government, but in a prominent role for 
local courts. In Holland these courts assumed a role in debt recovery 
almost from the moment they emerged. Th ere is a link with Holland’s 
history of urbanisation: towns did not emerge until late; and once they 
did, they very soon acquired self-governing powers, including the 
right to administer justice in commercial confl icts.
Th e second mechanism, debt litigation via courts of justice, was well 
established at an early stage. Th e late rise of the Holland towns worked 
in their favour: models that had proved to work elsewhere could be 
easily adopted. Th e details of some of the legal procedures for debt 
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recovery used in the towns of medieval Holland were probably copied 
from the southern Low Countries, most likely under the infl uence 
of trade contacts. In fact, it seems quite possible that the Den Bosch 
charter of liberties appealed to the Haarlemmers exactly because it 
contained a set of detailed rules well suited to the needs of a rapidly 
developing economy. Nevertheless, the impact of the local context was 
vital. Local courts with a role in monitoring land transfers already 
existed, and the people of Haarlem were probably familiar with issues 
like mortgages, ratifi cation of debts, and fact-fi nding methods of proof. 
Th is prepared the way for the adoption of rules like those in the Den 
Bosch charter.
Th e importance of local circumstances becomes clear when we 
focus on the one important aspect in which debt litigation procedures 
in Holland, England and the southern Low Countries diff ered. Th is 
aspect is closely related to the social and political characteristics of 
society. It regards the central position of Holland’s local courts, both 
urban and rural, in voluntary jurisdiction, as opposed to the domi-
nance of the large cities in the southern Low Countries and that of the 
registries acknowledged under the Statute of Acton Burnell and the 
Statute of Merchants in England. On the one hand the judicial auton-
omy of these local courts reveals a weak spot in the system of debt liti-
gation in Holland: the recovery of debts across administrative borders 
remained cumbersome. On the other hand, the fact that local courts, 
urban and rural alike, virtually had a local monopoly in voluntary 
jurisdiction helped to prevent urban domination of the countryside 
and thus reduced opportunities for rent-seeking. It also appears to 
have stimulated an active role for local authorities in debt recovery, 
thus providing reliable and easily accessible mechanisms for debt liti-
gation and debt registration at the local level.
In short, in medieval Holland a solid foundation for a locally-based 
system of contract enforcement grounded on individual responsibili-
ties was laid at an early stage. Th is arrangement had potential for future 
development: in later years Amsterdam, for instance, built on this 
foundation to create a much more elaborate system of local justice in 
commercial confl icts.124 It thus contributed signifi cantly to the creation 
of favourable conditions for market exchange in the long run.
PART III
MARKET PERFORMANCE: QUANTITATIVE TESTS
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In December 1438, aft er more than a year of grain shortages, the 
Council of Holland renewed the trade restrictions that had been intro-
duced in the year before; they included export prohibitions for grain 
and beer and a strict supervision of the internal grain trade. Th e words 
that were used on this occasion betray despair: the Council ‘could not 
think of anything better to provide our poor community with grain’.1 
Apparently, Holland grain markets were unable to cope with circum-
stances of extreme scarcity. Th is is perhaps not surprising: between 
1437 and 1439 dearth was causing serious problems in much of north-
western Europe. It is hardly realistic to expect that Holland commodity 
markets would have been effi  cient enough to allow the county to escape 
these problems altogether. Th e question is: did Holland markets do a 
better job than markets elsewhere—not just during this crisis, but also 
in normal years?
Th e preceding chapters have shown that, in late medieval Holland, a 
framework of commodity market institutions developed that might be 
expected to have lowered transaction costs and facilitated exchange. 
It  now remains to be seen if these expectations came true; in other 
words, whether quantitative measurements support the hypothesis 
that commodity markets in Holland performed well when compared 
with markets elsewhere. Th is subject is addressed in this and in the fol-
lowing chapter. Th e present chapter focuses on market integration. Th e 
underlying assumption, derived from New Institutional Economics, is 
that favourable institutions, by reducing transaction costs, promote the 
rise of well-integrated markets. Chapter 9 will examine market orien-
tation. Starting from the view that effi  cient market institutions and low 
transaction costs encourage and facilitate participation in market 
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transactions, an attempt is made to estimate the degree of commer-
cialisation of late medieval society in Holland.
Market integration and market orientation have been selected 
because they can be seen as general indicators of market perfor-
mance.  In this way, they provide a valuable addition to the earlier 
chapters, which each focused on only a part of the institutional frame-
work. Market integration and market orientation have the advantage 
of refl ecting the impact of the institutional framework as a whole 
for the economy at large. However, precisely because of the general 
nature of the two indicators, they cannot be expected to provide 
absolute proof of a causal relation between certain institutions on the 
one hand and market performance on the other. Th erefore, the quanti-
tative approach in this and the following chapter should be seen as 
complementary to the qualitative but much more detailed informa-
tion presented earlier. Only by combining the results of both is a fair 
assessment of the relation between institutions and market perfor-
mance possible.
Th e nature of the relation between institutions, market integration, 
and economic growth is controversial. Some of the discussions on this 
issue are linked to the debate on the Great Divergence. Th ey evolve 
around the question of whether greater market effi  ciency, supported 
by more favourable institutions, was one of the elements that gave pre-
modern Europe an advance over the rest of world. Carol Shiue and 
Wolfgang Keller, for instance, who are critical of this assumption, 
argue that on the eve of the Industrial Revolution grain markets in 
China’s Yangtze delta were just as integrated as grain markets on the 
European continent. Th ey stress that market integration in Europe 
improved suddenly and dramatically only in the early 19th century 
and conclude that market integration was a refl ection of accelerated 
economic growth rather than a pre-condition for it. Th e opposing view 
is refl ected in a recent analysis of 18th-century Indian grain markets by 
Roman Studer, who does not deny that market integration in Europe 
increased substantially in the 19th century, but demonstrates that in 
the late 18th century grain markets in Europe nevertheless showed 
much higher levels of integration than those in India.2
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If this is true, then the next question is when and how Europe had 
obtained this advance. Opinions diff er on the development of European 
market integration during the early modern era and on the role of 
institutions in this process. One group of scholars sees signs of increas-
ing integration, supported by institutional improvements. Karl Gunnar 
Persson, for instance, claims that the leap in the 19th century was pre-
ceded by a gradual process of increasing integration on a much lower 
level. He states that by the middle of the 18th century the contours of a 
European wheat market were beginning to show, and attributes this to 
the gradual emergence of robust trading and information networks.3 
Similar conclusions have recently been drawn for the North Sea and 
Baltic region in particular.4 For rural England, it has been argued that 
regional specialisation, combined with interregional integration, made 
signifi cant progress in the course of the 17th century.5 Others, how-
ever, deny that the early modern era brought signifi cant improvement. 
A recent contribution by Victoria Bateman claims that early modern 
market integration levels followed a U-shaped trend, dropping off  in 
the late 16th and 17th centuries (mainly due to warfare) but recovering 
aft erwards. As a result, market integration in 1800 was at about the 
same level as in 1500.6
Th is shift s the rise of market integration back to the Middle Ages. 
Once again, opinions diff er on scope, intensity, and progress. Johan 
Söderberg, for example, has demonstrated important similarities in 
grain price movements in the late 14th and 15th centuries within a 
cluster of cities and towns in northwestern Europe, both on the North 
Sea coasts and further inland—in the southern Low Countries, the 
north of France, the present-day Netherlands, and the south of 
England.7 Richard Unger, on the other hand, stresses that even at the 
end of the Middle Ages most grain consumed in the cities of north-
western Europe came from nearby, and only in years of dearth were 
large volumes of grain brought in from further afi eld. Unger concludes 
that interregional integration in the North Sea region was weak in the 
14th and 15th centuries and only gradually became stronger in the 
16th century, although he does admit that at least in the southern Low 
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Countries a well-integrated regional market had already formed before 
that period.8 On this last issue, Unger follows the conclusions of Van 
der Wee in his study of the Antwerp market and Marie-Jeanne Tits-
Dieuaide in her analysis of grain prices in Brabant, both of whom con-
clude that an integrated regional market was in existence in the 15th 
century.9
Th is strongly suggests that on a regional level a considerable degree 
of market integration had been reached by the end of the Middle Ages, 
but it is still unclear when this process began. For England, with its 
abundance of early price data, Gregory Clark claims that an effi  cient 
and coherent market for grains on a national level, with only limited 
price diff erentials between locations, had emerged as early as the 
beginning of the 13th century.10 Certainly, it has been argued that 
England was a special case. James Galloway, linking market integration 
to England’s institutional framework, believes the emergence of strong 
central government at an early stage had helped reduce transaction 
costs through ensuring a stable currency, imposing national standards 
for weights and measures, removing internal fi scal or political barriers 
to trade, and providing legal means for contract enforcement.11 
However, whether this really gave England an advance with regard to 
market integration is doubtful; since 13th-century price data for conti-
nental northwestern Europe are lacking, a comparison for this period 
cannot be made.
Th erefore, this chapter focuses on the late 14th and early 15th cen-
tury, when data become more abundant. It compares levels of market 
integration for Holland, England, and the southern Low Countries 
at that point in time, and attempts to relate the fi ndings to some of the 
characteristics of the organisation of markets outlined in the previous 
chapters. Th e analysis focuses on wheat prices for two very practical 
reasons: fi rstly, the availability of more and earlier price data than for 
any other commodity (although in Holland they are by no means abun-
dant); and secondly, the possibilities for interpretation and  comparison 
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off ered by the literature—the integration of markets for wheat is a well-
researched subject. It is true that wheat markets may not be representa-
tive in every respect for grain markets in general or for commodity 
markets in a wider sense. Wheat was more expensive than rye, barley, 
and oats, and therefore better able to bear the costs of transport than 
the cheaper grains. More importantly, Holland was dependent on the 
import of bread grains, a fact that may have brought some specifi c ele-
ments to the grain trade. On the other hand, this also means that wheat 
market integration probably demonstrates the limits of the possibili-
ties provided by the framework of market institutions and in this sense 
can be seen as an indicator of the effi  ciency of that framework.
Th e theory is simple. Institutional economists link market integration 
to institutional effi  ciency: institutions that provide security and facili-
tate the matching of supply and demand reduce transaction costs and 
thus promote the rise of integrated markets. However, in practice a 
given set of institutions may aff ect market integration in diff erent and 
sometimes contradictory ways. Furthermore, non-institutional factors 
such as transport costs can also have a profound impact on market 
integration. Th is is why this chapter fi rst outlines in what ways both 
institutional and non-institutional factors can be expected to have 
aff ected market integration in medieval Holland. Next, aft er an explan-
atory note on the methods and data that have been used, price volatil-
ity is discussed—the fl uctuation of prices over time. Well-integrated 
markets are usually less volatile because highs and lows are more easily 
levelled out by grain transports from surplus to shortage regions: in 
this sense, volatility can be seen as the result of market integration. 
Following this, we will look at the underlying integration across dis-
tance—not primarily price convergence, as transport costs will always 
cause price diff erentials, but rather the co-movement of prices in dif-
ferent locations.
8.2 The impact of institutional and 
non-institutional factors
Th e debate on the benefi ts of integrated markets goes back to the 
second half of the 18th century, when the French économistes attacked 
the traditional regulation of food provisioning practised by urban and 
central authorities. Th ey claimed that export prohibitions, forestall-
ing prohibitions, compulsory staples, checks on private grain stocks, 
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public granaries, and bread price regulation ultimately did not have 
the desired eff ect of stabilising prices. Th ese measures actually aggra-
vated problems, in two ways: in the short run, they hampered the free 
fl ow of goods that could have evened out local shortages; and in the 
long run, they discouraged competition between producers and thus 
blocked investments in production. Regulation of the type criticised by 
the économistes was indeed common practice in Europe’s pre-modern 
grain markets. Th e exact nature, scale, and intensity varied, but author-
ities everywhere tried to ensure the transparency of markets and ban 
collusion and speculation. It should be added, however, that rules 
were usually only rigidly enforced in periods of dearth; moreover, 
authorities only very rarely tried to directly control prices by setting a 
maximum.12
Th e eff ects of regulation on grain prices are not quite clear. According 
to Persson, there is no evidence that the économistes were correct in 
their claim that regulation made matters worse, whereas there are indi-
cations that strict regulation did contribute to the goal of soft ening 
extreme price fl uctuations.13 Th e Ghent grain staple, for instance, is 
thought to have provided the urban population with a stable supply of 
cheap grain (even though Ghent’s privileged position meant that other 
towns could not enjoy the same advantage, as we saw earlier).14 Yet 
Persson has also shown that in the early modern era the eff ects of regu-
lation were limited: even in the most rigidly controlled markets, price 
volatility did not fall below a certain threshold level.15
Looking at the organisation of Holland’s medieval grain markets 
from the perspective of this discussion, elements refl ecting both sides 
of the argument can be discerned. Th e previous chapters have shown 
that Holland markets were relatively open and informal, which should 
have enhanced market integration. Urban markets were usually easily 
accessible: outside traders and merchants (people from out of town, 
non-burgesses or non-guild members) faced few restrictions. Coercion 
was uncommon: urban market districts remained fl exible and there 
were few restrictions to informal trade in the countryside. In addition, 
the balance of powers provided checks on excessive taxation of trade 
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by the count, lords, and towns: tolls and impositions were moderate. 
Th e absence of uniformity in weights and measures and the weakness 
of cross-boundary mechanisms for contract enforcement did work in 
the opposite direction, but as argued earlier the eff ects were probably 
mild.
On the other hand, the grain trade was in some respects an excep-
tion: practices and regulations did not diff er as much from those in the 
neighbouring regions as they did for many other commodities. Firstly, 
urban authorities in Holland, as did their counterparts elsewhere in 
Europe, intervened in the grain trade in the interest of urban food 
provisioning. Bread was probably their fi rst concern: bakers were 
subjected to a series of regulations on the weight and quality of bread, 
and bread price regulation is found in Holland towns from at least the 
early 15th century onwards.16 But town governments also regulated the 
grain trade in their attempts to promote transparency and prevent 
speculation.17 Th e early 15th-century Leiden by-laws provide an illus-
tration: grain sales on Saturday, the day of the weekly market, were 
restricted to market hours and had to take place in public; during the 
rest of the week grain could be sold only for the price it had fetched 
on the previous Saturday. Th e resale of grain purchased at the market 
was prohibited, and exports of this grain were restricted. Forward 
transactions and the fi nancial obligations ensuing from them had to be 
offi  cially registered with the court of aldermen, and the term for such 
transactions was limited to six weeks at most.18 Secondly, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, some of the towns in Holland’s few grain-producing 
regions possessed a regional grain trade monopoly, despite the absence 
of a tradition of coercion. Goedereede and Naarden enjoyed such a 
regional staple privilege even in the 14th century, and Brielle may have 
been in the same position.
However, strict enforcement of urban grain trade regulation was 
probably limited to times of dearth; in fact, some of the Leiden rules, 
such as the export restriction, may well have been intended as crisis 
interventions in the fi rst place. Moreover, the Leiden regulations are 
modest in comparison to the very elaborate set of rules that structured 
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the retail grain trade in Ghent.19 Ghent, admittedly a very prominent 
case, expected all grain trade to take place at one of the offi  cially desig-
nated market places, strictly prohibited all forestalling, and issued 
rules to protect consumers determining precisely when and where 
bakers, brewers, millers, and merchants could buy grain. In times of 
dearth, merchants were, moreover, obliged to sell part of their stocks 
daily, consumers could buy only limited amounts, and all exports were 
prohibited.20
Likewise, even though in Holland some regional grain trade monop-
olies existed, it was not a general pattern. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
Alkmaar—also a market centre for a grain-growing district—failed in 
its attempts to establish a monopoly for its weekly market. Delft  for-
bade its own burgesses to buy grain in the direct vicinity of the town, 
but apparently did not try to impose a similar prohibition on others.21 
As we shall see shortly, the Catharinagasthuis (St. Catherine’s Hospital) 
and Leeuwenhorst Abbey, two religious institutions in the Leiden 
region, had no trouble buying grain directly from producers in the 
Delft  region. Maintaining that there were no diff erences at all would 
therefore stretch the argument too far. Despite nuances, the hypothesis 
that the organisation of Holland grain markets facilitated market inte-
gration is still a valid point of departure.
Other factors besides the institutional framework may also have had 
an impact on the level of market integration in Holland. Th e most 
important of these factors is the exceptional position of Holland with 
regard to bread grain provisioning. Holland imported more grain, in 
relative and perhaps even in absolute terms, than any of its neighbours. 
In this respect, Holland was very unlike England, which at least until 
the early 14th century was quite able to sustain its own population. 
England imported grains on a signifi cant scale only in years of dearth. 
For London, there is evidence of occasional grain shipments from 
Germany, Flanders, and even the Mediterranean.22 Exports were 
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 probably much more frequent, although they still involved only a tiny 
fraction of the country’s cereal production.23
With the subsistence crises of the fi rst half of the 14th century, 
England’s grain exports declined signifi cantly. Exports were tied to a 
system of royal licenses; the restrictions on trade embodied by this sys-
tem were supported by the Commons, fearful of shortages. Only at the 
end of the century did the grain trade revive. Th e lift ing of export 
restrictions in 1394 was probably both a refl ection of and a stimulus 
for this revival: Englishmen no longer required a license to ship cereals 
overseas, as long as they paid the regular custom duties and did not 
take their cargo to an enemy nation. In 1437 a condition was added: 
the grain price had to be below a certain level for export to be permit-
ted. From the port towns on the coasts of Norfolk and Suff olk, grain 
was transported to Flanders and Holland on a regular basis. Quantities 
were usually modest; but in times of dearth and high prices on the 
continent, England could be an important source of supply for the Low 
Countries.24
Unlike England, Flanders was unable to feed its growing popula-
tion.  Th is may have been the case even in the 12th century, but it 
became an increasingly pressing problem with the progress of urbani-
sation in the 13th and 14th centuries, a problem that could only be 
solved by large imports of bread grains.25 By far the most important 
external supplier was the north of France. Wheat from Hainault, Artois 
and the region around Lille, Douai and Cambrai was transported north 
over the rivers Scheldt and Lys to be consumed in the towns of Flanders 
and Brabant.26 At the same time, Flanders continued to produce grain 
on its own soil. For the Oudenaarde region, it has been estimated 
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that—around 1550—more than half of the arable land was used for 
bread grain cultivation, with much of the produce consumed by the 
smallholders themselves.27
By that time, in large areas of Holland the cultivation of wheat and 
rye had become almost impossible. Th e peat lands that had rendered a 
satisfactory crop of bread grains for many years aft er their reclamation 
increasingly failed to do so, as the drained peat soil gradually subsided. 
Exactly when wheat and rye cultivation became problematic is still a 
matter of debate—perhaps as early as 1350, but certainly by the early 
15th century.28 With the exception of a few regions with sandy or clay 
soils—such as the South-Holland islands, the Honterland (the region 
west of Delft ), the Gooiland, and parts of West-Friesland—Holland 
could no longer survive without importing bread grains. Even around 
the year 1400, Holland grain merchants were buying large quantities of 
grain in the ports of the Somme region. Th ey also visited the grain 
markets in the cities of the southern Low Countries.29 French, Flemish 
and Brabant grain remained important in the 15th century, but Holland 
also imported substantial quantities of grain from other regions—from 
the German Rhineland and the upper Meuse region, from nearby 
Guelders, Utrecht and Zeeland, and from the north of Germany. Only 
at the end of the century did this diversity begin to give way to a grow-
ing dominance of the rye trade with the Baltic region, although this 
process was not completed until the middle of the 16th century. By 
then, Holland probably produced only 10 to 25% of the bread grain it 
needed, depending on imports for the remainder.30 As will be shown in 
the following pages, this dependence on grain imports had important 
eff ects. It probably gave rise to a pattern of price change over the year, 
deviating from what was customary in other countries, and it is likely 
that it stimulated interregional market integration.
A second non-institutional factor bound to aff ect market integration is 
the cost of transport. Its importance is clear from the fact that market 
integration in Europe jumped to a much higher level with the innova-
tions in transport technology of the modern era.31 Th e possibility of 
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another jump of this kind in the high Middle Ages cannot be excluded. 
Twelft h-century England, for example, witnessed a dramatic increase 
in the number of bridges and a transition from traction by oxen to 
traction by horses that may well have had a similar revolutionary eff ect. 
However, quantitative data from this period that would allow us to 
detect the consequences of such a jump for price integration are lack-
ing, and from the 14th century onwards—when reliable data are avail-
able—transport costs appear to have changed very little.32
Even if no major revolution in transport costs took place in the late 
Middle Ages, the costs of transporting grain have a bearing on the 
analysis in the following pages for another reason: they are linked to 
the mode of transport. Calculations made by Masschaele, on the basis 
of data from a number of 14th-century English sheriff s’ accounts, show 
that the ratio of the costs of land transport to river transport to sea 
transport was about 8:4:1.33 Medieval Holland, because of its location 
on the coast and in the delta of Rhine and Meuse, had easy access to 
transport by sea and by river. Moreover, the county was characterised 
by an extensive network of smaller inland waterways. Th is must have 
helped maintain low transport costs for grain.
Fragmentary data on internal transport costs support this assump-
tion. In the year 1388/89, Egmond Abbey purchased wheat in Haarlem 
on several occasions. For three of these occasions, the accounts report 
transport costs to Egmond, a distance of 24 kilometres as the crow 
fl ies. Th ese transports added on average 1.8%, or 0.07% per kilometre, 
to the price the Abbey had paid for the wheat. About ten years later, 
functionaries of the count organised three large transports of wheat 
bought in Haarlem to Amsterdam, a distance of 17 kilometres. Each 
transport added about 1.0% to the average price of wheat in this year, 
or 0.06% per kilometre. Finally, when in 1432 the Catharinagasthuis in 
Leiden arranged for six small wheat transports between Delft  and 
Leiden—a distance of 19 kilometres—the transport costs added on 
average 0.1% per kilometre to the price of the wheat.34 Masschaele’s 
calculations of transport costs for wheat in 14th-century England 
arrive at an addition of 0.25% per kilometre for land transport; for 
river transport, the addition was just above 0.1%.35 Th e Holland rates 
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just mentioned are around or below the latter fi gure, which is probably 
a refl ection of the density of the network of waterways in Holland.
Both the early dependence on grain imports and low transport costs 
related to Holland’s geographical situation may have stimulated mar-
ket integration independently of the impact of favourable market insti-
tutions. Th is must be taken into account when comparing Holland 
with England or with the southern Low Countries. Here this will be 
undertaken in general terms only; developing a quantitative model 
that weighs the eff ects of institutional against non-institutional factors 
is beyond the scope of this study.
8.3 Methods and data
Sophisticated methods for measuring price integration such as those 
used by Persson require continuous or almost continuous price series, 
a requirement the data from late 14th and early 15th-century Holland 
do not meet.36 Th erefore, the analysis presented here is based on the 
simplest of methods. Price volatility, both within and between years, is 
assessed by calculating variation coeffi  cients—in the fi rst case over 
monthly and in the second over annual prices (the variation coeffi  cient 
is the standard deviation as a percentage of the mean). Co-movement 
of prices is measured on the basis of correlation coeffi  cients over 
annual prices. Unfortunately the nature of the sources does not allow 
for a detailed analysis of co-movement of prices on a regional level 
(within Holland). Th e analysis of price movements therefore focuses 
on the international level (the links between Holland markets and 
markets abroad). In order to preserve proportionality, prices have been 
converted to a logarithmic scale; to allow for interregional compari-
sons they have also been converted to grams of silver per hectolitre.37
Th e use of simple measures has disadvantages. Correlation coeffi  -
cients may be infl uenced by something more than just market integra-
tion. High coeffi  cients may also refl ect similarities in weather 
conditions and thus in yields; likewise, low coeffi  cients may, at least in 
theory, indicate local diff erences in yields. About the latter we need not 
worry too much: research results for the late Middle Ages suggest that 
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local weather conditions did not have a strong impact on prices. 
According to Clark, in medieval England the connection between 
manorial yields and local prices was weak. For 65 manors Clark com-
pares local yields in the 13th, 14th and early 15th centuries to local 
prices. He fi nds that prices were only marginally infl uenced by local 
yields; instead, they conformed to a very large extent to a national 
trend. If local yields were high and prices threatened to fall, the surplus 
soon fl owed out to markets where it fetched a better price, thus restor-
ing local prices to average levels. If yields were low and prices high, 
grain would fl ow in—with the same eff ect. Clark estimates that, even 
when local yields doubled, local prices would still fall by only 2.5%.38
Th e possibility of adverse growing conditions prevailing in a large 
region over a longer period of time—for instance, in the case of a very 
dry or a very wet summer or, even worse, a series of consecutive bad 
years of this type—is another matter.39 In situations like these, prices 
on the whole would no doubt have moved upward even if markets had 
been isolated, accounting for part of the correlation. Yet prices would 
not have risen with the same speed and to the same level everywhere; 
there were bound to be local variations in supply and demand, and it 
would still depend on the degree of market integration whether these 
local variations were evened out or not. Th erefore, correlation coeffi  -
cients—if used with caution—can still be a helpful instrument of anal-
ysis in situations where more advanced methods are not applicable.
Price volatility, in whatever way it is measured, may also be infl u-
enced by more than just market integration. Soft ening of extremes 
through market regulation has already been discussed. In addition, 
there is a second factor that aff ects liberal markets as well as regulated 
ones: storage. Stored reserves of grain can level out defi cits in much the 
same way as can transports from surplus to shortage regions. However, 
there is no reason to think that in Holland storage was much greater or 
lesser than in neighbouring regions. Carry-over of grain reserves from 
one year to the next appears to have been a marginal phenomenon 
everywhere. Although many people may have held on to a small grain 
reserve for their own use, as a safeguard against famine, grain prices 
were too unpredictable to induce merchants or farmers to stock large 
volumes from one year to the next as a profi t-maximising strategy. 
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It was by no means certain that next year’s grain prices would cover the 
costs of storage for a year.40
Producers and merchants did of course store grain aft er the harvest 
in order to sell it in the course of the year, but the costs—which 
included barn rent, the consequences of depreciation of the grain, and 
the opportunity costs of the interest foregone—would have been much 
the same everywhere.41 It is true that between 1380 and 1440 interest 
rates in Holland fell from about 10% to around 6.25%, but they did 
much the same in England and in the southern Low Countries.42 In 
short, as long as measures assessing price fl uctuations are used in a 
comparative approach, there is little reason to fear the results will be 
biased by diff erences in storage volumes.
Before the late 14th century, Holland grain price data are fragmentary, 
unreliable, or both. Th ere are some prices in the early 14th-century 
comital accounts, but they are few and far between.43 Th e year 1344/45 
is an exception: thanks to war-time preparations, there are some refer-
ences to wheat purchases in the comital accounts, and the account of 
Egmond Abbey over the same year—the oldest account in the Abbey’s 
archive—provides several more.44 Th e Egmond accounts for the next 
couple of decades are missing, but the comital accounts have been pre-
served. De Boer has constructed series of wheat, rye, and oats prices in 
the second half of the 14th century based on the comital accounts for 
the central part of Holland. However, as De Boer himself admits, 
although these series indicate long-term price movements, they prob-
ably do not accurately refl ect short-term market fl uctuations, as they 
are based on the monetary valuations of annual grants or rents that 
had originally been in kind.45 Th is eff ectively rules out their use for a 
study of market integration.
Only at the end of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th century do 
the accounts of religious institutions begin to render real price series. 
Unfortunately, their geographical distribution is rather unbalanced. 
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46 Hof, Egmondse kloosterrekeningen, 20; the shipping costs for bringing grain from 
Frisia on page 33 probably refer to the transport from Ouddorp and Oterleek as well.
47 Noord-Hollands archief, Archief van de abdij van Egmond, inv. no. 798, f 105v, 
143, 153v.
48 For the sources and source editions, see Appendix D.
From the northern part of Holland, there is only a very short series of 
wheat prices from Egmond Abbey, covering the years 1387/88 to 
1391/92. Th e only other two price series available before the late 15th 
or even the early 16th century are from the Rijnland region in the 
central part of Holland: the prices of the Catharinagasthuis in Leiden 
from the year 1392/93 onwards and the price series of Leeuwenhorst 
Abbey in Noordwijkerhout (about 11 kilometres north of Leiden) 
beginning in the year 1410/11. Each of these sources is briefl y dis-
cussed below; Appendix D provides more detail and also presents the 
annual average prices calculating from the sources.
Egmond Abbey, situated in the north of the county, was Holland’s 
oldest religious institution, but the surviving records give wheat prices 
for only fi ve years at the end of the 14th century. Th ese prices are usu-
ally based on just two or three entries in the accounts. Moreover, it is 
not entirely clear if these entries refl ect market prices. It is not impos-
sible that, in years of dearth, Egmond Abbey could make use of its 
position as a powerful landowner to obtain grain below market prices. 
We know that in the middle of the 14th century Egmond Abbey still 
partly relied on its own barley production: the account over the year 
1344/45 mentions barley being taken to Egmond from the nearby vil-
lages of Ouddorp and Oterleek in West-Friesland (although barley 
from distant Texel was sold locally).46 Th e late 14th-century accounts 
no longer mention grain shipments from Ouddorp and Oterleek, but 
they do show that at least occasionally some of the land rents were paid 
in kind.47 For these reasons, the Egmond prices have not been included 
in the analysis, although for the sake of completeness and future refer-
ence the data have been incorporated in Appendix D.
Th e Catharinagasthuis and Leeuwenhorst price series span longer 
periods of time, although both have gaps. Prices until the year 
1439/1440 were collected anew from the original accounts. Th is year 
was selected as the fi nal year because this permits a full analysis of the 
interesting events during the dearth years 1437 to 1439. For both series, 
checking the originals led to the correction of several mistakes—some 
of them rather serious—in the published annual fi gures.48
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49 De Moor, Lonen en prijzen, 32–33.
50 Ligtenberg, Armezorg, 19–20, 31.
51 Th e possibility that this did happen cannot be discarded until a satisfactory 
explanation has been found for the near absence of rye purchases: it is almost beyond 
belief that a hospital and guesthouse for the poor would have supplied its patients and 
guests with nothing but wheaten bread.
Th e Leeuwenhorst fi gures probably refl ect market prices most accu-
rately. Th e Abbey frequently made purchases of wheat; added up over 
the year, quantities were sizable. Th e Abbey owned land in some of the 
areas where bread grain production was possible: the sandy coastal 
strip and the Honterland. It had its own farm and may, especially in 
times of dearth, have produced part of its own rye. Th is would explain 
why, during the later decades of the 15th and the fi rst decades of the 
16th century, the accounts do not mention rye purchases.49 For wheat, 
however, there are no such gaps; even in times of extreme dearth, the 
Abbey continued to buy wheat. Until the year 1430/31, the entries in 
the accounts are usually dated. Th e dates demonstrate that purchases 
were distributed fairly evenly over the year. Th e accounting year begins 
in August and ends in July, approaching the ideal of an accounting year 
that coincides with the harvest year.
Th e Catharinagasthuis (St. Catherine’s hospital) was an urban hospi-
tal that provided food and shelter—originally to poor travellers, but in 
the late 14th and early 15th century mainly to the sick and dying.50 Th e 
Catharinagasthuis series has the advantage of starting almost twenty 
years earlier than the Leeuwenhorst prices, but on the other hand 
wheat purchases were less frequent and total volumes were smaller. 
Still the Catharinagasthuis probably bought all its bread grains; it 
rented out its agrarian land and there is nothing in the accounts to sug-
gest rent payments were ever requested in kind.51 Unfortunately, the 
accounting year of the Catharinagasthuis, beginning and ending at St. 
Peter ad Cathedram (February 22), covers parts of two harvest years. 
Conversion to harvest years is not possible because the dates of the 
transactions have almost never been noted, limiting possibilities for a 
fruitful comparison with other price series.
Despite their large demand for wheat, we can be fairly sure 
Leeuwenhorst Abbey and the Catharinagasthuis did not dominate the 
market to the extent that they were able to dictate prices. Both the 
Abbey and the Catharinagasthuis bought some of their wheat at the 
weekly markets of Leiden (‘op die grote brugghe’, at the large bridge) 
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52 E.g. RAL AG, inv. no. 334–6 f 13, 334–27 f 25, 334–37 f 24; NA AAL, inv. no. 23 f 
2v, 26 f 2v, 31 f 2.
53 De Moor, Lonen en prijzen, 33.
54 Poes Pietersz. was gasthuismeester in 1413, Van Oestgheest in 1424 and Kerstanz. 
in 1418–1420 (RAL AG, inv. no. 334–27/28/30). Cf. Van Kan, Sleutels tot de macht, 
83, 88, 231, 267–268.
55 RAL AG, inv. no. 334–2 f 11 (1384) and 334–3 f 9v (1396). However, there are a 
few years in which not all entries mention the name of the seller.
56 RAL, AG inv. no. 334–25 f 25v.
and, in the case of Leeuwenhorst, also in Delft .52 Many transactions 
took place outside offi  cial market hours, but these probably conformed 
to regular market conditions. Leeuwenhorst, for example, usually did 
business with a number of merchants all over the region, which makes 
it unlikely the Abbey was able to infl uence prices.53 In Leiden there is, 
at fi rst sight, more reason for suspicion. Several of the grain merchants 
with whom the Catharinagasthuis did business can be identifi ed as 
members of the Leiden elite, and some of them (Dirc Poes Pietersz., 
Gerrit of Oestgheest, and Wermbout Kerstantz.) were—or had been—
also members of the hospital board.54 Moreover, in some years the hos-
pital obtained most of its wheat from just one merchant. In theory, this 
kind of relationship could have led to pre-arranged price agreements 
or other deviations from the market mechanism, but the accounts sug-
gest this was uncommon.
For instance, in only two years the hospital bought all of its wheat 
from one cornmonger, and both these years date from the 1390s.55 
Aft erwards, there were no exclusive monopolies, although between 
1414 and 1419 the greater part of the wheat deliveries came from one 
merchant: fi rst from Dirc Poes Pietersz., then from Wermbout 
Kerstantz. Moreover, even when there was a preference for a specifi c 
merchant, purchases were oft en valued at diff erent prices, obviously 
following seasonal fl uctuations in market price. Th e year 1417 is a 
good example. In this year the Catharinagasthuis made several pur-
chases of wheat from Dirc Poes Pietersz, for prices starting at a little 
over 19 groot per achtendeel and falling stepwise to just under 12 groot 
at the end of the accounting year.56 It is therefore safe to assume that, 
with the possible exception of the fi rst decade, the Catharinagasthuis 
price series refl ect market prices fairly accurately.
In order to gain insight into interregional market integration, Holland 
prices must be linked to similar price series in neighbouring regions. 
Nearby Utrecht renders wheat price series starting in 1370, based on 
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57 Noordegraaf, Hollands welvaren, 15–17; Van Tielhof, Hollandse graanhandel, 31.
58 Tijms, Prijzen van granen, 25–47. For the conversion of prices into silver, I have 
used Table 6 on page 77. Th is conversion results in prices that between about 1420 and 
1443, when Maastricht currency was revalued, are consistently higher than elsewhere; 
clearly the offi  cial rate no longer corresponded with the actual value. Th is may to some 
extent have infl uenced results, although the measures that have been used are not very 
sensitive to this kind of bias.
the accounts of the chapters of the Dom Church and the chapter of 
St. John. Th e Dom Church accounts also provide recordings of market 
prices per month, used to determine the canons’ monthly provision-
ing  allowance. In the past, the late 15th- and 16th-century Utrecht 
monthly grain prices have sometimes been used as proxies for 
Holland grain prices, based on the argument that the Utrecht and the 
Holland markets were closely related.57 Th is approach has not been 
copied here, not only because until the late 15th century these monthly 
recordings are scarce, but also because of a more fundamental argu-
ment: if Holland market institutions really made a diff erence to the 
level of market integration, using Utrecht prices will not bring it out. 
Th erefore, the Utrecht prices have been included in the analysis of 
interregional integration. Appendix D gives more information on the 
Utrecht price data and on the rather complicated conversion of Utrecht 
currency to silver. For Maastricht, situated on the Meuse in the south-
east of the present-day Netherlands, annual wheat prices are available 
from 1342 onwards. Th e chapters of St. Servatius and Our Lady jointly 
recorded the market price in Maastricht around the fi rst of July of 
each year to use it as a basis for the conversion of rents in kind into 
cash payments.58
In Flanders, the earliest wheat price series are those of St. Donatian’s 
chapter in Bruges, starting in 1348/49. For the 15th century, we also 
have an incomplete series of wheat prices from four religious institu-
tions in Ghent, starting in 1400/01. For Brabant, there are price series 
of the hospitals of the beguinages in Brussels and Louvain, starting in 
1400/01 and 1403/04 respectively. All these prices are institutional 
prices subject to the same limitations as the Catharinagasthuis and 
Leeuwenhorst price series, but for Louvain and Brussels—and to a 
lesser extent also for Ghent—there is an extra handicap: in part, the 
data are based not on market prices but on grain rents converted into 
cash. Although at least for Louvain there is enough evidence to prove 
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59 Verlinden, Dokumenten II, 34–36 (Bruges; also available online (IISH, ‘Database 
of Historical Prices and Wages’)); Verlinden, Dokumenten I, 36–37 (Ghent; cf. 
Okunishi, ‘Grain Price Fluctuations’, for a critical discussion of the quality of the Ghent 
data); Tits-Dieuaide, Formation des prix céréaliers, 269–271, 15–16 (Brussels and 
Louvain). Th e accounting year of the Bruges and probably also the Ghent series runs 
parallel with the harvest year, that of the Brussels and Louvain series begins and ends 
in May or June. Conversion of the Flemish and Brabant currency into silver has been 
based on Van der Wee and Aerts, ‘Vlaams-Brabantse muntgeschiedenis’, 83–84.
60 Beveridge, ‘Statistical Crime’ (Exeter); Rogers, History of Agriculture and Prices 
(London). Both are also available online: Allen and Unger, ‘Allen-Unger Database 
European Commodity Prices 1260–1914’. Th e accounting year of both series runs par-
allel with the harvest year. Conversion of the English currency into silver has also been 
based on the Allen-Unger Database (originally derived from Feavearyear, Th e Pound 
Sterling). On the London region grain market, see Campbell et al., Medieval Capital.
that in normal years these prices closely followed the market, in years 
of dearth this may not always have been the case.59
For England use has been made of two well-known price series. Th e 
Exeter prices published by Beveridge are urban market prices, recorded 
by the Exeter authorities in order to set the Assizes of Bread (that is, to 
fi x the weights of bread to be sold for a certain price). Th e prices pub-
lished by Rogers are oft en referred to as London prices, but strictly 
speaking they are sales prices collected from the accounts of a large 
number of manors. Nevertheless, since most of these manors are situ-
ated in the counties around London and since research has shown 
these counties to have been part of a coherent grain market, the use of 
the Rogers series as a representation of wheat prices in the London 
region is acceptable. Both the London region prices and the Exeter 
prices are available from a very early date onwards.60
8.4 Price volatility
Th e concept of volatility covers both seasonal price fl uctuations and 
fl uctuations in prices from one year to the next. A detailed study of 
the fi rst requires high-quality data: preferably monthly prices, but at 
least frequent and dated entries distributed over the year. For early 
15th-century Holland, data of this kind are very scarce. Th e entries 
of grain purchases in the Catharinagasthuis accounts are undated; 
those in the Leeuwenhorst accounts are dated only for the fi rst two 
decades of the series, that is for a total of 13 years between 1410/11 and 
1430/31.
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61 McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at Interest’, 178–179.
62 Poynder, ‘Grain Storage’, 6.
63 Th e month of August has not been included because there are only very few 
observations in this month. If fi gures are converted to a logarithmic scale and the 
change rate is calculated over the entire year, as is done by McCloskey and Nash, the 
fi gure is 8.7%.
Th ere are two ways in which these Leeuwenhorst data can be used to 
study the development of wheat prices within the year. Th e fi rst follows 
the method devised by McCloskey and Nash. In order to estimate stor-
age costs, McCloskey and Nash used pairs of prices to calculate an 
annual price change rate in late 13th- and 14th-century England. In 
the absence of reliable series of monthly prices, they collected a large 
number of price pairs—prices from two diff erent months in the same 
year and in the same location. By combining these, they arrived at an 
average seasonal increase of around 30% or more on the September 
price.61 Th is method has been replicated and extended to later time 
periods by Nicholas Poynder, who has drawn two conclusions from 
the fi ndings: fi rstly, aft er the 14th century a very signifi cant drop in 
seasonal increase took place (for the 15th and the fi rst half of the 16th 
century, Poynder arrived at a change rate of only 9%); and secondly, 
this could not have been caused only by the decline in storage costs due 
to falling interest rates. Poynder claims institutional factors also con-
tributed: in the 14th century, seasonal increase was very high because 
large-scale grain production was ineffi  cient and merchants paid high 
transaction costs to obtain grain stocks.62
Th e application of the McCloskey and Nash method to the 
Leeuwenhorst prices over the years 1410/11 to 1430/31 leads to a sur-
prising outcome: instead of rising in the course of the year, between 
September and July wheat prices fell by an average of 0.7% per month 
or 7.5% over the entire period.63 Th is may be a coincidence; the sample 
is, of course, very small. However, evidence from Bruges suggests there 
is more to it than that. Th e Bruges series gives prices for three moments 
in the year: November 11, February 2, and Ascension Day. In the sec-
ond and third decade of the 15th century a downward trend is also 
visible here: in the six months between November 11 and Ascension 
Day, Bruges wheat prices fell on average 2.7 % (or 2.1% if the compari-
son is restricted to the same 13 years that are covered by the 
Leeuwenhorst data). In Bruges this is clearly not a temporary phenom-
enon. A downward seasonal trend can also be demonstrated for the 
years before 1410 and aft er 1430, and in fact for the early modern era 
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64 Th e Lier monthly grain prices have been published by Tits-Dieuaide, Formation 
des prix céréaliers, 282–284.
as well. However, both in Utrecht—which has monthly prices for 23 
scattered years between the early 15th and the early 16th century—and 
in the Brabant town of Lier—with fairly complete monthly prices from 
1433 onwards—seasonal fl uctuations on average move upward instead 
of downward, with rates not very diff erent from the change rate for 
England calculated by Poynder.64 Th e fi gures are summarised in 
Table 4. Th ere is no way to explain price falls in the course of the year 
by storage costs alone, whatever their level; if anything, this proves that 
Nicholas Poynder is correct in claiming that seasonal fl uctuations were 
not determined just by storage.





Calculated over Period Number 
of years
Noordwijkerhout − 7.5% September – July 1410/11–1430/31 13
Bruges − 4.4% Nov 11 – Ascension Day 1348/49–1409/10 56
− 2.7% Nov 11 – Ascension Day 1410/11–1430/31 19
− 1.0% Nov 11 – Ascension Day 1431/32–1500/01 67
− 3.2% Nov 11 – Ascension Day 1501/02–1700/01 180
Utrecht + 7.6 % October – July 1401/02–1507/08 23
Lier + 5.4% September – July 1433/34–1499/00 43
England + 9.0% Entire harvest year 1400–1539
Sources: see Appendix D (Noordwijkerhout, Bruges and Utrecht); Tits-Dieuaide, 
Formation des prix céréaliers, 282–284 (Lier); Poynder, ‘Grain storage’, 6 (England).
In order to throw some more light on the backgrounds to seasonal 
grain price fl uctuations in Holland, the Leeuwenhorst price data have 
also been processed in a second way. Figure 11 shows the development 
of wheat prices between September and July as a percentage of the 
average price in that year. Th e graph suggests prices fell in autumn, 
recovered partially in the winter months, and then continued to fall 
until the summer, when they rose sharply. Without more detailed 
research, it is not possible to come up with a conclusive explanation for 
this pattern. Here, no more than a hypothesis—and a tentative one at 
that—can be ventured. It links up with the fact that both Bruges and 
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Holland were, to a large extent, dependent on grain imports. Grain 
supplies may have reached markets only gradually in the course of the 
year. As a result, prices would not have experienced a sudden drop 
around harvest time as a result of large quantities of grain arriving on 
the market simultaneously, as happened in grain-producing regions. 
Instead, they declined much more slowly, in parallel with the continu-
ous arrival of grain throughout the year. In winter, this process may 
have been suspended as shipping temporarily came to a halt because of 
the weather; in summer, merchants may have preferred to postpone 
their next trip to the production areas until the new harvest was in and 
prices had fallen.
Th e evidence on seasonal fl uctuations remains inconclusive, if only 
because of the scarcity of detailed price data for the early 15th century. 
Fortunately, an analysis of price volatility between the years is more 
manageable: annual averages, or prices recorded on the same date 
every year, are more widely available.
Figure 12 compares the variation coeffi  cients per decade derived 
from the price series of the Catharinagasthuis and Leeuwenhorst 
Abbey with those calculated for the eastern Low Countries, the south-
ern Low Countries, and England. Th e results for the Catharina-
gasthuis  and Leeuwenhorst Abbey, although at the low end of the 
Figure 11 Monthly wheat price between September and July in the accounts of 
Leeuwenhorst Abbey, as a percentage of the annual wheat price; averages over the 
years 1410/11–1430/31
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65 Ibid., 224–228. Tits considers the grain export embargo imposed by the Hansa 
towns to be the major cause for the crisis of 1437–1439, but later research has shown 
that at that stage, both in Holland and in Flanders, Baltic imports were minor in com-
parison to imports from northern France (Van Tielhof, Hollandse graanhandel, 122–
125; Dambruyne, Mensen en centen, 318–320). Moreover, at that time extreme dearth 
was also reported in France, England, and the German lands (Irsigler, ‘Getreidepreise’, 
588–589).
international spectrum, are within ‘normal’ range. Th e fi gures for the 
Catharinagasthuis may, moreover, have been underestimated: ampli-
tudes may well have been dampened by the fact that each accounting 
year covers parts of two consecutive harvest years, and for the fi rst 
decade perhaps also by pre-arranged price agreements with a single 
merchant.
Extreme price fl uctuations in the 1430s are directly related to the severe 
grain shortages in the years 1437 to 1439. Th ese years were marked by 
rapidly rising grain prices in large parts of Europe, probably caused by 
widespread harvest failure.65 It is worthwhile examining this crisis in 
some more detail. In these years, the authorities in Holland intervened 
in the grain trade on an unprecedented scale, laying the foundations 
for increasingly intensive dearth policies in the late 15th and early 16th 
Figure 12 Variation coeffi  cient of logs of annual average wheat prices (in grams of 
silver per hectolitre) per decade in Leiden, Noordwijkerhout, and eight other locations 
in the Low Countries and England, 1390–1440
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66 Van Schaïk, ‘Prijs- en levensmiddelenpolitiek’, 247.
67 Hamaker, Middeleeuwsche keurboeken Leiden, 506–507.
68 De Jager, Middeleeuwsche keuren Brielle, 177–180. Th ese regulations are incorpo-
rated in a collection of by-laws offi  cially recorded in 1445, but most likely date back to 
the crisis of the previous decade.
69 Heinsius, ‘Oudst-bewaarde stadsrekening van Gouda’, 281 (Gouda); De Blécourt 
and Meijers, Memorialen Rosa II, no. 500 (Rotterdam).
70 Van Limburg Brouwer, Boergoensche charters, 37–39; Unger, ‘Hollandsche graan-
handel’, 464–465, 490–491; Van Schaïk, ‘Prijs- en levensmiddelenpolitiek’, 227.
centuries.66 Some of the reactions to the crisis were predictable. In 
Leiden, for instance, bakers and grain merchants were forbidden to 
buy grain at the weekly market, and market hours for consumers were 
reduced.67 In Brielle, there were export prohibitions on grain and beer, 
prohibitions against buying and selling grain before market hours, and 
limitations on the amount of grain people could buy per week.68 Other 
towns went further and began buying grain themselves: Gouda sent 
the town clerk Dirc Sonderdanc to Amsterdam to purchase 100 last 
of grain, and Rotterdam bought 15 last of ‘old’ wheat and rye in the 
same city.69
Most striking, however, are the interventions of the central govern-
ment, aft er extensive deliberations with the representatives of the 
towns. In September 1437, a general export prohibition on grain was 
proclaimed; beer could be exported only if, in return, a certain amount 
of grain was imported. In October even more drastic measures were 
announced—so drastic, in fact, that their implementation can hardly 
have been successful. All grain prices were to be fi xed at a certain max-
imum (for wheat this was 21 to 24 groot per achtendeel, depending on 
origin and quality); in addition, in every town and village the entire 
grain trade was to be put into the hands of small groups of cornmon-
gers, who were to receive instructions from government offi  cials about 
how much grain each of them should buy and sell within a certain 
period.70
Th e eff ects of these policies are questionable, to say the least. In the 
Leeuwenhorst accounts, wheat prices of more than twice the offi  cial 
maximum can be found (the highest price recorded is 56 groot per 
achtendeel), and there are no signs of the number of suppliers being 
limited. In fact, the opposite is the case: the Abbey appears to be 
buying many small amounts of wheat from a large number of sellers 
against rapidly mounting prices. Everything suggests distress. 
Admittedly, this was also the case in the neighbouring regions, but 
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Holland appears to have been hit hardest. Table 5 displays wheat prices 
in the years 1437/38 and 1438/39 as a percentage of the average wheat 
price in the ten years preceding the crisis; Figure 13 shows the actual 
development of wheat prices in this period in graphic form.71
Table 5 Annual wheat prices in 1437/38, 1438/39, and 1439/40 as a percentage of aver-
age annual prices over the years 1427/28 to 1436/37 in Holland, Flanders, Brabant, and 
England
Price relative to average price 1427/28–1436/37








Sources: see Appendix D
71 Th e fi gures for Leiden, Utrecht and Maastricht have not been included. Th e 
Leiden series misses the years 1437/38 and 1438/39; the Utrecht and Maastricht series 
both miss 1438/39.
Figure 13 Annual average wheat prices (in grams of silver per hectolitre) from 1427/28 
to 1439/40 in Holland, Flanders, Brabant, and England
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72 Unger, ‘Feeding Low Countries Towns’, 338.
Th e table and graph both suggest that Holland was vulnerable to 
dearth: of all locations, Noordwijkerhout displays the highest price 
peak. Although for the Catharinagasthuis the years 1437/38 and 
1438/39 are missing, the account for 1439/1440—which in the case of 
the Catharinagasthuis covered spring and summer of the harvest year 
1438/39 as well as the autumn and winter following the good harvest 
of 1439—gives a price that is 204.5% over the level of the preceding ten 
years. Th is suggests that Leiden wheat prices during the crisis were also 
very high.
Th e fact that Bruges also had serious problems—price rises in 
Bruges are second only to those in Holland—conforms with a pattern 
described by Unger, who points out that coastal regions witnessed 
greater price fl uctuations than towns located on rivers that gave them 
access to a variety of suppliers.72 Price increase and price volatility in 
Ghent, Brussels, and particularly in Louvain were indeed more moder-
ate than in Holland or Bruges. Unger concludes that interregional (i.e. 
overseas) integration was weak; however, this is not necessarily true. 
For one, the fi gures for the Brabant towns may have been fl attered by 
the fact that prices for these towns, and to a lesser extent also for Ghent, 
were in part derived from monetary valuations of rents, which in a 
time like this may very well not have followed the market. For Louvain, 
in particular, there is cause for suspicion: it is hard to believe that 
Louvain market prices during the crisis should have been so much 
lower than prices elsewhere in the region. In addition, Ghent may—as 
suggested earlier—have profi ted from its grain staple and the rigid 
regulation of the grain trade. Th is may have taken the edge off  price 
extremes.
More fundamentally, the dependence of Holland and also of Bruges 
on imports probably contributed to higher-than-average price spikes 
in years of scarcity. Under these conditions, the authorities in export-
ing regions were likely to attempt to minimise exports, whereas in the 
importing regions the eff ects of actual scarcity may well have been 
exacerbated by uncertainty and fear about future grain supplies. It is 
worth noting that in London and especially in Exeter—both in coastal 
districts but not nearly as dependent on imports—the crisis of 1437–
1439 did not hit as hard as in Holland or in Bruges: prices did not rise 
to the same heights. In itself this does not prove much; harvests in 
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England, or at least in the West Country, may simply not have been 
quite as disastrous as on the continent. However, it does make clear 
that we should not jump to conclusions about the level of market inte-
gration based on price volatility alone.
8.5 Price integration
Additional information can be gleaned from a study of the integration 
of prices: the degree to which prices in diff erent locations move in 
concert. For 16th-century Holland, some research on price integration 
has been conducted: Cornelisse, for instance, has investigated diff er-
ences in peat prices in various towns in the central part of Holland, and 
Noordegraaf has compared the trends in Leiden and Utrecht grain 
prices.73 Both authors come to the conclusion that—from at least the 
middle of the 16th century—markets displayed a considerable degree 
of integration, but their studies lack a comparative perspective and do 
not cover the period before the 16th century in any detail. Unger’s 
recent attempt to measure market integration in the North Sea region 
by studying price correlation focuses on the 15th century and has a 
clear interregional component; but as far as Holland is concerned, the 
fact that Unger uses only the Leiden price series—with their deviating 
year of account—diminishes the validity of his conclusions.74 Here the 
more reliable Leeuwenhorst data have been used to monitor the co-
movement of prices between Holland and the neighbouring regions in 
the early 15th century. First, however, we will take a brief look at some 
snippets of information bearing on Holland’s internal grain market.
In May, June, and July 1398 the count of Holland sent out two pur-
veyors to purchase large quantities of wheat as provisions for a military 
campaign against the Frisians. Th e records of these purchases in com-
bination with the accounts of the Catharinagasthuis over the same year 
provide a fi rst, very cursory glance at price integration within Holland. 
In total, the purveyors bought 914 hoed of wheat—most of it in 
Haarlem—at a price of 9.4 groot per achtendeel on average.75 In the 
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Getreidepolitik, 28 (13th-century Verona and Parma); Hermesdorf, Rechtsspiegel, 387 
(late 14th-century Breda); Van Tielhof, Hollandse graanhandel, 215–222 (16th-century 
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same year, the Catharinagasthuis paid an average price of 10.3 groot 
per achtendeel for its wheat in Leiden.76 Taking the diff erence in meas-
ures into account (the Haarlem achtendeel was about 6% larger than 
the Leiden achtendeel), the Haarlem price was no more than 3% above 
the Leiden price.
Of course, it is impossible to draw conclusions about the level of 
market integration from this single comparison of prices. However, in 
combination with the ease with which the count’s functionaries were 
apparently able to buy large quantities of grain within a limited period 
of time, it does at least suggest that—even at the end of the 14th cen-
tury—Holland wheat markets were not isolated or primitive. Th is sug-
gestion is supported by De Boer’s analysis of a late 14th-century poem 
by the moralist poet, Willem of Hildegaersberch. Th e poem deals with 
the misdemeanours of some Parisian cornmongers who, through 
speculation and even sorcery, tried to corner the market. As De Boer 
explains, Van Hildegaersberch clearly assumed that his Holland audi-
ence was familiar with grain merchants buying up stocks of grain 
before harvest and with practices like regrating and forestalling.77 In 
fact, we have already seen that the Leiden by-laws of 1406 attempted to 
regulate forward trading of grain. Forward transactions in anticipation 
of the harvest existed even in Antiquity; in the Middle Ages, they were 
known both in southern and northwestern Europe, as were attempts to 
regulate the practice.78 Nevertheless, the fact that forward trade was 
also practised in Holland indicates that, despite the late rise of trade 
and towns, here too a mature grain market had developed by the end 
of the 14th century.
As mentioned above, early 15th-century price data for the northern 
part of Holland are lacking; all prices we have for this period come 
from the district around Leiden. A close connection between prices 
paid in this small region is to be expected. An analysis of the wheat 
prices paid by the Catharinagasthuis and Leeuwenhorst Abbey con-
fi rm this expectation. Since the accounts of the Catharinagasthuis run 
from February 22 to February 22 in the following year and the 
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Leeuwenhorst accounts from August to July, a comparison requires 
the time gap to be bridged. Th is has been achieved by using only 
the dated Leeuwenhorst entries and regrouping them according to the 
Catharinagasthuis accounting year. Two provisos apply. Where the 
Leeuwenhorst series is discontinuous, as it frequently is between 1410 
and 1420, data are concentrated in just a few months of the year. 
Moreover, aft er the year 1430/31, regrouping proved impossible 
because the Leeuwenhorst accounts no longer give dated entries. 
Figure 14 compares, in graphic form, the development of average 
annual prices paid by both institutions. It shows that prices moved 
indeed in close concert.
In the absence of additional price data, a qualitative analysis of the 
market behaviour of the Catharinagasthuis and Leeuwenhorst Abbey 
can help to illustrate how the local Leiden market was integrated in a 
wider regional market; it also indicates how the Leiden market was 
connected to markets in other parts of Holland and to production 
areas both in Holland and abroad. Leeuwenhorst Abbey bought part of 
its wheat in nearby Leiden, or at least from merchants living there. A 
few names actually come up in both sets of accounts: Gerrit of 
Oestgheest and Dirc Poes Pietersz., for instance, delivered wheat to 
Figure 14 Annual average wheat prices (in groten per achtendeel) paid by the 
Catharinagasthuis and Leeuwenhorst Abbey, 1410/11–1430/31





















79 E.g. NA AAL, inv. no. 19 f 2v-3, 20 f 2v. Nelle Poes, who frequently sold wheat to 
the Abbey from 1418/19 onwards, was probably the widow or daughter of Dirc Poes 
(De Moor, ‘Leveranciers’, part 1, AL 320.).
80 E.g. NA AAL, inv. no. 23 f 2v, 25 f 2v, 26 f 2.
81 RAL AG, inv. no. 334–41 f 29 and 29v, inv. no. 334–43 f 27;
82 E.g. RAL AG, inv. no. 334–6 f 13, 334–9 f 13v-14, 334–11 f 14v, 334–12 f 13, 
334–17 f 20, 334–31 f 20, 334–34 f 21v.
83 RAL AG, inv. no. 334–17 f 20 (four diff erent Haarlem merchants in 1412), 334–
39 f 24 (a ‘man from Amsterdam’ in 1426), 334–41 f 29 (a merchant from Monnickendam 
in 1432).
84 Campbell et al., Medieval Capital, 63–76.
Leeuwenhorst as well as to the Catharinagasthuis.79 But whereas—at 
least until the 1430s—the Catharinagasthuis obtained almost all of its 
wheat in Leiden and most of it from Leiden merchants, the Abbey also 
did business with merchants from various villages in the Rijnland 
region. Moreover, from the beginning of the price series, Leeuwenhorst 
regularly purchased wheat from what were presumably farmers in 
Delfl and—more specifi cally, the wheat-growing region west of Delft . 
In addition, the Abbey bought wheat in the town of Delft  itself, either 
from unidentifi ed persons at the weekly market (upt straet, in the 
street) or from merchants based there.80 Th is was something the 
Catharinagasthuis began to do in earnest only aft er 1430, perhaps 
because by that time the quantity of wheat the hospital needed had 
increased suffi  ciently to make the journey worthwhile.
A signifi cant portion of the wheat on sale in Leiden and particularly 
in Delft  probably came from the surrounding countryside. Th ree pur-
chases by the Catharinagasthuis of Poelscer or Poeldijx tarwe (wheat 
from Poeldijk, a village near Delft ) confi rm this.81 But Leiden was also 
visited by merchants from Gouda and Schoonhoven; they are men-
tioned repeatedly in the accounts of the Catharinagasthuis.82 References 
to merchants from the northern part of Holland (i.e. from Haarlem, 
Amsterdam, and Monnickendam) are less frequent and tend to be 
concentrated in a few years—no doubt years when price diff erentials 
were large enough to make the journey worthwhile.83 Although it was 
of course much smaller, in this respect the Rijnland grain market 
resembles the grain market in the London region as it has been 
described by Bruce Campbell and co-authors. In normal years, most of 
the grain London needed came from a core provisioning zone with a 
radius of 30 to 50 miles—whereas in years of dearth, purchases were 
made over a much greater distances.84
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86 Van Kan, Sleutels tot de macht, 88–89.
87 Studer, ‘India and the Great Divergence’, 402.
Apart from a single appearance by an Utrecht merchant and one 
purchase of ‘eastern’ wheat, the Catharinagasthuis accounts do not 
directly refer to imports.85 Nevertheless, part of the grain was no doubt 
imported—for instance, by a man like the Leiden merchant Floris 
Paedse, who frequently sold wheat to the Catharinagasthuis and is 
probably the same person as Florent Page, one of the Holland mer-
chants involved in a confl ict about the export of grains from Abbeville 
in 1409.86
Considering the proximity of the Catharinagasthuis to Leeuwenhorst 
Abbey and the fact that they bought part of their grain at the same 
markets (and sometimes even from the same merchants), it is not sur-
prising to fi nd that prices were closely linked. Using the same regrouped 
data as above, the correlation coeffi  cient of the logs of wheat prices in 
the accounts of the two institutions can be calculated at 0.879. Th is is 
high, but nothing out of the ordinary. Over the same two decades, the 
correlation coeffi  cients for the markets of Brussels and Louvain (24 
kilometres apart) and Bruges and Ghent (40 kilometres apart) were in 
the same range: they can be calculated at 0.829 and 0.889 respectively. 
In fact, for towns and villages situated this close together, similar levels 
of integration have also been demonstrated for late 18th-century 
India.87
In summary, the price correlation between the Leeuwenhorst and 
the Catharinagasthuis fi gures tells us very little about the level of mar-
ket integration within Holland in comparison to internal integration 
in other regions. Data that would allow for a study of the correlation 
between grain markets in the Rijnland region and grain markets in 
other part of Holland are simply lacking. In order to discover how 
Holland compared with the neighbouring regions with regard to mar-
ket integration, a diff erent approach is required: links between Holland 
markets and markets abroad have to be examined.
Because the accounting year of the Catharinagasthuis does not coin-
cide with the harvest year, the Leeuwenhorst fi gures are the best guide 
to the position of Holland in the interregional wheat market of north-
western Europe. For the years 1410/11–1430/31, correlation coeffi  -
cients have been calculated for in total 36 pairs of locations: all 
imaginable combinations between Noordwijkerhout (Leeuwenhorst 
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Abbey) in Holland, Utrecht and Maastricht in the eastern Low 
Countries, Bruges and Ghent in Flanders, Brussels and Louvain in 
Brabant, and the London region and Exeter in England. Figure 15 pre-
sents the results. For each location, a scatter plot and a logarithmic 
regression line display the correlations with the other eight locations 
related to distance. For greater clarity the graph is split into three 
panels.
Th e position of a regression line relative to the other regression lines 
indicates the overall degree of market integration between a given 
market and the other markets in the North Sea region. Th e regression 
line for Noordwijkerhout is highest, suggesting that by the early 15th 
century wheat markets in Holland—or at least in the central part of 
Holland—were very well connected to markets in the neighbouring 
regions. Th e slopes of the regression lines indicate the degree to which 
market integration depended on distance. Th e regression line for 
Noordwijkerhout is quite fl at: this indicates that Holland markets were 
not only well integrated with foreign markets nearby, but also with 
those further away. In this regard, however, Holland is not unique: the 
markets in the southern Low Countries display similar fl at slopes.
Th e slopes for London and Exeter and also for Utrecht are much 
steeper, suggesting a more rapid decline of market integration with 
increasing distance. For Utrecht this might perhaps be explained by 
higher transport costs: Utrecht was an inland town and did not have 
good access to waterways. However, in the case of London and Exeter, 
transport costs can do little to explain the diff erence from Holland. 
Both towns had easy access to the sea, yet this did not stimulate inte-
gration with distant markets to the same degree as in Holland. Th e 
English grain market was clearly relatively self-contained: as long as it 
could sustain its own population, there was no need to go further 
afi eld.
Th e position of Holland can be studied in more detail by looking at the 
development of wheat prices over time. Table 6 shows that even though 
for the period as a whole correlations are high, fl uctuations in time 
were considerable. In the years between 1410 and 1420, and especially 
between 1430 and 1440, correlation coeffi  cients were, generally speak-
ing, higher than in the intermediate decade. Between 1420 and 1430 
the link between the Leeuwenhorst prices and those in the towns of the 
southern Low Countries remained fairly strong, but the connections to 
Utrecht and Maastricht were much weaker than before, and the link 
with England was completely severed.
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Figure 15 Correlation coeffi  cient of logs of annual average wheat prices (in grams of 
silver per hectolitre) between nine locations in Holland and the eastern Low Countries, 
the southern Low Countries, and England, related to the distance between locations, 
1410/11–1439/40













































































88 I can off er no explanation for the negative correlation with Louvain between 1410 
and 1420, but it is likely the cause is to be found in local circumstances: for this decade, 
correlations for wheat prices between Louvain and all other towns except Brussels are 
weak or non-existent.
89 Grolle, Muntslag, 145–147, 158, 179–180.
General dearth in the years 1415/16 and 1437/38 probably explains the 
high coeffi  cients for the two corresponding decades. To some extent, 
these fi gures may be fl attered: these are two examples of years when 
widespread harvest failure due to adverse weather conditions over a 
wide region may have driven up prices everywhere, thus raising cor-
relation coeffi  cients regardless of the actual degree of market integra-
tion. However, we saw that in times of dearth prices also tended to 
move in concert for another reason, one that does refl ect a real increase 
in integration: scarcity induced merchants to search for supplies much 
further afi eld than they would normally have done. Th erefore, at least 
part of the fl uctuations is probably real: Holland grain markets were 
not as well integrated with markets abroad during the 1420s as before 
and aft erwards.88
Admittedly, Holland currency was far from stable in this decade, but 
it had also been highly unstable between 1410 and 1420.89 Moreover, 
the fall in the level of integration was not restricted to Holland 
alone: except for the links between Leeuwenhorst and the towns in the 
southern Low Countries in the 1420s, almost all connections across 
national borders were weak. Th e most likely explanation is simply the 
Table 6 Correlation coeffi  cient of logs of annual average wheat prices (in grams of 
silver per hectolitre) between Noordwijkerhout and seven other locations in the Low 
Countries and England per decade, 1410/11–1439/40
Noordwijkerhout 
with:
1410/11–1419/20 1420/21–1429/30 1430/31–1439/40 Entire 
period
Utrecht 0.599 0.472 0.985 0.862
Maastricht 0.955 0.558 0.885 0.831
Bruges 0.597 0.682 0.974 0.803
Ghent 0.830 0.899 0.902 0.835
Brussels 0.869 0.697 0.776 0.747
Louvain -0.516 0.759 0.831 0.756
London region 0.907 -0.533 0.911 0.681
Exeter 0.831 0.153 0.807 0.626
Sources: see Appendix D
 market integration 309
90 James Galloway arrives at a similar conclusion for England in the 14th century 
(Galloway, ‘One Market or Many?’, 37).
91 Kerling, Commercial Relations, 108.
absence of years of serious shortages, which maintained grain prices at 
modest levels and thus temporarily removed the stimulus to interna-
tional trade.
Th e fi ndings allow for a reconciliation of two apparently contradic-
tory views on interregional market integration: on the one hand, 
Söderberg’s statement that in the early 15th century an interregional 
grain market functioned in northwestern Europe; and, on the other 
hand, Unger’s denial of the existence of such a market. It is clear that 
there were links—some of them very strong—between grain markets 
in northwestern Europe. However, the result was anything but a 
tightly-knit and stable entity. Th e data indicate a mix of bilateral links 
of diff erent strength, refl ecting stronger or weaker trade connections. 
Moreover, they suggest a pattern of very considerable upward and 
downward fl uctuations in the level of integration, initiated at least in 
part by the occurrence or absence of years of dearth.90 In other words, 
an interregional market network did exist, but it was far from homoge-
neous and tended to contract when and where the need for long-
distance grain trade was obviated by abundant harvests.
In this heterogeneous and unstable network, Holland was the region 
with the strongest and most durable links to other markets in the 
North Sea region. Clearly, the explanation for this situation hinges 
on  Holland’s dependence on imports. Nevertheless, there is good 
reason to believe market structures—by facilitating these imports—
also contributed. If we follow the route that grain imports took, we 
encounter several elements of the institutional framework discussed 
in earlier chapters that may have played a part. Th e fi rst is the rise 
of sea-fi shing and village fi sh markets. In her study on commercial 
relations between Holland and England, Nelly Kerling argues that 
in the late 14th and early 15th century the grain trade from Great 
Yarmouth and King’s Lynn to Holland was partly conducted by 
London  fi shmongers who visited the coastal villages of Holland, 
off ering corn in exchange for fi sh.91 Even if volumes were modest, as 
they probably were, this does demonstrate how the near absence of 
restraints on rural commerce in Holland may have helped to facilitate 
grain imports.
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Th e second element is the fact that, despite Dordrecht’s offi  cial 
monopoly on the grain trade in the delta of the Rhine and the Meuse, 
other towns—by making use of every legal and geographical loophole, 
but also by lobbying and making alliances—managed to develop prof-
itable trade activities themselves. One of these towns was Brielle. 
Merchants from Brielle are also found, and in greater numbers than 
Dordrecht merchants, exporting grain (and cloth) from King’s Lynn in 
that city’s customs account over the year 1392–1393.92 Another new 
trade centre was Delft . By the middle of the 15th century, and quite 
possibly earlier than this, Delft  had developed beyond a market centre 
for wheat grown in the region; it had become an important market for 
‘western’ grain as well.93 In Flanders, on the other hand, Ghent contin-
ued to dominate the transit grain trade until the early 16th century, 
much to its own benefi t but at the expense of other towns, who were 
unable to develop their own grain trading activities.94
Finally there is the near absence of restrictions on, or taxation of, 
international trade. In this respect Holland compares favourably to 
England. Medieval Holland did not know a licensing system for inter-
national trade; notably, whereas in the early 16th century, export 
licenses were successfully re-introduced in England, attempts by the 
Habsburg authorities to do so in Holland for the growing transit grain 
trade ran into such fi erce opposition that the idea had to be aban-
doned.95 Apart from the river tolls, which were levied at low rates and 
from which most Holland merchants were exempted anyway, grain 
imports were not taxed. In 14th-century England, on the other hand, 
the national customs system expanded to cover a larger range of prod-
ucts, while rates moved upward. Poundage for instance, the imposition 
on the export of ‘general merchandise’ (including grain), increased 
from 1.25% in the early 14th century to 5% around 1400.96
Th ere can be no doubt that grain imports would have taken place in 
Holland no matter how the institutional framework was shaped. Th ey 
also took place in Flanders, under very diff erent conditions, and in 
England too if the need was there. However, whether they would have 
 market integration 311
developed as strongly as they did, and with the same prolonged suc-
cess, is another matter.
8.6 Conclusions
Th is chapter tests one of the central theses of this book—the idea that 
in late medieval Holland a framework of market institutions developed 
that raised market performance—by assessing the integration of mar-
kets for wheat in the late 14th and early 15th centuries. Th e results are 
not as straightforward as the hypothesis suggests.
Whereas theory predicts that, in a well-integrated market, price vol-
atility is relatively low, in Holland prices fl uctuated as much as in the 
neighbouring regions. In fact, during the food crisis of the late 1430s, 
wheat prices mounted to higher levels than elsewhere. Moreover, 
although wheat prices within the county—as far as the scarce data 
allow for conclusions—moved in close concert, in this Holland was by 
no means unique: the grain markets of England and the southern Low 
Countries were also well integrated. Apparently, the presence of a 
favourable institutional framework did not give Holland an advantage. 
Certainly, grain market institutions in Holland, England and the 
southern Low Countries bore a closer resemblance than the institu-
tional frameworks governing exchange in many other commodities: 
authorities everywhere tried to prevent grain shortages, or at least 
dampen their consequences, through regulation. In the face of the 
needs of grain provisioning, diff erences in the institutions governing 
the internal grain trade disappeared to some extent. Nevertheless, even 
when these diff erences continued to exist, they apparently did not 
aff ect market performance that much.
Only when Holland wheat price series are compared with those in 
neighbouring regions do diff erences in the level of market integra-
tion appear. In the early 15th century, an interregional grain market 
in northwestern Europe existed, but it was far from homogeneous or 
stable, contracting when and where grain was abundant. Here Holland 
does stand out: its multilateral interregional links were stronger and 
more consistent than England’s or those of the southern Low Countries. 
Th at this did not lead to a reduction of price volatility can be explained 
by the vulnerability that came with a dependence on imports: in times 
of dearth, export restrictions in the producing regions could cause 
acute problems in Holland.
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Good access to water transport can, at most, provide a very partial 
explanation for Holland’s well-established interregional connections: 
these connections largely depended on sea transport, to which several 
of the other towns mentioned in this chapter also had good access. 
Holland’s dependence on grain imports, on the other hand, is an 
important explanatory factor. Th e driving force behind Holland’s 
interregional grain trade was the demand for bread grains, and no 
doubt regulations and trading practices were adapted to suit this pur-
pose. Under the infl uence of pre-existing traditions, the direction this 
process of adaptation took—moving towards easily accessible markets 
and few restraints on trade—was, however, diff erent from what hap-
pened in England or, more to the point perhaps, in the southern Low 
Countries, a region where large quantities of grain were also imported 
but under very diff erent conditions. If market structures had been less 
favourable, it is doubtful whether Holland would have been able to 
build up the same robust and wide-fl ung interregional trade network.




Th e 1514 Informacie, an assessment of the economic situation of the 
towns and villages of Holland for taxation purposes, paints a vivid pic-
ture of the way villagers in early 16th-century Holland made a living. 
In Ouddorp in West-Friesland, for instance, some villagers cultivated 
the land, others hired themselves out with their carts as carriers, and 
fi ve or six were employed as sailors on a herring buss. In Aalsmeer, just 
south of Amsterdam, the population was engaged in peat digging, but 
they also held cows and cut reeds. In Zwammerdam, north of Gouda, 
the villagers likewise held cows and cultivated the land; in addition, the 
women were engaged in spinning wool and the men mostly in digging. 
Th e people of Streefk erk, east of Rotterdam, held cows and grew hemp 
and some oats; they were, moreover, engaged in fi shing and catching 
birds, and in digging and diking.1 Th e variety of activities is striking; 
furthermore, by their nature the majority of these activities must have 
involved the production of goods (or services) for the market.
Even though a growing body of research stresses the importance of 
markets—both commodity markets and factor markets—for medieval 
economies, the timing and the extent of commercialisation are still 
subjects of debate. Th is is partly due to diffi  culties with measuring the 
level of commercialisation: good data are diffi  cult to fi nd. Urbanisation 
is an important element: towns could not exist without markets to pro-
vide them with foodstuff s and raw materials. Conversely, a large part of 
the urban population was engaged in producing commodities for, or 
providing services through, the market. Nevertheless, the importance 
of self-provisioning among townsmen should not be underestimated. 
For artisanal products and services, auto-consumption cannot have 
taken up more than a very small part of total production; but for 
agriculture it was another matter. Many townspeople grew part of 
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their own food. Early 14th-century tax registers for the English town of 
Colchester, for instance, show that approximately half of all house-
holds owned substantial grain stocks or livestock. Among them were 
several well-to-do landowning artisans and merchants, but even 
townspeople of middling wealth frequently held one or more pigs or 
cows. Although they probably intended to sell part of the produce—
otherwise, the beasts would not have been included in the tax regis-
ter—they no doubt used some of it to supply their own households. 
In fact, greater self-suffi  ciency was probably one of the reasons why 
urban craft smen and traders held on to landownership.2
More importantly, urban population numbers alone are not suffi  -
cient to establish the level of commercialisation: the rural popula-
tion  also engaged in commercial activities, either in the shape of 
proto-industrial production and services, or through market-oriented 
agricultural production. Th e idea that peasants were by nature 
subsistence- oriented and only turned to the market if they were forced 
to, has proved incorrect.3 Th e production of foodstuff s and raw materi-
als for the market was an integral part of peasant agriculture. However, 
the neo-classical alternative—of peasants always ready and even eager 
to engage in specialisation and market-oriented production—is also 
unsatisfactory. It does not explain why in some situations peasant 
reacted to market opportunities with great alacrity, whereas at other 
times and in other places they were much more reluctant to do so. 
Institutional economics off er a fruitful approach to this paradox, by 
predicting that peasants respond to the institutional framework that 
shapes the functioning of markets. If market institutions are effi  cient 
and transaction costs are low, peasants will be stimulated to produce 
for the market; if, on the other hand, markets are diffi  cult to enter or 
unsafe, posing high barriers to trade, peasants may prefer subsistence 
as the less costly or less risky alternative.4 It is from this point of view 
that an attempt is made here to compare the pace and timing of the 
process of commercialisation in Holland with the situation in Flanders 
and England. If neo-institutionalist theory is correct, the diff erent 
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institutional frameworks for commodity markets in the three coun-
tries should result in diff erent levels of market orientation.
Th is hypothesis will be tested by estimating the share of labour input 
devoted to providing goods or services for the market. In a study focus-
ing on commodity markets, this may seem a rather roundabout way to 
get to the heart of the issue, but alternatives all break down in the face 
of data problems. Th e total volume of market transactions cannot, at 
least for Holland, be calculated with any degree of accuracy before the 
early 16th century: sources that would allow for such a calculation are 
simply unavailable. Directly estimating the share of goods produced 
for the market is diffi  cult because of the very frequent occurrence of 
consecutive stages of production. Th e only way to deal with this would 
be through a calculation of added value for each stage, but again the 
source material poses restrictions. An approach via labour input avoids 
most of these problems, while it is also in keeping with the theoretical 
starting point outlined above. An additional advantage is that it allows 
us to use the results of studies on occupational structure and speciali-
sation of labour in the three countries. It should be clear that the esti-
mates indicate orders of magnitude, and no more than that.
We will look at three elements: the level of urbanisation (with a cor-
rection for self-provisioning agrarian activities of townspeople), non-
agricultural activities in the countryside, and the market orientation of 
rural agrarian production. For each element, an attempt is made to 
arrive at a quantitative estimate of the labour input for two dates: the 
beginning or middle of the 14th century, and the end of the 15th or 
beginning of the 16th century. Together, the estimates for the three ele-
ments provide an indication of the total proportion of labour input 
devoted to market-oriented production at those two moments in time. 
Considering the timeframe covered by this book, assessments for the 
early 13th century and the middle of the 15th century would have been 
more logical. However, for Holland, but to a lesser extent also for 
Flanders and England, early 13th-century data simply do not allow for 
quantifi cation. Moreover, for all three regions, detailed information in 
the form of fi scal documents is available for the late 15th or early 16th 
century, providing a much needed reliable point of reference for many 
estimates.
Neither Holland nor Flanders or England were perfectly homo-
geneous regions, but the degree of heterogeneity diff ered. In addition, 
there is the more practical issue of diff erences in the availability of 
data. In combination, these two facts call for a diff erentiated approach. 
316 chapter nine
Holland was the smallest region and although there were internal dif-
ferences—urbanisation for instance was lower in the north than in the 
centre or south of the county—for an analysis of market orientation it 
is still possible to discuss Holland as one region. In Flanders, on the 
other hand, agriculture in the coastal region—with its predominance 
of large leasehold farms that mainly produced for the market—was 
radically diff erent from the system of peasant smallholding that pre-
vailed in the rest of county. In order to do justice to this diff erence, the 
estimates of market orientation of agriculture and of non-agricultural 
rural activities in inland Flanders are complemented by separate esti-
mates for the situation in coastal Flanders. Finally, England was of 
course many times larger than Holland or Flanders and more hetero-
geneous than either. However, accurate data needed to make calcula-
tions for specifi c regions are largely lacking; in fact, even in aggregated 
form the English data display several uncertainties. Th erefore, for 
England all fi gures are presented as ranges. In addition, an attempt is 
made to establish where, with respect to the indicated ranges, the most 
urbanised and most densely populated eastern part of England—
exemplifi ed by the county of Suff olk—should be positioned.
It cannot be stressed suffi  ciently that no more than an indication of 
the order of magnitude is intended. Indeed, the data do not permit 
anything else; estimates, and sometimes rather rough ones at that, are 
all that is to be had. When estimates for diff erent aspects are combined 
in an aggregate fi gure, distortions are moreover easily magnifi ed. 
Nevertheless, while fi gures for Holland, Flanders and England sepa-
rately are open to discussion, by carefully comparing the information 
available for the three regions it is possible to provide an impression of 
the diff erences in long-term developments. Linking these diff erences 
to the institutional framework is more diffi  cult. As was shown earlier, 
other factors besides institutions may also aff ect market performance. 
For Holland, ecological problems reducing possibilities for bread grain 
cultivation and the growing demand from the urban middle classes for 
products like dairy, meat, and fresh sea-fi sh have earlier been identi-
fi ed as important elements; they will feature again in this chapter.
Two aspects of methodology need to be clarifi ed in advance. First, in 
estimating the share of agrarian labour devoted to market-oriented 
production, the cultivation of fodder and raw materials to be processed 
by the farmer himself has been assessed according to the destination of 
the fi nished product. Th e labour needed to cultivate the fl ax used for 
linen production by the farmer and his family, for instance, has been 
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classed as market-oriented, since the linen was ultimately marketed. 
Th e second aspect regards the concept ‘labour input’. Th e analysis will 
be restricted to labour aimed directly at bringing in cash or commodi-
ties—in other words, limited to ‘professional’ activities. Apart from 
domestic work, this also omits all kinds of unpaid services to members 
of the local community, such as helping out neighbours at harvest 
time. Of course, this kind of labour had an economic value, but a lack 
of data and the diffi  culties of distinguishing between economic and 
social activities put quantifi cation out of reach. However, as the restric-
tion to professional activities applies to Flanders and England as well 
as to Holland, the comparison will probably not be much aff ected.
9.2 Holland
Although in the early 13th century Dordrecht was already a modest-
sized river trade centre, and places like Leiden, Delft , Haarlem and 
Alkmaar were beginning to show the fi rst signs of urbanisation, 
Holland was still mainly an agrarian region on the margins of European 
civilisation. Yet, even then the beginnings of a monetary economy 
must have been in place, in the countryside as well as in the nascent 
towns. Th e reclamation of Holland’s peat lands provided the colonists 
with the means to feed themselves and their families. Th e original 
standard size of a peatland farm was 16.5 to 18 morgen (around 15 
hectares),5 and at that time grain cultivation would not have been a 
problem. Still, taxes and fi nes would have had to be paid in cash. Th e 
fi rst references to payments of schot or jaarbede (a tax to be paid by 
every household, most likely originating in the dues owed to the count 
as the owner of all land) date from the early 12th century. Even older 
(probably late 11th century) is the botting, a monetary compensation 
replacing the duty to house and feed the count (or his representative) 
when he visited once every three or four years to preside over the ses-
sions of the supreme court.6 If peasants were able to pay taxes in cash, 
they must have sold at least part of their produce. Th at they did indeed 
seek out markets is, moreover, in keeping with the evidence presented 
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10 Blockmans, ‘Social and Economic Eff ects’, esp. 861–862.
in Chapter 2 on the existence of 12th-century fairs or markets in the 
earliest administrative and religious centres of Holland, and of an 
important cattle trade between the southern part of Holland and the 
towns of Flanders and Brabant around the year 1200.
In the late 13th century, the existing towns began to expand and 
several new ones emerged. Nevertheless, by 1300 only about 30,000 
people (14% of the total population) lived in towns. Most of these 
towns were small or very small; even Dordrecht had no more than 
around 5,000 inhabitants in 1300.7 By 1514, when the Informacie ren-
ders the fi rst reliable general assessment of economic and demographic 
conditions in the towns and villages of Holland, the situation had 
changed drastically. Th e urban population had grown to about 124,000, 
resulting in an urban ratio of 45%. In the southern half of Holland, the 
ratio was even considerably higher.8 To contemporaries this must have 
been an incredibly high percentage: it surpassed urbanisation levels in 
Flanders and northern Italy. One thing had remained unchanged, 
however: the size of individual towns was still modest. Th at even at this 
stage 40% of the urban population was living in towns with 2,000 to 
10,000 inhabitants and another 12% in towns with less than 2,000 
inhabitants is perhaps not remarkable: small and very small towns also 
dominated in many other parts of northwestern Europe. More striking 
is the fact that large cities (with 20,000 residents or more) were entirely 
absent: no town had developed that came even remotely near a metrop-
olis. Th e remaining 48% of the urban population of Holland lived in 
one of fi ve medium-sized towns: in Leiden (about 14,000 inhabitants), 
Amsterdam, Haarlem, Delft , and Dordrecht (each with 11,000 to 
12,000 inhabitants).9
Developments in the second half of the 14th century are particularly 
striking. Th e Black Death probably did not take death tolls of up to 
50%—as in England and Mediterranean France—but losses from the 
echo epidemics of the 1360s to 1380s still appear to have been severe.10 
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However, they were compensated for very quickly: by 1400 the urban 
population had surpassed its pre-Plague level. Only a considerable 
migration to the towns could have accounted for this. For Leiden and 
Gouda, a sizable immigration—mainly from the surrounding coun-
tryside—has indeed been demonstrated for the late 14th century. 
Th e numbers of registered new burgesses suggest a migration that 
exceeded, relatively speaking, that to the cities of Flanders in the same 
period. Besides deteriorating conditions in the Holland central peat 
district, where arable farming was becoming increasingly diffi  cult, the 
attractions of the fl ourishing urban economies probably contributed to 
this migratory wave.11 In the 15th century, towns continued to expand. 
Only in the last two decades of the century did economic malaise trig-
ger a decline in towns like Leiden, Gouda, and Haarlem; Amsterdam, 
however, still experienced some growth.12
No doubt the urban population was largely occupied in market-
oriented industrial production or in providing services, but the role of 
agriculture should not be underestimated. It is a telling sign that the 
urban liberties of the Brabant-Holland family, adopted by a large num-
ber of towns in Holland between the mid-13th and the mid-14th cen-
tury, contain a section stating the right of each burgess to be absent 
from town for two weeks during summer to bring the harvest in and 
for another two weeks during autumn to sow next year’s crop without 
jeopardising his burgess status.13 Moreover, within the urban freedom, 
the young towns had many open spaces that provided room for stables, 
paddocks, vegetable gardens, orchards, and even corn fi elds.14
Th e 1514 Informacie suggests that in the smallest towns this situa-
tion hardly changed. For seven out of the ten towns with less than 
2,000 inhabitants for which the Informacie gives information on the 
occupational structure, arable farming or animal husbandry were 
recorded; in fi ve towns the local authorities actually mentioned 
agriculture before all other activities.15 Th e order in which the main 
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occupations are recorded in the Informacie has been used by Van 
Zanden for a reconstruction of the structure of labour input in the 
countryside at the end of the Middle Ages. Assuming that village 
authorities reported occupational activities in order of importance, he 
attributes weights to each of these activities accordingly and thus 
arrives at an estimate of their share in total rural labour input.16 We 
shall return to the results of Van Zanden’s calculations for the country-
side shortly. Here it is of interest that the data for the smallest towns 
can be processed in the same way, with one adaptation: more people 
than in villages would have been engaged in local retailing and a vari-
ety of other professions not included in the ‘main occupations’ men-
tioned in the Informacie. Depending on the assumptions made on this 
issue, the share of labour input devoted to agriculture can be calculated 
at 20 to 35%.17
In the larger towns the role of agriculture was more modest. With 
growth, much of the urban open space fell victim to the needs of indus-
try and housing for the urban population, which must have been 
accompanied by an increase in the proportion of urban labour input in 
market-oriented manufacture and services. For towns with 2,000 to 
10,000 inhabitants, a calculation based on the occupational activities 
mentioned in the Informacie renders a share of less than 10% of urban 
labour input devoted to agrarian activities. However, in this category 
the obvious domination of the industrial and service sectors may 
easily  have given rise to an underestimation of the primary sector. 
Th e case of Edam (2,300 inhabitants) illustrates this. For this town, 
the Informacie mentions only shipbuilding and shipping as main occu-
pations,18 but the exceptionally detailed local tax registers display a 
pattern very similar to that described earlier for Colchester in England. 
Th ey show that, at the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th 
century, approximately half of all Edam households owned one or 
more cows, the average being 2.3 animals. In many cases, the head 
of the household was a sailor, craft sman or trader, with dairying as a 
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side-employment.19 Th is strongly suggests that for towns with 2,000 to 
10,000 residents the proportion of urban labour input devoted to agri-
culture was not as marginal as the Informacie indicates. A share of 10 
to 20% seems more realistic.
For the fi ve towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants, the Informacie 
does not mention agriculture at all. Likewise, Van Zanden’s recon-
struction of the urban occupational structure of Leiden and Dordrecht 
around 1500, which uses other sources, shows that in these two towns 
some two-thirds of urban labour input was engaged in the secondary 
sector and about one third in trade, transport, and other services. Th e 
contribution of agriculture was negligible.20 However, the data on 
which Van Zanden based his calculations refer to primary occupation 
only; agrarian (or in fact any other) side-employment was not recorded. 
Th erefore, the importance of agriculture may again have been under-
estimated, and a share of up to 10% seems a reasonable assumption.
Part of the urban agricultural activity was no doubt intended for 
auto-consumption, but a substantial share of the produce must have 
been sold on the market. Th e Edam case again provides an illustration. 
Even if the members of an Edam household owning cows should each 
have consumed 4 kilogram of butter and 8 kilogram of cheese per year 
(this is twice the average consumption for all Hollanders estimated by 
Van Bavel and Gelderblom and approaches the consumption per head 
of the well-to-do occupants of Leeuwenhorst Abbey in 1540), auto-
consumption would still have been only 40%, leaving the remaining 
60% to be sold.21 Th e share of marketable surplus, however, may have 
been lower for products of arable farming; therefore, market orienta-
tion of urban agricultural activities has been estimated conservatively 
at 50%. Th is would result in a share of urban labour devoted to market-
oriented activities, non-agrarian and agrarian combined, of 82 to 90% 
for the towns with less than 2,000 inhabitants, 90 to 95% for the towns 
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with 2,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, and 95 to 100% for the largest towns. 
Th e market orientation of the urban sector as a whole can thus be esti-
mated at 88 to 94% in the middle of the 14th century and 92 to 97% 
around 1500; the modest increase is related to the fact that in the 
meantime many towns had grown in size.
Examples of non-agricultural, market-oriented activities in Holland’s 
late medieval countryside are easy to fi nd. In fact several have 
already  been mentioned, varying from the brewing and spinning 
that took place in the vicinity of many towns to the manufacturing of a 
loom in Noordwijkerhout.22 For a quantitative assessment of the situa-
tion around 1500, Van Zanden’s calculations, refl ecting the variety of 
activities mentioned for each village in the Informacie, provide a good 
point of departure. Th e results are remarkable: the share of rural input 
in agriculture was only about 41%, a very low rate from an interna-
tional perspective.23 Th ere is obviously a relationship with the changes 
rural Holland experienced in the late 14th and early 15th century. Th e 
subsidence of the peat soil and the subsequent deterioration of eco-
logical conditions made bread grain cultivation increasingly diffi  cult. 
In a reaction to the diminishing prospects for subsistence farming, 
peasants developed a wide range of non-agrarian, market-oriented 
activities such as peat digging, shipping and fi shing, spinning and 
weaving, and the construction and maintenance of dikes and canals.24
By 1500 not just non-agrarian activities in the Holland countryside 
were market-oriented, but so too were most agrarian activities. Th is 
may seem surprising, since this development had not been accompa-
nied, as it was in England, by the rise of large landownership, tenant 
farming, and wage labour. In Holland, for the time being, peasants 
held on to their land: the structure of small family farms remained in 
place until at least the middle of the 16th century. By then, about 20% 
of labour input in agriculture was performed as wage labour.25 Yet the 
nature of the produce of the small Holland farms makes it clear that 
only part of this produce was consumed by the farmer and his family. 
Meat and dairy, the products of animal husbandry, were primarily des-
ignated for urban markets in Holland or abroad. Where arable farming 
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did take place, it produced, besides pulses and vegetables, mainly 
products that served as raw material for the urban industries: hemp, 
hops, barley, and oats.26
Peasants no doubt ate home-grown peas, beans and vegetables, and 
could well have drunk home-brewed beer made of their own barley 
and oats. Even if they brought most of their meat and dairy to the mar-
ket, they would not have missed the opportunity to consume some of 
it at home. Nevertheless, a considerable part of rural agrarian labour 
must have been market-oriented, as is demonstrated by dairy produc-
tion in the Waterland countryside. Around the year 1500, three quar-
ters of households in the villages around Edam owned cows, the 
average number being 4.8 head.27 Fragmentary evidence from other 
parts of Holland suggests that this was fairly normal: 5 to 6 head seems 
to have been the typical size of a peasant’s herd.28 Th e marketable sur-
plus the Waterland villagers could expect from a herd of this size can 
be calculated in the same way as has just been done for urban livestock 
owners: it was around 80%.29 Again, market orientation may have been 
less pronounced for products other than dairy—to be on the safe side, 
market orientation of the agrarian sector as a whole has therefore been 
estimated at 60 to 80%.
Combined with the fi gures on urbanisation and on non-agrarian 
occupations in the countryside, it follows that around the year 1500 
between 87% and 94% of the total labour input of Holland’s population 
was devoted to the production of commodities and the provisioning of 
services through the market.
Before the early 16th century, information on Holland’s rural occupa-
tional structure is more scarce, but Van Bavel’s study of early proto-
industrialisation provides a starting point. Based on estimates for a 
large number of diff erent non-agrarian activities—peat-digging, peat 
transport, fi shery, and the cloth and linen industry being the most 
important ones—Van Bavel estimates that even in the middle of the 
14th century about a quarter of rural labour was not devoted to agri-
culture. Th is fi gure does not include digging and diking, or the labour 
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of the many millers, bakers, blacksmiths, and others servicing the local 
community. For 1500 Van Bavel estimates the share of rural labour 
input involved in digging and diking at 5% and the share engaged in 
local services at 10%.30 In the middle of the 14th century, the fi gures 
may have been somewhat lower, although there can be no doubt both 
groups existed. Egmond Abbey, for instance, frequently bought nails 
and iron tools from at least two local smiths in the latter part of the 
14th century. Th e Abbey’s accounts over 1388 also mention lists of 
wages paid to labourers hired to dike the Zijpe, a sea-arm that had 
been causing extensive fl ooding.31 An estimate of around 30% of total 
rural labour input in non-agrarian activities in the middle of the 14th 
century is therefore not presumptuous.
Of the remaining 70% devoted to agrarian work, a much larger pro-
portion than in the early 16th century would have been devoted to 
subsistence-oriented activities: before 1350, grain cultivation did not 
pose any problems and urban demand for provisions was still modest. 
For the English peasantry of the late 13th and early 14th century, the 
share of labour that went into growing crops for the market is esti-
mated at 30 to 40%.32 Th ere are no good grounds to argue this propor-
tion was either much higher or much lower in Holland.
Table 7 combines the fi gures. It shows that by the middle of the 14th 
century an estimated total of less than two-thirds of Holland’s labour 
input was devoted to market-oriented activities, while in 1500 this 
share had risen to about 90%. Two conclusions can be drawn. Th e fi rst 
is that even a late developer like Holland must have experienced a sig-
nifi cant growth of commercialisation before the middle of the 14th 
century. A reliable estimate for the year 1100 or 1200 cannot be given, 
but there can be no doubt that at that time market orientation was far 
below the level of 1348. Secondly, the process of commercialisation 
continued to proceed rapidly between the middle of the 14th and the 
end of the 15th century. Th e development is even more striking when 
the simultaneous growth of population numbers from around 235,000 
in 1348 to about 275,000 in 1500 is taken into account. By the end of 
the 15th century, the number of people dependent on the market for 
their sustenance was about 70% higher than 150 years earlier.
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Late 15th / early 
16th century
Population 1514: c. 275,000
Density: c. 60 residents 
per km2
Urban sector
a.  Urban population as percentage 
of total (see text)
23% 45%
b.  Share of urban labour input in 
market-oriented activities (see text)
88–94% 92–97%
c.  Resulting share of total population 
in market-oriented activities (a × b)
20–22% 41–44%
Rural sector
d.  Rural population as percentage 
of total (100% – a)
77% 55%
e.   Share of rural labour input in 
non-agrarian activities (see text)
30% 59%
f.   Resulting share of total population 
in market-oriented activities (d × e)
23% 32%
g.  Share of rural labour input in 
agrarian activities (100% – e)
70% 41%
h.  Share of rural agrarian labour 
input in market-oriented 
activities (see text)
30–40% 60–80%
i.    Resulting share of total population 
in market-oriented activities 
(d × g × h)
16–22% 14–18%
Total share of labour input in 
market-oriented activities ( c + f + i)
60–66% 87–94%
Sources: see text.
Population density in 1514 has been based on an estimated area of 4,600 km2 
(see Chapter 2, note 42).
9.3 Flanders
To all appearances, in Flanders a high level of market orientation had 
been reached much earlier than in Holland, owing to the county’s early 
industrialisation and urbanisation. Towns fi rst emerged in Flanders in 
the 10th century. Stimulated by the rise of the textile industry, a phe-
nomenal urban growth took place in the 11th and particularly the 12th 
century. By 1200, Flanders had become the most urbanised region in 
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northern Europe, with Ghent, Bruges and Ypres as its main centres of 
industry and trade. Th e three cities continued to grow in the 13th and, 
with the possible exception of Ypres, also in the fi rst decades of the 
14th century. In the latter half of that century, recurrent epidemics, 
warfare, and structural problems in the textile industry heralded 
decline.33
In contrast to Holland, Flanders had no medium-sized towns: 
besides the three large cities, there were only small and very small 
towns. Th e development of these lesser towns between the middle of 
the 14th and the late 15th century displays a diff erentiated pattern. 
Although many small towns—especially the older drapery centres 
but  also, for instance, the small port towns in the Zwin estuary—
stagnated or declined in the 15th century, others developed favoura-
bly and expanded rapidly. Th e new industrial centre of Hondschoote 
is a good example, as are the ports of Ostend and Dunkirk.34
Th e earliest reliable demographic information for Flanders is pro-
vided by the Flanders Transport of 1469, an assessment of the demo-
graphic and economic conditions of the Flemish towns  and  rural 
districts made for taxation purposes. Th e Transport is not complete, 
but in combination with other sources it permits us to estimate the 
population numbers in all of Flanders in the third quarter of the 15th 
century. By then, about 35% of the Flemish population was living 
in  towns. Around 47% of these townspeople lived in Ghent (about 
60,000 residents) or Bruges (around 45,000). Another 40% lived in 
one of the eighteen small towns with a population of 2,000 to 10,000; 
among them was Ypres, which by this time had seen its population 
fall to under the 10,000 mark. Th e remainder, about 13%, lived in 
one of the many very small towns with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants.35 
By 1500, the urban ratio may actually have been somewhat lower 
than 35%, if only because in the intermediate years Ghent and 
Bruges experienced a marked decline.36 Th is distribution of the urban 
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population can be used to calculate the market orientation of the 
labour input of the urban population, using the same assumptions 
about agricultural activities in towns of varying sizes as in Holland. 
Th is results in a share of urban labour devoted to market-oriented 
activities of 92–97%.
Information for the middle of the 14th century is much less reliable. 
Population estimates for Flanders before the late 15th century are frag-
mentary and uncertain. It is likely that the urban ratio in the 14th cen-
tury was higher than in the 15th, but we do not know how much 
higher. Staying on the safe side, the urban ratio for the middle of the 
14th century has here been estimated at 40%.37 Total market orienta-
tion of urban labour input may also have been a little higher than in 
the late 15th century, but the absence of demographic data precludes a 
translation into quantitative terms. In the calculations, levels of market 
orientation have therefore been kept at their late 15th-century level of 
92–97%.
Th e countryside of Flanders can be divided into two quite distinct 
regions. Inland Flanders, covering perhaps three quarters of the 
total area of the county, consists of sandy or loamy soils that were 
mainly occupied during the early or high Middle Ages. Th ere were 
some large farms owned by lords in this densely populated region, but 
smallholding prevailed, and peasants retained secure property rights 
to their plots throughout the Middle Ages. Th e heavier soils of coastal 
Flanders were reclaimed later in time. Th e region was increasingly 
dominated by middle-sized and large farms, and by the end of the 
Middle Ages the great majority of these farms were held in leasehold.38 
Th e degree of market orientation of agriculture in the two regions 
diff ered.
Th e predominant agrarian system in inland Flanders has been 
described as a ‘commercial peasant system’. Peasants were primar-
ily  focused on feeding themselves and their families, putting in 
large amounts of labour to increase yields on their small plots; but as 
part of their survival strategy they also produced for the market.39 
Because of the scale of the Flemish cities, their provisioning needs 
for both food and raw materials for the textile industry must have 
been relatively large. Th erefore, by the middle of the 14th century 
328 chapter nine
40 Th oen, Landbouwekonomie, 706–707, 722–726, 840–842.
41 Ibid., 876.
the share of labour input in market-oriented activities was probably at 
the high end of the range of 30 to 40% estimated for Holland (and 
England).
However, market orientation of agriculture in inland Flanders most 
likely did not increase much in the late 14th and 15th century. Although 
Erik Th oen’s detailed study of the agrarian economy in the inland 
Oudenaarde and Aalst districts demonstrates a rising share of indus-
trial commodities such as rape seed, hops and particularly fl ax, a large 
part of the agricultural sector remained geared to subsistence. By the 
middle of the 16th century, peasants in the Oudenaarde district sowed 
at least half of their land with bread grains. Th ere is good reason to 
believe they did not merely do this because of the high nutritional 
needs of fl ax and the crop rotation that had to be practised as a conse-
quence, but also to satisfy the needs of their own families. Peasants 
owning less than two hectares cultivated bread grains on an even larger 
percentage of their plots than average (between 60 and 80%), whether 
grain prices were high or not, suggesting that most of their grain 
crop was intended for auto-consumption.40 Larger farms no doubt 
produced for the market to a much greater extent, but the continued 
preponderance of small, mainly subsistence-oriented farms—in fact, 
the number of small farms probably grew in the 15th century41—
suggests that in inland Flanders the share of labour input in agricul-
ture  devoted  to market-oriented activities underwent no signifi cant 
changes between 1350 and 1500.
In contrast to inland Flanders, agriculture in coastal Flanders expe-
rienced a transformation in the late Middle Ages. In the early 13th 
century, social structures in this newly reclaimed part of the county are 
reminiscent of the situation in Holland: the power of the count was 
strong, local lordship was relatively weak, and many peasants were 
freeholders. But whereas in Holland smallholding continued to exist 
until the end of the Middle Ages, in coastal Flanders leasehold 
gained  ground from the 13th century onwards. Th is was accompa-
nied by a process of land concentration: a minority of peasants accu-
mulated substantial quantities of land at the expense of many others 
who lost their holdings. Th is process probably originated in the high 
costs of water management in the region, but it was accelerated by an 
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institutional factor rooted in customary law: the right of the count to 
expropriate land from landowners unable to pay their share in the 
expenses of dike maintenance or repair.42
Th e result was a predominance of middle-sized and large leasehold 
farms that mainly produced meat, dairy, and commercial crops. Th e 
Veurne district is a good example. In the early 16th century, the pol-
ders around Veurne were an important cattle-farming region. Although 
very little information on the marketing of meat and dairy produced 
on the large farms in this district is available, there can be no doubt 
that most of these products were sold on the urban markets in the 
vicinity.43 Th e polders also produced large quantities of wheat and bar-
ley. Wheat was used as bread grain for the farmer’s family and the farm 
labourers, but the surplus was sold; the barley crop was almost entirely 
marketed.44 In short, while in the early 14th century the market orien-
tation of agrarian labour in coastal Flanders was probably not very dif-
ferent from the rest of the county, by the late 15th century it must have 
been considerable higher. An estimate of 70 to 80% (the same as for 
English tenant farming)45 seems realistic.
Urbanisation rates in coastal Flanders were probably similar to those 
in inland Flanders. An accurate fi gure cannot be given. Although late 
15th-century population fi gures for towns and countryside are avail-
able per casselry, the fi ve coastal casselries (the Franc of Bruges, Vier 
Ambachten, Veurne, Bergues and Bourbourg) all include parts of 
sandy inland Flanders as well as coastal polders. However since for 
these fi ve casselries the urbanisation rate is 34%—virtually the same as 
for Flanders as a whole—there is no reason to believe that in the coastal 
region a much smaller, or larger, percentage of the population lived in 
towns than in the rest of the county.46
However, diff erences existed in the proportion of rural labour 
devoted to non-agrarian activities. As we saw in Chapter 3, in the early 
14th century, Flemish towns became more aware of rural competi-
tion  and increasingly attempted to suppress rural cloth production. 
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Spinning and other preparatory activities still took place in the 
countryside, but they were subordinated to the needs of urban indus-
try. From the late 14th century, the countryside of inland Flanders 
increasingly turned to linen production as an alternative, combined 
with the cultivation of fl ax. Even though the development of the 
rural labour force towards greater occupational diversity and mar-
ket  orientation was probably muted by urban dominance, a modest 
growth did take place. Van Bavel’s calculations show that in the rural 
districts around Aalst and Oudenaarde the share of labour input in 
textile production rose slightly in the course of the 14th and 15th 
centuries, from around 15% to around 20%. Other proto-industrial 
activities did not acquire a prominent position.47 Of course, in Flan-
ders too bakers, smiths and other artisans were active in the villages, 
selling  their products to the local population. Assuming their num-
bers were similar to what they were in Holland, for inland Flanders 
the total share of rural labour input in non-agrarian activities can 
thus  be estimated at about 20% in the early 14th century and 30% 
around 1500.
For coastal Flanders there is no similar detailed study, but the pro-
portion of rural labour input devoted to non-agrarian activities appears 
to have moved in the opposite direction. In the early 14th century, 
many smallholding peasants in the coastal region combined agricul-
ture with activities specifi c for the region, such as peat-digging, salt 
making, fi shing, and dike maintenance.48 In this they much resembled 
the peasants in Holland. A share of labour input into non-agrarian 
activities of 30% seems realistic—the same as in Holland for the mid-
dle of the 14th century. By the early 16th century, however, the number 
of smallholders had dwindled. Consequently, the importance of non-
agrarian labour in the countryside must have declined, from 30 to per-
haps 20%.
A calculation along the lines of what has been presented for Holland 
leads to the conclusion that at the end of the 15th century two-thirds 
to three-quarters of total labour input in inland Flanders was devoted 
to market-oriented activities. In the middle of the 14th century, this 
share had been only slightly lower (Table 8).
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Table 8 Share of labour input in market-oriented activities, Flanders
Mid 14th 
century
Late 15th / early 16th century
Population 1469: c. 647,000
Density: c. 76 residents per km2
Urban sector
a.  Urban population as percentage 
of total (see text)
40% 35%
b.  Share of urban labour input in 
market oriented activities (see text)
92–97% 92–97%
c.  Resulting share of total population 
in market-oriented activities (a × b)
37–39% 32–34%
Rural sector
d.  Rural population as percentage 
of total (100% – a)
60% 65%
e.  Share of rural labour input in 
non-agrarian activities (see text):
   – Inland Flanders





f.  Resulting share of total population 
in market-oriented activities (d × e):
  – Inland Flanders





g.  Share of rural labour input in 
agrarian activities (100% – e):
   – Inland Flanders





h.  Share of rural agrarian labour input in 
market-oriented activities (see text):
  – Inland Flanders





i.  Resulting share of total population in 
market-oriented activities (d × g × h):
  – Inland Flanders





Total share of labour input in market-








Population density in 1469 has been based on an estimated area of 8,500 km2. Th is is 
the area of the current Belgian provinces of West-Vlaanderen and Oost-Vlaanderen 
plus Dutch Zeeuws Vlaanderen and the French Westhoek.
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Th e diff erences from Holland are clear: inland Flanders reached a 
higher level of market orientation at an earlier stage, but there was only 
very limited growth aft erwards. In coastal Flanders, the share of labour 
input devoted to market-oriented activities in the middle of the 14th 
century would at best have been only marginally higher than in inland 
Flanders. However, at the end of the Middle Ages the highly commer-
cialised nature of agriculture in coastal Flanders would have meant a 
total share of labour input in market-oriented activities of 82 to 89%—
almost as high as in Holland. It should be stressed, though, that the 
lowlands of coastal Flanders covered perhaps a quarter of the total area 
of the county. Moreover, population densities in this region were much 
lower than in inland Flanders.49 For Flanders as a whole, market orien-
tation would therefore have been considerably lower than the Holland 
fi gure.
9.4 England
Demographic development in medieval England has been, and still is, 
the subject of scholarly debate: there is no general agreement on either 
the total population or the proportion living in towns before the mid-
dle of the 16th century. Towns in England emerged earlier than in 
Holland. Based on the references to urban land and houses in Domesday 
Book, by the late 11th century some 8 to 10% of a population of 1 to 2 
million may have been living in towns. In the 12th and 13th century, 
total population numbers soared. Th e more cautious estimates state 
that there may have been a little over 4 million people living in England 
at the end of the 13th century.50 Th e progress of urbanisation, however, 
seems to have been fairly modest; for the late 13th century, Campbell 
calculates an urban ratio of 15%. Lonely at the top of the urban hierar-
chy stood London, estimated by Campbell at 60,000 inhabitants, fol-
lowed at a considerable distance by York (22,700). Of all townspeople, 
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15% lived in one of these two large cities. In contrast to Flanders, 
England had medium-sized towns of 10,000 to 20,000 inhabitants, but 
they were few. Only Bristol, Lincoln and Norwich qualifi ed as such; 
together they were home to 6% of the urban population. Another 39% 
lived in towns with between 2,000 and 10,000 inhabitants and the 
remaining 40% in towns with less than 2,000 inhabitants.51
An earlier, less detailed estimate by Dyer arrives at a somewhat 
higher urban ratio of 20% for the year 1377. Th e main reason for the 
diff erence appears to be Dyer’s much higher estimate of the average 
size of the smallest towns (the towns with less than 2,000 inhabitants): 
750 residents instead of the 340 used in Campbell’s calculations. 
Dyer’s higher urban ratio thus assumes an even higher proportion of 
the urban population living in the smallest towns than the 40% calcu-
lated by Campbell.52 Here Campbell’s urban ratio of 15% has been 
taken as a minimum and Dyer’s 20% as a maximum for the middle of 
the 14th century. Assuming that in England—just as in Flanders and 
Holland—50% of urban agricultural labour was devoted to production 
for the market, the total share of urban labour input into market-ori-
ented activities can be estimated at 89 to 94%.
Th e Black Death took the lives of perhaps half the population of 
England. Recovery did not begin until the early 16th century, and only 
in the 17th or even the 18th century did the population fi gure once 
more reach the level of around the year 1300.53 Whether in the late 
14th and 15th century towns fared better or worse than the country-
side is not quite clear. Recent research, based on a comparison of 
the returns for 100 provincial towns in the poll tax of 1377 and the 
lay subsidy of 1524/25, suggests that the urban ratio stabilised or may 
even have declined a little. Th e calculations below are based on the 
fi rst of these two options.54 Th e development of the market orientation 
of urban labour input is also open to debate. Th ere may have been 
more room for agricultural activities in and around the shrunken 
towns; however, raised standards of living may also have stimulated 
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market demand. Assuming the two trends more or less kept each other 
in balance, the market orientation of urban labour is taken to have 
stabilised from the 14th century.
In the countryside, estate surveys for the 12th century testify to the 
presence of other than strictly agrarian activities: they mention large 
numbers of millers, smiths, and carpenters and also contain occasional 
references to other professions such as masons and weavers. Most of 
these people probably also worked their land; some of them seem to 
have held that land as a ‘service holding’, rendering their specialised 
services to the lord of the manor in return. Th ey can therefore not be 
considered as purely market-oriented producers. Still, in the course of 
the 13th century the number of specialised craft smen in the villages 
increased and the system of service holdings almost entirely disap-
peared, giving way to monetary rents.55 Some regional specialisation 
emerged: growing urban demand gave rise to activities such as mining, 
charcoal burning, pottery, tile-making, commercial sea-fi shing, and 
salt production, depending on local resources.56
Th ese activities were restricted to specifi c, oft en small, regions; 
moreover, villagers usually combined them with agriculture. Th erefore, 
probably only a modest part of the labour force was involved in them. 
On the other hand, there is no reason to believe the proportion of the 
English rural population engaged in providing basic services to their 
neighbours was much smaller than the rates assumed for Holland or 
Flanders. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, to give just one example, 
many women occasionally sold bread and beer to other villagers, in 
England as well as in Holland. Th e issue can also be approached from 
another angle: the fact that about 40% of the peasantry did not have 
enough land to support a family must have induced people to look for 
ways to supplement their income.57 Harvest time excepted, the agricul-
tural sector could accommodate only limited numbers of wage labour-
ers, so non-agricultural activities provided an alternative. In short, 
Britnell’s assumption that in total about 5% of rural labour input would 
have been devoted to non-agrarian activities seems an underestima-
tion.58 A rate of 10 to 20% sits more comfortably with the evidence for 
the Low Countries.
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Th is takes us to the agrarian sector of the rural economy. In the late 
13th and early 14th century, seignorial agriculture balanced between 
the needs of consumption and the attractions of the market. Th ere 
were large diff erences depending on product, location, and the needs 
of the lord’s household. In the London region, lay lords tended to sell a 
large part of their demesnes’ grain harvest, whereas convents and col-
leges oft en transferred a considerable share to the central household in 
town. Nevertheless, for the London region as a whole, an estimated 
50% of the grain crop (aft er deduction of next year’s seed) ended up in 
the market.59 In more distant regions, demesne grain cultivation was 
probably less commercialised, but the products of pastoral farming 
were frequently marketed. Peterborough Abbey, its manors scattered 
over the east Midlands, sold only a very small part of its grain crop but 
about half the yield of the dairy herds and almost all of the wool from 
its sheep.60
Th e seignorial sector probably covered between one fi ft h and one 
third of the land under cultivation and produced a more or less corre-
sponding part of agricultural output. Peasants, either villeiners or free-
holders, were responsible for the remainder.61 Th e yardlanders, the 
most prosperous 25% or so of the peasantry, probably followed strate-
gies very similar to those adopted by manorial lords: they were infl u-
enced by market opportunities, but also by the subsistence needs of 
their own families and those of the village community that regulated 
land use on the open fi elds. An analysis of the lay subsidy roll of 1297 
for 44 villages in Bedfordshire has shown that the taxable wealth of the 
top layer of the peasantry in these villages was to a large extent deter-
mined by the distance to the nearest weekly market.62 Th e correlation 
is particularly strong for wealth held in sheep, followed by the malting 
grains oats and dredge (a mixture of barley and oats), and by other 
livestock. For wheat, however, no correlation appears in the analysis, 
suggesting that the decision to cultivate bread grains depended on 
considerations of subsistence rather than on the market.
Yardlanders, at least in normal years, had a surplus to sell: according 
to Dyer’s budget calculations, they were able to market up to half of 
their grain crops and an even higher share of products like meat, dairy, 
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eggs, fruit, and vegetables.63 It is doubtful whether the agricultural 
activities of those with more modest holdings were as much market-
oriented as this, let alone those of the 40% of rural households with so 
little land that it could not sustain a family. Even this latter category 
may well have had a cow out on the common pasture and sold part of 
the dairy it produced—to give just one example of a market-oriented 
strategy. However, considering the fact that people who owned but lit-
tle land already depended on wage labour for part of their sustenance, 
they would probably have preferred to use most of what their tiny plots 
did render to reduce their dependency on the market and increase self-
suffi  ciency. In total, perhaps 40 to 50% of labour input in the seignorial 
sector and 30 to 40% in peasant agriculture may have been devoted to 
market-oriented production.
Between the early 14th and the late 15th century, important changes in 
the English rural economy took place. A higher standard of living gave 
rise to an increased demand for industrial products, stimulating fur-
ther regional specialisation.64 Consequently, the proportion of rural 
labour input into non-agrarian activities was no doubt higher in 1500 
than it had been in 1300 or 1350. Court roll evidence suggests that in 
early 16th-century rural Norfolk just over a quarter of the rural popu-
lation found primary employment in craft s and services.65 Norfolk 
belonged to the most commercialised part of England; proportions 
were probably lower elsewhere. On the other hand, many peasants and 
agricultural labourers may have combined agricultural work with 
part-time industrial activities—at the end of the Middle Ages this 
combination was quite common.66 An increase of the share of rural 
labour input into non-agrarian activities to 20 to 30% therefore seems 
reasonable.
Agriculture also experienced changes. Direct management of 
demesnes declined strongly. Rising labour costs and declining prices 
eroded profi ts; in growing numbers lords decided they were better 
off  as lessors than as managers. Between 1300 and 1400 the seignorial 
sector may already have been reduced by half, and it continued to 
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 contract in the 15th century.67 Th e former demesne lands—perhaps 
a fi ft h or a quarter of all agricultural land—were leased out to an 
emerging class of tenant farmers, many of them of peasant origin. 
Relationships between lords and tenants changed, and new methods of 
production and management were introduced: the lessees practised a 
large-scale, capital-intensive, specialised, and highly commercialised 
type of agriculture.68 For this group, a share of 70 to 80% of labour 
input into cultivating marketable crops does not seem too high.
Changes in peasant agriculture were not as dramatic. As population 
numbers diminished, many peasants were able to acquire land that fell 
vacant, thus enlarging their holdings. Some fi elds were converted into 
pasture and more peasants than before owned livestock. Th is gave 
them a better chance of producing a marketable surplus than their pre-
decessors. On the other hand, just like manorial lords, peasants were 
confronted with slack markets and falling prices.69 In the end, most 
yardlanders and half-yardlanders continued to practise mixed farming 
with a strong emphasis on grain cultivation, balancing between the 
needs of their own families and marketing opportunities.70 Ultimately, 
the proportion of labour input in market-oriented production in the 
peasant sector was probably not very diff erent from the 30 to 40% 
reached in the early 14th century.
Th ese estimates combined (see Table 9) suggest an increase in the 
share of labour input in market-oriented activities from 46 to 62% in 
the early 14th century to 57 to 71% by 1500—a considerable increase, 
but not on a par with developments in Holland.
Of course regional diff erences were substantial. In the most commer-
cialised eastern part of England, market orientation at the end of the 
Middle Ages was certainly at the top end of the ranges indicated for 
the country as a whole and may even have been a little above it, as a 
look at the county of Suff olk may demonstrate.71 Landownership 
and social structure in Suff olk, one of the most densely populated 
counties of England, exhibited some special features. Manors were 
small in comparison to other parts of England, and most manorial 
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a.  Urban population as percentage of 
total (see text)
15–20% 15–20%
b.  Share of urban labour input in 
market-oriented activities (see text)
88–94% 89–94%
c.  Resulting share of total population in 
market-oriented activities (a × b)
13–19% 13–19%
Rural sector
d.  Rural population as percentage of total 
(100% – a)
80–85% 80–85%
e.   Share of rural labour input in non-
agrarian activities (see text)
10–20% 20–30%
f.   Resulting share of total population in 
market-oriented activities (d × e)
8–17% 16–26%
g.  Share of rural labour input in agrarian 
activities (100% – e)
80–90% 70–80%
h.  Share of rural agrarian labour input in 
market-oriented activities (see text):
   – seignorial sector
   – farmer tenants






i.    Resulting share of total population in 
market-oriented activities (d × g × h):
   – seignorial sector
   – farmer tenants






Total share of labour input in market-
oriented activities ( c + f + i)
46–62% 57–71%
Sources: see text.
Th e estimated population in 1541 is given by Wrigley and Schofi eld, Population 
History, 208. Th e division of labour input in the agriculture over the seignorial sector, 
farmer tenants, and peasants is estimated at 20–30% : 0% : 80–70% in the early 14th 
century, and at 5% : 20–25% : 75–70% by 1500. Because of interdependencies between 
the components, the ranges indicated in the last line are narrower than summation of 
the lowest and highest estimates for each of the components suggests (e.g. the share of 
non-agrarian and agrarian rural activities cannot both be at the high end of the indi-
cated ranges at the same time).
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lords exercised only limited powers. About 80% of the peasants were 
freemen. Smallholding prevailed: in the early 14th century about three 
quarters of all peasants, a higher share than in most other counties, 
had less than 10 acres of land. Communal land use arrangements were 
mostly restricted to pasturing rights, and individuals could usually 
crop their lands as they saw fi t.
Let us fi rst take a look at the situation in the early 14th century. 
Manorial accounts suggest that, in Suff olk, commercialisation of the 
seignorial sector was at the high end of the scale indicated in Table 9. 
Th is is probably also true for the peasant sector. As elsewhere, those 
who held no more than a few acres probably gave priority to feeding 
their families, but middling and wealthy peasants were highly respon-
sive to market forces. In the sources, they are found selling grain, rent-
ing gardens and orchards, producing hemp, and leasing the lord’s dairy 
herds.
Considering the fact that most holdings were too small to sustain a 
family, it is hardly surprising that many peasants supplemented their 
income with activities like sea-fi shing, brewing, or petty retailing. Th e 
share of rural labour input in non-agrarian activities was therefore 
probably also at the high end of the range given for England as a whole. 
Nevertheless, urbanisation levels appear to have been moderate: 
despite the large number of small towns, the urbanisation rate in the 
early 14th century was only about 15%. A calculation based on these 
assumptions arrives at an estimate of, at most, 60% of total labour 
input devoted to market-oriented activities.
Between the early 14th and the early 16th century population num-
bers in Suff olk fell sharply, just as they did elsewhere in England; but 
despite demographic contraction, the Suff olk economy did remarkably 
well.72 Th e rise of tenant farming and the yeomanry was not very dif-
ferent from developments elsewhere in England; but responding to a 
rising demand for meat and dairy from the much larger group of peo-
ple that could now aff ord these products, Suff olk experienced a very 
pronounced shift  to cattle farming. By the end of the 15th century, 
cattle farming dominated the rural economy. Th is probably allowed 
agriculture to maintain its commercial orientation on the relatively 
high early 14th-century level.
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Even more striking was the rapid rise of industries such as brick-
making, leather working, and particularly textile production—
likewise in response to raised living standards. Spreading from the 
older urban centres to small towns and villages, the textile sector 
off ered employment to an increasing share of the rural population of 
Suff olk. According to Bailey, by 1500 about one-third of the rural pop-
ulation earned a living predominantly from craft s.73 Certainly, many 
combined this with agricultural work, holding on to their few acres of 
land to provide the household with some basic foodstuff s; on the other 
hand, many peasants and agricultural labourers probably also found 
part-time employment in the cloth industry. It is therefore safe to 
assume that the total share of rural labour input into non-agrarian 
activities was above the range indicated in Table 9 for England as a 
whole: 30 to 40% (instead of 20 to 30%) seems reasonable.
Th e rise of the textile industry also aff ected urbanisation. In contrast 
to the general trend in England, the urban ratio in Suff olk increased 
markedly at the end of the Middle Ages—by the early 16th century, 
about 30% of the Suff olk population lived in towns. A calculation that 
takes both the raised estimates for the share of non-agrarian activities 
and the urban ratio into account, would suggest that by 1500 a total 
share of, at most, 77% of labour input in Suff olk was devoted to mar-
ket-oriented activities.
9.5 Conclusions
Th e aim of Chapters 8 and 9 has been to test market performance in 
late medieval Holland by looking at two quantitative indicators: mar-
ket integration in Chapter 8 and market orientation in the current 
chapter. As we have seen, Holland’s advance over England and Flanders 
on the issue of market integration was limited. In contrast, the results 
for market orientation as presented in the current chapter suggest 
some striking diff erences. Admittedly, these results should be seen as 
indications. Th ey are composed from estimates of the share of labour 
input devoted to market-oriented activities; some of these estimates 
are rooted in detailed research, others necessarily rest on much less 
solid ground. Even so, the trend in Table 10, which summarises the 
results, is clear.
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In Flanders a considerable level of commercialisation had been reached 
by 1350. Aft er this, market orientation rose markedly in the coastal 
area; but as virtually no progress was made in larger and more densely 
populated inland Flanders, for the county as a whole the increase of 
market orientation must have been limited. In early 14th-century 
England, market orientation was relatively low. In the next century and 
a half, commercialisation did increase, but even in the most commer-
cialised eastern part of the country it did not reach the same level as in 
Holland. Here, in the middle of the 14th century, commercialisation 
was below the Flemish level, but by the early 16th century an impres-
sive 90% or so of labour input was devoted to market-oriented activi-
ties. Th is high fi gure resulted from three interrelated elements: a high 
urban ratio, the widespread presence of non-agrarian activities in the 
Holland countryside, and—despite the predominance of small family 
farms—the highly commercialised nature of agriculture.
Th ese three elements are constituents of a commercialised economy 
rather than explanations for its rise. For that we need to look deeper, fol-
lowing the suggestions made in the previous chapter. Non-institutional 
factors were no doubt important. For example, rising standards of liv-
ing triggered changes in consumption patterns. Common people in 
the post-Plague era could spend more on food, drink, and clothing 
than their predecessors, thus stimulating market-oriented pastoral 
farming and encouraging the growth of urban industries. Th is hap-
pened in Holland; it also happened in coastal Flanders (at least with 
regard to cattle farming) and in Suff olk, and for that matter also in 
other parts of Europe. A second non-institutional factor aff ected 
Holland alone. Because of the subsidence of the peat soil, bread grain 
cultivation in Holland became increasingly problematic from the late 
Table 10 Share of labour input in market-oriented activities: Holland, Flanders, and 
England
Early / mid 14th 
century




– Inland Flanders 63–70% 65–72%
– Coastal Flanders 67–74% 82–89%
England:
– Range for England as a whole 46–62% 57–71%
– Suff olk (maximum fi gures) 60% 77%
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14th or early 15th century onwards. Peasants adapted en masse to the 
new situation by shift ing to pastoral farming and other forms of mar-
ket-oriented agriculture, by taking up proto-industrial activities in the 
countryside or—very frequently—by a combination of both.
However adaptation was not automatic. Severe fl ooding and 
repeated harvest failure, especially since they were preceded by recur-
rent outbursts of the Plague in the second half of the 14th century, 
might have been disastrous: they could well have led to serious decline 
and depopulation. Th is did not happen; on the contrary, population 
numbers recovered with remarkable speed from the impact of the 
Plague. Holland’s society was apparently suffi  ciently robust to cope 
with such adverse circumstances.
Th e explanation for this resilience can only be found in institutional 
factors, in turn related to the structure of society. Among these factors 
are the favourable commodity market institutions discussed in the fi rst 
two parts of this book. Th at institutions did indeed matter is also sug-
gested by the case of Suff olk. Although Suff olk, in contrast to Holland, 
experienced a sharp demographic decline during the late Middle Ages, 
at the same time commercialisation increased more rapidly than in 
most other English counties. One of the factors—not the only one—
that contributed to Suff olk’s relative success was the way in which 
social structures encouraged entrepreneurship and trade.74 In fact, 
in some respects—such as the weak character of manorialism, the 
weakness of communal restrictions on land use, and the presence of 
many small towns that did not impose strict controls on trade and 
industry—Suff olk institutions are reminiscent of Holland rules and 
practices.
Returning to Holland, we can conclude that the strong growth of 
market orientation between 1350 and 1500 would not have been pos-
sible without the support of an effi  cient organisation of commodity 
markets. Holland’s favourable institutions did not generate high levels 
of commercialisation of their own accord: the process was ultimately 
triggered by non-institutional forces. But the contribution of the insti-
tutional framework was nonetheless essential: it facilitated and sup-
ported fl exible adaptation to changing circumstances.
74 Bailey, Medieval Suff olk, 145, 290–293.
CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSIONS
How to explain medieval Holland’s rapid economic development from 
a largely agrarian region on the margin of European civilisation around 
the year 1200 to a highly urbanised and market-oriented society by the 
end of the Middle Ages? Th is book set out to explore the contribution 
of commodity market institutions rooted in the region’s specifi c social 
and political structure—in turn related to the history of reclamation 
and settlement—to Holland’s rapid commercialisation. It focused on 
the organisation of commodity markets in Holland in the 13th, 14th, 
and early 15th century and compared this to developments in England 
and Flanders (or the southern Low Countries in general), discussing 
institutions, the factors that gave rise to them, and their impact on 
market performance.
10.1 Endogenous factors
Let us begin with a sobering remark. In many respects, commodity 
market institutions in Holland were not at all unique; indeed, they 
closely resembled those in neighbouring regions. Th is is certainly 
true for the organisation of long-distance trade: the system of broker-
age in Dordrecht, for instance, functioned much as it did in the trade 
centres in the neighbouring regions. To a lesser extent, this is also true 
for local and regional trade: practices such as trading at informal 
Sunday gatherings near the church, or urban bread price regulation, 
were known in Holland as well as in many other parts of northwestern 
Europe.
In those areas where commodity market institutions in Holland do 
appear to diff er from those in England or in the southern Low 
Countries, the eff ects of diff erent historiographical traditions should 
be taken into account. Contrasts are sometimes exaggerated by the 
emphasis historians have placed on particular aspects. Th e literature 
on England, for instance, tends to underline the absence of urban coer-
cion over the countryside and the uniformity of weights and measures 
imposed by national standards. Upon closer examination, it turns out 
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that in both aspects there were exceptions and nuances that diminish 
English distinctiveness.1
Having said this, we can also conclude that some very real diff er-
ences did exist, and that these diff erences were indeed frequently 
rooted in social and political relations. Th e reclamation of Holland’s 
central peat district had given rise to a class of free peasants, who rec-
ognised the count as their sovereign but were not subject to feudal ties. 
Th e manorial system, so prominent in many parts of England, had in 
Holland all but disappeared at an early stage. Th e count of Holland, 
although clearly growing in authority especially in the second half of 
the 13th century, did not command the same power over his subjects 
as the king of England. On the other hand, towns in Holland were late 
to emerge. Once they did, urbanisation rates increased rapidly; but 
even by contemporary standards, all Holland towns were small or very 
small. No metropolis dominating the urban network developed. Towns 
only slowly acquired political infl uence: even in the middle of the 14th 
century they were by no means in a position to dictate conditions, as 
the cities of Flanders frequently were. Periods of turmoil excepted—
such as the civil war that in the 1340s and 1350s made the count vul-
nerable to urban demands—central and local power more or less kept 
each other in balance.
Th e society that emerged fulfi lled, to a large extent, conditions for 
the development of benefi cial economic institutions: a political con-
stellation that provided eff ective constraints on rent-seeking by power-
holders and that gave power to a broad group of people with investment 
opportunities and therefore with an interest in securing property rights 
for all. Th e main characteristics of this society and the way these 
aff ected the organisation of commodity markets can be summarised by 
focusing on four aspects: the balanced relation between state and 
towns, the weakness of seignorial control, the near absence of urban 
coercion over the countryside, and the limited role of guilds.
Central and local government
Th e early rise of a strong central state in England left  a clear imprint on 
market institutions: central coordination and central regulation of 
trade was much more prominent than in Holland. Even if we take into 
account that, owing to the diversity of local practice, English ambitions 
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of centralisation and uniformity were never fully realised, there was a 
stark contrast. Uniform standards for weights and measures and cen-
tral intervention in the enforcement of commercial contracts—both 
established in England largely in the course of the 13th century— were 
virtually unknown in Holland until at least two centuries later.
Th e absence of central coordination in Holland had its disadvan-
tages: fragmentation implied barriers to trade and thus, at least in the-
ory, raised transaction costs. In practice these drawbacks were partly 
mitigated by processes of voluntary adjustment to shared norms, as 
is illustrated by the active role of towns in the creation of a com-
mon standard for the size of herring casks in the 15th century. More 
importantly, the absence of central regulation also had advantages—
advantages that were perhaps less direct and less tangible, but that cre-
ated, in the long run, conditions favourable to trade. Aft er all, central 
regulation usually resulted from, and in turn reinforced, the powers of 
the state to exploit trade to its own advantage. Where it was absent, 
rent-seeking by the state was less likely to develop.
In the Low Countries, both north and south, control over market 
institutions was in the hands of local merchant elites, who had good 
reason to promote rules and practices that prevented rent-seeking by 
the ruler or his offi  cials. Local systems for the maintenance of weights 
and measures in the Low Countries were as eff ective, and probably 
cheaper and less prone to abuse, than the English centralised system. 
Likewise, comital taxation of international trade was largely restricted 
to the tolls on river transports, with rates that in comparison to the 
English wool customs were very modest indeed.
In Flanders there was, at least until the late 14th century, even less 
danger of squeezing by the ruler, but here the balance tended to tip to 
the other side. Th e large Flemish cities were so powerful that they had 
little trouble pressuring the count into far-reaching concessions, fre-
quently at the cost of others. Staple policies demonstrate this. Both 
Bruges and Ghent not only acquired important staple privileges, but 
they were also able to enforce these privileges over a wide area. Urban 
extraterritorial powers could be used to eff ectively block the eco-
nomic development of other, smaller towns, as happened in the Zwin 
estuary.
Again, conditions in Holland were more likely to stimulate growth 
in the long run. Dordrecht aspired to a privileged position similar to 
that of Ghent and Bruges, but it was not as successful in achieving this 
goal. It is true that thanks to the fact that the interests of the count and 
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the town coincided—river tolls were easier to levy if trade was concen-
trated in Dordrecht—the town had a propitious start as a staple town. 
Nevertheless, comital support was withdrawn more than once; and 
even though the alliance was usually restored aft erwards, the frequent 
interruptions did provide a check on Dordrecht’s power. Moreover, 
they made Dordrecht more vulnerable to the joint eff orts of the many 
smaller river towns— aided at fi rst by their lords but soon learning to 
form alliances among themselves—to diminish Dordrecht’s privileged 
position, or to circumvent it.
Lords and rural communities
Th e impact of the position of lords and rural communities in Holland 
on the organisation of markets is best illustrated by a comparison with 
England. Th e strong position of the nobility and the persistence of 
manorialism gave English lords a degree of control over the peasantry 
that local lords in Holland could not match. In the late Middle Ages, 
English manorialism changed character; however, this did not mean 
lords released their grip on the local economy. It merely changed form: 
requisitioning, labour services, and rents in kind made way for cash 
rents and impositions on various economic activities, including trade.
In their attempts to gain control over markets, English lords were 
sometimes restrained by the Crown, for instance during the Quo 
Warranto campaigns of the late 13th and early 14th century, when 
lords who held unauthorised markets were called to order. However, in 
many other instances institutions that facilitated rent-seeking by lords 
were left  undisturbed by central government. Regulation of weighing 
and measuring, for instance, was offi  cially based on a system of uni-
form, national standards; but in the middle of the 14th century, 
Parliament formally authorised the existing custom of the use of mano-
rial weights and measures suited to the needs of the manor’s lord. 
In fact, in many ways central institutions provided a framework that 
not only tolerated but at times also actively supported seignorial rent-
seeking. Th e right of many lords to fi ne transgressors of the national 
Assizes of Bread and Ale, for instance, permitted the lords to develop a 
lucrative system of retrospective licenses for the sale of these two basic 
foodstuff s on their lands.
Local lords in Holland—if at all present—had only limited powers. 
Th ey simply were not in a position to exploit rural trade to the full. 
It is not a coincidence that the few exceptions to this rule are found in 
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the coastal district, with its remnants of a manorial past: the abbot of 
Egmond, the lord of Voorne, and the lord of Wassenaer owned mar-
kets at some point in time and were entitled to at least part of the rev-
enues of weighing and measuring. However, in the rest of the county 
the near absence of manorial structures, combined with a lack of urban 
control over the countryside to be discussed in the next section, gave 
rise to a tradition of informal rural trade. In the second half of the 14th 
century, this tradition was to facilitate the rise of new types of special-
ised rural trade venues with direct access to international trade net-
works: fi sh markets in coastal villages and rural weigh houses for dairy 
products. In this way, the ‘absence of a truly feudal past’—in the words 
of De Vries and Van der Woude—did indeed favourably aff ect the 
organisation of medieval commodity markets.2
Rural communities in Holland were usually quite able to set their 
own economic course. Notably, villages in the north of the county 
seem to have taken the lead. In the late 13th century, we thus fi nd the 
Kennemerland villages Akersloot, Uitgeest, and Wormer involved, 
together with many of Holland’s towns, in a protest against the 
Dordrecht staple. As it happens, in the late 15th and early 16th century, 
two of these three villages actively claimed the right to regulate local 
weighing and measuring themselves. Also, public weigh houses for 
dairy in the countryside emerged fi rst—during the second half of the 
14th century—in the north of Holland. Although the count leased out 
most of these facilities to individuals, some were exploited by local 
communities. Th is suggests that although the process of reclamation of 
the central peat district does provide a partial explanation for the 
strong position of village communities in Holland, other factors also 
contributed. Th e leading role of the north seems to indicate that a 
Frisian tradition of village autonomy, most prominent in the north of 
the Holland, may have had an impact.
Towns and countryside
Village autonomy brings us to the third characteristic of the Holland 
society that aff ected market institutions: the near absence of urban 
coercion over the countryside. Th is aspect stands out best when 
contrasted with the situation in the southern Low Countries and 
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 particularly in Flanders, where towns frequently imposed regional 
trade monopolies in order to concentrate trade in a certain commodity 
within the town walls. Even though in practice these staples were 
sometimes diffi  cult to eff ectuate, there was a striking diff erence with 
Holland, where urban monopolies were not common. If they existed, 
it was mainly in border regions, where monopolies were sometimes 
granted by the count in order to prevent a shift  of economic activity 
and fi scal revenues to an adversary on the other side of the border. 
As a consequence, whereas in the southern Low Countries rural trade 
was mainly limited to local exchange, in Holland the near absence of 
urban restrictions permitted the rise of a network of rural trade venues 
with direct connections to international trade routes.
Power relations, both between towns and central government, and 
between social groups within towns, provide an important part of the 
explanation. Holland towns, when given the opportunity, did attempt 
to dominate their surroundings, as is shown by the eff orts to prohibit 
rural industries and—in the case of Alkmaar—village markets when 
comital power was at a low ebb during the civil war in the middle of 
the 14th century. However, these experiments were short-lived. Under 
less tumultuous conditions, the authority of the count provided an 
eff ective check on urban ambitions. Moreover, the merchant elites that 
ruled the towns were not, by defi nition, opposed to rural markets; aft er 
all, rural trade venues were not merely potential competitors, but in 
many cases also convenient locations for urban merchants to purchase 
the products of commercialised agriculture and fi shery.
Dordrecht was again an exception. From at least the early 15th cen-
tury onwards, the local authorities took steps to ensure that the popu-
lation from the district of Zuidholland sold foodstuff s and raw 
materials exclusively in Dordrecht. Only in the late 15th and early 16th 
century did other towns also step up their attempts to restrict rural 
trade. Th e fi nancial crisis of the late 15th century may have triggered 
urban awareness of the risks of rural competition, but the decisive fac-
tor that made change not only desirable from an urban perspective but 
also possible was the increased political infl uence of towns. In this 
respect, Holland followed a course that contrasted with what happened 
in Flanders—and in fact in many other parts of Europe—where in the 
late Middle Ages the growing power of the state tended to reduce 
urban protectionism and urban coercion.3 Nevertheless, by the end of 
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the 15th century, facilities for rural trade were fi rmly embedded in tra-
dition and privileges, and rural communities in Holland were able to 
maintain at least part of their ability to resist urban domination.
Admittedly, the absence of a hierarchical relation between towns 
and countryside that characterised medieval Holland had mixed 
results. Mechanisms for coordination across local boundaries were not 
strong. Because village courts traditionally had the same position in 
debt registration and debt recovery as urban courts, commercial con-
fl icts between a burgess and a resident of a nearby village were not 
always easy to resolve. In Flanders and Brabant, the courts of the main 
cities had a prominent role in such situations; in England, central insti-
tutions off ered a way out. In Holland, however, neither was the case. 
Nevertheless, on the whole the disadvantages were outweighed by the 
benefi ts: the absence of urban dominance over the countryside opened 
possibilities for rural commercialisation and signifi cantly reduced the 
risks of rent-seeking.
Merchant elites and guilds
Guilds, both merchant guilds and guilds of craft smen and retailers, had 
only a very modest role in the shaping of commodity market institu-
tions in medieval Holland. Th e reason is clear enough: in 13th-, 14th-, 
and early 15th-century Holland only few guilds were active. Merchant 
guilds, if they ever existed, disappeared at a very early stage: the only 
reference to a merchant guild in the Holland sources—it is from 
Dordrecht—dates from the year 1200. In most towns, guilds of craft s-
men and retailers emerged only in the second half of the 15th or even 
in the 16th century; and only in Dordrecht had a full-fl edged system of 
guilds already been established by the year 1400.
Among historians the idea that guilds are nothing but instruments 
of elite rent-seeking that frustrate economic development is increas-
ingly under attack. A growing group of scholars point to the benefi ts of 
guilds for the formation of human capital, the coordination of produc-
tion, and also the functioning of markets.4 With regard to this last 
aspect: merchant guilds did indeed provide a wide range of services 
that made trade safer in a time when the authorities were unable to do 
so, varying from protection on the road to bargaining power vis-a-vis 
4 Epstein and Prak, ‘Introduction’; see also the other contributions in the same 
volume.
350 chapter ten
5 Greif, ‘Institutions and Impersonal Exchange’.
predatory rulers and mechanisms for contract enforcement. Craft 
guilds could also have positive eff ects on market performance: they 
off ered a way to solve information asymmetries between buyer and 
seller by imposing standards for quality and quantity.
Medieval Holland had to do without these assets, but that does not 
appear to have been much of a problem: urban authorities provided the 
rules and enforcement mechanisms needed to regulate trade. Related 
to their late rise, the young towns in Holland enjoyed self-government 
almost from the moment they emerged. Th e local court provided 
mechanisms for individual contract enforcement to traders and mer-
chants almost from the start, facilitating—in Greif ’s terminology—a 
smooth and early introduction of an individual responsibility system.5 
Th us the foundation was laid for the later development of the strong 
position of the local court in the resolution of commercial confl icts. 
Local authorities in Holland also provided checks on quality and quan-
tity of the products of urban industries, in a way similar to how this 
was achieved by craft  guilds in the southern Low Countries.
Th ere was obviously a reverse side to the eff ects of guilds on the 
functioning of commodity markets: guilds had the potential to develop 
into vehicles for the exclusion of outsiders from the market. In this 
sense, the near absence of guilds in the towns of Holland constituted 
an advantage. In the cities of Flanders there was, aft er the 12th century, 
no more need for merchant guilds as a substitute for urban jurisdiction 
than in Holland. Nevertheless, some of these guilds continued to exist 
for at least another century, and merchant elites probably used them as 
an instrument to defend their own interests. Holland escaped this par-
ticular type of institutional sclerosis. Even in Dordrecht the merchant 
elite was apparently unable to use the local guild as a vehicle for exclu-
sion or rent-seeking once it had outlived its original function.
Th e absence of guilds of craft smen and especially retailers had simi-
lar eff ects. In Flanders, and also in England, outsiders (non-burgesses, 
or non-guild members) oft en faced restrictions when they tried to gain 
access to urban markets. Certainly, complete exclusion was rare; and 
for products in high demand, restrictions were frequently lift ed. 
However, outsiders usually had to pay extra taxes, or had to put up 
with less favourable trading conditions. In Holland, restrictions of this 
type were unusual until the end of the 15th or even the 16th century, 
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at  least on market days—in many towns ‘foreign’ tradesmen were 
welcome at the weekly market on the same conditions as burgesses. 
In short, the overall assessment of the eff ects of the very limited role of 
guilds of retailers and craft smen in medieval Holland on the organisa-
tion of markets is favourable: it did not harm market information and 
it enhanced market accessibility.
In summary, the single most striking element was the weakness of 
both vertical ties (constraints ensuing from the exertion of lordly 
power) and horizontal ties (constraints ensuing from collectivities 
such as guilds) that characterised the organisation of commodity mar-
kets in Holland. Th is did not mean that Holland was automatically at 
an advantage. Th e weakness of hierarchical and collective forces had 
benefi ts, but also drawbacks; to a large extent, their relative weight 
depended on circumstances of time and place.
A good example is the creation, by seignorial initiative, of a dense 
network of rural markets and fairs in 13th and early 14th-century 
England. Th is development is characteristic of the control the English 
kings on the one hand and lords on the other were able to exert over 
trade. When in the 12th century it became clear that there was money 
to be made out of controlling trade, the Crown successfully claimed 
the right to install a market or fair as a royal prerogative. Lords with a 
keen eye for the gains commerce could bring, tried to acquire a market 
license. As a result, literally thousands of these licenses were granted 
between the late 12th and the middle of the 14th century. At that point 
in time, this may well have stimulated the progress of rural commer-
cialisation: it off ered tenants and smallholders a nearby outlet for their 
surplus products and provided those with little or no land with a way 
to buy the food they could not grow themselves. In the late 14th cen-
tury, however, patterns of supply and demand changed. Higher stand-
ards of living led to an increased demand for products that until then 
had been a luxury: meat, leather, fresh fi sh, dairy, and higher quality 
textiles. Th e resulting growth of specialisation and interregional trade 
was better served by another type of marketing infrastructure: the less 
formal, low-cost, and fl exible trade venues that thrived in rural Holland.
Whether this argument also applies to the trade monopolies 
imposed by the cities of Flanders is doubtful. It is perhaps tempting to 
believe that coercion was a good thing when trade volumes were still 
small, in order to support urban investments in a commercial infra-
structure, to provide peasants with a stable market, and to prevent 
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free-riding;6 but this idea is not supported by the facts. Both Bruges 
and Ghent resorted to coercion only at a later stage in their develop-
ment, when they were already fl ourishing trade centres. Th is suggests 
that the good of society at large was not the driving force: instead, elites 
used their growing power to bend the institutional framework to sus-
tain their wealth. Elites in Holland towns attempted to do the same, 
but they were blocked by countervailing powers.
Change set in at the end of the Middle Ages. Th e specifi c character 
of the Holland society waned; the balance of powers changed, and 
market institutions changed with it. Th e main eff ect in the short-term 
was an increase of urban protectionism and urban exploitation of the 
countryside. However, by then favourable institutions were well 
embedded in law and tradition. Th ey came under pressure but could 
not be budged altogether.
10.2 Exogenous factors
We can conclude that the balance of powers characteristic of social and 
political relations in Holland, did indeed give rise to commodity mar-
ket institutions that reduced opportunities for power-holders to exploit 
trade at the expense of others, institutions that were thus able to 
enhance market effi  ciency. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that the internal characteristics of society were the only elements that 
shaped the institutional framework, nor that the institutions that 
developed were the only factors that determined market performance. 
Few scholars would contest that exogenous factors also played a part. 
Nevertheless, probably in reaction to the emphasis placed on these fac-
tors until quite recently, there is a tendency among the supporters of 
New Institutional Economics to focus exclusively on endogenous ele-
ments. In reality, both endogenous and exogenous factors contributed; 
the challenge is to discover how the two interacted.
We have already seen that institutions in Holland frequently resem-
bled institutions in neighbouring regions a good deal, even though 
polit ical and social relations diff ered greatly. Th e resemblance can-
not  be entirely attributed to identical economic problems triggering 
similar solutions. At least in part, similarities are explained by a pro-
cess of institutional migration: rules, practices, and organisational 
6 Epstein, ‘Town and Country’, 14.
 conclusions 353
 arrangements that had developed elsewhere and had proven to be suc-
cessful were simply copied. Interregional commercial contacts facili-
tated this process. Timing played a part: Holland was able to profi t 
from its position as a latecomer. Opportunities for adopting eff ective 
practices from other, more advanced regions were plentiful. In more 
than one respect the southern Low Countries, with their early com-
mercial prominence, appear to have been a source of institutional 
inspiration for Holland. In some cases the sources actually suggest a 
south-to-north trajectory of introduction of trading rules and customs 
in Holland—for instance, in the replacement of the duel by truthfi nd-
ing methods of proof in debt confl icts. or in the extension of the immu-
nity from arbitrary arrest from fairs to weekly markets.
Institutional migration is not automatic. Holland may have learnt 
from the example of others, but it was a selective learning process. Th e 
selection was at least in part determined by pre-existing institutions 
and by the social and political relations characterising Holland’s soci-
ety. However, there is reason to believe that when economic needs 
were more pressing than usual, endogenous factors mattered less. Th e 
rules and practices shaping the internal grain trade in Holland did not 
diff er as much from those in neighbouring regions as those regulating 
trade in most other commodities. Some—although not all—of the 
towns in Holland’s few grain-producing regions enjoyed regional grain 
trade monopolies, even if these were uncommon for other products; 
and, just as in the neighbouring regions, the severe grain shortages of 
the 15th century were countered with a combination of export restric-
tions, forestalling prohibitions, regulation of private grain stocks, and 
sometimes also by public grain purchases and distributions. Th e vital 
needs of grain provisioning apparently removed some of the factors 
that under other circumstances may have prevented the adoption of 
‘foreign’ institutions.
It is possible to take the argument one step further. Th e propitious 
development of the interregional sea-fi sh trade and the dairy trade that 
rural Holland experienced aft er the middle of the 14th century was 
primarily driven by a rising demand for a greater variety of high qual-
ity foodstuff s, at home and abroad. Institutions like the village beach 
markets and the weighing facilities for dairy in the countryside did not 
generate the growth of this trade, although they did facilitate and most 
likely also reinforce it. In other words, it is not just that institutions can 
be moulded by exogenous as well as by endogenous factors, but also 
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that market performance is not exclusively determined by institutions, 
whatever their origin.
Th e conclusion that non-institutional factors directly aff ected mar-
ket performance is supported, fi rstly, by the chronology of events. 
Aft er all, the basic social and political relations that provided the foun-
dation for a favourable set of commodity market institutions in Holland 
were already in place well before the middle of the 14th century; but 
only when, at the end of that century, patterns of supply and demand 
changed, was the Holland economy able to make its jump-start. 
Apparently, favourable institutions by themselves did not generate 
growth as long as other stimuli were absent.
Th e role of non-institutional factors is also demonstrated by the 
results of quantitative tests, even though these are necessarily—because 
of scarcity of reliable quantitative data—limited in scope. Although in 
the fi rst half of the 15th century internal market integration in Holland 
was probably not better than in England or in the southern Low 
Countries, external integration was relatively strong; that is, prices on 
Holland’s wheat markets moved more closely in concert with prices on 
wheat markets abroad than they did in England or in the southern Low 
Countries. Moreover, external integration was not only high in periods 
of dearth, but also when prices were low.
Compared to the modest diff erences in the level of market integra-
tion, the diff erence in the development of market orientation between 
Flanders, England, and Holland is striking. In Flanders, a considerable 
level of commercialisation had been reached by the middle of the 14th 
century: about two-thirds of labour went into market-oriented activi-
ties. However, with the exception of the coastal region, progress aft er 
that was limited. In England, market participation in 1350 was most 
likely signifi cantly below the Flemish level, but by 1500 it had just 
about caught up. In Holland, changes were even greater: by the middle 
of the 14th century, market orientation was probably a little below the 
Flemish level, but in the early 16th century an astonishing 87 to 94% of 
labour input was devoted to market-oriented activities.
It is clear that this rapid commercialisation would not have been 
possible without an effi  cient organisation of commodity markets sup-
porting it. However, this does not necessarily mean that favourable 
institutions were the direct cause. Against the background of the anal-
ysis of the institutional framework presented above, a more complex 
course of events seems more likely. Th e direct stimulus to commer-
cialisation was provided not by institutions, but by other factors: 
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7 Th is research was carried out at Utrecht University in the years 2001–2007 within 
the framework of the collective research project ‘Power, Markets and Economic 
Development: Th e Rise, Organisation and Institutional Framework of Markets in 
Holland, Eleventh–Sixteenth Centuries’.
changes in supply and demand related to demographic changes in the 
second half of the 14th century (a pan-European phenomenon), and 
the ecological crisis that around the same time took place in the 
Holland peat lands and initiated a shift  away from bread grain produc-
tion. Holland peasants, craft smen, and merchants were able to make 
the most of the new economic opportunities that came with these 
changes, because commercial institutions permitted an adequate 
response. In short, favourable commodity market institutions in medi-
eval Holland were a necessary condition for strong market perfor-
mance, but by themselves did not suffi  ce to generate it.
10.3 Commodity markets and factor markets
Th is book has focused exclusively on commodity markets, but of 
course the rise of commodity markets constituted only part of the 
process of commercialisation in medieval Holland: markets for land, 
labour, and capital also developed. If anything, the transformation 
experienced by these factor markets appears to have been even more 
drastic. Th e availability of recent research results on the organisation 
of factor markets in medieval Holland allows us to place the develop-
ment of commodity market institutions, as discussed in this book, in a 
wider perspective.7
Th e main features of commodity market institutions in medieval 
Holland identifi ed above—the weakness of both hierarchical and col-
lective ties—can also be discerned in factor market institutions in 
medieval Holland. In fact, on the whole the specifi c character of 
Holland’s society seems to have left  a more profound impact on the 
organisation of factor markets than on the structure of commodity 
markets. As a consequence, diff erences between Holland, England, 
and Flanders are more striking for factor markets than for commodity 
markets.
Th e land market in Holland was in many ways shaped by the ubiq-
uity of free and individual landownership. Th is stimulated the rise of a 
real-estate market unencumbered by restrictions on exchange. Whereas 
the transfer of villein holdings in England required the consent of a 
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 8 Van Bavel and Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Landholding and Land Transfer’, 22–24, 26.
 9 Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets, 184–190, 262, 265–266.
10 Kuijpers, ‘Who Digs the Town Moat?’, 8–10, 23–29; Kuijpers, ‘Labour Legislation’, 
12–15.
manorial lord, in Holland no such consent was needed. Impositions on 
transfers, commonly levied by lords in England but also in Flanders, 
were low or even absent in Holland. Moreover, customary prohibitions 
on the sale of land to non-peasants or non-family members were few.8
Th e characteristics of the capital market were aff ected by those of 
the land market, with which it was intimately connected: land, aft er 
all, was the single most important collateral for long-term loans. 
In England, the rise of the capital market was probably slowed down 
by the constraints on villein land; in any case, an English market 
for renten, the main instrument used to create funded debt in Holland 
and also in the southern Low Countries, did not develop. Moreover, 
because of the competition from royal, manorial, and ecclesiastical 
courts, English local courts did not have the same central position in 
the registration of land and capital transfers as their counterparts in 
the Low Countries. As a consequence, reliable information on prop-
erty rights was not as easily available in English villages. Diff erences 
between Holland and the southern Low Countries are at fi rst sight not 
as striking, but they are nonetheless essential. In the south, urban 
courts used their monopoly in the registration of transfers to reinforce 
their domination of the surrounding countryside. In Holland, village 
courts maintained their central position in land and capital markets, 
thus providing the rural population with a stronger position in both.9
Holland’s labour market was to a large extent defi ned by early per-
sonal freedom. In England labour markets were characterised by 
restrictions on mobility ensuing from either feudal obligations or, in 
the wake of the Black Death, central labour legislation such as the 
Statute of Labourers; in Holland such restrictions were absent. Corvée 
labour, common in many parts of Europe, was employed only in excep-
tional situations in Holland, such as severe fl ooding or an acute threat 
of war. Th is was also true for the southern Low Countries, but there 
fl exibility and mobility in the labour market, or at least in the urban 
segment, were restricted by guild regulations on access to the trade and 
employment conditions. In Holland, the late rise of craft  guilds meant 
that regulations of this type were not introduced on a signifi cant scale 
until the late 15th century.10
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Why did endogenous factors—the social and political relations that 
characterised Holland society—leave a deeper imprint on factor mar-
ket institutions than on commodity market institutions? Th ree possi-
ble explanations come to mind. Th e fi rst is one of timing. Both in 
Holland and elsewhere, commodity markets were the fi rst to develop; 
factor markets emerged at least two centuries later. Despite the scarcity 
of sources, we may safely assume that in some places in Holland small-
scale commodity markets existed in the 12th century and quite possi-
bly earlier than this. Continuity of a trade function dating back to 
the late Carolingian era—in, for instance, Vlaardingen, Valkenburg, 
Medemblik and Muiden—cannot be ruled out. Th is might mean that 
some of the most basic institutions regulating commodity trade date 
back to a time when the large-scale reclamation of the peat district had 
not yet taken place, and the specifi c characteristics of the society that 
Holland was going to become had not yet developed. Th us, commod-
ity market institutions would, from the beginning, have been based on 
the same principles as those in adjoining regions, which would in turn 
have directed the course of their later development. However, this line 
of reasoning attributes a very profound infl uence to what at best can 
only have been a thin and rather superfi cial layer of early market insti-
tutions; it is diffi  cult to believe that these institutions would have had a 
lasting impact once the political context changed.
A second consideration focuses on the process of migration of insti-
tutions. Commodity trade crosses boundaries frequently and easily. 
Trade contracts between merchants may have facilitated the migration 
of institutions developed elsewhere. Examples are not diffi  cult to fi nd. 
We saw how the Cologne standard weight was used in interregional 
trade throughout the Rhine delta; we also saw that once that was the 
case, Cologne weights became the standard at many local markets as 
well. Certainly, medieval factor markets were by no means purely local 
or regional either. However, at least for the land market and the labour 
market, the parties that determined the institutional framework (land-
owners and landusers, and employers and labourers respectively) may 
not have had the same international outlook as merchants.
Th irdly and fi nally, factor market institutions by their nature were 
probably closer to the most basic values of life and therefore more 
fi rmly embedded in the fabric of society. As in almost all pre-modern 
societies, in Holland land and descent were constituents of power. 
Land ownership to a very large extent defi ned the status of an indi-
vidual in society—not just his economic position, but also his role in 
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11 Van Bavel and Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Landholding and Land Transfer’, 24.
12 Th e protest against the Naarden fi sh staple is discussed in section 4.2.
the family, his social status, and his political infl uence.11 Th erefore, the 
way land markets were organised, and by implication also the organi-
sation of the capital markets that developed from these land markets, 
was intimately linked to the basic characteristics of society. To a lesser 
extent the same is true for labour: then, as now, labour determined a 
person’s position in life. Labour market institutions, especially if they 
relate to aspects like labour mobility or remuneration, cannot be easily 
disentangled from the society of which they are a part. Although the 
movable goods a person owns also matter for status, they do not have 
the same defi ning quality. Th is would explain why the link between 
commodity market institutions and the structure of society is not as 
tight: commodity market institutions might simply be more adaptable 
to exogenous forces.
In fact, this demonstrates that for an explanation of the rapid commer-
cialisation of Holland in the Middle Ages an analysis of commodity 
markets alone does not suffi  ce: a wider perspective is needed. Be that 
as it may, clearly the characteristics of society that determined the 
organisation of factor markets also had an impact on commodity mar-
kets. Even though by itself this would not have been suffi  cient to gener-
ate economic growth, it did help to improve the effi  ciency of these 
markets. Th e Holland towns that in 1457 raised their voices against the 
fi sh staple in Naarden because it clashed with the tradition of a free fi sh 
trade were of course biased—this particular interpretation suited their 
own interests.12 Nevertheless, there was some truth in their statement: 
in Holland, restraints on trade, although not absent, were in many 
respects relatively mild, allowing people to make full use of commer-
cial opportunities once these presented themselves.
1 For the diff erence between jaarmarkt and kermis in the Middle Ages and their 




Th e Dutch medieval sources mention two concepts that are both trans-
lated as ‘fair’ in English: the jaarmarkt, which is mainly a commercial 
event, and the kermis, which is primarily a festival. Usually the kermis 
was related to a religious feast, most oft en the commemoration of the 
dedication of a local church. Sometimes the jaarmarkt has religious 
origins as well, but in many other cases there seems to be no such con-
nection.1 Th is survey is restricted to fairs as commercial institutions: 
the jaarmarkten in the Dutch sources. Th e only two kermissen that 
have been included are those in late 15th-century Amsterdam. Since 
the Amsterdam by-laws frequently refer to trade at the kermissen, it is 
clear that despite the name these events had a commercial role besides 
a social and religious one.
Sources
Th e survey is based on:
•  A systematic check of a large body of edited sources of both central 
government and local authorities, consisting of collections of char-
ters, accounts and by-laws. Titles can be found in the second column 
of the survey. Th e most productive publications—for this purpose—
were the following fi ve editions:
•  Koch, A.C.F., J.G. Kruisheer, J.W.J. Burgers, J. Sparreboom, and 
E.C. Dijkhof (eds.), Oorkondenboek van Holland en Zeeland tot 
1299 I-V (Th e Hague 1970–2005), indicated in the table as OHZ. 
Volume V was published when this part of the research had already 
been completed and has therefore not been checked systemati-
cally. Instead, for the last decade of the 13th century and the fi rst 
years of the 14th century an older edition of comital charters has 
been used: L.P.C. van den Bergh and J. de Fremery (eds.), 
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Oorkondenboek van Holland en Zeeland II (Amsterdam/Th e 
Hague 1866).
•  Van Mieris, F. (ed.), Groot charterboek der graaven van Holland en 
Zeeland en heeren van Vriesland II–IV (Leiden 1753–1756) (vol-
ume I has not been checked as for the 8th to 13th centuries the 
OHZ is virtually exhaustive).
•  Niermeyer, J.F. (ed.), Bronnen voor de economische geschiedenis 
van het Beneden-Maasgebied I, 1104–1399 (Th e Hague 1968).
•  Hamaker, H.G. (ed.), De rekeningen der grafelijkheid van Holland 
onder het Henegouwsche huis I–II (Th e Hague 1875).
•  De Boer, D.E.H., D.J. Faber, and H.P.H. Janssen (eds.), De rekenin-
gen van de grafelijkheid van Holland uit de Beierse periode II, De 
rekeningen van de rentmeesters van de domeinen, 1393–1396, and 
III, De rekeningen van de gerechtelijke ambtenaren (Th e Hague 
1983).
•  A systematic check of the comital accounts for the years 1450 and 
1500. Th e revenues from the count’s domains, which included the 
tolls at several fairs in small towns and in villages, were collected by 
stewards who had to report to the treasury annually. Most accounts 
have been preserved; they are now in the Nationaal Archief, Archief 
Grafelijkheidsrekenkamer of Rekenkamer der Domeinen van Holland, 
Afgehoorde en gedeponeerde rekeningen (indicated in the table as 
GRRek).
Th e accounts for the following domains have been checked (the 
names are given in Dutch): Noordholland; Zuidholland; Kenne-
merland en West-Friesland; Voorne; Gouda, Schoonhoven en ’t land 
van Stein; Woerden; Arkel, Van der Leede en Schoonrewoerd; 
Schoonhoven; Putten; Strijen; Heusden; Beverwijk en Noordwijk; 
Amstelland, Waterland en Zeevang; Muiden en Gooiland; Texel en 
Wieringen.
In the few cases where the year 1450 or 1500 was missing, the nearest 
available year was checked instead. Whenever a previously existing 
fair was no longer mentioned in an account, the accounts for the 
previous year and the next year were also consulted in order to verify 
if the fair had really ceased to exist.
In addition use has been made of:
•  A mid 16th-century merchant manual titled Een zeer huerbuerlic 
registre oft e Handbouck voor alle man. Th is booklet, published in 
Ghent in 1544, provides all kinds of information of use to merchants 
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in the Low Countries, for instance on the value of coinage, the eff ect 
of tides on the accessibility of the main ports, and also the dates and 
locations of fairs. However, the information on this latter aspect is 
incomplete: several fairs that according to other sources took place 
in the middle of the 16th century are not mentioned in the 
Huerbuerlic registre. Perhaps the Huerbuerlic registre gave only the 
fairs that had a function in interregional trade, but of this we cannot 
be certain. Th erefore this manual is only used as a supplementary 
source of information—as confi rmation of the continued existence 
of fairs known from other sources.
•  Secondary literature on individual towns or fairs. Th ese works have 
mainly been used to supplement information on the continuation of 
medieval fairs in the 16th century (and sometimes beyond).
The survey
Th e survey presents the following information:
• column 1: the location (town or village) of the fair;
•  column 2: the year in which the fair is fi rst mentioned and the source 
of this reference (marked with an * if the reference regards the grant 
of an offi  cial license) and the source of this reference;
•  column 3: the year (or period) in which the fair was last mentioned 
in the sources that were consulted, and the source of this ‘last’ 
reference;
•  column 4: the sources of additional references to the fair between 
the fi rst and the ‘last’ date.
•  column 5 shows if the fair is mentioned in the Huerbuerlic registre or 
not.
•  column 6: the date of the fair, i.e. the day on which is started and its 
offi  cial duration. Both date and duration are usually mentioned in a 
license where it exists. However, it should be remembered that small 
changes in dates were probably frequent; also, it is oft en not clear if 
the recorded duration is the duration of the fair itself or that of the 
safeguard, which usually covered a longer period.
• column 7: additional remarks.
Not included in the survey are:
•  A fair in Hoppenisse, on the border with Utrecht, granted to Lord 
Zweder van Beusekom by the bishop of Utrecht in 1271. By the time 
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this region was incorporated in the county of Holland, the village 
Hoppenisse had ceased to exist.2
•  Two fairs in Schoorl, reputedly granted by Duke Philip the Good of 
Burgundy. Schoorl certainly did have two important cattle fairs at a 
later stage; the license for these fairs, which according to the villagers 
had been destroyed during the ‘troubles’ in the 1570s, was confi rmed 
by the Estates of Holland in 1609 and again in 1623.3 But although 
according to local historian R.P. Goettsch the original license had 
been granted in 1446, no evidence in the primary sources has been 
found to support this assumption.4
On a regional level fairs were oft en scheduled consecutively. As an 
example, the table below reproduces the schedule of fairs in the north 
of Holland (Kennemerland, West-Friesland, Waterland and Zeevang) 
around the year 1450 as it can be deduced from the survey. Fairs of 
which the existence in 1450 is not certain are in italics. Th e dates of the 
‘middle’ and ‘last’ fair in Monnickendam are unknown; therefore they 
have not been included in the schedule.
2 OHZ III, no. 1566; Niermeyer, Bronnen Beneden-Maasgebied, no. 75.
3 Register van Hollandt en Westvrieslandt, 1607–1609 page 810 and 1623–1626 page 
214; Regionaal Archief Alkmaar, Stadsarchief Alkmaar, inv. no. 2318.
4 Goettsch, Schoorl, 42. Goettsch refers to Lams, Groot previlegie en handvestboeck 
Kennemerlandt, but this edition of source material contains no reference to fairs in 
Schoorl, nor is it mentioned in a list of privileges in the local archives (Regionaal 
Archief Alkmaar, Oud Archief Schoorl, inv. no. 15) or in the comitial registers of 
this period (Nationaal Archief, Archief Grafelijkheidsrekenkamer, part I; the inven-
tory gives excerpts of the contents of the ‘Rood register A’ and the ‘Eerste Geluwe 
register P’).
Month Location Date Offi  cial duration
March Hoorn Palm
April Alkmaar One week aft er Easter 3 weeks
May Monnickendam Week before Pentecost
Hoorn Pentecost
June Medemblik June 5 or 12 2 weeks
Haarlem June 24
Egmond June 24
July Beverwijk July 15 1 week
Akersloot July 25
Grootebroek July 25
August Hoorn (dairy fair) August 10 1 week
Alkmaar August 24 3 weeks
 survey of fairs 363
September Enkhuizen Sunday before September 14 2 weeks
Alkmaar September 16 1 week
Beverwijk September 28 or October 1 1 week



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Licenses for fairs granted in the first half of the 
16th century:
– Amstelveen: license for a horse fair granted in 1523 (Noordkerk, 
Handvesten Amstelredam, 321–322);
– Gouda: license for a second horse fair granted in 1502, license for a 
third horse fair granted in 1505 (Geselschap, Inventaris, summaries 
243 and 255);
– Haarlem: license for two horse fairs granted in 1512 (Handvesten 
Haerlem, 187–189);
–  Schoonhoven: license for a dairy fair granted in 1535 (Van Berkum, 
Beschryving Schoonhoven, 63–68).
APPENDIX B
RURAL WEIGH HOUSES IN THE NORTH OF HOLLAND 
AROUND 1400




Akswijk (Havixwijc) 1375 Accounts Waterland and Zeevang 1375 (NA 
AGH, inv. no. 1679, f5v).
Purmerend 1368 –  Gousset index, 1395: weigh house rented 
out to Sijmon Ruijsch (NA LLRK, inv. no. 
223, f279v);
–  Gousset index, 1399: weigh house rented 
out to Jan Melijsz. (NA LLRK, inv. no. 223, 
f280v);
–  Accounts Waterland and Zeevang 1368, 
1369, 1375 (NA AGH, inv. no. 1677 f15, 
inv. no. 1678 f14, inv. no. 1679 f4v).
Broek in Waterland 1375 Accounts Waterland and Zeevang 1375 (NA 
AGH, inv. no. 1679, f5).
Waterland 1359/1360 Accounts Waterland and Zeevang 1359/60 to 
1367 (NA AGH, inv. nos. 1670–1676).
Uitdam 1368 Accounts Waterland and Zeevang 1368, 1369 
and 1375 (NA AGH inv. nos. 1677–1679).
Kennemerland
Graft 1392 –  Gousset index, 1392: permission to Voppe 
Berwoutsz. to install and exploit a weigh 
house (NA LLRK, inv. no. 212, f138).
–  Gousset index, 1397: prolongation of rent 
of the weigh house to Voppe Berwoutsz. 
(NA LLRK, inv. no. 212, f139).
–  Accounts of Kennemerland and West-
Friesland, from 1410/1411 onwards (NA 
AGH, inv. no. 1583 f8 and inv. nos. from 
1584 upward).
Oostzaan 1417 or 
before
Gousset index, 1421: weigh house rented out 
to Claas Dirksz; the weigh house had 
previously been rented to him by Duke 
Willem VI (NA LLRK, inv. no. 230, f431).
(Continued)
388 appendix b 
Village Year of fi rst 
reference
Source
Westzaan 1421 –  Gousset index, 1421: weigh house rented 
out to Claas Dirksz. (NA LLRK, inv. no. 
230, f431);
–  Gousset index, 1428: weigh house rented 
out to Claas Dirksz. (NA LLRK, inv. no. 
230, f433);
Wormer 1384/85 Accounts of Kennemerland and West-
Friesland, from 1384/85 onwards (NA AGH, 
inv. no. 1583 f8 and inv. nos. from 1584 
upward).
West-Friesland
Grootebroek 1424 Gousset index, 1424: weigh house plus 
revenues donated to the local militia (NA 
LLRK, inv. no 212, f241v; also in Van Mieris, 
Groot Charterboek IV, 713).
Niedorp 1391 –  Gousset index, March 1391: permission to 
the people of Niedorperambacht to install a 
weigh house (NA LLRK, inv. no. 221, 
f96v–97);
–  Gousset index, November 1391: weigh 
house rented out to Henrick Dirksz. (NA 
LLRK, inv. no. 221, f97);
–  Gousset index, 1417: weigh house rented 
out to Peter Gillisz. (NA LLRK, inv. no. 221, 
f103v; also in Van Mieris, Groot 
Charterboek IV, 463);
–  Accounts of Kennemerland and West-
Friesland, 1410/1411 (NA AGH, inv. no. 
1583 f8).
Schellinkhout 1402 –  Gousset index, 1402: weigh house rented 
out to Claas van Essen and Gijsken Vogel 
(NA LLRK, inv. no. 226, f121v);
–  Gousset index, 1423: weigh house rented 
out to Gijsbrecht Jansz. (NA LLRK, inv. no. 
226, f126).
NA AGH: Nationaal Archief, Archief Graven van Holland




CHARTERS OF URBAN LIBERTIES
Th e oldest charters of liberties of Holland towns that have been pre-
served date from the fi rst decades of the 13th century and relate to two 
towns in the southern part of the county: Geertruidenberg (1213) and 
Dordrecht (1220 or 1221). Dordrecht, situated in the river delta of 
Rhine and Meuse, had developed into a small centre of the interna-
tional river trade in wine, grain, wood and salt in the course of the 12th 
century. Geertruidenberg was situated on the overland route between 
Holland and the southern Low Countries, close to the Brabant border. 
By the time it received urban privileges, it was probably not  much 
more than a village. In the late 12th century some of the earlier settle-
ments on the sandy strip behind the dunes began to develop into towns. 
Haarlem, Delft , Alkmaar and Leiden all acquired charters of liberties 
in the middle of the 13th century. In the last decades of that century 
urbanisation accelerated. Trade and urban industries expanded, exist-
ing towns grew and new ones emerged. By the middle of the 14th cen-
tury most of these towns had been granted urban liberties.5
List of charters of liberties referred to in Chapter 7:6
Town Date charter of 
liberties
Edition of charter used
Geertruidenberg 1213 OHZ I, no. 334
Dordrecht 1220/1221 and 1252 OHZ I, nos. 406 and 910
Haarlem 1245 OHZ II, no. 672–673;
Hoogewerf, Haarlemse stadsrecht
Delft 1246 OHZ II, no. 680
Alkmaar 1254 OHZ II, no. 1009
Leiden 1266 OHZ III, no. 1433
Schiedam 1270 OHZ III, no. 1524; Van der Feijst, 
Geschiedenis van Schiedam, 292–294
5 For a survey of the history of urbanisation, see Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Van waterland 
tot stedenland’, 118–120, and De Boer, ‘Op weg naar volwassenheid’.
6 A survey of all charters of urban liberties in the present-day Netherlands is pre-




As elsewhere in Europe, liberties were oft en derived from models 
used in other towns. In Holland the best known and largest ‘family’ of 
charters is the Brabant-Holland fi liation. A large part of the Haarlem 
charter of 1245 was based on the liberties of the Brabant town of Den 
Bosch. In turn, a draft  version of the Haarlem charter served as a model 
for several other towns in Holland. Th e liberties of a group of smaller 
towns on the islands in the southwestern part of Holland and in 
Zeeland—Brielle and Goedereede among them—form a second, more 
loosely associated fi liation.7 Other towns, for instance Dordrecht, 
Leiden and Amsterdam, had liberties of local origin, unrelated to 
either of these two fi liations.
Th e use of charters of urban liberties in historical research involves 
some methodological problems that are best understood by looking 
at the charters’ original function. First and foremost, they aimed at 
offi  cially establishing or confi rming the position of the town as a 
separate administrative and jurisdictional district with a certain degree 
of autonomy. Charters of urban liberties were never meant to be com-
prehensive law codes. Th ere was no need for anything of the kind: 
unwritten customary law met the normal requirements of urban 
(Cont.)
Town Date charter of 
liberties
Edition of charter used
Vlaardingen 1273 OHZ III, no. 1632
Vianen 1336 De Geer, ‘Rechten van Vianen’
Rotterdam 1340 Van Mieris, Groot Charterboek II, 638–640
Amsterdam 1342 Van der Laan, Oorkondenboek van 
Amsterdam, no. 49
Naarden 1353 Van Mieris, Groot Charterboek II, 847–848
Brielle 1330 and 1343 Cappon and van Engen, 
‘Stadsrechtoorkonden van Brielle’
Goedereede 1312 Pols, ‘Bevestiging’
 7 For the Brabant-Holland fi liation, see Kruisheer, Stadsrechtoorkonden van 
Haarlem, Delft  en Alkmaar; for the fi liation on the Zuid-Holland and Zeeland islands, 
Cappon and Van Engen, ‘Stad door stadsrecht?’
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 8 Van Engen, ‘Geen schraal terrein’, 73–74, 77; Kruisheer, Stadsrechtoorkonden van 
Haarlem, Delft  en Alkmaar, 60.
 9 Telting, ‘Oude rechten van ’s-Gravenzande’, 382.
10 Kruisheer, ‘Oudste Leidse stadsrechtoorkonden’; Kruisheer, ‘Oudste Zeeuwse 
stadsrechtoorkonden’; Kruisheer, Stadsrechtoorkonden van Haarlem, Delft  en Alkmaar. 
A summary of the conclusions on the charters of Haarlem, Delft  and Alkmaar and on 
the towns of Zeeland is given by Kruisheer, ‘Stadsrechtbeoorkonding’.
society well enough. Th e need for recording was probably felt only 
when new rules were introduced, particularly if these rules deviated 
materially from customary law. Th e charters therefore only show a 
small part of the rules and practices that were actually being used, and 
they sometimes tend to stress the exceptional instead of the regular.8
Nevertheless, the charters provided a useful legal framework for 
many years. Th is is demonstrated by the codifi cation of local rules and 
customs drawn up by the authorities of the small town of ’s-Graven-
zande in 1448. In this document the paragraphs from Haarlem’s  charter 
of liberties, by then 200 years old, were taken as point of departure. 
Although some rules were referred to as outdated, most of the 13th-
century regulations on contract enforcement were clearly still consid-
ered valid in the middle of the 15th century.9
Historiography
Until recently studies of the charters of liberties in the Holland towns—
particularly of the mid 13th-century charters—largely focused on their 
origins. Jaap Kruisheer was one of the main representatives of this 
strain of research. In his studies of several charters of urban liberties of 
towns in Holland and Zeeland, he invariably arrived at the same con-
clusion: the charters were granted on the initiative of the burgesses, 
who wished to have both their locally evolved rules and the results of 
negotiations with the count on their rights and privileges offi  cially 
confi rmed. In support of this conclusion Kruisheer pointed to aspects 
such as the presence of preliminary versions of the charters in urban 
archives and changes from the subjective to the objective style, sug-
gesting the incorporation in the charter of pre-existing local laws.10 
Henri Camps opposed the view of Kruisheer and argued that in the 
case of the charters of Haarlem, Alkmaar and Delft  not the urban com-
munity but the count must have been the initiator. Th e charters of 
these towns, according to Camps, refl ect an attempt of the count to 
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11 Camps, Stadsrechten Willem II.
12 An example of this approach is the volume edited by Rutte and Engen, 
Stadswording in de Nederlanden.
13 Rutte, Stedenpolitiek en stadsplanning. For Holland, see pages 119–143.
14 Henderikx, ‘Graaf en stad’, 57–58, 61–62.
reinforce his position: day-to-day administration was delegated to the 
town government, but only in return for fi xed fi nancial and military 
obligations.11
Th e debate between Kruisheer and Camps was not only polemic in 
tone, it was also rather limited in character. It concentrated very much 
on the analysis of the documents and their genesis, with little refer-
ence to the historical context. Surprisingly perhaps, the regulations in 
the charter and what they had to say about medieval urban society 
were also not explored very thoroughly. In more than one respect the 
debate has recently taken a new direction. Th e scope has broadened: 
diplomatic research has established fi rmer links with historical, archae-
ological and geographical studies on the genesis of towns.12 Interest in 
the role of the ruler has also been renewed, this time not as a contrast 
to the autonomous development of towns, but as its complement. It has 
become clear that besides towns that developed mainly as a result of 
improved economic opportunities and the initiative of the inhabitants, 
there is also a category of towns where lordly infl uence was more 
prominent. Rulers promoted the rise of these towns, because to 
them they were instruments with which to achieve political goals.13 
Moreover, even for the towns that did develop more or less autono-
mously, the role of the count should not be overlooked: the early his-
tory of the oldest towns of Holland shows a strong interconnection 
between their roles as residential, administrative and military centres 
of the count and their social, economic and institutional development 
as urban settlements.14
15 Verhoeff , Oude Nederlandse maten en gewichten.
APPENDIX D
WHEAT PRICES
1. Holland wheat price series
Nature of the prices
Prices in this appendix are unweighted annual averages calculated over 
the accounting year used in the accounts. In addition, for Leeuwenhorst 
Abbey a conversion to the accounting year used by the Catharinagasthuis 
has been compiled. Th e original prices are in groot per achtendeel, the 
converted  prices in grams of silver per hectolitre. All prices are net 
prices, without freight or impositions—both of which are sometimes 
recorded separately in the accounts.
Units of volume
Th e modern equivalents of the medieval units of volume used for the 
conversion to grams of silver per hectolitre are based on the data col-
lected by J.M. Verhoeff .15 Where Verhoeff  gives more than one inter-
pretation, the fi gure he notes as ‘anno 1572’ has been used. As Verhoeff  
explains in his introduction, almost all fi gures are based on late 18th-
century measurings; their reliability for the Middle Ages is therefore 
uncertain. Th e following units have been used:
Delft : 1 achtendeel of 34.6 litres;
 1 zak of 3 achtendeel or 103.8 litres;
 1 hoed of 32 achtendeel or 1107.2 litres.
Leiden: 1 achtendeel of 34.2 litres;
 1 zak of 2 achtendeel or 68.4 litres;
 1 hoed of 32 achtendeel or 1094.4 litres.
Haarlem: 1 achtendeel of 36.3 litres;
 1 hoed of 32 achtendeel or 1161.6 litres.
Currencies
In the accounts prices are in a variety of currencies, both Holland 
and foreign. Th ese have all been converted to the Holland groot as a 
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16 Th e standard work on monetary policy in this period is Grolle, Muntslag. For an 
older, shorter, but in some respects more illuminating survey: De Boer, Graaf en 
grafi ek, 176–187.
17 Grolle, Muntslag, 223.
18 De Boer, Graaf en grafi ek, 184.
19 Marsilje, Het fi nanciële beleid van Leiden, 214–222.
common denominator. Th e conversion of English, Flemish and Bra-
bant currencies to silver used in the calculations is mainly based on the 
nominal values of each of these currencies (for the sources see the 
footnotes in section 8.3). However, for Holland this was not an option. 
In the late 14th and early 15th century the value of Holland currency 
was extremely unstable: frequent depreciations alternated with drastic 
revaluations.16 Th e nominal rates of the consecutive issues of the groot 
collected by J.J. Grolle give the offi  cial value at the moments of revalu-
ation, but do not refl ect the very considerable changes during the peri-
ods of depreciation in between.17 Th erefore, in the calculations of the 
price of wheat in grams of silver per hectolitre until the year 1433/34 
the conversion of the groot into silver has been based on:
– Th e offi  cial rates given by Grolle for the moments of revaluation;
– In between, for the years for which prices are available: estimates 
based, if possible, on the changes in the exchange rate of the groot to 
the old French écu (oude schild) (indicated in italics in the table 
below). Th e exchange rates were taken from:
– Th e accounts of Egmond Abbey (published by Hof and origi-
nals) and the comital accounts (rates published by De Boer)18 for 
the years 1387/88 to 1391/92;
– Th e accounts of the Catharinagasthuis (rates published by 
J.W. Marsilje),19 with a few additions from the original accounts.
Th e French écu was a relatively stable golden coinage in common use 
in Holland; so were the English noble and the Rhineland guilder, but 
the accounts mention exchange rates to the French écu most frequently. 
When no exchange rates were available, the silver value of the groot has 
been estimated by interpolation; between 1430/31 and 1433/43 it has 
been kept constant because there was no relevant information 
available.
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Th is results in the following values of the Holland groot:
Year Silver value of 
Holland groot
Remarks Exchange rate of 
groot to old French 
écu

























1396–1397 1.04 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
45.5 (Cath.gh.)
1397–1398 1.04 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
45.5 (Cath.gh.)





1401–1402 0.80 nominal value aft er revaluation 
(Grolle)
50 (Cath.gh.; aft er 
revaluation)
1402–1403 0.80 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
50 (Cath.gh.)
1403–1404 0.80 as in 1402/03 50/52 (Cath.gh.)
1404–1405 0.75 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
50/57 (Cath.gh.)
1405–1406 0.59 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
67.5 (Cath.gh.)




1410–1411 0.82 as in 1411/12
1411–1412 0.82 nominal value aft er revaluation 




From 1434/35 onwards, that is aft er the unifi cation of the Flemish, 
Brabant and Holland currency by Duke Philip the Good, currency 
more or less stabilised. For these years the value of the groot has been 
based on the nominal values collected by Van der Wee and Aerts.20
Year Silver value of 
Holland groot
Remarks Exchange rate of 
groot to old French 
écu
1412–1413 0.82 as in 1411/12
1413–1414 0.82 as in 1411/12 45.5/52 (Cath.gh.)
1414–1415 0.72 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
52 (Cath.gh.)
1415–1416 0.72 as in 1414/15 52 (Cath.gh.)
1416–1417 0.66 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
56 (Cath.gh.)
1417–1418 0.66 as in 1416/17 56 (Cath.gh.)
1418–1419 0.59 interpolation
1419–1420 0.52 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
72 (Cath.gh.)
1420–1421 0.44 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
84 (Cath.gh.)
1421–1422 0.44 as in 1420/21
1422–1423 0.61 nominal value aft er revaluation 
(Grolle)
1423–1424 0.70 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
72 (Cath.gh.)




1426–1427 0.57 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
88 (Cath.gh.)
1427–1428 0.56 estimate based on rate to old 
French écu
90 (Cath.gh.)
1428–1429 0.56 as in 1427/28
1429–1430 0.75 nominal value aft er revaluation 
(Grolle)
1430–1431 0.75 as in 1429/30
1431–1432 0.75 as in 1429/30
1432–1433 0.75 as in 1429/30 67 (Cath.gh.)
1433–1434 0.75 as in 1429/30
20 Van der Wee and Aerts, ‘Vlaams-Brabantse muntgeschiedenis’, 85.
(Cont.)
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21 I am grateful to Chris Hanselaar, who allowed me to use the data for the grain 
purchases by Egmond Abbey that he collected from the Abbey’s archives.
22 Hof, Egmondse kloosterrekeningen, 48, 55, 101, 102, 132; Noord-Hollands Archief, 
Archief van de abdij van Egmond, inv. no. 798, f 82 and 91v.
Th e use of a method of conversion for the Holland currency that is 
diff erent from the methods used for the neighbouring regions has 
obvious disadvantages, but the alternative—using only nominal values 
in a situation of extreme instability—is even less attractive.
1.1 Egmond Abbey 1387/88–1391/9221
Sources
Wheat prices for the fi rst three years have been taken from the edition 
of the accounts (clearances between the abbot and his stewards) pub-
lished by J. Hof. Prices for the last two years have been collected from 
the original accounts.22 Th e abbot’s accounts between 1393 and 1403 
do not render any wheat prices; the accounts aft er 1403 have not been 
preserved.
Year of account
Th e year of account began and ended at St. Donatian (August 7) in the 
fi rst three years of the series and at St. Michael (September 29) at the 
last two years. Entries are usually dated.
Units
Purchases are noted per achtendeel (probably the Haarlem achtendeel 
of 36.3 litres) or per hoed of 32 achtendeel.
Currency
Prices in the accounts are in d, s and lb. comans payment (i.e.: lb. Holl. 
of 30 groten per lb.).
Location and sellers
When the location of the purchases is mentioned, it is usually Haarlem, 
once Alkmaar. In Haarlem the Abbey probably did business with a 
number of merchants, most frequently with a man named Claes 
Ketelaer.
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23 Posthumus, Nederlandse prijsgeschiedenis II, 445–457, column 160; Regionaal 
Archief Leiden, Archieven van de gasthuizen, inv. no. 334–342 to 334–345 (in the 
notes as RAL AG). Inv. no. 334–341 (the account over the year 1392/93) is not availa-
ble for study because of severe damage.
Volumes and frequency
Egmond Abbey bought on average 50 achtendeel of wheat per year, in 
two to three transactions.
Annual average wheat prices
Year  Price 
 Original Converted






1.2 Catharinagasthuis Leiden, 1392/93–1439/40
Sources
Th e Catharinagasthuis price series have been published by 
N.W. Posthumus. Th e published prices (all average annual prices) 
between 1394/95 and 1439/40 have been checked against the originals. 
Th e series continues till the late 18th century.23 Checking the original 
accounts has led to several corrections of and additions to the prices 
published by Posthumus. In the following cases the diff erence was 
more than 5%:
– 1401/02: in the course of this year a revaluation of the groot took 
place. Th e new groot was worth 33% more than the old groot. Instead 
of converting all prices to either the new or the old currency, 
Posthumus bases his annual average on a mix of both.
– 1404/05 and 1405/06: Posthumus has only prices for 1405/06. He 
obviously missed one account, which may have been due to the fact 
that the account over 1405/06 has been incorrectly identifi ed and 
marked as ‘1404’ by a modern archivist. However, the average given 
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by Posthumus for 1405/06 does not match the data from the origi-
nal accounts for 1404/05 or 1405/06. Th e reason is unclear.
– 1412/13 and 1413/14: for no apparent reason Posthumus gives no 
wheat prices for these years (although he does give them for the 
other grains).
– 1417/18 and 1420/21: the annual averages given by Posthumus are 
too low. He probably confused, at some point, groten and lichte 
groten, which can easily happen unless the price per unit is consist-
ently checked with the sum in d, s and lb. Th e value of the lichte 
groot is 2/3 of that of the (regular) groot.
– 1424/25 and 1425/26: the annual averages given by Posthumus are 
much too high. He probably did not realise that the leeuwen in these 
accounts had, from their previous value of 2 groot, by this time 
devaluated to 4/3 groot, although the accounts do state this new 
value quite clearly.
– 1432/33: the annual average given by Posthumus is too high. Partly 
this may be due to a mistaken identifi cation, in the case of a pur-
chase made in Delft , of the zak with the Leiden zak of 2 achtendeel 
instead of the Delft  zak of 3 achtendeel; the remainder of the diff er-
ence cannot be accounted for.
– 1434/35: the annual average given by Posthumus is far too high. 
Again this may partly be due to the failure to distinguish the Delft  
zak from the Leiden zak. In addition, in the course of this year 
Philip of Burgundy issued a new, unifi ed currency for the Low 
Countries. Th is implied a revaluation of the groot: the value of the 
new groot was 43% higher than that of the old groot. As in 1401/02, 
Posthumus probably did not convert all prices to either the old or 
the new groot, but based his annual average on a mix of both.
– 1435/36 and 1436/37: the annual average given by Posthumus is too 
high, probably due to the failure to distinguish the Delft  zak from 
the Leiden zak.
Year of account
Th e year of account began and ended at St. Peter ad Cathedram 
(February 22) or on the day before.
Units
Purchases are usually noted per achtendeel or per hoed of 32 achten-
deel. Th e achtendeel is normally the Leiden achtendeel of 34.2 litres, 
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but  for purchases made in Delft  (see below) it is probably the Delft  
achtendeel of 34.6 litres. Since the diff erence is small, it has been ignored 
here: all prices have been calculated on the basis of an achtendeel of 
34.2 litres. Some purchases at the end of the period were recorded per 
zak: in 1415/16 this is probably the Leiden zak of 2 achtendeel, but in 
1422, 1432/33 and 1435 it is most likely the Delft  zak of 3 achtendeel 
(judging from the location of the transaction and also from the price).
Currency
In the accounts prices per unit are in all kinds of currencies in com-
mon use: until 1410 usually in groten (of 8d), then mostly in botdragers 
(until 1416), lichte groten (until 1420), leeuwen (1421), botgens (until 
1423), again leeuwen (until 1425), tuinen (until 1427), then aft er a gap 
of fi ve years kromstaarten (1432 and 1433) and from 1434 onwards 
groten again. Th e totals are always in d, s and lb. Holl. (comans pay-
ment). All prices have been converted to groten (comans payment) per 
achtendeel (whereas Posthumus gives groten per zak of 2 achtendeel). 
In the years 1401/1402 and 1434/35 a revaluation took place in the 
course of the year; the accounts render the prices for the fi rst part of 
the year according to the old value of the groot and the prices for the 
second part of the year according to the new value. Here all prices in 
these years have been converted to the new value.
Location and sellers
Until the late 1420s almost all purchases were made in Leiden. Except 
in the few cases when wheat was bought on the weekly market (op die 
grote brugghe or op die marct), the hospital accounts almost always 
mention the sellers. In many cases they can be identifi ed as Leiden 
cornmongers and members of the Leiden elite; some of them were also 
members of the hospital board. Other merchants came from Gouda or 
Schoonhoven, or occasionally from the northern part of Holland. 
Aft er 1430 the hospital also purchased wheat from what were presum-
ably farmers from the villages of Poeldijk and Rijswijk in the wheat-
growing region west of Delft , or in the town of Delft  itself.
Volumes and frequency
In the 1390s the hospital on average bought 75 achtendeel of wheat per 
year; in the 1430s this had increased to over 300 achtendeel (100 hecto-
litres). In some years, for instance in the 1390s, in 1415/16 and in 
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1416/17, only a few wheat transactions have been recorded. In these 
cases a servant was regularly sent out to fetch small quantities of grain 
on credit; the bill, based on an average price over the entire period 
(‘overhoeft ’) was settled once or twice a year. In other years the number 
of transactions is much higher: in 1404/05 and 1405/06, for instance, 
12 purchases per year were recorded, in 1432/33 the total was 20 pur-
chases. Because the entries are usually not dated, it is not clear if wheat 
purchases were distributed evenly over the year.
Annual average wheat prices
Year  Price 
 Original Converted

































24 De Moor, Lonen en prijzen, 160–164, or http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/leeuwenhorst/
grainproducts.xls; Nationaal Archief, Archief Abdij van Leeuwenhorst, inv. nos. 18 to 
38 (in the notes as NA AAL).
Year  Price 
 Original Converted



















1.3 Leeuwenhorst Abbey, Noordwijkerhout, 
1410/11–1439/40
Sources
Th e price series of Leeuwenhorst Abbey have been published by 
Geertruida de Moor. Th ey are also available on the internet. Th e prices 
between 1410/11 and 1439/40 have been checked against the origi-
nals.24 Th e series continues until 1570/71. Checking the original 
accounts has led to several corrections of and additions to De Moor’s 
annual fi gures. In the following cases the diff erence was more than 5%:
– 1410/11 and 1412/13: for these years the accounts render the prices 
in licht geld. However, while for the years 1414/15 to 1418/19 
De Moor correctly converts all prices from licht geld to comans 
payment by multiplying with 2/3, she fails to do so for the years 
(Cont.)
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1410/11 tot 1412/13. Th erefore her annual averages for these two 
years are much too high.
– 1417/18, 1425/26, 1429/1430: De Moor’s annual averages are too 
high; the reason is unclear.
– 1430/31: De Moor’s annual average is too low: the reason is unclear.
– 1434/35: in the course of this year Philip of Burgundy issued a 
new, unifi ed currency for the Low Countries. Th is implied a revalu-
ation of the groot: the value of the new groot was 43% higher than 
that of the old one. Instead of converting all prices to either the new 
or the old currency, De Moor bases her annual average on a mix of 
both.
– 1437/38, 1438/39, 1439/40: De Moor’s annual averages bear no rela-
tion at all to the prices in the original accounts. Th e reason is most 
likely a copying or editing mistake: the fi gures for 1433/34 to 
1436/37 have mistakenly been noted a second time, for the years 
1437/38 to 1440/41. As a consequence, De Moor’s series completely 
miss the price peak in the years 1437/38 and 1438/39.
Year of account
Th e year of account began in August and ended in July.
Units
Purchases are usually noted per achtendeel or per hoed of 32 achten-
deel. Th e achtendeel is probably either the Leiden achtendeel of 34.2 
litres or the Delft  achtendeel of 34.6 litres. Since the diff erence small, 
it has been ignored here: all prices have been calculated on the basis 
of an achtendeel of 34.2 litres. Several purchases were recorded per zak, 
which is according to the accounts equal to 3 achtendeel.
Currency
In the accounts prices per unit are in all kinds of currencies: between 
1410/11 and 1420/21 in schellingen and denieren, from 1424/25 to 
1427/28 mainly in tuinen or leeuwen, in 1429/30 mostly in krom-
staarten and from 1430/31 onwards mainly in groten. Th e totals are 
always in d, s and lb Hollands; until 1418/19 these are in licht geld and 
from 1420/21 onwards in comans payment (the value of licht geld is 2/3 
of the value of comans payment). All prices have been converted to 
groten (comans payment) per achtendeel (whereas De Moor gives 
denieren per achtendeel).
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In the year 1434/35 a revaluation took place in the course of the 
year; the accounts render the prices for the fi rst part of the year accord-
ing to the old value of the groot and the prices for the second part of the 
year according to the new value. Here all prices in this year have been 
converted to the new value.
Location and sellers
Except for some of the purchases made at the weekly market in Delft  
or Leiden, the Abbey’s accounts almost always mention the sellers. 
Purchases were made from merchants in Leiden, Delft  and from sev-
eral villages in the region, occasionally from merchants from Gouda or 
from Th e Hague, and frequently from what were presumably farmers 
from the villages of Poeldijk, Wateringen, Maasland, Monster or De 
Lier in the wheat-growing region west of Delft . Some of these farmers 
were probably renting land from the Abbey.
Volumes and frequency
Leeuwenhorst Abbey bought between 800 and 1100 achtendeel per 
year at fi rst. Later the volumes were reduced to between 500 and 800. 
In all years several wheat transactions were recorded. Th e minimum is 
10 purchases (in 1425/26 and 1426/27), the maximum 45 purchases 
(in 1437/38). Until 1430/31 most entries are dated. Although wheat 
purchases took place throughout the year, most wheat was bought in 
autumn and winter.
Annual average wheat prices
Year Price original accounting year 
(August-July)
Price for accounting year of 
Catharinagasthuis (Feb 22-Feb 22)
Original 
(in groot per 
achtendeel)
Converted 
(in grams of silver 
per hectolitre)
Original 
(in groot per 
achtendeel)
Converted 
(in grams of silver 
per hectolitre)
1410–1411 10.2 24.38158 11.45 27.36952
1411–1412  8.2 19.60088
1412–1413 10.22 24.42939 10.24 24.47719
1413–1414 10.33 24.69232
1414–1415 10.09 21.10381 10.22 21.37571
1415–1416 10 20.91557
1416–1417 18.58 36.08533 17.77 34.51218
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2. Utrecht wheat prices
Sources
Large numbers of medieval Utrecht price data have been published 
by Posthumus. Here only two of the seven grain price series col-
lected  by Posthumus have been used. Th e most important is the 
wheat price series of the chapter of the Utrecht Dom, available (with 
several lacunae) from the year 1394 onward.25 At some point during 
the 13th century the Dom chapter began granting its canons a monthly 
Year Price original accounting year 
(August-July)
Price for accounting year of 
Catharinagasthuis (Feb 22-Feb 22)
Original 
(in groot per 
achtendeel)
Converted 
(in grams of silver 
per hectolitre)
Original 
(in groot per 
achtendeel)
Converted 
(in grams of silver 
per hectolitre)
1417–1418 11.48 22.29600 15.64 30.37538
1418–1419 15.69 27.08666 14.13 24.39353
1419–1420 14.57 22.00899




1424–1425 20.18 37.06305 19.76 36.29167
1425–1426 19.6 34.36154 20.2 35.41343
1426–1427 20.4 34.06100 19.57 32.67519
1427–1428 21.62 35.29581 22.57 36.84673
1428–1429 19.5 31.83480
1429–1430 14.61 32.03947 15.66 34.34211










25 Posthumus, Nederlandse prijsgeschiedenis II, 70 ff . column 28a.
(Cont.)
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26 Ibid.Nederlandse prijsgeschiedenis II, 41; cf. Sillem, ‘Tabellen van marktprijzen en 
granen te Utrecht’, 3–5, for a more detailed explanation of the origins of these taxa-
tiones bladorum.
27 Posthumus, Nederlandse prijsgeschiedenis II, 217 ff . column 89.
28 Ibid.Nederlandse prijsgeschiedenis II, 226.
29 For a—not always very clear—survey of Utrecht’s monetary history: Ibid., 12–30.
allowance in money instead of expecting them to join collective meals. 
In order to set the appropriate level of the allowance, monthly or 
weekly grain prices at the local market were systematically registered.26 
For the 15th century monthly prices are available for only a few years. 
However, the annual prices that have been based on the taxationes 
bladorum are available for much of the century, with some omissions 
for one to three years and a rather large gap between 1451 and 1459. 
Th ey can be considered reliable refl ections of the unweighted average 
annual wheat price in Utrecht.
Prices for the decades between 1370 and 1394 and for some lacunae 
in the early years the Dom chapter prices have been supplemented 
from the wheat price series of the chapter of St. John, which covers the 
years between 1370 and 1406.27 Information on the origin of these 
prices is more scarce, but Posthumus assumes St. John’s used a method 
similar to the Dom chapter.28 Th e other price series either begin (much) 
later or are based on less reliable sources and have therefore not been 
used.
Year of accounting
Th e Utrecht year of accounting begins and ends at St. Remigius 
(October 1).
Unit of volume
Th e unit of volume used in the Utrecht series is the modius or mud, 
which equals 120.4 litres.
Currency
Utrecht had its own currency, which was originally closely linked to 
Rhineland coinage; from the 14th century onwards the infl uence of 
monetary developments in Holland on Utrecht currency continued to 
grow. Th e value of the Utrecht currency depreciated rapidly from the 
early 15th century onwards.29 Th e basic unit of the Utrecht currency 
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30 Spuff ord, ‘Currency exchanges (from Handbook of medieval exchange)’.
31 Posthumus, Nederlandse prijsgeschiedenis II, 23–27.
32 Metz, Geld, Währung und Preisentwicklung, 345.
was at fi rst the plak, aft er 1390 the albus or witte, and from 1466 
onwards the stuiver of 12 albi. Each of the Dom chapters used their 
own currency of accounting, but in his edition of Utrecht prices 
Posthumus converted all prices to plakken, albi and stuivers.
Th ese prices have been converted to grams of silver as follows. 
According to the exchange rates of the Utrecht currency to the Rhine-
land guilder published by Peter Spuff ord, prices have fi rst been con-
verted to Rhineland guilders, with some interpolations to fi ll in the gaps 
(in italics in the table below). Spuff ord based these rates on the data 
collected by Ten Haeff  and Enno van Gelder from the accounts of the 
construction of the Utrecht Dom church.30 Since these accounts begin 
in 1395, no exchange rates are available before that year. As a conse-
quence, for the years 1387 to 1394 the value of the plak/albus had to be 
extrapolated with the aid of the changing exchange rates to the French 
écu collected by Posthumus (also in italics in the table).31 Subsequently 
all prices in Rhineland guilders have been converted to prices in grams 
of silver with the aid of the offi  cial silver values of the Rhineland guil-
der published by Rainer Metz, collected from the ordinances.32 Metz 
also collected very detailed data on the actual silver content of the 
Cologne albus and its (changing) rate to the Rhineland guilder, but 
although this method no doubt off ers a much better approximation of 
the actual value of the Rhineland guilder in Cologne, it is not at all 
certain that it refl ects the value of the Rhineland guilder in Utrecht 
with the same accuracy. Th erefore this dataset has not been used here.
Silver value of the Utrecht albus and average annual wheat prices
Year Silver value of Utrecht 
albus (in italics: intra- 
and extrapolations)
Original wheat price 
(in plakken (until 1390) 
or albi (aft er 1390) 
per modius)
Converted wheat 
price (in grams of 
silver per hectolitre)
1387/88 1.05404 38.00 33.26699
1388/89 0.92755 35.15 27.07933
1389/90 0.82817 27.27 18.75771
1390/91 0.77296 32.67 20.97396
1391/92 0.77296 43.00 27.60577
(Continued)
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Year Silver value of Utrecht 
albus (in italics: intra- 
and extrapolations)
Original wheat price 
(in plakken (until 1390) 
or albi (aft er 1390) 
per modius)
Converted wheat 
price (in grams of 
silver per hectolitre)
1392/93 0.71350 32.87 19.47910
1393/94 0.71350 43 25.09615
1394/95 0.70269 40.07 23.38611
1395/96 0.70269 54.6 31.86628
1396/97 0.70269 62 36.18515
1397/98 0.70269 46 26.84705
1398/99 0.68481 40 22.75109
1399/1400 0.69824 56 32.47606
1400/01 0.69824 65 37.69543
1401/02 0.69824 72 41.75493
1402/03 0.65944 74.5 40.80449
1403/04 0.64037 42.5 22.60444
1404/05 0.62873 51.78 27.03945
1405/06 0.62873 51.88 27.09167
1406/07 0.62873 66.67 34.81499
1407/08 0.62873 80.88 42.23543
1408/09 0.62306 99.03 51.24745
1409/10 0.62306 80.25 41.52891
1410/11 0.62306 54.56 28.23449
1411/12 0.62306 58.5 30.27341
1412/13 0.61750 67.63 34.68565
1413/14 0.61750 63.88 32.76238
1414/15 0.57633 58 27.76357
1415/16 0.57633 54.56 26.11690
1416/17 0.50267 90.75 37.88787
1417/18 0.46400 56.63 21.82419
1418/19 0.44031 65.13 23.81831
1419/20 0.46561 56.63 21.89973
1420/21 0.46561
1421/22 0.46561 130.5 50.46644
1422/23 0.46561 80 30.93728
1423/24 0.41527 91.5 31.55916
1424/25 0.37938 106.38 33.52054
1425/26 0.36583
1426/27 0.34920 135.88 39.41023
1427/28 0.32691 164.5 44.66570
1428/29 0.25608 159.5 33.92466
1429/30 0.22763 147 27.79199








Archief Graven van Holland (AGH)
• Memoriale BD, 1390–1397, inv. no. 198;
• Memoriale BF, 1407–1408, inv. no. 203;
•  Register OR van akten van hertog Willem V inzake Holland, Zeeland en 
Henegouwen, 1346–1348, inv. no. 220;
• Register V van akten van hertog Albrecht, 1391–1402, inv. no. 228;
• Register EL 21, c. 1369, inv. no. 676;
•  Memorie door de steden Delft , Leiden, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Schiedam c.s. 
inzake de stapel van Haarlem, inv. no. 969;
•  Trezorier: inv. nos. 1236 (account over the years 1380–1382), 1247 (account over the 
years 1392–1394), 1267 (account over the year 1413/1414).
•  Rentmeester en baljuw van Amstelland, Waterland en Zeevang: inv. nos. 1659 
(account over the year 1346/1347) to 1679 (account over the year 1375);
•  Rentmeester van Kennemerland en Friesland: inv. nos. 1553 (account over the year 
1367/1368) to 1577 (account over the year 1404/1405), 1583 (account over the year 
1410/1411), 1588 (account over the year 1415/1416), 1593 (account over the year 
1420/1421) and 1599 (account over the year 1425/1426);
•  Rentmeester van Gouda, Schoonhoven en het land van Stein: inv. no. 1766 (account 
over the year 1398/1399).
Archief Graven van Blois (AGB):
•  Baljuw en rentmeester van Beverwijk en Noordwijk: inv. no. 267 (account over the 
year 1379/1380), inv. no. 284 (account over the year 1395/1396);
•  Gaarder van de markttollen te Haarlem (account over the year 1374–1393): inv. nos. 
523–534.
Archief Grafelijkheidsrekenkamer of Rekenkamer der Domeinen van 
Holland: Afgehoorde en gedeponeerde rekeningen, (1425) 1446–1728 
(1793) (GRRek)
•  A. Rekeningen rentmeesters-generaal, inv. nos. 150 (account over the year 1450/
1451), 151 (account over the year 1451/1452), 196 (account over the year 1500);
• B. Domeinen:
•  I. Noordholland: inv. nos. 283 (account over the year 1449/1450), 334 (account 
over the year 1500);
•  II.Zuidholland: inv. nos. 556 (account over the year 1450/1451), 557 (account 
over the year 1451/1452), 597 (account over the year 1500);
•  III. Kennemerland en West-Friesland: inv. nos. 859 (account over the year 
1428/1429), 880 (account over the year 1449/1451), 881 (account over the year 
1450/1451), 927 (account over the year 1500);
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•  IV: West-Friesland: inv. no. 1129 (account over the year 1500);
•  VI: Voorne: inv. nos. 5593 (account over the year 1455), 5594 (account over the 
year 1455/1456), 3351 (account over the year 1499/1500);
•  VIII: Gouda, Schoonhoven en ’t land van Stein: inv. nos. 1706 (account over the 
year 1446/1447), 1707 (account over the year 1447/1448), 1708 (account over the 
year 1448/1449), 1743 (account over the year 1500);
•  IX: Woerden: inv. nos. 1851 (account over the year 1448/1449), 1852 (account 
over the year 1449/1450), 1901 (account over the year 1499), 1902 (account over 
the year 1500);
•  XII: Arkel, Van der Leede en Schoonrewoerd: inv. nos. 2171 (account over the 
year 1450/1451), 2235 (account over the year 1500);
• XIII: Schoonhoven: inv. no. 2348 (account over the year 1500);
• XV: Putten: inv. no. 2471 (account over the year 1500);
• XVI: Strijen: inv. no. 2576 (account over the year 1500);
•  XVIII: Heusden: inv. nos. 2713 (account over the year 1450), 2761 (account over 
the year 1500);
•  XIX: Beverwijk en Noordwijk: inv. no. 2869 (account over the year 1455/1456);
•  XV: Amstelland, Waterland en Zeevang: inv. nos. 2904 (account over the year 
1449/1450), 2951 (account over the year 1500);
•  XXI: Muiden en Gooiland: inv. nos. 3045 (account over the year 1448/1449), 3077 
(account over the year 1500);
•  XXII: Texel en Wieringen: inv. nos. 3163 (account over the year 1454/1456), 3182 
(account over the years 1497–1500)
Archief van de Leenhoven en Leen- en Registratiekamer van Holland, 
1520–1807 (LLRK)
Index van mr. Martinus Gousset op registers van de graven van Holland over de peri-
ode 1316–1440, inv. nos. 203 to 232.
Archief Abdij van Leeuwenhorst (NA AAL)
Afgehoorde rekeningen, inv. nos. 18 to 38 (accounts over the years 1410/11 to 1439/40).
Archief Familie van Wassenaer van Duvenvoorde, 1226–1996
Vismarkt, hofvis en pondgeld, inv. nos. 2632 to 2646.
Noord-Hollands archief
Archief Stads- en gemeentebestuur van Beverwijk (Gemeente 
Beverwijk), 1298–1817 (ASGB)
Akte waarbij Karel V onder bepaalde voorwaarden aan de stad toestaat om de jaar-
lijkse leermarkt in plaats van op Scheiding der Apostelen (15 juli) op Beloken Paasavond 
(de zaterdag na Pasen) tot de zaterdag daaropvolgende te mogen houden, inv. no. 40.
Stadsbestuur van Haarlem (stadsarchief van Haarlem)
•  Memorie van gedeputeerden van de Hollandse steden en dorpen voor commissar-
issen vanwege de landsheer, waarbij tegen de Naardense visstapel wordt geprotes-
teerd, 1457, inv. no. 81
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•  Akten van vrijgeleide voor de bezoekers van de Lucasmarkt te Haarlem (1474, 1492, 
1495, 1507), inv. nos. 666 to 669.
Regionaal Archief Alkmaar
Archief Abdij van Egmond
Verrekeningen tussen abt Jan de Weent en de rentmeesters, 1388–1403, inv. no. 798.
Gemeentebestuur Schoorl (oud archief, 1507–1513)
Registers van privileges, 1148–1492, inv. no. 15.
Gemeentebestuur Alkmaar (oud archief, 1325–1815)
• Stukken betreff ende de rechten van Alkmaar inzake de Schoorlse jaarmarkten, 
1623–1625, inv. no. 2318;
• Plakkaat van de stadhouder en raden van Holland betreff ende het opkopen van 
boter, kaas, pluimvee en andere eetbare waren, 23 januari 1556, inv. no. 2877.
Regionaal Archief Leiden (RAL)
Archieven van de gasthuizen (AG)
Sint Catharinagasthuis, Rekeningen van de gasthuismeesters, inv. no. 334, vols. 2 to 45 
(accounts over the years 1394/95 to 1439/40).
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